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 4 
Introduction 
 
Statehood matters in development cooperation, and so does state fragility. The 
provision of financial aid by states or international organizations to developing 
countries depends on two basic conditions: a state must exist, and it needs an 
authorized and competent government. International organizations require 
government counterparts with the capacity to express consent and to legally commit a 
country. The transfer of financial aid is contingent on national governments having 
the capacity to meet specific requirements and to assume responsibility in the 
development process. In the large number of fragile states that are characterized by 
weak institutions and poor governance, the lack of a government with both legal and 
factual capacity can thus significantly complicate, delay, and even prevent 
development cooperation – in places with the most urgent needs.1 
When South Sudan became the world’s youngest state in July 2011, the country 
had some of the world’s lowest development indicators: half of the population had no 
access to drinking water, and chances of dying in child birth were higher than 
completing school for 15-year-old girls.2 International development organizations like 
the World Bank sought to assist in building the new state from scratch.3 To ensure 
that its resources were used effectively and meet development objectives, however, 
the World Bank also insisted that the nascent government fulfills largely the same 
bulk of requirements as any other state requesting financing.4 With few institutions 
actually in place and functioning, South Sudan was expected to have a reasonably 
effective public financial management system, a national framework for the 
attainment of environmental and social standards, and of course the ability to plan and 
                                                        
1 There is no agreed definition of fragile states. A typical example and frequent reference is the 
definition of the OECD: “A fragile region or state has weak capacity to carry out basic governance 
functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society.” OECD, 
'Fragile States 2013. Resource Flows and Trends in a Shifting World ' (2013), 15. In its “Harmonized 
List of Fragile Situations” for 2015-2016, the World Bank counts 34 countries and one territory (the 
West Bank & Gaza) as fragile. See online: 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/pubdocs/publicdoc/2015/7/700521437416355449/FCSlist-FY16-Final-
712015.pdf (accessed August 2015). For more on the definition of fragile states, see chapter I.1. 
2 THE WORLD BANK, 'South Sudan - Interim Strategy Note for FY2013-2014' (2013), paras. 17-22. 
3 I refer to international development organizations as international organizations that provide Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), which includes organizations that do not have an exclusive 
development mandate, such as the European Union. On the definition of ODA, see infra note 51. 
4 E.g. GREG LARSON, et al., Harvard Center for International Development (CID) Working Paper No. 
268, 'South Sudan’s Capability Trap: Building a State with Disruptive Innovation' (October 2013), 29, 
criticizing the World Bank’s unrealistic fiduciary and contracting requirements under the Multi-Donor 
Trust Fund for South Sudan. 
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implement development projects. In short: Before the World Bank assists in building 
state institutions, it requires a certain level of institutional capacity on the part of the 
state. 
South Sudan is not the only example where the discrepancy between a state’s 
formal legal status and its actual capacity complicated development cooperation in 
manifold ways. Most post-conflict countries like Kosovo, East-Timor, Afghanistan, 
and Iraq, went through a period where an official government had yet to emerge and 
develop the type of institutions and administrative capacity that are usually 
prerequisites for the transfer of financial aid. Somalia had no functioning government 
for a period of twelve years – and thus no entity authorized to even request assistance 
from the African Development Bank, or ratify the Cotonou Agreement, the basis for 
aid from the European Union.5  
Looking at development cooperation with fragile states, a problem thus becomes 
concrete that goes to the heart of international law. Public international law knows 
only states and non-states, and operates on the formal premise that all states have an 
‘effective government’. 6  This formal premise does not correspond to a reality in 
which many entities with the legal status of states are actually unable to fulfill even 
most basic functions. The counterfactual nature of juridical statehood and the 
principle of sovereign equality thus mask a fundamental problem that state fragility 
can pose to the functioning and effectiveness of the international legal order. It 
crucially depends on the existence of states and governments with the minimum level 
of institutional and administrative capacity necessary to exercise rights and 
obligations, and to partake in international cooperation.  
While international law has principally remained blind to the actual differences 
between equal sovereigns, this thesis demonstrates that international development 
organizations, which operate on its premise and within its confines, have not. 
Arguably, development cooperation has always been concerned with strengthening 
the effectiveness of government (and governance) in recipient countries.7 As subjects 
                                                        
5 In contrast, Somaliland, an autonomous region within Somalia claiming independence, has 
established a government determined to lead its own development. Not being recognized as 
independent state, Somaliland could nevertheless receive no direct support from international 
development organizations. 
6 The existence of an effective government is the central, defining criterion of statehood under 
international law. JAMES CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd Edition 
(Clarendon Press, 2007), 42; and infra chapter I.3 a). 
7 The emphasis on the role of the state in development cooperation has been varying since the 1950s. 
For an overview, see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, State-Building. Governance and World Order in the 21st 
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of international law, however, development organizations also operate on the basis of 
rules that presuppose the existence of an effective government. The lack of a 
government with both legal and factual capacity can thus stand in the way of assisting 
fragile states and their populations – a problem that has attracted increasing attention 
since latent fragmentation and overt crises in fragile states have become a key concern 
for the international donor community.  
In this thesis, I argue that international development organizations have therefore 
adapted rules that govern the provision of development aid, adapted to reflect the lack 
or severe limitation of government effectiveness in fragile states. By analyzing the 
mostly internal rule-making activities of the World Bank and a range of regional 
organizations in comparison, I show how a differentiated approach to dealing with 
fragile states has been implemented in the law of development cooperation – with 
significant effects on the rights and obligations accorded to fragile states in the 
development process.8 Exploring the case of international development organizations 
holds a broader relevance. It proves how in the actual practice of international 
cooperation, state fragility has triggered a legal response – with all the potentials and 
perils involved where international organizations address a problem that based on the 
principle of sovereign equality, international law deliberately neglects. 
 
1. Objectives and Significance 
 
This thesis was born out of the observation that fragile states are a phenomenon 
beyond law, but how international development organizations have addressed the 
challenges of engaging with fragile states may well be of legal significance. There is a 
large gap between the positivist assertion that variations of government effectiveness 
have no bearing under international law, and an often messy reality in which 
international organizations seek to respond to the practical and legal challenges of 
engaging with countries that have very weak or no government. The ensuing response 
of international development organizations should interest legal scholars, because it 
involves the use of formal and informal legal instruments and concerns the rights and 
obligations accorded to fragile states. At the same time, in the practice of 
                                                                                                                                                              
Century (Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 1-42, and the references provided in infra note 283. I 
describe the state-centric paradigm of development cooperation in infra chapter II.2 a). 
8 On the law of development cooperation as defined by Dann, see infra note 51. 
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development cooperation, the legal dimension of the challenges of dealing with 
fragile states is often not fully considered. A general understanding of the regulatory 
approaches and instruments that different organizations have used, or could use, to 
better address these challenges is missing.  
Accordingly, this thesis pursues three main objectives. The first objective is to shed 
light on a phenomenon that has largely escaped the grasp of legal scholars, although 
(or because) it concerns international law’s very foundations. 9  International law 
defines the state as a constant, not a variable. It is concerned with the effectiveness of 
governments when considering the emergence and discontinuity of states, but not 
with the evolution of their effectiveness.10 The counterfactual nature of international 
law’s conception of statehood and sovereignty serve an important purpose: to prevent 
material inequality and factual power discrepancies from translating into law, and 
hence to protect national autonomy and self-determination. 11  State fragility may 
therefore be an empirical phenomenon, but it is deliberately no legal concept.  
Yet, the discrepancy between the formal legal status of a state and its factual 
capacity – between juridical statehood and empirical statehood – undoubtedly poses a 
problem to the decentralized international legal order.12 It relies on states having the 
capacity to exercise rights and obligations, and to implement international law 
domestically.13 In essence, international law does not only presume, but also require 
                                                        
9 A limited number of articles and books deal with the phenomenon of state failure from a legal 
perspective, mostly with a focus on the complete breakdown of government. See, for instance, the early 
study of DANIEL THÜRER, 'Der Wegfall effektiver Staatsgewalt: "The failed state"', 34 Berichte der 
Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht, 9 (1996); Geiß’ monograph ROBIN GEIß, Failed States. Die 
normative Erfassung gescheiterter Staaten (Duncker & Humblot, 2005); and in English, RIKKA 
KOSKENMÄKI, 'Legal Implications Resulting from State Failure in Light of the Case of Somalia', 73 
Nordic Journal of International Law, 1 (2004); and CHIARA GIORGETTI, A Principled Approach to 
State Failure. International Community Actions in Emergency Situations (Brill, 2010). For a review of 
the relevant literature, see MARIE VON ENGELHARDT, 'Die Völkerrechtswissenschaft und der Umgang 
mit Failed States. Zwischen Empirie, Dogmatik und postkolonialer Theorie', 2 Verfassung und Recht in 
Übersee, 222 (2012); and infra chapter I.3 a). 
10 CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, Part 1; GERARD KREIJEN, State Failure, 
Sovereignty and Effectiveness. Legal Lessons from the Decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa (Nijhoff, 
2004), chapter 4. 
11 MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, 'The Wonderful Artificiality of States', 88 Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting (American Society of International Law), 22 (1994). 
12 The terms “juridical statehood” and “empirical statehood” were coined by International Relations 
scholars Jackson and Rosberg in their influential work on “quasi-states”. See ROBERT H. JACKSON & 
CARL G. ROSBERG, 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood', 
35 World Politics, 1 (1982). 
13 E.g. JONATHAN E. HENDRIX, 'Law Without State: The Collapsed State Challenge to Traditional 
International Enforcement', 24 Wisconsin International Law Journal, 587 (2006). For further 
references, see infra note 189. 
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states with an effective government, which thus becomes a precondition for the 
functioning and effectiveness of in fact all international legal regimes.  
While the ensuing problems are widely acknowledged, international legal 
scholarship has generally limited itself to studying the legal consequences of a 
complete breakdown of government, like in Somalia.14 In contrast, the phenomenon 
of state fragility, which encompasses effectiveness deficits that fall short of a 
complete government breakdown, is certainly more difficult to grasp. Fragile states, 
however, can equally challenge the functioning and effectiveness of legal regimes, if 
they lack the capacity to participate in intergovernmental fora of decision-making, to 
comply with an increasing reach and depth of international regulation, and to give real 
effect to the commitments they enter into.15  At the same time, with some 30-50 
countries considered as fragile, state fragility has far more real world significance 
than rare incidents of state collapse.16  
This thesis therefore aims to illustrate the concrete challenges that dealing with 
fragile states poses to the subjects of a state-centric international legal order, and to 
the functioning of international legal regimes. By analyzing the regulatory activity of 
international development organizations, I seek to highlight that such challenges are 
already being addressed in practice – and not just ad hoc, but involving the use of 
formal and informal legal rules to consolidate and formalize a differentiated approach 
to dealing with fragile states. Ultimately, a look at the actual position that fragile 
states are accorded could yield more shades of gray than the formal conception of 
sovereign statehood – the neat picture of internal authority and external equality – 
suggests.17 As Joseph Weiler already hypothesized: “the international community and 
                                                        
14 Supra note 9. Also CHIARA GIORGETTI, 'International Norms and Standards Applicable to Situations 
of State Fragility and Failure: An Overview', in Hassane Cissé, et al. (eds), The World Bank Legal 
Review. Volume 3. International Financial Institutions and Global Legal Governance (The World 
Bank, 2012), 264: “A rigorous analysis of the legal implications, significance, and consequences of 
state fragility is – despite its importance – missing.” 
15 Stefan Oeter therefore calls on international legal scholars to devote more attention to the study of 
“precarious statehood”. STEFAN OETER, 'Regieren im 21. Jahrhundert: Staatlichkeit und internationales 
System', in Stefani Weiss & Joscha Schmierer (eds), Prekäre Staatlichkeit und Internationale Ordnung 
(Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 81-83. For a broader look at variations of state effectiveness 
and the consequences of inherent weakness, see also KREIJEN, State Failure, Sovereignty and 
Effectiveness. Legal Lessons from the Decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
16 The number of countries designated as fragile depends on what criteria and methodology are used. A 
common reference point is the World Bank’s “Harmonized List of Fragile Situations” (supra note 1). 
The OECD used to add countries that are also included in the Fragile States Index of the Fund for 
Peace, available online at http://fsi.fundforpeace.org (accessed August 2015). 
17 To be sure, unlike the legal status of statehood, the “the extent of powers, rights and responsibilities 
of any entity is to be determined only by examination of its actual position” – and may well be a matter 
of degree. CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, 44. 
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international law in certain circumstances contemplate an evolving legal reality of 
statehood”.18 
To existing legal scholarship on statehood and state ‘failure’, this thesis thus adds 
in multiple ways. I first extend the scope of analysis from rare incidents of complete 
government breakdown, and provide a more nuanced doctrinal understanding of the 
broader spectrum of limited government effectiveness. By putting the focus on the 
concrete challenges associated with dealing with fragile states, I move beyond the 
often abstract and isolated engagement of legal scholars with the meaning of state 
failure, or its consequences for the application of established legal concepts. Perhaps 
most importantly, I demonstrate the need for legal scholars to analyze what position 
fragile states are accorded by other legal subjects, in different legal regimes – and 
therefore to consider rules that may not always form part of the traditional sources of 
international law, but can nonetheless have significant effects on the countries 
concerned. 
This thesis is not only about fragile states, however, but about development 
cooperation with fragile states. After all, it is in the practice of development 
cooperation with fragile states that the discrepancy between juridical statehood and 
empirical statehood comes to bear, with potentially severe consequences. It is in 
development cooperation that the question of how to deal with countries that have the 
legal status of states, but very weak factual capacities, is of particular practical 
relevance. And, importantly, it is here where we observe how international 
organizations have sought to address the challenges of engaging with fragile states in 
an increasingly systematic and formalized way, adapting rules that inform the 
allocation, planning, and implementation of aid. 
My second objective is therefore to highlight an important, legal dimension to the 
challenges of aiding fragile states, which has so far received little attention in the 
relevant academic or policy-oriented literature.19 Traditional development cooperation 
                                                        
18 JOSEPH H. H. WEILER, 'Editorial. Differentiated Statehood? 'Pre-States'? Palestine@the UN', 24 
European Journal of International Law, 1 (2013), 5.  
19 There is a vast literature on the characteristics of fragile states, the challenges of development 
cooperation with fragile states, and the consequences for development policy-making. For a 
preliminary overview of the relevant literature, see, for instance, LARS ENGBERG-PEDERSEN, et al., 
Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Report 9, 'Fragile Situations. Current Debates and 
Central Dilemmas' (2008); CLAIRE  MCLOUGHLIN, Governance and Social Development (GSD) 
Resource Center, 'Topic Guide on Fragile States' (2010); and with a focus on the emerging policy 
response of donor states and organizations, the special issue of Conflict Security & Development, Vol. 
12, Issue 5, 2012. In detail, see infra chapters I.2 b) and II.2. 
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is state-centric: it primarily consists of an intergovernmental process, whereby donor 
states or international organizations provide financial and technical assistance to 
recipient states. 20  Counterparts in recipient states are thus national governments, 
which are expected to take the lead and ‘own’ the development process.21 For based 
on the current aid orthodoxy, not only a certain level of institutional capacity and 
good governance on the parts of recipient countries, but also commitment to assume 
ownership are generally seen as preconditions for aid to be effective. 22  Such 
conditions are often not met in the weak-capacity, conflict-affected and politically 
charged environments associated with fragile states.  
While there is a vast literature on the factors that make aiding fragile states 
challenging, 23  one basic dimension has often been overlooked in the academic 
discourse, or perhaps taken for granted.24  International development organizations 
must treat recipient countries as legal sovereigns: They need a government 
counterpart that can formally request their engagement, and negotiate and sign the 
international legal agreements on the basis of which they provide assistance. 25 
Moreover, development organizations operate on the basis of a legal agreement 
                                                        
20 I thus consider only the provision of ODA by governments or international organizations, and not 
assistance provided by non-public entities such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), or 
private businesses. On the definition of ODA and the understanding of development cooperation 
underlying this thesis, see infra note 51. 
21 The principle of ownership is most prominently captured in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness of March 2005 (hereinafter Paris Declaration), in which donors committed to basic 
principles to improve the quality and effectiveness of aid, including ownership of developing countries 
and alignment of donors behind their objectives. In detail, see infra chapter II.2 a).  
22 Burnside and Dollar prominently argue that there is a positive correlation between sound institutions 
and economic growth: C. BURNSIDE & D. DOLLAR, 'Aid, Policies, and Growth', 90 American Economic 
Review, 847 (2000). Although their findings have been challenged (infra note 287), there is a 
perceptible trend in the practice of development cooperation towards supporting states that have an 
institutional structure capable of absorbing and implementing aid, and that are committed to good 
governance.  
23 E.g. PAUL COLLIER, The Bottom Billion. Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be 
Done About It (Oxford University Press, 2007); from a policy-oriented perspective, MICHAEL 
ANDERSON & MAGÜI MORENO TORRES, UK Department for International Development, PDRE 
Working Paper 1, 'Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction' (August 
2004); and with examples of the dilemmas facing external actors, TOBIAS DEBIEL, et al., Development 
and Peace Foundation, Policy Paper 23, 'Between Ignorance and Intervention. Strategies and 
Dilemmas of External Actors in Fragile States' (2005).  
24 I am aware only of one brief discussion in JOANNA MACRAE, et al., Overseas Development Institute, 
'Aid to 'Poorly Performing’ Countries: A Critical Review of Debates and Issues' (July 2004), at pp. 43-
45. 
25 As international legal subjects, international organizations are bound to respect customary principles 
of international law, including the fundamental principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the UN 
Charter, Article 2 (1). See, for instance, DANIEL BRADLOW, 'International Law and the Operations of 
the International Financial Institutions', in Daniel Bradlow & David Hunter (eds), International 
Financial Institutions and International Law (Kluwer, 2010), at 11-25; and in more detail, PHILIPP 
DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and 
Germany (Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 238-258. 
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themselves, the founding treaty, which determines for what purposes and under what 
conditions they can engage with a country. Most organizations are thus bound to 
ensure that the resources they provide are used effectively and support development 
objectives. 26  They hence establish an array of substantive and procedural 
requirements that recipient governments must meet in order to receive aid – which 
demands a certain level of institutional and administrative capacity. 27  Even aid 
orthodoxies like the ownership principle are regularly incorporated in the rules that 
guide the conduct of international development organizations, which are committed to 
accord a decisive role to recipient governments in the development process.28  
Accordingly, not alone factors like insecurity, weak capacity, or poor governance 
make fragile states a particularly challenging environment for development 
cooperation.29 Rather, an intricate blend of technical considerations, political concerns, 
and legal issues come together. For international development organizations are 
concerned with strengthening the effectiveness of governments in developing 
countries, but they equally operate on the basis of rules that presume the existence of 
effective government counterparts.30 It is those rules that can significantly complicate, 
delay, or even prevent development assistance in the absence of a government with 
legal and basic factual capacity – eventually depriving a population of urgently 
needed assistance. After all, fragile states lag far behind other countries in achieving 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).31 How do development organizations 
engage in situations where no official government exists? How do they assist 
countries that lack the minimum capacity required to qualify for aid, let alone to 
assume ownership of the development process? And how do they ensure that aid is 
nonetheless effective?  
                                                        
26 In detail, see infra chapter III.2; or DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative 
Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, 284-295.  
27 I provide examples of such requirements in infra chapter II.2 a), and elaborate their legal nature and 
effects in infra chapter III.2. 
28 DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU 
and Germany, 241-244; PHILIPP DANN & JULIA SATTELBERGER, 'Verrechtlichung in der 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit: Zur normativen Verdichtung des Prinzips der Eigenverantwortung', in 
Aram Ziai (ed) Im Westen nichts Neues? Stand und Perspektiven der Entwicklungstheorie (Nomos, 
2014). 
29 Such factors are well researched (supra note 23). 
30 In contrast to international law, where it is not clear what precisely the ‘effective government’ 
criterion requires, the level of capacities and type of institutions required from recipient governments in 
development cooperation is more defined – and more demanding. For a discussion of what effective 
government entails for international development organizations, see infra chapter II.2 a). 
31 OECD, 'Fragile States 2014. Domestic Revenue Mobilization in Fragile States' (2014), 18. 
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This thesis provides an analysis of how international development organizations 
have sought to overcome the constraints posed by their legal and policy frameworks 
when dealing with countries that have very weak or no government. I seek to show 
how a variety of organizations have adopted or modified mostly internal rules that 
regulate the design, management, and delivery of development assistance based on 
their legal mandates, but also the rights and obligations that are normally accorded to 
recipient governments. More precisely, I compare the rule-making processes and 
outcomes of the World Bank,32 the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), and the European Union (EU), with the aim of identifying 
the commonalities and differences in the way they deal with fragile states.  
Such an analysis is not merely a scholarly endeavor, but holds considerable 
practical relevance. At a time where development organizations invest a significant 
amount of research and resources into finding a response to the challenges of aiding 
fragile states,33 this thesis offers a more complete account of the nature of these 
challenges, and provides an inventory of different approaches that have been 
developed in response. After all, the surge of legal and policy reforms through which 
international development organizations have sought to enhance engagement with 
fragile states suggests that there is a clear demand for more appropriate rules – rules 
that provide guidance, but are flexible enough to take into account different country 
circumstances, for instance.34 Besides, current poverty projections suggest that the 
question how to design an appropriate regulatory framework for aiding fragile states 
will remain of practical concern to international development organizations for 
decades to come. By 2015, half of the world’s poor living of less than USD 1.25 a day 
will already be in fragile states, and this concentration of poverty is expected to 
continue.35 
                                                        
32 ‘World Bank’ in this thesis denotes the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). I use the term ‘World Bank’ and ‘Bank’ 
interchangeably.  
33 The amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA) going to fragile and conflict-affected states 
has more than doubled between 2000 and 2010. OECD, 'Fragile States 2013. Resource Flows and 
Trends in a Shifting World', Figure 2.1 (p. 50).  
34 ANNE-MARIE LEROY, 'The Bank's Engagement in the Criminal Justice Sector and the Role of 
Lawyers in the "Solutions Bank": An Essay', in Legal Vice Presidency (ed) Annual Report FY 2013. 
The World Bank’s Engagement in the Criminal Justice Sector and the Role of Lawyers in the 
“Solutions Bank” (The World Bank 2013). 
35 OECD, 'Ensuring Fragile States Are Not Left Behind. 2013 Factsheet on Resource Flows and 
Trends' (2013); and the projection of HOMI KHARAS & ANDREW ROGERSON, Overseas Development 
Institute, 'Horizon 2025. Creative Destruction in the Aid Industry' (2012), chapter 2.  
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Finally, there is one more reason why the regulatory activities of international 
development organizations concerning fragile states warrant our attention – and 
critical scrutiny. As I will demonstrate, international development organizations 
respond to the challenges of engaging with fragile states not only ad hoc, but adapt 
their legal and policy frameworks, and hence seek a more formalized response. This is 
remarkable, considering that some of these challenges go back to the ‘effective 
government’ premise that lies at the heart of the state-centric international legal order. 
International law may acquiesce to a government’s loss of effectiveness until it is 
merely fictitious – for the sake of legal certainty, or the protection of national 
autonomy.36  Upholding such a legal fiction does not, however, solve the various 
problems that the discrepancy between a country’s legal status and its actual capacity 
can entail in the practice of international cooperation – as illustrated by the example 
of international organizations in need of an interlocutor, signatory, and ‘owner’ of the 
development process. When development organizations adapt rules to account for 
variations of government effectiveness, or deal with the absence of a government in 
power, they engage in an area full of intricate questions – questions to which neither 
general rules and principles of international law, nor the (primary) law of international 
organizations necessarily provide clear answers.37  
Against this background, the response of international development 
organizations deserves more attention because it could be instructive for other areas 
of international cooperation – international trade, environmental cooperation, or in 
principle any area that builds on the existence of ‘effective government’ to negotiate, 
sign, and give real effect to treaty obligations or other forms of regulation.38 State 
fragility is no isolated phenomenon – and we may find that where the discrepancy 
between juridical statehood and empirical statehood leads to structural problems for 
                                                        
36 A temporary loss of effective control or disappearance of government does not automatically lead to 
the extinction of the state under international law. On the principle of continuity, see, for instance, 
KREIJEN, State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness. Legal Lessons from the Decolonization of Sub-
Saharan Africa, at 363 ff. 
37 As I elaborate in chapter I.3 b), general international law – based on the legal doctrine of statehood 
and the principle of sovereign equality – holds no overarching response to dealing with countries that 
are considered unable or unwilling to fulfill certain rights and obligations. Concepts such as the 
“responsibility to protect” remain contested and still evolving.  
38 With examples from other areas of international cooperation where the lack of an authorized and 
sufficiently competent government can pose a challenge to the functioning and effectiveness of 
international legal regimes, see GIORGETTI, A Principled Approach to State Failure. International 
Community Actions in Emergency Situations; and BENEDICT KINGSBURY & KEVIN DAVIS, New York 
University, Hauser Globalization Colloquium Fall 2010 - Session December 1, 'Obligation Overload: 
Adjusting the Obligations of Fragile or Failed States' (2010), pp. 4-7; and the conclusion of this thesis, 
where I discuss the broader relevance of my findings. 
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which existing rules are systematically inadequate, they need to be addressed through 
adapting the rules. 39  The underlying assumption is that systematically inadequate 
rules forfeit the ability to guide and constrain, and the potential to serve as a basis for 
transparent and consistent decision-making.40  
The response of development organization equally deserves critical scrutiny, 
however, considering what is at stake: the sovereignty and formal equality of weaker 
states. Any attempt at introducing rules that differentiate between states on the basis 
of different levels of capacity or will to fulfill certain functions must be met with 
considerable caution, not least for the risk of cementing a second-class status of 
statehood.41 After all, who decides what constitutes a sufficient level (or quality?) of 
effective government, and what are the consequences? 
The importance of such concerns becomes clear when looking at development 
cooperation with fragile states. Decisions that concern the objectives and means of 
development interventions are generally taken in a context of material inequality, 
economic dependencies, and power discrepancies between donors and recipients – a 
context where donors wield considerable power and influence, with the ability of 
recipients to integrate their preferences constantly endangered. 42  International 
development organizations wield influence not only when they become involved in 
domestic institution-building and governance reforms in recipient countries.43  The 
influence starts with setting the rules, mostly single-handedly and often informally, 
                                                        
39 E.g. GEIß, Failed States. Die normative Erfassung gescheiterter Staaten, 310, arguing that the lacuna 
resulting from international law’s formalist assumption of functioning statehood was too critical to be 
addressed merely on a case-by-case basis, and through ad hoc decisions grounded in politics, not law. 
40 MICHAEL IOANNIDIS & ARMIN VON BOGDANDY, 'Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law: What it is, 
What has been done, What can be done', 51 Common Market Law Review, 59 (2014), at 72-73, 
according to whom a legal system stops fulfilling “its core function, to support reliable expectations”, 
if its rules are systematically ignored, for instance because states lack the capacity to comply. On 
demands concerning the flexibility of public international law – for reasons of legitimacy and 
effectiveness – see also ISABEL FEICHTNER, The Law and Politics of the WTO Waiver. Stability and 
Flexibility in Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 6-20; 325.  
41 The risk is not negligible, considering the colonial origins of international law and its history of 
differentiating between civilized and uncivilized states. On the origins and persistence of formalized 
hierarchies in international law, see GERRY J. SIMPSON, Great Powers and Outlaw States. Unequal 
Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge University Press, 2004) and ANTONY ANGHIE, 
Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
respectively.  
42 DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU 
and Germany, 238, 257. 
43 This is particularly true for post-conflict and fragile states. See KRISTEN E. BOON, '"Open for 
Business": International Financial Institutions, Post-Conflict Economic Reform, and the Rule of Law', 
9 New York University Journal of International Law & Politics, 513 (2007). 
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that determine the terms and conditions and recipients of aid.44 Fragile states, in turn, 
usually belong to the most aid-dependent countries, and – provided there is a 
government – are in a weak bargaining position to negotiate with international 
development organizations.45  In this context, rules that protect the right of every 
government to request external assistance, to determine the country’s development 
objectives, and to participate in the planning and implementation of development 
projects assume a crucial role, and should not be simply discarded.  
It is hence impossible to study the regulatory activities of international 
development organizations concerning fragile states without paying attention to 
another side of the tale – one where organizations appear as influential rule-makers 
that operate in an unequal environment, and where it is far from clear on what basis 
and for what purposes they consider countries as fragile. This thesis critically 
scrutinizes how international development organizations attempt to uphold the formal 
sovereignty of recipient states, while dealing with the consequences of empirical 
fragility. 
2. Approach and Structure 
 
In line with the objectives outlined, I propose a rather unusual approach for 
scholars of international law to grapple with state fragility – but one that mainly 
requires directing attention to a concrete question. How, and to what effect have 
international development organizations adapted rules in their legal and policy 
frameworks to engage with fragile states? The underlying idea is that by examining 
what position fragile states are accorded by other legal subjects, we learn more about 
the significance of state fragility from the perspective of international law. In the field 
of development cooperation, international organizations have sought to systematically 
                                                        
44 E.g. BRADLOW, 'International Law and the Operations of the International Financial Institutions', pp. 
25-27; or BENEDICT KINGSBURY, 'Global Administrative Law in the Institutional Practice of Global 
Regulatory Governance', in Hassane Cissé, et al. (eds), The World Bank Legal Review. Volume 3. 
International Financial Institutions and Global Legal Governance (The World Bank, 2012), 13, 
arguing with regards to the internal rule-making activities of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
that “the drawing, nudging, and redrawing of the lines are themselves a significant form of 
governance”. 
45 In 2011, aid accounted for 29% of all inflows to fragile states, as compared to other developing 
countries, where aid accounted for only 5%. OECD, 'Fragile States 2014. Domestic Revenue 
Mobilization in Fragile States', p. 36. Some fragile states, however, have a rather strong bargaining 
position vis-à-vis international donor institutions, if donors have a strategic or political interest in 
engaging with these countries. See HUBERT KNIRSCH, 'Die Internationalen Finanzinstitutionen und 
Prekäre Staaten', in Stefani  Weiss & Joschka Schmierer (eds), Prekäre Staatlichkeit und Internationale 
Ordnung2007), at 426. 
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respond to the difficulties of engaging with countries that have the legal status of 
states, but very weak or no government. Insofar as the response involves the use of 
formal or informal legal rules, which directly or indirectly concern the rights and 
obligations accorded to fragile states, it is also of legal significance.46  
While the approach of this thesis holds a broader relevance to which we return in 
the conclusion, my principal focus is thus on development cooperation, and on the 
practice of international organizations. As illustrated before, it is a focus that makes 
the analysis relevant and rewarding, both for development practitioners and 
international legal scholars. However, it comes with a number of difficulties that need 
to be clarified upfront.  
To begin with, development cooperation is a policy field that is only starting to 
attract more attention from legal scholarship.47 The process by which donor states or 
international organizations provide aid to developing countries is mostly considered 
as political and voluntary, perhaps guided by technical considerations, but not by 
legal rules. Thinking of development cooperation as a process instructed by law will 
thus be new to many development practitioners and legal scholars alike. Yet, while 
other rationalities may be dominant in the allocation and implementation of foreign 
aid, this does not mean that law plays no role therein. 48  How national and 
international donors provide assistance to a country is subject to rules, which define 
the objectives, establish terms and conditions, and regulate the process of 
development cooperation.49 These rules are mostly set by donors, but they can equally 
determine the roles and responsibilities of (fragile) recipient countries in development 
                                                        
46 Jochen Frowein takes a similar approach in his study of de facto regimes, which also challenge the 
formalist doctrine of statehood. Frowein finds that “[b]ecause of the imperfect nature of international 
law no possibility exists of clarifying whether entities have the quality of States although they are not 
recognized as such. Therefore, it is of great importance to analyze State practice as to the position of 
those regimes in international law.” JOCHEN FROWEIN, 'De Facto Regime', in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) 
The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, March 2013), 
para. 2, and JOCHEN FROWEIN, Das de facto-Regime im Völkerrecht (Heymann, 1968), pp. 1-3. 
47 This is not entirely true, if we consider that the role of (domestic) law as an instrument in 
development cooperation has concerned international lawyers at the latest since the 1970s. How 
promoting the rule of law and access to justice can benefit development are, however, entirely different 
questions than what role law plays in the regulation of development cooperation itself. On different 
approaches to law and development cooperation, see also infra note 409. 
48 With a convincing discussion of the reasons why development cooperation has not yet attracted more 
attention from international lawyers, and why law nonetheless plays or should play a role in this field, 
see DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU 
and Germany, pp. 27-32.  
49 Ibid.. With a more narrow focus on international donors organizations, also DANIEL D. BRADLOW & 
DAVID B. HUNTER (eds), International Financial Institutions and International Law (Kluwer, 2010); 
and with a broader focus on private (national or international) donors, KEVIN DAVIS, '‘Financing 
Development’ as a Field of Practice, Study and Innovation', 168 Acta Juridica, 168 (2009). 
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cooperation.50 Based on Dann’s foundational work, I refer to the body of rules that 
regulate the transfer – the allocation, planning, and implementation – of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) as the law of development cooperation.51  
One of the reasons why the law of development cooperation is a field of law that 
has long escaped the attention of legal scholars is its relative informality, or more 
precisely, the mixing of traditional sources of international law with some more 
informal sources.52 Herein lies a further difficulty that we will have to grapple with, 
as becomes clear when looking at the sources that regulate the conduct of 
international organizations engaged in development cooperation. At first glance, the 
focus on international organizations makes it easier to comprehend that development 
cooperation is governed by legal rules and procedures. International organizations are 
founded by states through an international legal treaty, and this founding treaty 
becomes a quasi-constitutional framework for all their activities. In the case of 
development organizations, the founding treaty usually defines for what purposes the 
organization may provide ODA, and further circumscribes how. 53  Clearly, the 
conduct of international development organizations thus does not follow political or 
technical considerations alone.  
More concrete rules that guide the conduct of international development 
organizations, however, are contained not in founding treaties, but are later adopted 
by various organs of an organization, and prima facie apply only internally. It is at 
least controversial to what extent this sort of secondary rules can be shoehorned into 
the traditional sources of international law as established in Art. 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ).54 Certainly, they continue to fall largely off 
                                                        
50 DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU 
and Germany, pp. 200, 217. 
51 Ibid., 13-14. What constitutes ODA is defined by the OECD DAC based on three elements: that 
resources are provided by official agencies, serve the main objective of promoting “economic 
development and welfare of developing countries”, and have a concessional character. See online, 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm#Definition 
(accessed December 2014). Dating back to 1972, the ODA definition excludes a variety of forms and 
actors through which financing is increasingly provided to developing countries. At the time of writing, 
the OECD was therefore in the process of reviewing it. Even if the ODA definition will consequently 
be extended, it will still include the provision of development assistance through international 
organizations, and will hence remain relevant considering the focus of this thesis.  
52 Ibid., 29. On the legal nature and effects of the sources of the law of development cooperation, see 
infra chapter III.1. 
53 On the substance of rules contained in the legal frameworks of international development 
organizations, see infra chapter III.2.  
54 See, for instance, JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, International Organizations as Law-Makers (Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 237, arguing that the World Bank’s internal rules can be seen as sources in the sense of 
Art. 38; or MARKUS BENZING, 'Secondary Law', in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) The Max Planck 
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the radar of international legal scholarship, while they can assume significant effects, 
including outside an organization’s internal sphere.  
Therefore, when examining how international development organizations adapt 
their legal and policy frameworks to engage with fragile states, I take internal rules 
seriously – and demonstrate why legal scholars are well advised to do so. I show that 
internal rules are potent instruments in steering the conduct of international 
development organizations, and regularly assume external effects for recipient 
countries through formulating the terms and conditions, including procedural rights, 
for the transfer of ODA. Internal rules can be used to consolidate organizational 
practices or authoritative interpretations of the founding treaties, and thus affect 
existing treaty law.55 Rules that are relatively formalized and internally binding can 
thus be seen as part of an organization’s legal framework. The various instruments the 
organs of international organizations produce to provide further, non-binding 
guidance to staff instead belong to the policy framework. In considering both, I 
acknowledge that formal and informal rules often interact in the law of development 
cooperation – and that informal does not always mean ineffective.56 
There is one more difficulty concerning the approach of this thesis that comes not 
from the focus on the law of development cooperation, or on the rules of international 
organizations in particular. Instead, it concerns the very notion of fragile states. It 
bears repeating that fragile state is no legal term, and we will see that international 
law is indeed short of concepts to grasp a variable condition such as state fragility.57 If 
anything, fragile states are best described with reference to the discrepancy between 
                                                                                                                                                              
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, March 2007), para. 2, stating that 
there is a “growing consensus that secondary rules promulgated by international organizations today 
form part of the sources of international law.” In contrast, other legal scholars find that only secondary 
legislation belongs to the traditional sources of international law, whereas internal rules and 
organizational practice are a „distinct source of law in the internal legal order of the organization“. 
CHRISTIANE AHLBORN, Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL) Research Paper No 2011-03 
(SHARES Series), 'The Rules of International Organizations and the Law of International 
Responsibility' (2011), 15-16; and in a similar vein, PHILIPPE Q. C. SANDS & PIERRE KLEIN, Bowett's 
Law of International Institutions (Sweet & Maxwell, 2001), 448 ff.. On the legal nature and effects of 
secondary rules, see infra chapter III.1.  
55 E.g. BENZING, 'Secondary Law', paras. 4 and 32; and the references in infra note 439. 
56 Supra note 52. An extensive scholarly literature is concerned with the effects of formally non-
binding rules in general. See, for instance, KENNETH W. ABBOTT & DUNCAN SNIDAL, 'Hard and Soft 
Law in International Governance', 54 International Organization, 421 (2000) (from a political science 
perspective); DINAH SHELTON, Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms in the 
International Legal System (Oxford University Press, 2003); and revisiting the doctrine of sources to 
propose a legitimation for soft law, MATTHIAS GOLDMANN, Internationale Öffentliche Gewalt. 
Handlungsformen internationaler Institutionen im Zeitalter der Globalisierung (Springer, 2015). 
57 Chapter I.3 b) (ii). 
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formal legal status, and weak capacity in fact – between the spheres of juridical 
statehood and empirical statehood. Yet, not only scholars of international law struggle 
to define what fragile states are. There is no agreed definition or classification of 
fragile states, although the notion has become a highly successful catchphrase in the 
international development community and beyond. It is used in academic and policy 
circles to refer to a large and extremely heterogeneous group of countries, which are 
basically characterized as having very weak capacity and poor governance.58 Many, 
more or less subjective elements could be added, such as weak state-society relations 
or the prevalence of armed conflict.59 In short: The lack of an agreed definition of 
fragile states is symptomatic both of the conceptual ambiguity of the notion, and of 
the politics inevitably involved in classifying countries as fragile.  
I therefore advocate a cautious and critical handling of the notion of fragile states, 
or state fragility – for instance, by acknowledging that the underlying empirical 
phenomenon is not new, and by asking what lies behind its simplifying social 
construction and rising popularity as a political concept.60 Moreover, I do not propose 
a clear-cut definition of fragile states where there is none. Instead, the approach of 
this thesis demands consideration of how other legal subjects – in our case, 
international development organizations – define, classify, and ultimately address 
fragile states through legal and policy reforms.61 
Based on these preliminary clarifications, I proceed in four main steps. The first 
two chapters present in more detail the central puzzle: fragile states are a phenomenon 
beyond law, but how international development organizations have addressed the 
challenges of engaging with fragile states may well be of legal significance. Chapter I 
begins by introducing fragile states as a phenomenon that is characterized by the 
discrepancy between weak factual capacity, and the formal legal status of state 
institutions. Accordingly, I trace the emergence and meaning of the notion of fragile 
                                                        
58 Supra note 1.  
59 Definitions of state fragility increasingly emphasize not only the lack of capacity or effectiveness on 
the part of state institutions, but rather their weak legitimacy. E.g. OECD, 'The State’s Legitimacy in 
Fragile Situations. Unpacking Complexity' (2010), at 7; or THE WORLD BANK, 'World Development 
Report: Conflict, Security, and Development' (2011), at 84. For an overview of different definitions of 
fragile states, see MCLOUGHLIN, 'Topic Guide on Fragile States', pp. 9-14, and on the evolving 
conceptual understanding of state fragility in detail, chapter I.2 b). 
60 Chapter I.2. 
61 I therefore use “fragile state” as a non-legal umbrella term, to explore how international development 
organizations perceive and address a range of challenges that the discrepancy between a country’s 
formal legal status, and its limited capacity in practice may entail. On the use of the notion of fragile 
states in this thesis, see also infra chapter I.1. 
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states from an empirical-sociological perspective, and contrast it with the typically 
reluctant or self-restrained perspective of international legal scholars, which have 
mostly neglected fragile states as an empirical phenomenon. Chapter II turns to the 
field of development cooperation, to illustrate how international organizations have 
responded to the challenges they face when seeking to engage with fragile states. I 
give an initial overview of the policy-making, standard-setting, and reform activities 
of international organizations that belong to the largest contributors of ODA to fragile 
states.62   
The second step lays the groundwork for understanding and analyzing the legal 
significance of such activities, and the consequences for fragile states. Chapter III 
therefore provides a basic understanding of the legal nature and substance of rules that 
normally govern how international organizations negotiate, plan, and implement 
development projects in collaboration with the governments of recipient countries: the 
law of development cooperation, or more precisely, the law of international 
development organizations. I first analyze the legal nature of its main sources, 
highlighting the various functions and potential effects of internal rules. Next, I draw 
on the legal frameworks of different development organizations to give an impression 
of the basic, normative ideas that generally instruct their conduct.  
On this basis, chapters IV and V provide a systematic analysis of how, and to 
what effect selected international development organizations have adapted the rules of 
their legal and policy frameworks to engage with fragile states – the third main step. 
Chapter IV focuses in detail on the World Bank, the most important driver of the 
fragile states agenda. Chapter V subsequently compares the relevant rule-making 
processes, instruments, and outcomes of the World Bank with those of two 
organizations that have a very similar legal framework and mandate, the AfDB and 
the ADB, and with one organization that shows notable differences in both regards, 
the EU. 63  A comparative analysis serves to discern and analyze converging and 
divergent elements in the way they deal with fragile states, and accommodate state 
fragility in the design of the applicable legal frameworks.  
                                                        
62 Based on OECD statistics, in 2011, fragile states received the largest share of multilateral aid from 
the EU institutions, followed by the International Development Association (part of the World Bank 
Group), and the African Development Fund (ADF, part of the AfDB). OECD, 'Fragile States 2014. 
Domestic Revenue Mobilization in Fragile States', p. 93. Other important donors included the ADB and 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).  
63 I explain this selection of organizations in infra chapter II.3 b). 
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In the final step, I synthesize and discuss the resulting findings. Chapter VI begins 
by identifying broader patterns in the analyzed regulatory approaches of different 
organizations. Subsequently, I examine the potentials and perils of development 
organizations adapting legal rules to instruct and formalize how they deal with fragile 
states. The Conclusion summarizes my key findings and reflects on their theoretical 
and practical relevance beyond the field of development cooperation. 
Before I begin, one final remark concerns the thesis’ methodology. The very 
subject of fragile states calls for interdisciplinarity. It is an empirical phenomenon, a 
social construct, a political concept, and should interest international legal scholars. 
This thesis therefore advocates an approach that sees the bigger picture – even as it 
remains essentially concerned with adding a legal perspective to that picture. For 
instance, I examine the emerging fragile states discourse with a view to relevant 
research in the social sciences, before turning to the juridical conception of the state 
and the (self-)limitation of legal doctrine in describing state fragility.64 I take a look at 
both practical and legal challenges that international development organizations 
encounter in aiding fragile states – and do not pretend that all of these can be 
addressed through modifying the applicable legal framework. 65  Moreover, in 
considering how different organizations adapt their legal and policy frameworks, I 
seek to understand and scrutinize their motives, too.66 
There are, however, limits for legal scholars to think outside the box without 
losing academic credibility. While the subject of this thesis is truly interdisciplinary, 
the type of questions I ask are the type of questions that can be answered with a legal 
methodology – and these are often not the questions that start with ‘why’. We will see 
that a legal analysis that explains and interprets, structures, compares, and evaluates 
the rules that international development organizations make or modify to engage with 
fragile states nonetheless provides insights that reach well beyond a jurisprudence of 
concepts. In this sense, interdisciplinarity implies putting law in perspective, while 
demonstrating the relevance of a legal perspective to other disciplines. 
 
 
 
                                                        
64 Chapter I.2. 
65 Chapter II.2 b). 
66 In particular, chapter V.3. 
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I. Fragile States – The Discrepancy between Empirical and 
Juridical Statehood 
 
Not least since September 11, 2001, a group of countries has quickly moved from 
the periphery of the international community to the top of the policy agenda. It is an 
extremely heterogeneous group of 30-50 countries, which are loosely characterized by 
weak institutions and poor governance, often in combination with violent conflict.67 
To various degrees, they are unable to maintain security, enforce the law, or provide 
basic services to their populations. Politicians and diplomats, security experts and 
development practitioners, collectively refer to these countries as ‘fragile states’.  
Ask an international law scholar what fragile states are, and he will likely answer 
what fragile states are not – namely, a legal concept. The legal status of state is a 
binary category, and not a matter of degree. For gradations of statehood based on 
form, function, or performance, there is no room in an international legal order built 
on the principle of sovereign equality. The formal conception of statehood and the 
principle of sovereign equality thus prevent obvious material inequalities and power 
discrepancies between states from being translated into law. 
Statehood is a variable in fact, but a constant in law – this distinction between 
empirical-sociological accounts of statehood and the state as a legal concept is 
essential to understanding the phenomenon of state fragility, and shall be the starting 
point of my analysis. Entities that lack the capacity to perform basic state functions, 
but enjoy the legal status of states, are characterized by the discrepancy between 
empirical statehood and juridical statehood. 68  Accordingly, we need a basic 
understanding of the de facto dimension of statehood, and its de jure components, to 
comprehend the meaning and significance of state fragility – irrespective of the 
questionable value of the uniform classification of ‘fragile states’. 
If state fragility is a phenomenon that falls at the challenging interface between 
fact and law, however, legal scholars might argue that it has no relevance. After all, 
law consists precisely of the counterfactual postulation of norms – in this case, the 
                                                        
67 Supra note 16. 
68 Coined by Robert H. Jackson, the notions of empirical and juridical statehood serve to differentiate 
empirical-sociological accounts of statehood from the legal concept. See JACKSON & ROSBERG, 'Why 
Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood', p. 2; and in detail ROBERT 
HOUGHWOUT JACKSON, Quasi-states. Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World 
(Cambridge University Press, 1990). On the difference between empirical and juridical statehood, see 
also: GERARD KREIJEN (ed) State, Sovereignty, and International Governance (Oxford University Press, 
2002), 38 ff.. 
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legal status of state. This is one reason why the widespread phenomenon and elusive, 
but influential, political concept of fragile states has received so little consideration in 
legal scholarship. Yet such an orthodox, positivist view risks ignoring the potential 
interactions or tensions between the two spheres of fact and law, which are crucial to 
a realistic and comprehensive account of both. By looking closer at how juridical 
statehood is built on the premise of ‘effective government’, and thus on the fault lines 
of fact and law, we see why the very discrepancy between factual capacity and legal 
status in fragile states constitutes a fundamental challenge – to the state-based 
international system, as well as its legal order. 
 This chapter looks at the distinction between empirical and juridical statehood, 
and explores the phenomenon of state fragility at the interface. Subsequent to a brief 
disclaimer concerning the terminology I use in this thesis (I.1), I trace the emergence 
and meaning of the notion of fragile states from an empirical perspective (I.2), and 
contrast it with the typically reluctant or self-restrained engagement of international 
legal scholars with state fragility, based on the static conception of the state in 
international law (I.3). I conclude that while state fragility is not a legal concept, legal 
scholars are well advised to consider how the challenges of engaging with fragile 
states are perceived and addressed in the practice of international cooperation (I.4).   
 
1. Disclaimer on Terminology 
 
Terminology constitutes meaning, and in law, it can also constitute legal 
consequences. Accordingly, a thesis concerned with “fragile states” first warrants a 
disclaimer on terminology, and this is particularly true for a legal thesis.  
A Babylonian diversity of terms is used to describe the weakness, deficiency, or 
collapse of state institutions and authority.69 This diversity of terms, however, hardly 
provides an accurate reflection of the heterogeneity and complexity of the described 
phenomena. Rather, the different terms often describe the same phenomenon in the 
same vague manner – the difference being that different actors prefer to focus on 
different symptoms or consequences.70 Some allude to a state’s lack of capacity (e.g. 
                                                        
69 For an overview, see MCLOUGHLIN, 'Topic Guide on Fragile States', pp. 9-14.  
70 DIANA  CAMMACK, et al., Overseas Development Institute, , 'Donors and the ‘Fragile States’ 
Agenda: A Survey of Current Thinking and Practice. Report submitted to the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency' (2006), 16, arguing that many terms can be used interchangeably without altering 
the meaning.  
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‘weak’ or ‘ineffective’ state), some rather to the lack of legitimacy or political will to 
abide by certain rules of the international community, with an often-pejorative 
undertone (e.g. ‘rogue’, ‘pariah’, or ‘outlaw’ state). In international security discourse, 
the emphasis is often on the security threats associated with weak statehood (e.g. 
‘state sponsors of terrorism’)71, whereas in development discourse, the emphasis tends 
to be on a country’s development performance (e.g. ‘poor performer’; ‘difficult 
partner’), or its susceptibility to crisis (‘vulnerable country’; ‘country under stress’)72. 
The term ‘collapsed state’ is perhaps distinct in that it describes the end point and 
complete breakdown of state structures, but terms like ‘failing’, ‘fragile’ and ‘failed 
state’ all refer to intermediary stages, without there being a clear distinction.73  
The terminology of ‘fragile state’, ‘state fragility’, or ‘fragile situations’,74  is 
relatively new to the international agenda, and has gradually begun to replace ‘failed 
state’ as the predominant vocabulary. 75  First in international security, then in 
development discourse, ‘fragile state’ has become the catchphrase for policymakers as 
well as academics to refer to a heterogeneous group of states, which for various 
reasons have become a particular concern to the international community.76 At the 
United Nations (UN), it crops up with increasing frequency since 2007,77 and rapidly 
                                                        
71 Notably, in the United States, “state sponsors of terrorism” is a classification made by the Secretary 
of State, to which certain legal consequences under US law are attached, namely section 6(j) of the 
Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the 
Foreign Assistance Act. 
72 The World Bank used to describe countries with weak policies, institutions, and governance as 
“Low-Income Countries Under Stress” (LICUS). On the LICUS initiative, see infra chapter II.3 b). 
73  For example, Chiara Giorgetti speaks of a „a continuum from strong to weak states in which it is 
possible to identify weak or fragile states, failing states, failed states, and finally the extreme version: 
collapsed states.“ GIORGETTI, A Principled Approach to State Failure. International Community 
Actions in Emergency Situations, 49.  
74 Since 2009, the OECD DAC, the World Bank, and other donors have began to refer increasingly to 
‘fragile situations’ rather than ‘fragile states”. This terminological fine-tuning acknowledges that there 
can be pockets of fragility within non-fragile countries and is thus less state-centric. For the sake of 
simplicity, however, this thesis predominantly refers to ‘fragile states’ or ‘state fragility’. 
75 The term ‘failed state’ was coined by Helman and Ratner in 1992 (GERALD B. HELMAN & STEVEN R. 
RATNER, 'Saving Failed States', 89 Foreign Policy, 3 (1992)) and quickly found its way both into U.S. 
and European security policy, namely the National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
(September 2002) and the European Security Strategy (12 December 2003). In contrast, the 2010 U.S. 
National Security Strategy and U.S. Global Development Policy Fact Sheet now refer only to “fragile 
states” and “fragile democracies”, so does the 2005 European Consensus on Development (infra note 
297). 
76 On the genesis of the concept of fragile states, see also SIMONE BERTOLI & ELISA TICCI, 'A Fragile 
Guideline to Development Assistance', 30 Development Policy Review, 211 (2012). 
77 A search of the UN’s official documents since 2000 yields 56 hits for “fragile state(s)” until 2006, 
and 227 hits from 2006 to 2010 (in contrast to a total of 108 hits for “failed state” between 2000 and 
2011). Both terms appear in debates of the UN Security Council and General Assembly, as well as 
reports and statements of the Secretary-Generals. Until today, neither “fragile state” nor “failed state” 
has appeared in a Resolution of the Security Council or General Assembly.  
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makes its way into official policy documents of international organizations like the 
OECD, the World Bank, and the European Union.78 The term is picked up in national 
policy guidelines and operational strategies of major Western donor states like the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Germany.79  
Compared to other terms, ‘fragile state’ thus features a new quality: it does not 
only group together certain states or situations for analytical purposes, but also for the 
purposes of international policy-making. At the same time, it seems no longer 
politically incorrect to refer to fragile states, since a group of developing countries – 
the “g7+” – have endorsed the label and developed a proper definition of fragility.80  
To some extent, the success of the fragile states terminology is also owed to the fact 
that it reflects an evolving understanding of the causes and consequences of weak or 
collapsed state authority – for instance, acknowledging the process-like dimension of 
the phenomenon, and including a wider range of states on a continuum of fragility.  
Nevertheless, the fragile states terminology shares many of the shortcomings of 
previous terms like failed state, and is thus quite rightly criticized both as analytically 
imprecise and judgmental. The criticism begins with the imprecise connotation of the 
word “fragile”. The English word “fragile” can mean “easily broken or damaged” or 
“easily destroyed or threatened” when used in relation to objects, “delicate and 
vulnerable” in relation to persons, and in an antiquated sense, “morally weak” or 
“liable to err or fall into sin”.81 Accordingly, one could think of a number of meanings 
where fragile is used as an adjective to describe an organized political community, 
rather than a condition. The described entities could be threatened to fully collapse 
into anarchy, for instance, or have morally corrupted governments. A fragile state 
                                                        
78 On the use of the fragile states terminology in policy and operational documents of the OECD, the 
World Bank, the European Union, and other international development organizations, see infra chapter 
II.3. 
79 Examples include the USAID, Fragile States Strategy (January 2005) and the US Global 
Development Policy Fact Sheet (September 22, 2010); DFID’s Policy Paper, Why we Need to Work 
More Effectively in Fragile States (2005); Canada's International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride 
and Influence in the World (2005); France’s Policy Paper on Fragile States and Situations of Fragility 
(2007); or Germany’s guidelines for a coherent policy on fragile states (“Für eine kohärente Politik der 
Bundesregierung gegenüber fragilen Staaten - Ressortübergreifende Leitlinie”) of August 2012. 
80 The g7+ is an informal forum of developing countries and self-declared fragile states that advocate 
for their interests vis-à-vis international partners. The g7+ define fragility “as a period of time during 
nationhood when sustainable socio-economic development requires greater emphasis on 
complementary peacebuilding and statebuilding activities such as building inclusive political 
settlements, security, justice, jobs, good management of resources, and accountable and fair service 
delivery.” g7+, Note on the g7+ Fragility Spectrum (November 27, 2013). On the g7+ and its 
membership, see infra note 139. 
81 Oxford Dictionary, available online: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/fragile (accessed 
October 2014).  
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could also be particularly vulnerable to internal or external stresses, suggesting that 
we use the term as a metaphor that means “handle with care”. Considering how the 
term is commonly used does not provide more clarity: countries are referred to as 
fragile when they have very weak capacity, like Liberia, or when they are 
unresponsive to their citizens or the international community, like Gaddafi’s Libya. 
Likewise, the term fragile state has been used synonymous with complete state failure, 
or to describe a country that it is at risk of becoming a failed state.82 Besides, not only 
the connotation of “fragile” is imprecise, but also the reference to “states”, since 
fragility can also occur at the sub-national or transnational level.83  
The notion of fragile states is further criticized as judgmental because it suggests 
a certain deficiency contrasted with the image of a Western, ideal notion of statehood, 
and comes with implicit but not always adequate assumptions of how a resilient state 
should function and perform.84 The international community may have realized that 
the more disparaging reference to ‘state failure’ is not conductive to its efforts in 
aiding the states concerned, but the stigmatizing undertones of labeling a country as 
‘fragile’ do not go away easily.85 In this sense, much of the criticism applied to the 
label ‘failed state’ equally applies to ‘fragile state’ – it “is inaccurately state-centric, is 
destructively ambiguous, misplaces normative liability and attracts dangerous 
colonialist nostalgia”.86 
A legal thesis must take the analytical and normative shortcomings of the term 
“fragile state” particularly seriously. Jan Klabbers once ironically suggested in a legal 
blog introducing a concept of “soft statehood”, in parallel to the concept of “soft 
                                                        
82 E.g. DAN HARRIS, et al., German Development Institute, Discussion Paper 9/2009, 'Country 
Classifications for a Changing World' (2009), p. 23: “Fragile implies a strong potential or possibility 
for failure”.  
83 Instead of ‘fragile state’, the terms ‘fragile situations’ or ‘situations of fragility’ have therefore 
become more common. Supra note 74. 
84 As Rosa Brooks asks, “what, if anything, is the value of treating the world's many unstable and 
strife-ridden societies as "failed states," if in fact they never possessed most of the attributes of 
functioning states in the first place?” ROSA EHRENREICH BROOKS, 'Failed States, or the State as 
Failure?', 72 The University of Chicago Law Review, 1159 (2005), 1174. 
85 Criticism of the stigmatizing undertones of the failed- or fragile states is widespread: e.g. RALPH 
WILDE, 'The Skewed Responsibility Narrative of the "Failed States" Concept', 9 ILSA Journal of 
International & Comparative Law, 425 (2003), 425; RUTH GORDON, 'Saving Failed States: Sometimes 
A Neocolonialist Notion', 12 American University Journal of International Law and Policy, 903 
(1997); or CHARLES T. CALL, 'The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State’', 29 Third World Quarterly, 1491 
(2008), 1499. 
86 HENRY J. RICHARDSON, '"Failed States", Self-Determination, and Prenventive Diplomacy: 
Colonialist Nostalgia and Democratic Expectations', 10 Temple International and Comparative Law 
Journal, 1 (1996), 77. 
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law”.87 In reply to the many commentators that took him at face value, Klabbers 
reiterated that unlike other disciplines, law is a formal category, which must operate 
in a binary fashion – and that unlike social scientists and ethicists, lawyers must 
therefore refrain from any attempt to describe states as harder or softer.88 In other 
words, international relations scholars may deconstruct and question claims to 
statehood and sovereignty as formal categories against the background of empirical 
observations about limited state capacity, or the politics involved in granting or 
denying such titles and entitlements in the first place. When international lawyers 
speak of ‘fragile states’, however, they must face the suspicion of seeking to question 
the integrity of the juridical doctrines of statehood and sovereignty. 
Certainly, the danger of a “legal rationalization of political realities” is real when 
legal scholars negligently blend political and normative concepts and create confusion 
about the legal consequences.89 Particularly the notion of failed state could wrongly 
suggest, for instance, that the weakness or even breakdown of government authority 
would automatically lead to the termination of the state and its international legal 
personality, or to a qualification of its sovereign equality before the law. Critical legal 
scholarship has also sharpened our understanding of the “politics of redefinition”,90 
and thus pointed to a number of significant questions. Most importantly, who has the 
power to call a state “fragile”, on the basis of what, and for what purpose? After all, 
the advent of a new terminology often obscures the persistence of underlying 
concepts and reason – in this case, the patronizing mindsets of “civilized nations” and 
an often interventionist agenda.91  
I therefore emphasize from the outset that “fragile state” is not a legal term or 
concept. As the following section show, usages of the term as empirical-descriptive or 
normative concept are often hard to disentangle. Nonetheless, I use the term “fragile 
state” as a non-legal umbrella term because it is not less analytically precise than 
                                                        
87 JAN KLABBERS, Soft Statehood?, Opinio Juris (January 20, 2010), at 
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/01/20/soft-statehood/. 
88 JAN KLABBERS, More Soft Statehood... Opinio Juris (22 January 2010), at 
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/01/22/more-soft-statehood/. 
89 ALEXANDROS YANNIS, 'The Concept of Suspended Sovereignty in International Law and its 
Implications in International Politics', 13 European Journal of International Law, 1037 (2002), p. 1038.  
90 MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, 'The Politics of International Law - 20 Years Later', 20in ibid., 7 (2009), p. 
11, referring to the politics of redefinition as “the strategic definition of a situation or a problem by 
reference to a technical idiom so as to open the door for applying the expertise related to that idiom, 
together with the attendant structural bias.” 
91 E.g. DAVID CHUTER, 'Must Do Better: The African State, The African State, and the State of Africa', 
62 Studia Diplomatica, 27 (2009), 28: “changing terms are just successively more polite forms of the 
same idea.”  
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others, while it allows shifting the focus from the total collapse of effective 
government to the much more widespread occurrence and variances of weak 
statehood. Moreover, like no other term, “fragile state” has become the international 
community’s rallying cry for dealing with weak, political instable, conflict-ridden 
countries in an increasingly systematic manner, which is the subject of this thesis.  
 
2. Empirical Grasp on Fragile States 
 
“Empirically, the state must be treated as a variable rather than the constant 
supposed by legal theory.” – John Peter Nettl, 196892 
 
Various disciplines are concerned with the normative ideal and empirical 
functions, the emergence and evolution of states as a form of organized political 
community. As the quote by the American sociologist John Peter Nettl suggests, the 
decisive difference between empirical and legal approaches to statehood lies in the 
engagement with the state as a variable or as a constant. From an empirical-
sociological perspective, “stateness, or the saliency of the state, in different societies 
is indeed a quantitative variable”.93 Form, functions, and the effectiveness of states 
can vary greatly over time and space, although they are regularly presented as 
variations of an ideal type: the Western model of a hierarchical nation state with a 
bureaucratic apparatus at its core, providing security, justice, and welfare to its 
citizens.  
The following section approaches statehood from an empirical perspective, and 
state fragility as a variation of statehood in its de facto dimensions. I begin by 
highlighting that the existence of states that assume different functions with variable 
degrees of effectiveness is neither new nor exceptional, since the particular Western 
state model in many parts of the world never really took root, and its continued 
validity is challenged by the effects of globalization on the autonomy and capacity of 
states everywhere (a). On this basis, I explore how the empirical phenomenon of weak 
statehood suddenly began receiving so much attention, through tracing the evolving 
discourse and understanding of fragile states over the last two decades (b).  
                                                        
92 JOHN PETER NETTL, 'The State as a Conceptual Variable', 20 World Politics, 559 (1968). 
93 Ibid., 579. Also: CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM, 'Degrees of Statehood', 24 Review of International Studies, 
143 (1998). 
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a) Empirical Statehood – The State as a Variable  
 
In empirical terms, the state has always been a variable of different forms, 
functions, and capacities. Yet, different manifestations of statehood are often 
presented as variations of a common theme: the Western state model. This is not 
surprising, considering that the concept of modern statehood has a geographically 
confined, historical origin. Whereas people have been living in modes of social 
organization other than states for most of human existence, a process of state 
formation occurring in Western Europe between the 17th and 19th century has brought 
about a model of organization that has since come to dominate the political map 
around the globe.94 This particular model of social organization – the centralized, 
hierarchical nation state – is equally the product of an intellectual tradition that has its 
origins in Western Europe. The institutional patterns and functions of the modern 
state, for instance, were further delineated in the works of the German sociologist 
Max Weber, who described the state as relying on a bureaucratic apparatus with the 
ability to maintain a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force.95 In turn, 
the idea that the state is founded on a social contract between the rulers and the ruled, 
which attribute certain functions to the state and in turn pledge to pay taxes and obey 
the law, emerged from the works of influential political theorists like the English John 
Locke and the French Jean-Jacques Rousseau.96 Both Weber’s monopoly of the use of 
force and the social contract theory have become key references in most accounts of 
modern statehood – and as I return to shortly, in accounts of fragile statehood.97 
                                                        
94 There is a rich literature on state-building processes in Western Europe, often described as the 
particularization of sovereignty into smaller territorial units and ethnically defined areas and the 
centralization, institutionalization, and consolidation of power within these territories. For instance, 
CHARLES TILLY (ed) The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton University Press, 
1975); THOMAS ERTMAN (ed) Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and 
Early Modern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1997). Interestingly, the emergence of the national 
state is still often referred to as a historical accident. For instance, Nettle finds that “the most 
remarkable factor in the concretization of statehood in the historical experience of various countries is 
the apparent randomness of such development”. NETTL, 'The State as a Conceptual Variable', p. 566.  
95  WOLFGANG J. MOMMSEN & WOLFGANG SCHLUCHTER (eds), Gesamtausgabe Max Weber. 
Wissenschaft als Beruf, 1917/1919 - Politik als Beruf, 1919 (Mohr, 1992).  
96 E.g. JOHN LOCKE, Two Treatises of Government (1689) (University Press, 1960); JEAN-JACQUES 
ROUSSEAU, Du Contrat Social (1762) (Rieder, 1922) 
97 Chapter I.2 b). The limited explanatory value of the Western state model beyond the Western 
hemisphere has been elaborated in many studies on state failure or fragility, for instance, MARTINA 
FISCHER & BEATRIX SCHMELZLE, Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 
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The Western (or ‘European’, ‘Weberian’, ‘Westphalian’) state model, however, 
proved not to be easily transferable to other parts of the world – in fact, it is an ideal 
that has probably “never been an accurate description of many of the entities that have 
been regarded as states”.98 In the late 19th and 20th century, the model spread and was 
spread across the world in the wake of decolonization. Newly independent nations 
that emerged after the First and Second World War were indeed striving for statehood, 
seeking self-determination, integration, and domestic viability by adopting the typical 
structures of states found in Western Europe. These processes often involved the 
transplantation or imposition of institutions on other forms of social organization, 
however, which would continue to exist below a “semi-fictional overlay”.99 In the 
absence of certain historical, intellectual, and cultural dispositions, the Western state 
model did often not take root. Rather, the struggle of the “post-colonial state” 
particularly in Africa was partly attributed to the importation of practices and 
mentalities of the colonial state into its post-colonial successor: hierarchical, 
governmental structures, insulated from civil society and relying on thinly spread 
local elites, personalized networks of patronage, and clientelist loyalty.100 Moreover, 
colonialism had lasted long enough to destroy traditional, pre-colonial structures, 
while leaving newly independent states with underdeveloped infrastructure and weak 
institutions.101 Consequently, the accumulated cost of maintaining the sort of state that 
had turned into a global norm by decolonization, in particular the institutional and 
administrative capacities it required for the expected provision of public goods, could 
                                                                                                                                                              
Dialogue Series 8, 'Building Peace in the Absence of States - Challenging the Discourse on State 
Failure' (2009). 
98 STEPHEN D. KRASNER, 'Rethinking the Sovereign State Model', 27 Review of International Studies, 
17 (2001), 1.  
99 OUTI KORHONEN, 'The ‘State-Building Enterprise’: Legal Doctrine, Progress Narratives and 
Managerial Governance ', in Brett Bowden, et al. (eds), The Role of International Law in Rebuilding 
Societies after Conflict. Great Expectations (Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 21; and infra 
chapter I.2 b).  
100 There is by now a vast literature on the African post-colonial state, which social scientists begun 
studying since the 1980s. E.g. PIERRE ENGLEBERT & DENIS M. TULL, 'Postconflict Reconstruction in 
Africa Flawed Ideas about Failed States', 32 International Security, 106 (2008), 111, arguing that “at 
no point in the postcolonial era remotely resembled the ideal type of the modern Western polity.” In 
detail, see YOUNG CRAWFORD, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (Yale 
University Press, 1994); PIERRE ENGLEBERT, State Legitimacy and Development in Africa (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2000); or JEFFREY HERBST, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in 
Authority and Control (Princeton University Press, 2000). 
101 Pre-colonial state structures existed, for instance, in the Ashanti Empire (now Southern Ghana), the 
Kingdom of Congo (cutting across today’s Angola, Republic of Congo, and Democratic Republic of 
Congo). On the long history and diversity of pre-colonial social and political organization in Africa, 
see, for instance, CHRISTOPHER EHRET, The Civilizations of Africa: A History to 1800 (University of 
Virginia Press, 2002); or HERBST, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and 
Control, pp. 35-57. 
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not always be born. As Christopher Clapham sums up: “[i]n a world conditioned by 
the idea of progress, and accustomed to the state as an essential element in the march 
of progress, the universality of this form of organization has been taken for granted, 
while the question of whether the whole world could afford states has been 
ignored.”102  
The last episode in the evolution of modern statehood – its expansion to all parts 
of the world by means of granting the formal attributes of state sovereignty to newly 
independent nations – thus significantly increased the variation of statehood, perhaps 
at the same time as heralding its decline.103 Since then, the profound political and 
sociological transformations associated with globalization have eroded the power of 
the state as exclusive territorial authority everywhere.104  No state can today fully 
control its borders, run its economy autonomously, and protect its citizens from 
transnational threats on its own.105 Accordingly, intergovernmental cooperation has 
become closer, and states are delegating sovereign tasks to international organizations 
and submitting to international regulation at a growing pace.  
Looking at statehood from an empirical-sociological perspective thus exposes 
how the existence of states that fulfill variable functions with variable degrees of 
capacity is neither a new, nor necessarily an exceptional phenomenon. If anything, the 
discrepancy between an ideal type of statehood and its variable manifestations has 
become more apparent in all parts of the world, including the so-called Western 
hemisphere. Nevertheless, as a form of political organization and fundamental 
building block of the international system, the state has remained remarkably intact. 
Political entities are still thriving towards statehood, and care to maintain its formal 
                                                        
102 CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM, 'The Challenge to the State in a Globalized World', 33 Development & 
Change, 775 (2002), 778.  
103 NETTL, 'The State as a Conceptual Variable', p. 574.  
104 E.g. PETER EVANS, 'The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization', 
50in ibid., 62 (1997), at 68 ff.; HEINHARD STEIGER, 'Geht das Zeitalter des souveränen Staates zu 
Ende?', 41 Der Staat, 331 (2002), 337-346, arguing that globalization has affected all three dimensions 
of statehood: its territoriality, its integrative power, and the exclusivity of its claim to regulatory 
competence; ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004), 
studying the effects of globalization through the lens of the concept of the “disaggregated state”; ALICE 
TEICHOVA & HERBERT MATIS, 'Introduction', in Alice Teichova & Herbert Matis (eds), Nation, State 
and the Economy in History (Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 1-10, at 7 (“The nation-state is a 
historical phenomenon, and as such liable to 'expiry' fostered by the globalization process.”).  
105 In some ways, however, the globalizing economy has also reinforced the institutional centrality of 
the state, as ‘high stateness’ proved to be a comparative advantage for some countries. For instance, a 
strong state capable of providing legal certainty and exerting control over the economy through 
regulation is often seen as beneficial to economic development. On the model of the ‘developmental 
state’, see infra note 118). 
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appearance by cultivating state institutions even where they amount to a mere 
camouflage. The evolving discourse on state fragility to which we turn now therefore 
unfolds largely within the confines of an established, though historically contingent 
and normatively charged notion of statehood.  
b) The Evolving Understanding of Fragile States 
 
If the existence of stronger and weaker statehood is not a new phenomenon, how 
did the notion of state fragility become so prominent over the last two decades? Is it 
the result of a change of factual circumstances, or rather shifting perceptions in the 
light of a changing global policy environment? While the end of the Cold War came 
with a surge of internal conflict and instability in many parts of the world, the fragile 
state is as much a construction of the Western political and academic discourse. Two, 
often intertwined, narratives thus emerge behind the fragile states discourse, which 
are often difficult to disentangle. 106  One is that of a ‘real’ and also enormously 
complex challenge of weak governance and chronic underdevelopment that has 
gradually begun receiving more international attention; the other is a subjective 
construction of deficient statehood, which has come to be juxtaposed to an ideal 
notion of statehood, and regularly exposed as a threat to Western security interests. 
The end of the Cold War both brought about and brought to light the increasing 
“discrepancies between the outward forms and the inward substance of sovereign 
states” in many parts of the world.107 On the one hand, the instability and pathologies 
of the “post-colonial state” often became apparent only with the retreat of support 
from Western or communist countries.108 Before, the weak institutional apparatus of 
the military regimes, dictatorships, and one-party states which had come to dominate 
the political landscape in Africa and elsewhere since the 1970s had been kept 
artificially alive through outside support. The wave of democratization that swept 
                                                        
106 Other authors also point to a combination of empirical changes and changing perceptions and policy 
preferences to account for the sudden interest with fragile states. For instance, EDWARD NEWMAN, 
'Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World', 90 Contemporary 
Security Policy, 421 (2009), at 437; or MACRAE, et al., 'Aid to 'Poorly Performing’ Countries: A 
Critical Review of Debates and Issues', at 5, identifying as driving factors a combination of “changes in 
the political economy of a significant number of low-income countries”, and “changes in the global 
political environment […] marked by shifting interpretations of the limits and scope of states’ 
sovereignty”.  
107 JACKSON, Quasi-states. Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, p. 24. 
108  See, for instance, CRAWFORD YOUNG, 'The End of the Post-Colonial State in Africa? Reflections on 
the Changing African Political Dynamics', 103 African Affairs, 23 (2004), arguing that since African 
states were profoundly transformed by the reordering of politics after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
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through the developing world in the 1990s produced new governments that still 
struggled to keep up with demands for market liberalization and the pressures of 
globalization. In Eastern Europe, the sudden breakup of the Soviet Union and the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia also resulted in a spur of nationalist 
sentiments that had previously been suppressed, and that produced successor states 
facing difficulties to consolidate. On the other hand, a general sense of euphemism 
over “the end of history” (Fukuyama) and the triumph of the Western liberal political 
and economic system paved the way for a more overt universalization of that 
particular system. The end of the Cold War thus entailed significant shifts both in 
terms of political economy, and regarding the international political environment in 
which policies are formulated and implemented. 
Against this background, Robert H. Jackson was probably the first international 
relations scholar who turned from the pathologies of the “post-colonial state” to a 
broader conceptualization of statehood at the fault lines between factual manifestation 
and legal status, between empirical statehood and juridical statehood.109  In 1990, 
Jackson argued that a large number of developing countries were merely “quasi states” 
since they were unable to fulfill even the most basic functions of a state, but were 
supported from above by international law and financial aid.110 Quasi states possessed 
the legal status of states, participated in international organizations, and were 
protected by the principle of sovereignty, but they were lacking the institutional 
features of sovereign states and the actual capacity to exercise sovereign rights.111  
While Jackson had highlighted that material differences and empirical variations 
among states were not new, the sudden and rapidly increasing attention to “failed 
states” in the early 1990s initially seemed to suggest the emergence of an unknown 
challenge, a looming threat of “the coming anarchy”.112 With a view to the civil war, 
                                                        
109 Jackson’s ideas have been taken up and elaborated elsewhere. For example: CHRISTOPHER 
CLAPHAM, Africa and the International System. The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge University 
Press, 1996); or JEFFREY HERBST, 'Responding to State Failure in Africa', 21 International Security, 
120 (1996). 
110 JACKSON, Quasi-states. Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, at 5. Jackson 
unfolds his key argument with reference to the development regime, which “presupposes a new type of 
sovereign state which is independent in law but insubstantial in reality and materially dependent on 
other states for its welfare.” See also infra note 238. 
111 Ibid., p. 21. On the concepts of negative and positive sovereignty in detail, see p. 27 and p. 29 
respectively. See also ROBERT H. JACKSON & CARL G.  ROSBERG, 'Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: 
Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis', 24 The Journal of Modern African Studies, 1 (1986). 
112 Robert Kaplan, an American writer, captures his experience from a trip to Sierra Leone and Liberia 
in an essay titled “The Coming Anarchy”. ROBERT D.  KAPLAN, 'The Coming Anarchy. How Scarcity, 
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humanitarian crisis, and UN intervention in Somalia, Helman and Ratner coined the 
term ‘failed state’ for what they understood as a new phenomenon, a state “utterly 
incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community”.113  
In the following years, however, the international community witnessed the 
ensuing Bosnian War, how Liberia and Sierra Leone were racked by small-scale 
conflicts, and the genocide in Rwanda with its destabilizing effects on the Great 
Lakes region. It became clear that state failure was not a problem confined to Somalia, 
and the failed state discourse soon picked up on the historical antecedents of weak 
statehood.114  
While the analytical value of treating countries as “failed” that had never 
“remotely resembled the ideal type of the modern Western polity” was thus 
questionable,115  state failure continued to draw attention particularly in (security) 
policy-oriented literature. 116  The international community’s attempts at restoring 
security and order through military intervention and robust peace-keeping in Somalia 
or Rwanda in the early 1990s had proven moderately successful at best. At the same 
time, though the total collapse of state authority remained a rare occurrence, the 
proliferation of non-international armed conflicts and protracted humanitarian crises 
that were soon described as complex emergencies continued. At the UN, collapsing 
state institutions and the resulting breakdown of law and order were identified as 
                                                                                                                                                              
Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease are Rapidly Destroying The Social Fabric of our 
Planet', in The Atlantic (February 1994). 
113 HELMAN & RATNER, 'Saving Failed States', 3 et seq., arguing that through the breakdown of 
government, widespread poverty and violence, states were descending into anarchy, resulting in the 
deprivation of citizens’ rights and the threat of destabilizing neighboring countries and regions. 
Examples of failed states were Haiti, Yugoslavia, the USSR, Somalia, Sudan, Liberia and Cambodia. 
114 William Zartman, a renowned Africanist, studies the crises of many African states since 
independence, including the DRC of the 1960s; Chad, Ghana and Uganda during the early 1980s; and 
Somalia, Liberia and Ethiopia of the early 1990s. Zartman defines state collapse as “a situation where 
the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart”. IRA WILLIAM 
ZARTMAN, 'Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse', in Ira William Zartman (ed) Collapsed 
States. Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 1. 
115 ENGLEBERT & TULL, 'Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa Flawed Ideas about Failed States', at 
111. Also supra chapter I.2 a). 
116 E.g. the Harvard University’s Failed States Project, conducted under the aegis of Robert Rotberg 
between 1998 and 2002. The Failed States Project distinguishes between weak, failing, failed and 
collapsed states based on their ability to delivering political goods to their citizens (p. 2). Symptoms of 
state failure included a list as diverse as prevailing violence, flawed institutions and a lack of control 
over the peripheries, economic deprivation, a deteriorating infrastructure, loss of legitimacy and 
disharmony between communities. ROBERT I. ROTBERG (ed) When States Fail. Causes and 
Consequences (Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 5-9, and with country case studies, ROBERT I. 
ROTBERG (ed) State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (World Peace Foundation, 2003). 
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central features of a new breed of conflict in the 1992 “Agenda for Peace”, which also 
advocated the shift to a positive understanding of peace and to conflict prevention.117 
In the international development community, the mid-1990s brought an enhanced 
interest in what sort of state institutions and government policies could support 
economic development. Not only did the model of the developmental state that could 
effectively generate and manage economic policies experience a small renaissance,118 
but to further development, governments were now expected to deliver good 
governance, typically understood in terms of transparent and accountable 
management of public resources and respect for the rule of law.119 Both concepts – 
that of the developmental state and good governance – framed the evolving approach 
to state fragility, in that they forged a conception of the ideal type of state and 
governance that came to be juxtaposed to fragile and failed states.120 
It is a single event, however, that significantly increased the focus on weak 
statehood in the international security and development community: the terrorist 
attacks on the United States of September 11th, 2001. “America is now less threatened 
by conquering states than by failing ones”, the US government found in its National 
Security Strategy of 2002. 121  The terrorist attacks had been launched from 
Afghanistan, where retreating statehood appeared to have provided fertile grounds for 
the responsible terrorist group Al Qaeda. In a report released in 2004, the UN 
                                                        
117 An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping. Report of the 
Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 
31 January 1992. UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111 (17 June 1992); and on peace as a foundation for 
development, see the subsequent report B. Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Development, Report by the 
Secretary General, UN Doc. A/48/935 (May 6, 1994), paras. 16-40. 
118 Already since the 1970s, particularly regional studies scholars had enquired into the institutional 
structures and government policies believed to support the sort of fast-paced, economic development 
witnessed in South-East Asia. Examples of the now voluminous literature on the role of the state in the 
East Asian economic miracle and the model of the developmental state include PETER EVANS, 
Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton University Press, 1995); and 
ADRIAN LEFTWICH, 'Bringing Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State', 31 
Journal of Development Studies, 400 (1995). 
119 An important turning point was the publication of a World Bank study in 1989, which found that 
“[u]nderlying the litany of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of governance.” THE WORLD 
BANK, 'Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. A Long-Term Perspective Study' 
(1989), p. 60. On the emergence of good governance as a “guiding principle of statehood”, see RUDOLF 
DOLZER, 'Good Governance: Neues transnationales Leitbild der Staatlichkeit?', 64 Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 535 (2004), and infra chapter II.2 a). 
120 There is thus a close link in the 1990s between shifting aid policies, for instance the increasing use 
of conditionality and selectivity in development aid, and broader trends in international relations, 
whereby it became more accepted for external actors to become concerned with the political system 
and performance of a state, and to intervene in matters that used to be seen as part of the state’s 
domaine reservée. See MACRAE, et al., 'Aid to 'Poorly Performing’ Countries: A Critical Review of 
Debates and Issues', 14. 
121 National Security Strategy, Washington D.C., 2002.  
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provided a broad assessment of the threats that required collective international action 
– virtually all of them related in some way to weak statehood.122 
The “securitization” of weak statehood led powerful states and international 
organizations to devote increasing amounts of resources to the endeavors of 
rebuilding conflict-affected countries and stabilizing societies believed vulnerable.123 
Enhancing ‘state effectiveness’ through ‘state-building’ came to be seen as a panacea 
for the external and internal challenges associated with fragile states. Where Robert H. 
Jackson had spoken of a discrepancy between juridical and empirical statehood, 
Ashraf Ghani, former Minister of Finance and later President of Afghanistan, and 
Clare Lockhart, referred to a “sovereignty gap” as “the key obstacle to ensuring 
global security and prosperity”.124 In their book with the ambitious title “Fixing Failed 
States”, Ghani and Lockhart argue that the international community must collectively 
work to strengthen the capacity of states to fulfill certain basic functions.125  The 
central objective of the state-building agenda often followed the assumption that all 
states eventually had to converge towards the Western state model, with the state 
providing security, justice, and welfare to its citizens.126  Necessarily, attention to 
state-building thus reinforced both a particular ideal of statehood and the construction 
of the “Other”, the fragile state that did not yet conform to this model.127  
                                                        
122 United Nations Secretary General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the 
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Doc. A/59/565 (2004).  
123 NEWMAN, 'Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World', 434, 
whereby securitization is the “process by which issues are accorded security status or seen as a threat 
through political labeling, rather than as a result of their real or objective significance.”  
124 ASHRAF  GHANI, et al., Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper 253, 'Closing the 
Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building' (2005), at 4, and ASHRAF GHANI & CLARE 
LOCKHART, Fixing Failed States. A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 21, defining a sovereignty gap as the disjunction between the de jure assumption that all 
states are sovereign and the de facto reality that many are malfunctioning.  
125 GHANI, et al., 'Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building', 4. There is a vast 
literature on state-building. See, for instance, FUKUYAMA, State-Building. Governance and World 
Order in the 21st Century; SIMON CHESTERMAN, et al. (eds), Making States Work: State Failure and 
the Crisis of Governance (United Nations University Press, 2005); see RICHARD CAPLAN, International 
Governance of War-torn Territories. Rule and Reconstruction (Oxford University Press, 2005); or 
ARMIN  VON BOGDANDY, et al., 'State-Building, Nation-Building, and Constitutional Politics in Post-
Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and an Appraisal of Different Approaches', 9 Max 
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 579 (2005).  
126 E.g. JEAN D'ASPREMONT, 'Post-conflict Administrations as Democracy-building Instruments' 
Chicago Journal of International Law, 1 (2008), pointing out that externally supported state-building  
e.g. in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, has always been aimed at building democratic states. 
127 In her insightful book on “Decolonizing International Law”, Sundhya Pahuja notes that labeling 
some states as failed in turn served to maintain the integrity and monopoly of statehood itself, since 
“nation states that ‘failed’ did not challenge the orthodoxy that nation statehood was the natural form of 
collective politico-territorial organization, but were instead narrated away as not yet developed enough 
to achieve and maintain the nation state form.” SUNDHYA PAHUJA, Decolonizing International Law: 
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The state-building agenda was accordingly criticized for its patronizing, neo-
colonialist undertones, and for being mistakenly technical and too much focused on 
the formal institutions of the state. 128  The moderate success of the international 
community’s ambitious state-building projects from Kosovo to Afghanistan and Iraq 
soon provided evidence for the limitations of the approach and its underlying 
assumptions.129 It was partly attributed to an insufficient understanding not just of the 
political economy of conflicts, but of the local power structures and sources of 
legitimacy in these states more generally – that is, of the particular variations of 
empirical statehood.130  
Next to external state-building interventions, development and humanitarian 
assistance gained in importance as elements of a comprehensive strategy to prevent 
conflict, strengthen state capacity, and meet citizens’ basic needs in fragile states. 
Already in 2001 – prompted by the policy shifts of the United States, its major 
shareholder – the World Bank had established a task force to analyze the specific 
development challenges of fragile states, the “Low-Income Countries Under Stress” 
(LICUS) initiative. 131  In his 2007 work on the “Bottom Billion”, the estimated 
                                                                                                                                                              
Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
at 80.  
128 E.g. DAVID CHANDLER, 'Great Power Responsibility and "Failed States": Strengthening 
Sovereignty?', in Julia Raue & Patrick Sutter (eds), Facets and Practices of State-Buildung (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2009), 19, arguing that behind the objective of fostering state “capacities”, re-conceptualizing 
sovereignty as “responsibility”, and asserting the leadership of government partners in fragile states, 
they suspected the “desire on behalf of Western states to avoid direct accountability for policy 
interventions”. Prominent critics include also RALPH WILDE, International Territorial Administration. 
How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away, 1. publ. (Oxford University Press, 
2008); CAPLAN, International Governance of War-torn Territories. Rule and Reconstruction; 
CLAPHAM, 'Degrees of Statehood'; and SIMON CHESTERMAN, 'International Territorial Administration 
and the Limits of Law', 23 Leiden Journal of International Law, 437 (2010). For an overview of recent 
literature on the failings of Western state-building and development interventions, see NEIL COOPER, 
'Review Article: On the Crisis of the Liberal Peace', 7 Conflict, Security & Development, 605 (2007), 
606.  
129 On lessons learned, see, for instance, FRANCIS FUKUYAMA (ed) Nation-Building. Beyond 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 
130 For a critique of the “fetishization of state capacity” in the earlier state-building literature, see, for 
instance, SHAHAR HAMEIRI, 'Regulatory Statebuilding and the Transformation of the State', in David 
Chandler & Timothy Sisk (eds), Routledge Handbook on International Statebuilding (Routledge, 2013), 
at 54-57. 
131 The LICUS task force promoted the understanding that building effective and legitimate state 
institutions is not only a prerequisite for development progress, but also a measure of conflict 
prevention, given the proclivity of LICUS to become failed states and terrorist havens. See the LICUS 
Task Force Report (2002). Notably, the IDA’s commitments to fragile and conflict-affected states more 
than doubled immediately after fiscal year 2001. See INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP, The World 
Bank, 'World Bank Assistance to Low-Income Fragile- and Conflict Affected States' (2013), Figure 3.1 
(p. 26). On the World Bank’s and OECD’s increasing focus on fragile states post 9/11, see also 
STEPHEN BARANYI & MARIE-EVE DESROSIERS, 'Development Cooperation in Fragile States: Filling or 
Perpetuating Gaps?', 12 Conflict, Security & Development 443 (2012), 443, 446.  
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combined population of all fragile states, Collier argued that some states were caught 
in traps that prevented them from achieving development: the conflict trap, the natural 
resource trap, the landlocked with bad neighbors trap, and the bad governance in a 
small country trap.132 Since then, development actors have increasingly seized the 
topic from the exclusive grasp of security experts, and reframed it. The assumption 
that weak statehood constitutes a major threat to international security has given way 
to a more nuanced picture,133 and in 2009, World Bank President Robert Zoellick 
declared fragile states are “the toughest development challenge of our era” – one that 
requires the international community to think anew about the nexus between 
economics, security, and governance.134 
The lessons learned from overly ambitious state-building interventions, together 
with vigorous analysis of why traditional models of development cooperation proved 
often ineffective or counterproductive in fragile states, have contributed to a gradually 
more refined understanding of the phenomenon. There is now a growing recognition 
that allegedly weak states can display multiple forms of social organization, wherein 
non-state actors and de-centralized modes of service provision gain in importance. 
Accordingly, fragile states are not so much characterized by a political vacuum or 
“sovereignty gap” than by different forms of governance that assume controlling and 
allocating functions.135   Since non-state actors and informal institutions frequently 
take on some of the state’s functions in terms of service delivery, generally confined 
to parts of the territory or population, it appears necessary to distinguish between the 
                                                        
132 COLLIER, The Bottom Billion. Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About 
It, p. 4. Collier also contributed to an influential study that estimated the combined cost of state failure 
or fragility for the international community at around 276 billion USD per year. LISA CHAUVET, et al., 
United Nations University WIDER Research Paper No. 2007/30, 'The Costs of Failing States and the 
Limits to Sovereignty' (2007). See also DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES ROBINSON, Why Nations Fail. The 
Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (Crown Business, 2012), who provide a comprehensive 
account of the importance of political and economic institutions for economic development and thus 
explain ‘why nations fail’. 
133 For instance, Stewart Patrick argues that terrorist networks and international organized crime 
require the infrastructure of functioning states, and fragile states therefore pose a greater risk to their 
own people than they pose to international peace and security. STEWART PATRICK, Weak Links: Fragile 
States, Global Threats, and International Security (Oxford University Press, 2011). See also JAMES 
TRAUB, 'Think Again: Failed States', in Foreign Policy (June 20, 2011). Michael Mazarr finds that the 
concern with weak or fragile states in international security circles has always been “more of a mania 
than a sound strategic doctrine”, and is therefore gradually replaced with more long-term financial and 
technical assistance. MICHAEL J.  MAZARR, 'The Rise and Fall of the Failed-State Paradigm. Requiem 
for a Decade of Distraction', in Foreign Affairs (January/February 2014). 
134 ROBERT B. ZOELLICK, 'Fragile States: Securing Development', 50 Survival, 67 (2009), 68-69.  
135 See, for example, the comprehensive study INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, 'An Upside Down 
View of Governance' (April 2010), and the findings of the Berlin-based research project on 
“Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood” in JOSEF BRAML, et al. (eds), Einsatz für den Frieden. 
Sicherheit und Entwicklung in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit (Oldenbourg, 2010), 4. 
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“government“ on the one hand, and the exercise of “governance” – not confined to 
state actors – on the other.136  
In line with these findings, practitioners have shown a growing interest in opening 
the “black box” of the fragile state, and understanding state-society relations in 
situations where non-state actors assume key legitimizing functions of the state.137 
Not just the effectiveness of state institutions, their capacity to deliver certain core 
functions, have come to be seen as critical to an understanding of weak statehood, but 
also its authority and legitimacy. State legitimacy is mostly cast not as input-based, i.e. 
related to the democratic form of government, but output-based, i.e. based on the 
ability of the state to meet the needs and expectations of its citizens.138  
The evolution of such a gradually more pluralist and also more modest 
understanding of state fragility hits a temporary peak with the endorsement of the 
“fragile state” label by some of its nominees. In 2010, a group of fragile states 
announced the establishment of the g7+, an informal forum to exchange and promote 
their interest vis-à-vis international partners. The g7+ have since sought to define 
fragility not “through the lens of the developed”, but “through the eyes of the 
developing”, and to influence policy-making through a “fragile state perspective on 
fragility”.139 Independent of how influential the g7+ initiative can be in redirecting the 
                                                        
136 BRAML, et al. (eds), Einsatz für den Frieden. Sicherheit und Entwicklung in Räumen begrenzter 
Staatlichkeit, 5.  
137 OECD, 'The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations. Unpacking Complexity', 7, arguing that a 
“lack of legitimacy is a major contributor to state fragility because it undermines state authority, and 
therefore capacity”; also THE WORLD BANK, 'World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and 
Development', at 84. For an overview of what is meant by the concern with state-society relations in 
development cooperation, see the GSDRC synopsis available online: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-
guides/state-society-relations-and-citizenship/state-society-relations-overview (accessed December 
2014). 
138 OECD, 'The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations. Unpacking Complexity', p. 15, Basic Concepts. 
The OECD establishes that a lack of legitimacy undermines the state’s authority and weakens its 
capacity, hence contributing to fragility. In the World Development Report 2011, the World Bank 
adopts a notion of legitimacy that “denotes a broad-based belief that social, economic, or political 
arrangements and outcomes are proper and just.“ THE WORLD BANK, 'World Development Report: 
Conflict, Security, and Development', Glossary of Terms. However, many accounts of state fragility or 
failure still demonstrate a certain “democratic bias”, in that they link the form of government to the 
resilience of state institutions despite a lack of strong, scientific evidence. FELIX BETHKE, 'Zuverlässig 
invalide – Indizes zur Messung fragiler Staatlichkeit', 6 Zeitschrift für vergleichende 
Politikwissenschaft, 19 (2012). 
139 As of October 2014, the g7+ counts 20 members from four continents: Afghanistan, Burundi, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, 
Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, and Yemen. See online, 
http://www.g7plus.org/ (accessed December 2014). On the formation of the g7+ and their potential to 
influence and to overcome obvious asymmetries in political decision-making on conflict-affected and 
fragile states, see VANESSA WYETH, 'Knights in Fragile Armor: The Rise of the “G7+”', 18 Global 
Governance, 7 (2012); and infra chapter II.3 a). 
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discourse on fragile states, its establishment indicates that being classified as “fragile” 
is no longer seen as necessarily a disadvantage.140 
The conflation of competing interests and different social constructions, however, 
continues to render issues of conceptualization, definition, and measurement the most 
problematic aspects of the study of state fragility.141 Not only is it doubtful whether a 
multidimensional, fluid phenomenon like state fragility can meaningfully be captured 
in a single definition or index, without differentiating between different 
constellations.142 Perhaps inevitably, all accounts of state fragility are also based on a 
particular conception of the means and ends of statehood. For instance, drawing on 
Weber’s conception of the monopoly over the legitimate use of force, some accounts 
of state fragility concentrate on the state’s (in)ability to provide and maintain law and 
order. Others take a more comprehensive conception of statehood as a starting point, 
comparing fragile states with the Western model of liberal, democratic, rule of law-
abiding, welfare states.  
The majority of fragile states definitions draw on the social contract theory and 
accordingly look for the state’s capacity or will to fulfill certain basic functions 
towards its citizens.143 The OECD, for example, defines states as “fragile when state 
structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for 
                                                        
140 With an interesting case study on how developing countries can use the fragile states label for their 
purposes, e.g. to delay political reforms or to receive more donor funding, see JONATHAN FISHER, 
'When it Pays to be a ‘Fragile State’: Uganda’s Use and Abuse of a Dubious Concept', 35 Third World 
Quarterly, 316 (2014). It is important to note that many countries continue to refuse the fragile states 
terminology, and for that reason, refuse to join the g7+.  
141 HARVEY STARR, 'Introduction to the CMPS Special Issue on Failed States', 25 Conflict Management 
and Peace Science, 281 (2008), 282-283; or BERTOLI & TICCI, 'A Fragile Guideline to Development 
Assistance', 212, arguing that “the loosely defined character of the concept of fragility is a disturbing 
feature from both an academic and a policy-oriented perspective, as it produces an unwarranted 
perception of coincidence”. 
142 More recent proposals for measuring or defining fragility therefore seek to differentiate different 
dimensions of fragility (e.g. CHARLES T. CALL, 'Beyond the 'Failed State': Toward Conceptual 
Alternatives', 17 European Journal of International Relations, 303 (2010); or JÖRN  GRÄVINGHOLT, et 
al., German Development Institute, Discussion Paper 3/2012, 'State Fragility: Towards a Multi-
Dimensional Empirical Typology' (2012)); or to conceptualize fragility not in terms of a lack of 
capacity, legitimacy, and insecurity, but only insecurity (e.g. JAMES PUTZEL, Crises States Research 
Center, 'Why Development Actors Need a Better Definition of ‘State Fragility’' (2010)). 
143 In contrast, some authors prefer a more sociological conception of the state in describing state 
fragility. For instance, based on Durkheim’s conception of the state as “the very organ of social 
thought”, the focus shifts to the dynamics of socio-political cohesion, rather than state institutions alone. 
See NICOLAS LEMAY-HÉBERT, 'Statebuilding without Nation-building? Legitimacy, State Failure and 
the Limits of the Institutionalist Approach', 3 Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 21 (2009); also 
TRUTZ VON TROTHA, 'The “Andersen Principle”: On the Difficulty of Truly Moving Beyond State-
Centrism', in Martina Fischer & Beatrix Schmelzle (eds), Building Peace in the Absence of States - 
Challenging the Discourse on State Failure (Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict 
Management, Dialogue Series 8, 2009), proposing to think of these states in terms of ‘hybrid political 
orders’. 
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poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of 
their populations”.144 With its functional understanding of statehood, such definitions 
are not necessarily less biased than those that suppose the existence of specific 
institutions of liberal democracy. Certainly, most symptoms of state fragility may be 
reduced to the inability of the state to perform certain tasks in the realm of security, 
welfare, and rule of law:145 from uncontrolled borders and high levels of crime, to 
deteriorating infrastructures and privatization of health and education systems, to self-
enriching elites and corruption. Yet, functional definitions of statehood and state 
fragility may appear technical, but they often disguise questions that goes to the heart 
of every political system: what functions are expected from the state, and how do 
different functions – security, welfare, rule of law – relate to each other?  
Ultimately, it appears nearly impossible to disentangle the two narratives that lay 
behind the evolving understanding of fragile states, and to “de-politicize” the 
notion.146 Still, a glance at the evolving understanding of fragile states has also shown 
that a more nuanced understanding of the symptoms and drivers of state fragility is 
emerging. This understanding goes beyond the construction of state fragility as aliud 
of an ideal notion of statehood and as a threat to Western security interests. Instead, it 
involves an increasing sensitivity for alternative loci and modes of governance in 
fragile states, and informs a growing concern with the developmental effects of weak 
and unaccountable state institutions.147 Not just the effectiveness of state institutions, 
their capacity to deliver certain core functions, have come to be seen as critical to an 
understanding of weak statehood, but also their authority and legitimacy in the eyes of 
                                                        
144 See the definition in the OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & 
Situations, April 2007 (hereinafter Fragile States Principles). The OECD has proposed slightly 
different definitions in subsequent publications. See, for instance, the definition quoted in supra note 1. 
145 Most functional approaches roughly converge around these three core functions expected of a 
modern state. See, for instance, ULRICH SCHNECKENER, 'Fragile Staaten als Problem der 
internationalen Politik', 3 Nord-Süd Aktuell, 510 (2004), 513; GHANI & LOCKHART, Fixing Failed 
States. A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World, proposing 10 functions; JENNIFER MILLIKEN 
& KEITH KRAUSE, 'State Failure, State Collapse and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and 
Strategies', in Jennifer Milliken & Keith Krause (eds), State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction 
(Blackwell, 2005), suggesting „security, representation and welfare“.  
146 Edward Newman raises similar questions: “Is it possible to make a distinction between the concept 
of failed states as represented in discourse, and the reality of failed states – that is, to de-politicize the 
concept?” NEWMAN, 'Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World', 
421. 
147 Nay argues that the more refined understanding of state fragility is the result of processes of 
fragmentation and later assimilation, whereby a concept that has been appropriated by several 
international actors is first contested and subjected to various interpretations, and later refined and 
adapted to incorporate additional insights. OLIVIER NAY, 'International Organisations and the 
Production of Hegemonic Knowledge: How the World Bank and the OECD helped invent the Fragile 
State Concept', 35 Third World Quarterly, 210 (2014). 
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the population, and state-society relations more broadly.148 No matter whether the 
notion of fragile state is thus a viable category or concept, however, or remains a 
‘“trading language’ to talk about complex social realities too heterogeneous for 
theoretical agreement”,149 it still has an impact on international policy-making. We 
return to this in chapter II.  
 
3. Legal Grasp on Fragile States 
 
“The State has two aspects: rest and movement, continuance and progress, 
 body and spirit.” – Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, 1895150   
 
Unlike empirical-sociological accounts of statehood, legal scholars conceive of 
the state not as a variable or an aggregate of social conditions or events, but as part of 
the law – law stands for and guarantees the aspects of rest, continuance, and body. 
Whereas the emergence of states may be a historical and sociological process, 
international law transforms the empirical situation into a legal condition as soon as it 
attaches legal consequences to the existence of states.151  Once attained, the legal 
status of statehood is static and in principle does not reflect the empirical variances 
between states in terms of form or function, capacity or performance.  
In the following, I start with a brief introduction to the juridical concept of 
statehood (a), which explains why international law scholars have approached the 
                                                        
148 MACRAE, et al., 'Aid to 'Poorly Performing’ Countries: A Critical Review of Debates and Issues ', pp. 
46-50. For instance, the World Bank defines fragility and fragile situations in the World Development 
Report 2011 as “[p]eriods when states or institutions lack the capacity, accountability, or legitimacy to 
mediate relations between citizen groups and between citizens and the state, making them vulnerable to 
violence.” THE WORLD BANK, 'World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development', 
Glossary of Terms; see also ALEXANDRE MARC, et al., Societal Dynamics and Fragility.  Engaging 
Societies in Responsing to Fragile Situations (The World Bank, 2013), looking at fragility not just as a 
problem of state capacity, but also of relationships within society. 
149 NEHAL BHUTA, 'Governmentalizing Sovereignty: Indexes of State Fragility and the Calculability of 
Political Order', in Kevin E. Davis, et al. (eds), Governance by Indicators. Global Power Through 
Quantification and Rankings (Oxford University Press, 2012), at 135. 
150 JOHANN-CASPAR BLUNTSCHLI, The Theory of the State (Clarendon, 1985), 66-67, continuing: 
“There are two political sciences corresponding to this internal distinction, Public Law and Politics”. 
151 From a thoroughly positivist standpoint as represented by Hans Kelsen in his “General Theory of 
the State”, the state comes to be identified with the legal order: “The State is then taken into 
consideration only as a legal phenomenon, as a juristic person, that is as a corporation. Its nature is thus 
in principle determined by our earlier definition of the corporation. The only remaining question is how 
the State differs from other corporations. The difference must lie in the normative order that constitutes 
the State corporation.” (181). This leads Kelsen to claim that “[t]here is no sociological concept of the 
State besides the juristic concept” (188). HANS KELSEN, General Theory of Law and State (Harvard 
University Press, 1949). 
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topic of failed or fragile states with considerable caution, and why a juridical 
translation of state fragility remains of limited value (b).  
 
a) Juridical Statehood – The Wonderful Artificiality of the State 
 
The main difference between empirical and juridical statehood is aptly described 
by James Crawford in his seminal work on statehood in international law: “A State is 
not a fact in the sense that a chair is a fact; it is a fact in the sense in which it may be 
said a treaty is a fact: that is, a legal status attaching to a certain state of affairs by 
virtue of certain rules or practices.”152 If juridical statehood can thus be distinguished 
from empirical statehood, this raises two questions: what does the legal status consist 
in, and what are the rules or practices on the basis of which the status is granted? 
First, international law recognizes the state as a legal person. As such, the state 
obtains the capacity to be a bearer of rights and duties under international law.153 
Unlike other persons or entities that can bear rights and duties under international law, 
the state is not merely a passive recipient, but also an active participant in the 
international legal order. States constitute “the gatekeepers and legislators of the 
international system”, and, importantly, its principal enforcers.154 
The mutual role of states as both constitutive units and subjects of international 
law naturally poses a challenge to the conceptualization of states under international 
law. For instance, it has been subject to controversy whether there can be a legal 
concept of statehood if states are both the antecedents and the products of 
international law.155 Crawford seeks to respond to this controversy by identifying the 
legal characteristics that constitute the core of juridical statehood: the competence to 
perform acts on the international level, in particular to conclude treaties; the exclusive 
competence to regulate internal affairs, subject only to restrictions posed by 
international law; the freedom not to be subjected to compulsory jurisdiction, other 
                                                        
152 CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, 5. 
153 ICJ in Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations case, advisory opinion 
[1949] ICJ Rep. 174 at 178. Capacity refers to the legal, not the factual capacity to be the bearer of 
rights and duties under international law. 
154 CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, 29; MALCOLM N. SHAW, International 
Law, 5th (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 181. Of course, the proliferation of international 
organizations, courts and tribunals, as well as other international, national or transnational public and 
private actors who contribute to shaping the international legal order has challenged the state’s 
monopoly in this regard.  
155 E.g. MATHEW CRAVEN, 'States and Recognition in International Law', in Malcolm D. Evans (ed) 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2010), 218.  
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than by consent; and the right to be regarded as equal to other states under 
international law.156  
While these attributes serve to specify the particular form of standing that only 
states enjoy under international law, they should not be confounded with a set of 
fundamental rights and duties of states inherently linked to their legal status.157 Rather 
than constituting a set of rights, Crawford argues that the legal status granted to states 
under international law amounts to a “[presumption] as to the existence of such rights, 
powers, or capacities, rules that these exist unless otherwise stipulated.”158 The legal 
status of statehood thus amounts to no more or less than a “legally circumscribed 
claim of right.”159  
This somewhat intricate differentiation is important to bear in mind when 
examining the significance of state fragility from a legal perspective. It allows 
distinguishing between the (categorical) legal status of the state, and the specific role 
the state assumes as primary subject of international law. The role of the state – its 
“extent of powers, rights and responsibilities” – is variable in as much as states take 
on different rights and obligations under international law. 160  These variations, 
however, do not concern the legal status of state. 
If statehood is not merely presupposed by international law, the second question 
concerns the rules and practices that exist to determine whether an entity constitutes a 
state. The legal status of statehood is generally granted on the basis of three criteria, 
which were first established by Georg Jellinek in his doctrine of the three elements 
(Drei-Elementen-Lehre): a defined territory, a permanent population, and a 
                                                        
156 CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, 40-42. In a similar vein, Shaw identifies 
independence, equality, and the right to peaceful co-existence as the outstanding characteristics of 
states under international law. SHAW, International Law, 189. 
157 Some scholars posit a theory of fundamental rights and duties of states that is grounded in natural 
law, which is, however, disputed. SERGIO M. CARBONE & LORENZO SCHIANO DI PEPE, 'Fundamental 
Rights And Duties of States', in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press, January 2009).  
158 CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, 44.  
159 Ibid., 61. 
160 For instance, a state can agree to limit its powers by means of a binding agreement with other states 
or membership in an international organization. As long as the state’s legal independence from other 
states is maintained, the ICJ has established that its legal status remains unaffected. See Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case [Nicaragua v United States of America] [Merits] 
[1986] ICJ Rep 131. In his Advisory Opinion in the Austro-German Customs Union Case (PCIJ ser 
A/B no 41 (1931), 57-8), Judge Anzilotti has further defined independence: “[R]estrictions upon a 
State's liberty, whether arising out of ordinary international law or contractual engagements, do not as 
such in the least affect its independence. As long as these restrictions do not place the State under the 
legal authority of another State, the former remains an independent State however extensive and 
burdensome those obligations may be.” 
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government exercising effective control over the territory and population.161 These 
criteria also inform the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 
the most widely cited, textual basis for a definition of statehood until today.162  
For the purposes of this thesis, we can skip the first two criteria,163 and go straight 
to ‘effective government’ as the central constituting principle of statehood.164 In order 
to qualify as a state, an entity must have a government in general and exclusive 
control of its territory and with the ability to maintain law and order. The government 
is also the central organ by which the state acts on the international level. Effective 
government thus entails two aspects, both of which are important from the perspective 
of international law. Internally, a government is essential for enforcing international 
law domestically. Externally, the existence of a government remains the precondition 
for the state to act autonomously and legally independent from other states on the 
international plane, and to represent its people in international relations.  
                                                        
161 GEORG JELLINEK, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Julius Springer, 1922), p. 394. Other criteria are 
sometimes proposed as substitutes or complements, for instance, independence (to connote that a state 
is subject to no other authority than that of international law), or permanence (to emphasize that a state 
needs to show a certain continuance over a period of time). See SHAW, International Law, 181-182, 
arguing that independence constitutes the essence of legal capacity; or The American Law Institute’s 
Second Restatement, which demands that an entity “shows reasonable indications that the(se) 
requirements […] will continue to be satisfied” (Restatement 2nd, Foreign Relations Law of the US 
(1965), s 100 – 91. 
162 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Montevideo, 26 December 1933, 165 LNTS 19, 
Article 1: “The state as a person in international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a 
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations 
with other states” The fourth criterion is usually subsumed under the requirement of effective 
government, since it is rather a consequence than a requirement of statehood. Though the Montevideo 
Convention has been ratified by only a small number of South American states, Article 1 has become 
the generally accepted definition of statehood – perhaps for a lack of alternatives, as Thomas Grant 
argues the definition is ‘highly contingent upon the history, politics, and legal thought of its moment. It 
is over-inclusive, under-inclusive, and outdated.” THOMAS D. GRANT, 'Defining Statehood: The 
Montevideo Convention and its Discontents', 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 403 (1999), 
453. 
163 It suffices to note that international law makes no specification as to the required size of the 
population or territory, even if states with very small populations or territories (so-called micro or mini 
states) “may cast doubts on a State’s ability to comply with certain requirements of membership in 
international organizations.” KREIJEN, State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness. Legal Lessons 
from the Decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa, 19. On the criteria of permanent population and 
coherent territory in general, see IAN BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, 7th Edition 
(Oxford University Press, 2008), 70-71; or CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, pp. 
46-54. 
164 BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, 71; CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in 
International Law, 42. Government is the central criterion in that all other elements depend on it: 
territory is defined by international law with regards to territorial jurisdiction, i.e. the extent the 
government’s power extents over a geographical area or population. On the effective government 
criterion in detail, see also FRANZ LEIDENMÜHLER, Kollabierter Staat und Völkerrechtsordnung. Zur 
Aktualität der Westfälischen Ordnung, entwickelt an Fragen des Wegfalls effektiver Staatsgewalt 
(NWV Verlag, 2011), pp. 97-103 and 149-153. 
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Despite its central importance, what ‘effective government’ requires in 
international law is not easily established. As the concept implies, international law 
looks for the effectiveness of a government, and not so much its legality or legitimacy 
– at least traditionally.165 There is no legal rule that prescribes the form or internal 
constitution of a government, and states are free to choose their political, economic 
and social system. 166  In contrast, international law does require at least some 
centralized authority that is vested with the basic institutions and capacities necessary 
to uphold the monopoly on the use of force and effectively perform governmental 
functions.167 As justice Max Huber notes in the Island of Palmas case: “International 
law, the structure of which is not based on any super-state organization, cannot be 
presumed to reduce a right such as territorial sovereignty […] to the category of an 
                                                        
165 JAMES CRAWFORD, 'State', in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law January 2011), para. 14. The legality of a government has come to matter in certain 
cases, for example when Rhodesia was not recognized as a state by a majority at the United Nations 
since it was established on racial ideology. In turn, the claim that the legitimacy of a government does 
not matter for the creation of state is increasingly contested, and some authors have proposed to 
condition the recognition of states or governments on whether they enjoyed popular support. See, for 
instance, GREGORY FOX, 'The Right to Political Participation in International Law', 17 Yale Journal of 
International Law, 539 (1992), arguing that only democratic governments should be accredited at the 
UN; or GREGORY H. FOX & BRAD R. ROTH, 'Democracy and International Law', 27 Review of 
International Studies, 327 (2001), proposing the collective non-recognition of undemocratic states and 
governments. For a more nuanced view, see ANNE PETERS, 'Statehood after 1989: 'Effectivités' 
between Legality and Virtuality', in James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen (eds), Select Proceedings of the 
European Society of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2010), 182, who finds that 
effectiveness is a necessary, but not sufficient criterion of statehood, and must be complemented, but 
not substituted by considerations of legitimacy; or JURE VIDMAR, Democratic Statehood in 
International Law. The Emergence of New States in Post-Cold War Practice (Oxford University Press, 
2013), arguing that we need to understand the emergence of new states as a law-governed, political 
process, in which democratic requirements can be equally relevant or irrelevant as the traditional 
criteria of statehood. In sum, although there is an undeniable trend in state practice of recognition to 
consider a government’s legitimacy in addition to its effectiveness, this trend concerns the political act 
of recognition alone, and is not sufficient to have modified the legal doctrine of statehood.  
166 Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, para 94: “No rule of international law, in the 
view of the Court, requires the structure of a State to follow any particular pattern, as is evidenced from 
the diversity of the forms of State found in the world today.” The right to choose and to develop its 
internal system independently is, however, circumscribed by the principles of international law. 
ALFRED VERDROSS & BRUNO SIMMA, Universelles Völkerrecht: Theorie und Praxis (Duncker & 
Humblot, 1984), 275.  
167 In the Aaland Islands case (1920), LNOJ Sp. Supp. No. 4, pp. 8-9, an international dispute 
settlement under the League of Nations, it was found that Finland could be considered a sovereign state 
only when “a stable political organization had been created, and until the public authorities had become 
strong enough to assert themselves throughout the territories of the state without the assistance of the 
foreign troops.” See also: American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Vol. I, § 201, Comment d; 
and CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, 59, who maintains that a state required 
“competence, within its own constitutional system, to conduct international relations with other states, 
as well as the political, technical, and financial capabilities to do so”. In contrast, Shaw highlights 
“[some form of government or central control] should be regarded more as an indication of some sort 
of coherent political structure and society, than the necessity for a sophisticated apparatus of executive 
and legislative organs”, SHAW, International Law, at 180 (referring to the Western Sahara Case, pp. 12, 
43-44). 
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abstract right, without concrete manifestations.”168 The nature and extent of control 
required from a government in order to be ‘effective’ for the purposes of international 
law, however, are nowhere stipulated.169  
Against this background, the requirement of effective government is at the same 
time the most central, and the least stringently applied criterion of statehood. 
Effective entities have existed that were denied the legal status of states, just as 
entities that hardly exercised effective control were (still) accepted as states under 
international law. 170  While some of these cases may appear exceptional, others 
demonstrate that the effective government criterion is not absolute, but can be 
outweighed by other principles under certain circumstances.171 Where the continuity 
of established and recognized states is concerned, rather than the creation of new 
states, the criterion can been outweighed by the principle of continuity. 172 
Accordingly, a temporary loss of effective control or disappearance of government, 
for instance during external occupation or internal conflict, does not automatically 
lead to the extinction of the state. Moreover, the conferral of legal personality to 
newly independent states whose governments hardly exercised effective control has 
constituted a trend that has since been reinvigorated by international practice vis-à-vis 
the successor states of former Yugoslavia. 173  Accordingly, the principle of self-
                                                        
168 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Arbitral award relating to the arbitration of differences respecting 
sovereignty over the Island of Palmas, 4. April 1928 (Netherlands vs. United States of America), 22 
AJIL 1929, 867 ff., at 876. 
169 See CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, 60, and with some indications of the 
types of institutions and capacities required, the references provided in supra note 167. 
170 CRAWFORD, 'State', at 46. Crawford proposes Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Taiwan, the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus as examples for the former category, to which one could add, for instance, Somaliland. 
As examples for the latter category, Crawford counts various entities unlawfully annexed in the period 
1936–1940 (e.g. the Baltics or Poland), Guinea-Bissau before its recognition by Portugal, and Kuwait 
during the Iraq-Kuwait War in 1990–1991, and earlier, the conferral of statehood to the formal Belgian 
Congo (at 23). In more detail, see also CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, 56-59. 
171 PETERS, 'Statehood after 1989: 'Effectivités' between Legality and Virtuality', at 182.  
172 CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, 59. Even in cases were important 
governmental functions are carried out by another state or international organization on its behalf, as 
has been discussed with regards to international territorial administrations, the state can continue to be 
sovereign (32). On the principle of continuity, sometimes seen as bolstered by the principle of self-
determination, and how it is balanced with the principle of effectiveness in the context of state collapse, 
see also SIEGFRIED MAGIERA, 'Governments', in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International LawSeptember 2007), para. 17. On the role of the principle of continuity in the 
context of state failure, see also infra note 185.   
173 Both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were recognized by members of the European Union and 
admitted into the United Nations at a time when their respective governments did not control 
substantial areas of their territories during civil war. 
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determination can compensate for lower levels of government effectiveness, at least 
in the context of decolonization.174  
In sum, we can clearly distinguish juridical statehood from empirical statehood 
with regard to its consequences: primarily, to grant an entity international legal status. 
This status is the same for all states, and thus secures the state as a necessary form or 
structure of authority regardless of its specific praises as the “wonderful artificiality of 
the state”: the formality of the concept of juridical statehood allowed distinguishing 
“the state as the realization of Utopia, and the state as the form in which different 
Utopias clash today”.175 Ideally, sovereign statehood protects the state as a location 
where these clashes over competing societal visions can take place – a reason why 
international legal scholars continue supporting the formal trappings of sovereign 
statehood.176  
Fault lines between juridical and empirical statehood appear, however, when 
turning to the criteria on the basis of which the legal status of statehood is conferred. 
The legal definition of statehood is necessarily premised on the existence of empirical 
facts. This is not only because states were generally empirical realities before they 
assumed legal personality. As a decentralized legal order, international law relies on 
states possessing certain actual capacities in order to implement its norms 
domestically, to exercise legal rights and fulfill obligations. Accordingly, the principle 
of effectiveness assumes a central, constituting role for the criteria of statehood, and 
serves “a genuinely normative function” for the legal order as a whole. 177 
Effectiveness acts as a bridge between facts and norm, in that it ascribes legal 
                                                        
174 SHAW, International Law,pp. 183-185.  
175 KOSKENNIEMI, 'The Wonderful Artificiality of States', p. 28 and in passim. For Koskenniemi, the 
state is important as a location, a pure form, through which we can examine the consequences and 
acceptability of the various jargons of authenticity and enable political action. See also OSCAR 
SCHACHTER, 'The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for International Law', 36 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law, 7 (1998), 22, and CRAVEN, 'States and Recognition in International 
Law', 205.  
176 In contrast, Korhonen doubts that in light of its historical contingency, the state is the “neutral 
structure, which the classic and the formalist doctrines of state constitution seem to assume”. 
KORHONEN, 'The ‘State-Building Enterprise’: Legal Doctrine, Progress Narratives and Managerial 
Governance ', 27.  
177 PETERS, 'Statehood after 1989: 'Effectivités' between Legality and Virtuality', 174. See also the 
discussion in KREIJEN, State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness. Legal Lessons from the 
Decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa, pp.179-192; or LEIDENMÜHLER, Kollabierter Staat und 
Völkerrechtsordnung. Zur Aktualität der Westfälischen Ordnung, entwickelt an Fragen des Wegfalls 
effektiver Staatsgewalt, pp.157-159.  
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significance to certain facts. 178  Once the legal status of statehood has thus been 
conferred on entities with an effective government, juridical statehood operates as a 
binary legal category, based on the presumption that effectiveness is maintained.  
International law, it may be argued, both requires effective government, and 
presumes effective government. What happens when the principle of effectiveness is 
neglected in the creation of states – and the “juridical cart is now before the empirical 
horse”? 179  What if a government’s effectiveness subsequently declines, and its 
continued presumption turns into an untenable fiction? With juridical statehood built 
along the fault lines of law and fact, of legal and of factual capacity, these are 
questions of considerable complexity, but also significance. The balance between 
international law’s “concreteness” and “normativity” (Koskenniemi), the need to 
respond to changing realities while maintaining its counterfactual character, regularly 
tildes to the latter when it comes to the doctrine of statehood.180 This becomes clear 
when we approach the factual phenomenon of fragile statehood from a legal 
perspective. 
 
b) Approaching Fragile States from a Legal Perspective 
i. Legal Scholarship and the Engagement with Failed and Fragile 
States 
 
As noted at the outset, fragile states are a phenomenon located at the challenging 
interface between empirical and juridical statehood, and have therefore received little 
attention in international legal scholarship.181 Where legal scholars have engaged with 
fragile or rather ‘failed states’, the issue has triggered diverging and sometimes heated 
reactions. 182  Three reactions can be distinguished, which I briefly outline in the 
                                                        
178 Hiroshi Taki, Effectiveness, in RÜDIGER WOLFRUM (ed) The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2008), para. 5; HEIKE KRIEGER, Das Effektivitätsprinzip 
im Völkerrecht (Duncker & Humblot, 2000), 80-81. 
179 JACKSON, Quasi-states. Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, 23-24. 
180 E.g. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, 'The Politics of International Law', 1 European Journal of International 
Law (1990). 
181 Supra note 9; and GIORGETTI, 'International Norms and Standards Applicable to Situations of State 
Fragility and Failure: An Overview', 264: “A rigorous analysis of the legal implications, significance, 
and consequences of state fragility is – despite its importance – missing.” A notable exception is the 
Berlin-based, multi-year research project that grapples with “governance in areas of limited statehood” 
from various disciplinary perspectives, including law. See infra note 242. 
182 Though I emphasize the distinction between state fragility and state failure, with the latter 
concerning only the most extreme cases of governmental breakdown or collapse, in this section, I will 
employ both the terms ‘fragile state’ and ‘failed state’, to the extent I make reference to other legal 
studies wherein the terms failed, failing or fragile states are often used interchangeably.  
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following. First, some legal scholars seek to contribute to events on the political scene 
and the discourse among international relations scholars, rife with legal terminology, 
a positivist, doctrinal perspective. They occupy the middle grounds, if we consider the 
two ends of the spectrum. On the one end are those for whom state failure 
substantiates the claim that the traditional understanding of sovereign statehood is not 
only anachronistic, but also potentially harmful – and should be reconfigured to 
facilitate external intervention. On the other end of the spectrum are (critical) legal 
scholars, who relentlessly caution about the neo-colonialist and anti-pluralist 
undertones of the “failed state” notion and agenda, and demand that it should not be 
legitimized by international law, or lawyers.  
To begin with, in terms of legal doctrine, state failure is typically translated as the 
breakdown of effective government. This translation goes back to Daniel Thürer, who 
was the first to define a failed state for the purposes of legal analysis as one that 
“though retaining legal, capacity has for all practical purposes lost the ability to 
exercise it.” 183  Thürer captures the discrepancy between juridical and empirical 
statehood by referring to the distinction between a state’s legal capacity 
(Rechtsfähigkeit) and its factual capacity to act (Handlungsfähigkeit).184 Based on the 
principle of continuity, the failed state maintains its legal personality, and so the legal 
capacity to act. 185  International law thus acquiesces to the erosion of effective 
government in recognized states until it equals a mere fiction – an observation that 
accounts in part for the discipline’s limited concern with state failure. However, while 
legal capacity and capacity to act usually coincide, failed states often retain only the 
former, together with the legal status of statehood.  Their capacity to act – to realize 
rights and obligations through their own action – is typically very limited.  
Most legal studies on failed states endorse Thürer’s assertion that the legal status 
of the failed state continues and that it makes more sense for the purpose of legal 
analysis to think in terms of government effectiveness and capacity to act. For 
                                                        
183 DANIEL THÜRER, 'The "Failed State" and International Law', 81 International Review of the Red 
Cross, 731 (1999), 734. Based on the original German version THÜRER, 'Der Wegfall effektiver 
Staatsgewalt: "The failed state"'.  
184 The capacity to act is the effective capacity of an international legal subject to dispose over the 
realization of rights and duties through its own behavior. GEIß, Failed States. Die normative Erfassung 
gescheiterter Staaten, 127. I return to this concept in infra chapter I.3 b). 
185 On the role of the principle of continuity for the maintenance of legal status where effectiveness of a 
government is in doubt, see KOSKENMÄKI, 'Legal Implications Resulting from State Failure in Light of 
the Case of Somalia', 6; GEIß, Failed States. Die normative Erfassung gescheiterter Staaten, pp. 107-
111; the discussion in KREIJEN, State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness. Legal Lessons from the 
Decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa, at 363; and the references in supra note 172. 
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instance, Robin Geiß defines state failure as the collapse of effective government, 
which is indicated by the erosion of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, in 
combination with a paralysis of the people’s right to internal self-determination.186 
Similarly, Hinrich Schröder refers to states that formerly display all three elements of 
statehood, but where the breakdown of effective government leads to a situation 
where no government or other organ is in place, capable of representing the state in 
international relations. 187  In other words, the state’s capacity to act is severely 
restrained internally, through the loss of the monopoly on the use of force, and 
externally, through the lack of organs that can act independently on the international 
plain and perform the state’s rights and obligations under international law. 
Are existing legal concepts thus sufficient to grasp, and – more importantly – to 
address the breakdown of government in international law? Or has the international 
community sought new approaches in dealing with failed states? Most authors 
confirm that the international community has no interest in the premature denial of 
statehood for reasons of legal certainty, and to guarantee the universal applicability of 
the international legal order – with regards to failed states, the international 
community’s response has been marked by pragmatism, that is, upholding the legal 
fiction of effective government.188  
The fundamental shortcomings of such a fictitious assumption, however, are 
widely acknowledged in legal scholarship.189 International law largely relies on states 
                                                        
186 GEIß, Failed States. Die normative Erfassung gescheiterter Staaten, 91. Similarly: KOSKENMÄKI, 
'Legal Implications Resulting from State Failure in Light of the Case of Somalia', 5-6; JÜRGEN BARTL, 
Die humanitäre Intervention durch den Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen im "failed state". Das 
Beispiel Somalia (Lang, 1999), 74; NEYIRE AKPINARLI, The Fragility of the 'Failed State' Paradigm. A 
Different International Law Perception of the Absence of Effective Government (Nijhoff, 2010), 11ff.; 
or LEIDENMÜHLER, Kollabierter Staat und Völkerrechtsordnung. Zur Aktualität der Westfälischen 
Ordnung, entwickelt an Fragen des Wegfalls effektiver Staatsgewalt, pp. 189-192. In contrast, Chiara 
Giorgetti defined state failure “as the incapacity of a state to perform its obligations towards its citizens 
and towards the international community in general. … State Failure can be seen as a condition in 
which the State is unable to provide political foods to its citizens and to the international community.” 
GIORGETTI, A Principled Approach to State Failure. International Community Actions in Emergency 
Situations, 43.  
187 HINRICH SCHRÖDER, Die völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit im Zusammenhang mit failed und 
failing States (Nomos, 2007), 64; also using Jellinek’s definition as a basis: INGO LIEBACH, Die 
unilaterale humanitäre Intervention im "zerfallenen Staat" ("failed state") (Heymann, 2004). 
188 KOSKENMÄKI, 'Legal Implications Resulting from State Failure in Light of the Case of Somalia', 35, 
establishing that “the absence of clear rules regulating state collapse was … interpreted to allow 
certain ‘flexibility’ from general rules”; and with a similar conclusion: GEIß, Failed States. Die 
normative Erfassung gescheiterter Staaten, 310-311. 
189 See, for instance, KREIJEN (ed) State, Sovereignty, and International Governance, 262 ff; BROOKS, 
'Failed States, or the State as Failure?', 1162; GEIß, Failed States. Die normative Erfassung 
gescheiterter Staaten, 310; SCHRÖDER, Die völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit im Zusammenhang mit 
failed und failing States, 74-78; AKPINARLI, The Fragility of the 'Failed State' Paradigm. A Different 
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to enforce international norms and judgments domestically.190 It is for this reason that 
effective government is the central criterion of juridical statehood, and makes the 
conferral of legal status dependent on factual circumstances. 191  The principle of 
effectiveness establishes a link between the “ought” and the “is”, between normative 
assumptions and empirical facts. If effectiveness is on the wane and the discrepancy 
between normative assumptions and empirical facts becomes too large, nothing less 
than the functioning and effectiveness of the international legal order are at stake. Its 
fundamental objectives – from the maintenance of peace and security to the 
realization of people’s self-determination – cannot be met if its constituting members 
lack the minimum level of capacities required to exercise rights and obligations under 
international law.192     
Next to international law’s effectiveness, the decline or breakdown of effective 
government affects the legitimacy of the international legal order, in so far as it still 
relies on state consent as its principal source. Without effective government, states 
cannot negotiate and enter into legal agreements, nor effectively participate in an 
increasingly dense network of international organizations and other fora of global 
policy-making and standard-setting, as Giorgetti highlights.193 
Ultimately, the rights of residents are left unprotected and they lack international 
representation if the government drops out as the central organ to uphold law and 
order domestically and to maintain international relations. Thürer and Herdegen 
therefore locate the failed states problematique at the intersection of state sovereignty 
                                                                                                                                                              
International Law Perception of the Absence of Effective Government, pp. 11-30; or GIORGETTI, A 
Principled Approach to State Failure. International Community Actions in Emergency Situations, 1-8. 
190 On the problem of international law’s enforcement in failed states in detail, see HENDRIX, 'Law 
Without State: The Collapsed State Challenge to Traditional International Enforcement'; or CARSTEN 
STAHN, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration. Versailles to Iraq and 
Beyond, 1. publ. (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 31, referring to the (unfulfilled) function of the 
state as an “executive agent of international obligations”. Importantly, not just non-compliance, but 
also the partial, superficial, or “mimicry” implementation of international legal rules count as a 
challenge in this regard. See also OETER, 'Regieren im 21. Jahrhundert: Staatlichkeit und 
internationales System', 78-80; or LEIDENMÜHLER, Kollabierter Staat und Völkerrechtsordnung. Zur 
Aktualität der Westfälischen Ordnung, entwickelt an Fragen des Wegfalls effektiver Staatsgewalt, pp. 
74-77 and 191. 
191 Supra note 177. 
192 As Brilmayer and Reisman put it in a nutshell: “the frequently lamented failures of international 
law are, in fact, failures of states”. In GIORGETTI, A Principled Approach to State Failure. 
International Community Actions in Emergency Situations, Foreword, p. xv. 
193 Ibid., chapter 1; also GEIß, Failed States. Die normative Erfassung gescheiterter Staaten, pp. 129-
150. The consequences of state failure for the legitimacy of the international legal order, however, are 
rarely addressed in more detail in the relevant legal literature. Arguably, this is owed to the fact that 
problems of legitimacy arise only when we consider a broader range of (fragile) states as unable to 
effectively participate in international policy- and law-making, and focus not on rare incidents of state 
collapse. 
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and the principle of self-determination of peoples, since state institutions now longer 
exist to represent the rights and legitimate interests of the people.194  With regards to 
Somalia, Koskenmäki concludes that the strict operation of international law and the 
acceptance of government as the only legitimate representative had overall 
contributed to the “marginalization of the Somali people”.195  
Considering that the lack of an effective government can pose such fundamental 
problems to the international legal order perhaps explains why another group of legal 
scholars look at state failure as a proof for the declining viability of sovereign 
statehood in its traditional, positivist conception, and take a more normative stance. 
On this end of the spectrum, few legal scholars actually propose to dismantle the 
formal trappings of juridical statehood altogether,196 or to qualify the legal status of 
states based, for instance, on the democratic nature of control exercised by the 
government in power.197 State sovereignty, however, is increasingly deconstructed 
and reconstructed not only in international relations scholarship,198 but also in legal 
scholarship – in ways that first of all concern the sovereignty of states deemed to have 
‘failed’ by various standards.  
For instance, following a constitutionalist or cosmopolitan tradition of thought, 
state sovereignty has its source and objective in the protection of individual autonomy 
or human rights, and statehood should play no role in determining the boundaries of 
moral duties to other people.199  Continuing this line of thought leads some legal 
                                                        
194 THÜRER, 'Der Wegfall effektiver Staatsgewalt: "The failed state"', 17; MATTHIAS HERDEGEN, in 
ibid., 49, 51. Other scholars similarly propose to reconfigure the mechanisms of popular representation 
at the international level in cases of state collapse. E.g. RICHARDSON, '"Failed States", Self-
Determination, and Prenventive Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia and Democratic Expectations', 75-
76; or GORDON, 'Saving Failed States: Sometimes A Neocolonialist Notion', 174. 
195 KOSKENMÄKI, 'Legal Implications Resulting from State Failure in Light of the Case of Somalia', 35.  
196 E.g. BROOKS, 'Failed States, or the State as Failure?', 1180, proposing to look for “some other form 
of international ordering that neither relies on fictions of state sovereign equality nor seeks to wholly 
trump existing subnational power structures."  
197 On the democratic entitlement debate, see supra note 165. 
198 Most prominently, STEPHEN D. KRASNER, Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton University 
Press, 1999); and the contributions in STEPHEN D. KRASNER (ed) Problematic Sovereignty. Contested 
Rules ad Political Possibilities (Columbia University Press, 2001). See also ROBERT O. KEOHANE, 
'Political Authority after Intervention: Gradations in Sovereignty', in J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. 
Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
199 E.g. ANNE PETERS, 'Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty', 20 The European Journal of 
International Law, 513 (2009), constructing state sovereignty as flowing from “humanity”, thus 
dissolving the conflict between sovereignty and human rights, and claiming the primacy for human 
rights. See also  MICHAEL REISMAN, 'Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International 
Law', 84 American Journal of International Law, 866 (1990); or CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, International 
Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a new Century. General Course on Public 
International Law (Volume 281) (Brill, 2001).  
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scholars to propose the grading of sovereignty in accordance with the “measure of 
care by government for its citizens”, 200  or more generally, the qualification of 
sovereignty on the basis of a government’s internal legitimacy or performance.201  
Certainly, the line between lex lata and de lege ferenda, between positivist and 
normative arguments, is increasingly difficult to draw in this context. To some extent, 
state practice already supports the qualification of sovereignty where a state commits 
mass atrocities or large-scale violations of human rights, and yet the idea to cast state 
sovereignty as a “responsibility to protect” that may be forfeited remains 
controversial.202 In the evolving discourse on the limits of sovereignty, however, it is 
safe to say that failed states are routinely quoted as examples where various kinds of 
external interventions in domestic affairs can, or should be justified.203 
                                                        
200 HELEN M. STACY, 'Relational Sovereignty', 99 American Society of International Law (ASIL) 
Proceedings, 396 (2005), 399: MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 'Earned Sovereignty. Juridicial Underpinnings', 31 
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 373 (2002-2003), 374; HENRY G. SCHERMERS, 
'Different Aspects of Sovereignty', in Gerard Kreijen (ed) State, Sovereignty, and International 
Governance (Oxford University Press, 2002); or YANNIS, 'The Concept of Suspended Sovereignty in 
International Law and its Implications in International Politics'. In contrast, Cohen argues that 
sovereign statehood can be reconciled with the rise of constitutionalist and cosmopolitan elements of 
order: JEAN L. COHEN, 'Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law', 18 Ethics & 
International Affairs, 1 (2004), 13. 
201 E.g. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, 'International Law in a World of Liberal States', 6 European 
Journal of International Law, 503 (1995), 536ff; ALLEN E. BUCHANAN, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-
determination. Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), 56-57; or 
with a more moderate argument, PETERS, 'Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty', 519-521.  
202 According to the concept of responsibility to protect, sovereignty is reconfigured as the primary 
responsibility of the state to protect its population. If a state, due to a lack of capacity and/or will, does 
not meet its primary responsibility, it passes to the international community. See INTERNATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (ICISS), International Development 
Research Centre, 'Responsibility to Protect' (2001), endorsed by the UN General Assembly in the 2005 
World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/60/L.1 (15.09.2005), para. 138. On the legal nature of the 
responsibility to protect, see also CARSTEN STAHN, 'Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or 
Emerging Legal Norm?', 101 The American Journal of International Law, 99 (2007); and tracing the 
evolving state practice on humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect from a critical 
perspective, ANNE ORFORD, 'Moral Internationalism and the Responsibility to Protect', 24 European 
Journal of International Law, 83 (2013), 98-103. 
203 For instance, the ICISS Report (supra note 202) that first sets out the concept and explicitly refers to 
situations of state failure as circumstances justifying intervention (para. 4.19), and to fragile states as a 
security threat throughout (e.g. para. 1.35). See also AMY ECKERT, 'United Nations Peacekeeping in 
Collapsed States', 5 Journal of International Law and Practice, 273 (1996), arguing that the UN should 
consider peacekeeping operations without consent in countries that lack a functioning government; 
NOEMI GAL-OR, 'Suspending Sovereignty: Reassessing the Interlocking of Occupation, Failed and 
Fragile State, Responsibility to Protect, and International Trusteeship (Lessons from Lebanon)', 41 
Israel Law Review, 302 (2008); or GIORGETTI, A Principled Approach to State Failure. International 
Community Actions in Emergency Situations, 185-188. Marauhn makes an interesting proposal that is 
prima facie less interventionist, namely, “political intervention by peaceful means in order to promote 
good governance”, “in so far as individuals may suffer from the breakdown of governmental structures 
in fragile states”. THILO MARAUHN, 'The Promotion of Good Governance in Fragile States', in Kerstin 
Kötschau & Thilo Marauhn (eds), Good Governance and Developing Countries (Peter Lang, 2007), 53.  
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The impression that the failed state label is (mis)used to justify infringements on 
the sovereignty of states deemed ineffective or illegitimate in turn explains why 
critical legal scholars – on the other end of the spectrum – follow the discourse with 
so much suspicion. Among the very first legal articles on state failure are those of 
Ruth Gordon and Henry Richardson, pointing to the “colonialist nostalgia” that 
underlies attempts to conceptualize and address weak or imploding statehood in the 
global South.204 It is often post-colonial and critical legal scholars that retrace the 
historical precedents and continuities of hierarchies between states, or even argue that 
factual hierarchies are entrenched by the legal doctrines of statehood and sovereign 
equality.205  
Their self-conscious, critical perspective offers important insights for the study of 
fragile states. Not only does it expose the particularistic social construction that often 
informs legal arguments regarding the sovereignty of the ‘failed’ state. It also 
profoundly challenges the assertion that fragile states are a new phenomenon, or an 
exception from the norm. 206  Critical legal scholars continually caution that any 
attempt at grading sovereign statehood today on the basis of the state’s capacity or 
will to fulfill certain functions would have to be considered in light of these 
continuities.207 Moreover, a critical perspective turns the juridical discourse on failed 
and fragile states upside down: rather than inquiring how they challenge the 
effectiveness of the legal order, attention turns to the question how existing legal rules 
                                                        
204 RUTH GORDON, 'Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship', 28 Cornell International Law Journal, 
301 (1995) and RICHARDSON, '"Failed States", Self-Determination, and Prenventive Diplomacy: 
Colonialist Nostalgia and Democratic Expectations'. 
205 Two prominent representatives are Antony Anghie, who retraces the colonial origins of 
international law and discloses how the civilizing mission of European states, the assertion of a 
dichotomy between civilized and uncivilized states, has profoundly shaped the international legal 
order; and Gerry J. Simpson, who finds that powerful states have repeatedly managed to transform 
their prerogatives into legal forms by establishing “legalised hierarchies” that persist behind the 
principle of sovereign equality. Supra note 41. 
206 For an overview of the historical evolution of juridical statehood, see, for instance, CRAVEN, 'States 
and Recognition in International Law', 217 ff., or from an explicitly postcolonial perspective, PAHUJA, 
Decolonizing International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality, 
chapter 3. 
207 In the past, the conferral of statehood rested on subjective criteria and decision-making, and 
empirical differences between states were translated into different legal status under international law, 
e.g. that of colonies, protectorates, mandate territories, or dominions. See, for instance, LASSA 
OPPENHEIM, International Law. Vol. 1 Peace, 8th (Longmans, 1955), § 65: “Yet there are States in 
existence which certainly do not possess full sovereignty, and are therefore named not-full sovereign 
States. All States which are under the suzerainty or under the protectorate of another State, … belong 
to this Group …. Such imperfect International Personality is, to some extent, an anomaly; but the 
very existence of States without full sovereignty is an anomaly in itself.”  
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may be complicit in creating and perpetuating state fragility through disadvantaging 
particularly weak states.208  
In sum, it seems that legal scholarship’s engagement with failed or fragile states 
is informed by the same two narratives that underlie the relevant discourse in other 
disciplines. Depending on whether state failure is acknowledged as an empirical 
phenomenon, or primarily exposed and criticized as a social construction, it has or has 
not been found worthy of doctrinal reconstruction. If so, legal scholars mostly 
concentrate on extreme (and extremely rare) instances of complete state failure or 
irrevocable state collapse, and the implications for international security. 209  In 
contrast, the broader spectrum and much more common phenomenon of state fragility 
is usually considered irrelevant for international law.210 What are the correlates of 
state fragility in legal doctrine? 
 
ii. Shortcomings of a Juridical Translation 
 
As a variable condition, state fragility is not amenable to a clear-cut legal 
definition. In fact, even from a purely empirical perspective, we have seen that it is 
difficult to pin down what precisely fragile states are, let alone to disentangle the 
constructed notion from its paternalistic undertones and normative baggage.  
Considering how international legal scholars have sought to describe state failure 
in terms of legal doctrine might nonetheless provide some clues as to how we can 
understand state fragility, a weaker form or preliminary stage of state failure. If legal 
                                                        
208 For instance, legal rules may pose requirements on fragile states that pose further strains on the 
already limited capacity and resources of fragile states. See KINGSBURY & DAVIS, 'Obligation 
Overload: Adjusting the Obligations of Fragile or Failed States'; STEFAN OETER, 'Prekäre Staatlichkeit 
und die Grenzen internationaler Verrechtlichung', in Regina Kreide & Andreas Niederberger (eds), 
Transnationale Verrechtlichung. Nationale Demokratien im Kontext globaler Politik (Campus, 2008); 
and more generally, CHRISTINA BINDER, 'Stability and Change in Times of Fragmentation: The Limits 
of Pacta Sunt Servanda Revisited', 25 Leiden Journal of International Law, 909 (2012), arguing that 
both the law of treaties and the law of state responsibility leave little room for states to escape or 
postpone international treaty obligations on the grounds that they lack the necessary capacities to 
comply.  
209 The vast majority of legal studies concerned with failed states show a remarkable concern with the 
question how security threats emanating from their territories can be prevented or mitigated within the 
framework of international law, including through forcible intervention. See only GEIß, Failed States. 
Die normative Erfassung gescheiterter Staaten,121-127; GIORGETTI, A Principled Approach to State 
Failure. International Community Actions in Emergency Situations, chapter 7; MARIO SILVA, 'Somalia: 
State Failure, Piracy, and the Challenge to International Law', 50 Virginia Journal of International Law 
Association, 553 (2010); LEIDENMÜHLER, Kollabierter Staat und Völkerrechtsordnung. Zur Aktualität 
der Westfälischen Ordnung, entwickelt an Fragen des Wegfalls effektiver Staatsgewalt, 443-505;  and 
the references in supra note 203. 
210 E.g. GEIß, Failed States. Die normative Erfassung gescheiterter Staaten, 57. 
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scholars describe state failure as the complete breakdown of effective government, 
state fragility amounts to its partial impairment.211 Accordingly, fragile state are states 
that retain legal capacity, while their capacity to act is not lost, but severely 
restricted.212 Aptly explained by Thürer and others, the capacity to act pertains to the 
government, so that both state failure and state fragility are phenomena that concern 
only the effectiveness and capacity to act of a country’s government, but not the legal 
status of state.213 
Looking a bit closer, however, the attempt to translate state fragility in terms of 
legal doctrine only reveals the shortcomings of existing concepts and tools when 
approaching the empirical phenomenon on a general basis, and shows that legal 
consequences can at best be determined on a case-by-case basis.  
Already the doctrinal focus on “government” is of limited value, insofar as it 
narrowly refers to the administrative body in control of the state at a given time. In 
contrast, the condition of state fragility often outlasts the term of a government, and 
affects not just its executive functions.214 Is it adequate to speak of a government’s 
limited effectiveness, if state fragility regularly “affects the basic and entire structure 
of the State”?215 Besides, if a government looses effective control over parts of the 
territory, we have seen that the result is usually not the emergence of a power vacuum 
or ungoverned space, as the notion of governmental breakdown may suggest. 216 
                                                        
211 The legal definition of state failure as the “breakdown” of effective government is not appropriate to 
describe state fragility, since breakdown connotes a sudden incidence and total collapse of government. 
In turn, the notion of a “crises of government” proposed by Anne Peters still connotes a temporary 
confined period of ineffectiveness, and thus excludes countries were ineffectiveness is not an exception 
but the norm. PETERS, 'Statehood after 1989: 'Effectivités' between Legality and Virtuality', 174. 
212 Also MARAUHN, 'The Promotion of Good Governance in Fragile States', 50.  
213 Supra notes 183 and 184. Some international lawyers have used the notion of “ineffective 
government” as antonym to the legal concept of effective government. As such, it refers not to a 
limitation of effective government, but rather to its negation. E.g. KREIJEN, State Failure, Sovereignty 
and Effectiveness. Legal Lessons from the Decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa, 334.  
214 In its broadest sense, “government” can encompass not just the executive organs, but all state organs 
(legislative, judicial and executive), at all levels (central state, regional, or local). In an international 
law context, however, government often refers to the executive organs of the state only, i.e. the Head of 
State and the cabinet. MAGIERA, 'Governments', paras. 2-4.  
215 GIORGETTI, A Principled Approach to State Failure. International Community Actions in 
Emergency Situations, 6. 
216 Supra note 135. See also ROBIN GEIß, 'Armed Violence in Fragile States. Low-intensity Conflicts, 
Spillover Conflicts, and sporadic Law Enforcement Operations by Third Parties', 91 International 
Review of the Red Cross, 127 (2009), 129-131, in which the author of an earlier monograph on ‘failed 
states’ circumscribes fragile statehood. 
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Rather, there is a growing understanding that non-state actors claim effective control 
where the government retreats.217 
Further, even if it is appropriate to characterize fragile states with regards to their 
governments’ limited effectiveness, we cannot make much of such a broad 
circumscription. In principle, effectiveness may well be variable, i.e. a “matter of 
degree”. 218  The principle of effectiveness, however, is used in the concept of 
‘effective government’ as a criterion to determine a binary legal status, and not in a 
broad sense, to encompass all instances where a factual situation may affect legal 
norms.219 Accordingly, once an entity has gained the legal status of state based on the 
presumption that it has a sufficiently effective government, a subsequent decrease of 
effectiveness has no automatic legal consequences. 
In turn, the concept of ‘capacity to act’, imported from domestic law, is useful for 
keeping apart a state’s legal capacity to be a bearer of rights and duties under 
international law, and the capacity required to actively perform legal acts and produce 
legal effects. 220  Like effectiveness, the capacity to act can also be a matter of 
degree.221 It is important to note, however, that the significance of the concept is a 
rather different one in international law than in domestic law. Domestic law regularly 
defines different categories of capacity for natural and artificial persons, and 
accordingly qualifies their ability to produce legal effects, e.g. to conclude treaties.222 
In international law, the principle of sovereign equality forbids such legal 
qualifications based, for instance, on categories of maturity, physical or mental 
health.223  Instead, the capacity to act refers to a government’s ability to exercise 
                                                        
217 Depending on the effectiveness of their claim, some of these non-state actors can have a proper 
status under international law, for instance, constituting a party to a conflict in the sense of Art. 3 of the 
4th Geneva Convention. See SCHRÖDER, Die völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit im Zusammenhang 
mit failed und failing States, 57-58. 
218 PETERS, 'Statehood after 1989: 'Effectivités' between Legality and Virtuality', 174. 
219 HIROSHI TAKI, 'Effectiveness', in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press, February 2013), paras. 3 and 4.  
220 On this, see the detailed discussion of the difference between a state’s formal and actual 
independence in CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law62-89.  
221 AKPINARLI, The Fragility of the 'Failed State' Paradigm. A Different International Law Perception 
of the Absence of Effective Government, 106, elaborating that whereas the legal capacity automatically 
attaches to the legal status of statehood, the capacity to act can depend on (and vary with) the 
individual subject of international law.  
222 In domestic legal orders, different categories of capacity to act exist for natural persons, for instance 
for minors or individuals with a certain physical condition. While they have legal capacity, their 
capacity to act is circumscribed by national law, with the underlying ratio being that the state seeks to 
protect more vulnerable members of society.  
223 The principle of sovereign equality also forbids an arrangement whereby one state or group of states 
would have to assume the role of a legal guardian for another state and thus defy its legal independence. 
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effective control over a territory and people, and its ability to perform certain rights 
and obligations.224 To what extent a government exerts control and has the capacity to 
act can thus be relevant in determining the state’s responsibility under international 
law, but this is only done on a case-by-case basis.225 
Finally, fragile states are often described as states that lack the ability or political 
will to perform certain functions vis-à-vis their citizens.226 International law knows a 
similar formulation: states may be found “unable or unwilling”. “Unable or unwilling” 
is a standard that appears in a number of legal regimes, and is typically used to decide 
questions of complementarity in multi-level systems of governance. If a state is found 
unable or unwilling to perform an obligation, the responsibility basically passes to the 
next level. Apart from the emerging concept of the responsibility to protect,227 the 
standard is applied, for instance, in the complementarity regime of the International 
Criminal Court; 228 the regime for the protection of Internally Displaced Persons;229 
and to determine the lawful scope of extra-territorial self-defense vis-à-vis non-state 
actors.230 At what point a state is found “unable or unwilling” is generally ill-defined, 
                                                                                                                                                              
Some international lawyers have nevertheless proposed different kinds of trusteeship arrangements to 
deal with the absence or ineffectiveness of governments in failed or fragile states. See, for instance, 
GIORGETTI, A Principled Approach to State Failure. International Community Actions in Emergency 
Situations, 184-188 (and pp. 9-17 on how the “international community has acted on behalf of states in 
the past”); and with a critical assessment of proposals to bring back trusteeship, GORDON, 'Some Legal 
Problems with Trusteeship'. 
224 On the link between the (internal and external) effectiveness of a government and its capacity to act 
under international law, see also GEIß, Failed States. Die normative Erfassung gescheiterter Staaten, 
128, and SCHRÖDER, Die völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit im Zusammenhang mit failed und failing 
States, 62-63. 
225 In detail, SCHRÖDER, Die völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit im Zusammenhang mit failed und 
failing States, pp. 84-107. Where state organs still exist and the capacity to act is only limited, not void, 
whether or not the organs of the state can be held responsible for a violation of international law – 
including for acts committed by non-state actors operating from its territory – can only be determined 
on a case-by-case basis. The concept of capacity to act does not establish general categories or 
thresholds in this regard. 
226 See, for instance, the definitions of the OECD quoted in supra note 1 and 144. 
227 See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (ICISS), 
'Responsibility to Protect', para. 2.30, and in general, supra note 202. There are no clearly defined 
criteria or thresholds, however, to determine when a country lacks the capacity or will to assume its 
responsibility to protect. On this point, see CARLO FOCARELLI, 'The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine 
and Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine', 13 Journal of Conflict 
& Security Law 191 (2008), 211.  
228 See Article17 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17.7.1998, 2187 UNTS 3. 
The meaning of “unable” and “unwilling” is probably most elaborated in this context. See, for example, 
JANN K. KLEFFNER, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdiction (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), chapter IV. 
229 See Principles 3 and 25 of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN Doc.  
E/CN./4/1998/53/Add.2 of 17.4.1998 and the comment of WALTER KÄLIN, 'Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement. Annotations', 32 ASIL Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, 1 (2000), 1. 
230 In this context, Ashley Deeks is among the few legal scholars that analyze what the “unable or 
unwilling” test actually implies from substantive and procedural perspective: ASHLEY S. DEEKS, 
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and in any case varies from one legal regime to another, depending on the state’s 
respective obligations. Consequently, the government of a fragile states may in certain 
circumstances be found “unable or unwilling” to exercise certain duties under 
international law, but this does not make the state less sovereign, or less of a state. 
The shortcomings of a juridical translation of state fragility are thus obvious. Its 
legal consequences will always depend on the case: on the particular symptoms of 
fragility, the general circumstances of a country, as well as the degree and kind of 
rights and duties the state has assumed but cannot realize. International law may 
increasingly circumscribe the structure and functions of states, but a violation of the 
respective obligations does not affect the state’s legal status.231 To argue otherwise 
would mean to conflate how governmental authority is exercised with the exercise of 
governmental authority as a criterion for statehood. Moreover, the principle of 
sovereign equality aims precisely at preventing effectiveness deficits or different 
levels of factual capacity from being translated into law. Outside of the specific case, 
the difficulty of defining and determining the legal consequences of state fragility 
thus constitutes not a regrettable constraint, but a deliberate restraint of an 
international legal order based on sovereign equality.  
4. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I approached fragile states as a phenomenon characterized by the 
discrepancy between empirical statehood and juridical statehood. Fragile states often 
lack the institutional and administrative capacities required to exercise rights and 
obligations under international law, while they are bestowed with the legal status of 
states and the formal trappings of sovereignty. An empirical-sociological perspective 
can well account for variations in state effectiveness. The causes and consequences of 
state fragility have attracted much research, although the notion of fragile states 
                                                                                                                                                              
'“Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense', 52 Virginia 
Journal of International Law, 483 (2012). Deeks notes that “strikingly little attention has been paid to 
the nature and consequences of – or solutions to – the imprecision surrounding the “unwilling or unable” 
test.” (488). To determine whether a government is “unable”, for instance, Deeks suggests assessing its 
level of territorial control and the capacity of its military and police forces (525-529). See also 
DAWOOD I. AHMED, 'Defending Weak States Against the “Unwilling or Unable” Doctrine of Self-
Defense', 9 Journal of International Law and International Relations, 1 (2013), 12-20. 
231 E.g. GIORGETTI, 'International Norms and Standards Applicable to Situations of State Fragility and 
Failure: An Overview', 265, arguing that international law does not only define the state and sanction 
its existence, but “[a]t the urging of multilateral organizations and bilateral aid agencies, transnational 
benchmarks and prescriptions are applied to such diverse activities as framing constitutions;  holding 
elections; establishing legislatures and courts […].” 
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remains a highly ambiguous and politically charged notion. From a legal perspective, 
variations in state effectiveness, the factual inequalities between states, or attempts at 
qualifying statehood accordingly, retreat behind the doctrine of juridical statehood 
and the fundamental principle of sovereign equality. The static conception of juridical 
statehood also explains why international legal scholars have mostly followed the 
evolving discourse on state fragility with considerable reservation, if not outright 
criticism. Not surprisingly, the attempt to provide a juridical translation of state 
fragility as a phenomenon that connotes effectiveness deficits that fall short of a 
complete breakdown of government proved to be of limited value.  
A suggested at the outset, however, the important distinction between 
empirical and juridical statehood should not obstruct our view at the twilight 
existence of fragile states. However doubtful the value of a uniform designation as 
‘fragile’, states do exist whose governments struggle to exercise effective control over 
their territory and people, while they are caught in cycles of extreme poverty and 
repeated conflict. Weak statehood undoubtedly threatens human development and 
human security, and can pose challenges to the international system that require an 
urgent and concerted response. To paraphrase James Crawford, the language of state 
failure has perhaps created a lot of confusion – but its principal value still consists in 
pointing to an urgent, “real debate about development and governance”.232 
At the same time, we have seen that the existence of states with extremely 
weak capacities puts into question international law’s fundamental assumptions – 
namely, the assumption of effective government, and the almost exclusive focus on 
the formal institutions of the state. 233  And while state fragility is not a new 
phenomenon, its relevancy from the perspective of international law is still growing, 
considering the increasing reach and depth of international regulation, as well a the 
diversification of actors and instruments of regulation. States that have a limited 
capacity to act will struggle with ever more demanding international obligations to 
provide numerous goods and services, and with maintaining the infrastructure 
                                                        
232 CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, 723: “To this real debate about 
development and governance the language of state failure has added little but confusion.” Crawford 
adds: “what is needed is not a more intrusive intervention doctrine, but more effective ‘measures’”. He 
seems to imply that such measures would consist of operational activities aimed at strengthening 
domestic capacities and governance. 
233 See supra chapter I.3 b) (i).  
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necessary to fulfill these tasks. 234  On the one hand, the fictitious assumption of 
effective government has thus more far-reaching consequences in an international 
legal order that has long moved from a law of coordination to a law of cooperation. 
On the other hand, it becomes easier for a state to be regarded as fragile, if statehood 
itself is increasingly cast as requiring not just the maintenance of a minimum level of 
law and order, but also the fulfillment of an array of requirements in other realms – 
from the combat of transnational crime to environmental protection. Neither the 
analytical shortcomings of the broad-brush notion of fragile states, nor the dubious 
premises of the evolving fragile states agenda, can thus conceal the fundamental 
challenge that the discrepancy between empirical and juridical statehood can pose to 
the international legal order – and to the actors operating on its premises and within 
its confines.  
Fragile states matter to international law – and a legal grasp on the empirical 
phenomenon that acknowledges the internal contradictions and biases of the notion is 
relevant and due. For international legal scholarship it means looking not just at the 
emergence or breakdown of effective government, but also at its evolution. The 
current restraint may constitute a tribute to the formality and “wonderful artificiality” 
of juridical statehood. Yet it risks lagging behind a reality that has long responded to a 
widespread lack of basic capacity on the part of national governments. Therefore, I 
propose to shift the focus away from the question what state fragility is, to the 
question how it is perceived and responded to, in order to learn more about its 
practical meaning, as well as its significance from the perspective of international 
law.235 A look at the evolving understanding of fragile states has shown that they have 
become a key priority and attracted a lot of attention particularly in the fields of 
international security and development cooperation. In this context, international 
organizations emerge as important actors in furthering a concerted approach to fragile 
states. As I illustrate in the subsequent chapters, international organizations 
increasingly engage in regulatory activities concerning fragile states, adopting rules 
                                                        
234 GIORGETTI, A Principled Approach to State Failure. International Community Actions in 
Emergency Situations, 1-4. If the array of formal and informal requirements imposed on them creates a 
burden that exceeds their limited capacities, they may actually suffer from what Benedict Kingsbury 
and Kevin have termed an “obligation overload”. KINGSBURY & DAVIS, 'Obligation Overload: 
Adjusting the Obligations of Fragile or Failed States'. In this context, the World Bank has used a very 
graphic comparison to illustrate that international obligations on states are becoming more demanding: 
whereas the 1948 UN Convention Against Genocide consisted of 17 operative paragraphs, the 2003 
Convention Against Corruption has 455.  
235 Jochen Frowein proposes a similar approach in his study of de facto regimes. Supra note 46. 
 63 
that do not necessarily conform to the traditional sources of international law – and 
yet they do require the attention of international law scholars. Ultimately, considering 
the actual position that fragile states are thus accorded by different actors, through 
different legal instruments, could yield more shades of gray than the formalistic 
conception of juridical statehood suggests.236  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
236 On this point, see also Weiler (supra note 18). 
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II. Development Cooperation with Fragile States – 
Challenge and Response 
 
 
One may endorse the notion of “fragile state” as a label for the development 
challenges of weak-capacity states, or reject it as too broad a category to be of any 
analytical value. One may endorse the notion for drawing attention to the familiar 
shortcomings of a state-based international system and its ontology, or reject it as too 
politicized and hegemonic a vocabulary to be used objectively. Either way, with its 
constant reiteration, quantification, and operationalizing, the notion of fragile states 
has become a basis for action in the field of development cooperation.237  
For development cooperation, the existence of states with very weak capacities 
for economic and social development constitutes its principal raison d’être. To some 
extent, the very emergence of an international development regime stems from the 
recognition that sovereign states may be autonomous in law, but are often weak and 
materially dependent on other states in reality. Though development cooperation is 
certainly not solely grounded in humanitarianism, its declared objective today consists 
in promoting the long-term economic, social and political development of poorer 
countries by providing them with financial and technical assistance. It is thus 
fundamentally concerned with strengthening the factual capacity and effectiveness of 
governments.238 In this sense, development cooperation could be seen to assume a 
crucial, auxiliary function for international law: it helps to strengthen or maintain the 
‘effective government’ on which the international legal order is premised.239 
                                                        
237 For a compelling argument of how even as a social construct, the classification of “fragile states” 
can impact on reality, see NEWMAN, 'Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-
Westphalian World'; and BHUTA, 'Governmentalizing Sovereignty: Indexes of State Fragility and the 
Calculability of Political Order', 135. 
238 E.g. JACKSON, Quasi-states. Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, p. 5 and 48, 
arguing that many developing countries are “consisting not of self-standing structures with domestic 
foundations – like separate buildings – but of territorial jurisdictions supported from above by 
international law and material aid – a kind of international safety net.” Jackson also points to a mutual 
dependency between quasi states and international development actors when he argues that the 
development “enterprise arguably would be unnecessary if there were no quasi-states”. See also 
CLAPHAM, Africa and the International System. The Politics of State Survival; and KAL RAUSTIALA, 
'Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law', 6 Journal of International 
Economic Law, 841 (2003), arguing that international economic institutions help reasserting the 
sovereignty of developing countries, which is compromised by processes of globalization.  
239 In contrast, Pahuja points out that “development works to circumscribe the political promise of 
international law”. PAHUJA, Decolonizing International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the 
Politics of Universality, 77. From the perspective of third world approaches, development cooperation 
is often criticized for sustaining developing countries in their dependency of industrialized countries. It 
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If there is already an intrinsic link between the regime of development 
cooperation and the broader challenge of weak statehood, in recent years, conflict-
affected and fragile states have emerged as a key priority in development discourse 
and practice. The combination of weak capacity and governance, insecurity and 
political instability render some countries a particularly challenging environment for 
development cooperation – and one where its state-centric paradigm and traditional 
business models have often proven inadequate or ineffective. An enormous amount of 
research and resources have consequently gone into finding a response to the 
challenge of aiding fragile states, which we will see later has resulted in a 
proliferation of reports, indices, policy recommendations and guidelines.240  
International organizations have been a driving force in these developments. 
Against the background of a comparatively poor track record in conflict-affected, 
instable and politically charged environments from the West Bank and Gaza to 
Afghanistan, virtually all international organizations engaged in operative 
development cooperation have sought to identify and address the specific constraints 
they are facing in these settings. Many organizations have begun to engage more 
strategically in state-building, and to adapt the processes and aid instruments whereby 
they engage with a country and provide assistance. Others have contributed to the 
evolving understanding of state fragility through their own research, or supported the 
development of international principles and guidelines for dealing with fragile states.  
Ultimately, it is the standard-setting activities, strategic and operational reforms, 
and evolving organizational practice of international development organizations that 
is essentially changing the design, management, and delivery of ODA vis-à-vis fragile 
states. 241  Moreover, it is through their actions that policy shifts in multilateral 
development cooperation have a direct bearing on the states concerned and their 
respective population. Since fragile states are typically very dependent on aid as ODA 
constitutes the single largest resource flow received, whether and how international 
development organizations engage with these countries can have considerable 
material, as well as political consequences. 
In this chapter, I further develop these arguments. I begin by stating how the 
notion of fragile state, through its constant reiteration, quantification, and 
                                                                                                                                                              
would thus discourage political debate about structural inequality and divert attention from urgent, 
fundamental reforms to the international system. 
240 Infra chapter II.1 and II.3. 
241 On the definition of ODA, see supra note 51. 
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operationalizing in the regime of development cooperation, has become a basis for 
action (II.1). Next, I lay out the challenges that international development 
organizations often face when seeking to engage with fragile states on the basis of a 
traditionally state-centric development paradigm (II.2). To illustrate how different 
organizations have responded to these challenges, I provide an overview both of 
general policy-making and standard-setting activities in the context of the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and of some of the strategic shifts and 
operational reforms undertaken by organizations engaged in operational development 
cooperation (II.3). In conclusion, I point out that not only development objectives, 
processes, and instruments are adapted for fragile states, but also the rules that inform 
them (II.4). 
 
1. From Discourse to Action 
 
Looking at the evolving engagement of scholars and practitioners with fragile 
states, we have seen how the notion has constantly been reiterated and refined as a 
catchphrase for the international community’s growing concern with weak state 
institutions. Attention and resources devoted to research on the causes, characteristics, 
and consequences of weak statehood have increased steadily over the last two decades. 
Policy-oriented research conducted by universities or think tanks in the United States 
and Europe has been supported through public sources of funding.242 Governments 
have engaged in policy analysis, often with a focus on the security implications of 
state fragility.243 International organizations like the World Bank and the OECD have 
commissioned research and produced their own reports, contextual analysis and case 
studies.244  
                                                        
242 For instance, the US-based Brookings Institute issues the “Index of State Weakness in the 
Developing World” (Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, Index of State Weakness in the Developing 
World, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2008). In Europe, the London School of 
Economics has established a “Crisis State Research Network” 
(http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/Home.aspx, accessed December 
2014); and in Germany, the Free University of Berlin hosts a collaborative research center on 
“Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood” (http://www.sfb-governance.de, accessed December 
2014). 
243 For instance, a “The State Failure Task Force” (later renamed in “Political Instability Task Force”) 
based at the University of Maryland was commissioned by the US Central Intelligence Agency in 1994 
to study the correlates of state failure.  
244 For an overview, see NAY, 'International Organisations and the Production of Hegemonic 
Knowledge: How the World Bank and the OECD helped invent the Fragile State Concept'; and 
including other organizations, infra chapter II.3 a) and b). 
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Research on fragile states – despite the various interests and needs of different 
actors that commission or produce it – is typically driven by a search for similarities 
between diverse countries, and the corresponding objective of generating uniform 
solutions. In the words of Nehal Bhuta, the supposition of a “unified object” of study, 
and with it the idea that “qualities of highly heterogeneous political and social orders 
can be mapped, grasped, known, compared and addressed” are thus continuously 
reinforced.245 Arguably, such discursive processes contribute to the ‘normalization’ 
(in the sense of Foucault) of a certain idea of statehood, and state fragility as a 
deviation thereof.246 Seen through the lens of constructivist theories of international 
relations, they contribute to the formation of identities and interests with an important 
impact on how fragile states are perceived and addressed by the international 
community.247 The understanding that a group of fragile states shares some distinct 
characteristics or at least needs, warranting a specific, urgent, and concerted response, 
is thus increasingly entrenched. 
This trend has been reinforced by numerous efforts to measure state fragility, 
which facilitate the move from discourse to action. Various research institutions, but 
also governments and international organizations, produce different indices, 
classifications, and rankings, both for analytical and practical purposes. 248  The 
quantification of state fragility becomes a means of proving the objectivity and 
viability of the concept, and thus a basis for its operationalization.249  
Most indices capture the progressive character of fragility by ranking countries on 
the basis of a metric scale, with an ideal notion of effective or resilient statehood 
positioned at the top end of the spectrum. Statehood is usually disaggregated in 
certain core dimensions – e.g. politics, security, economy, and social welfare – and a 
state’s performance is measured for each dimension using a compilation of different 
indicators, such as the World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI), Gross Domestic 
                                                        
245 BHUTA, 'Governmentalizing Sovereignty: Indexes of State Fragility and the Calculability of 
Political Order', 134 and 136. 
246 Ibid., 137 and 139, drawing on Foucault’s ‘dispositif’ of security as elaborated in his 1977-88 
Lectures on Security, Territory, Population.  
247 NEWMAN, 'Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World', 439. 
248 Examples include the “State Fragility Index” compiled at the George Mason University; the 
Brookings “Index of State Weakness” (supra note 242), and the “Failed State Index”, issued jointly by 
the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine. For an overview, see JAVIER FABRA  MATA & 
SEBASTIAN  ZIAJA, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and German Development 
Institute, 'Users’ Guide on Measuring Fragility ' (2009), 24, and BETHKE, 'Zuverlässig invalide – 
Indizes zur Messung fragiler Staatlichkeit'. 
249 BHUTA, 'Governmentalizing Sovereignty: Indexes of State Fragility and the Calculability of 
Political Order', 143. 
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Product (GDP), and Human Development Index (HDI).250 For example, the “State 
Fragility Index” measures two essential qualities of state performance, effectiveness 
and legitimacy, and these quality indices combine scores of measurements along the 
dimensions of security, governance, economics, and social development.251 Again, 
despite the different composition of indicators and the acknowledgement that the 
origins of fragility are manifold, the project of measuring state fragility is necessarily 
informed by the assumption that not every case is unique. Accordingly, the resulting 
country rankings show considerable overlap: typically, they are headed by Somalia, 
followed in diverging order by Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Chad, and Afghanistan.  
Scholars across disciplines have pointed out that indicators and rankings can play 
a potentially powerful role in constituting and shaping perceptions, and have 
sometimes important material consequences.252  Indicators measuring state fragility 
contribute to elaborating and entrenching the social construction of the fragile state. In 
the words of Robert Jackson, they form part of a “global statistical enterprise 
organized to measure and report on the comparative performance of countries”.253 
The material consequences of indicator-based classifications become evident where 
they are put to use, for instance, in the allocation of development aid. In the meantime, 
though measurement and classification occur on the basis of seemingly technical, 
indicator-based assessments, the political and normative nature of the underlying 
claims can hardly be disguised.254  
                                                        
250 The indicators used are a compilation from various sources and hence include data that was not 
collected for the specific purpose of measuring fragility. Indicators are then typically aggregated to 
generate the index value that seeks to display a country’s degree of fragility, i.e. the extent to which it 
is failing in some fundamental respect to fulfill the functions attributed to a state and reflected in the 
choice of indicators. HARRIS, et al., 'Country Classifications for a Changing World', 17-23. 
251 MONTY G. MARSHALL & BANJAMIN R. COLE, Center for Systemic Peace, 'Global Report 2011. 
Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility' (2011), pp. 36-38 (Technical Notes); also BETHKE, 
'Zuverlässig invalide – Indizes zur Messung fragiler Staatlichkeit', 25-26.  
252 For instance, economic and rational-choice literature, constructivist theories of international 
relations, and recently also international lawyers engaging with phenomena of global governance have 
studied the impact of indicators. For an overview, see KEVIN E. DAVIS, et al., 'Indicators as a 
Technology of Global Governance', 46 Law & Society Review, 71 (2012), 72-73.   
253 JACKSON, Quasi-states. Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, 23.  
254 BHUTA, 'Governmentalizing Sovereignty: Indexes of State Fragility and the Calculability of 
Political Order', 134 ff.; NEWMAN, 'Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-
Westphalian World', 426-429; and from the perspective of postcolonial approaches, PAHUJA, 
Decolonizing International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality, 93, 
arguing that “quantifiable, and therefore putatively scientific” measures like the GNP have replaced old 
distinctions based on race or “civilization” as new tools for safeguarding hierarchies between states and 
the model of the West.  
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Despite the lack of a clear concept, let alone an agreed definition, the notion of 
fragile states has thus proceeded from the realm of academic research and political 
discourse to a stage where it directly informs policy-making in security, development, 
and other relevant fields of practice.255 For instance, the construction of state fragility 
as a complex and multi-dimensional challenge has affected the interaction of different 
policy fields and actors, and contributed to the incorporation of civilian components 
into military operations, to the “securitization” of development cooperation, and to 
fostering a closer linkage between humanitarian assistance and development 
cooperation.256 More broadly, since weak statehood has come to be recognized as a 
root cause for multiple problems, state-building, or tackling state fragility, is 
increasingly seen as a global public good, which requires a concerted effort across 
institutions and policy fields.257  
 In development cooperation, these policy shifts have been accompanied by a 
commensurate increase in resource flows to fragile states. According to the OECD, 
the amount of official development assistance (ODA) going to fragile and conflict-
affected states has more than doubled between 2000 and 2010, when it accounted for 
37% of all ODA.258 These additional resources flows have usually concentrated in 
countries or regions of strategic interest to the West, but have also benefited long-
forgotten crisis and aid orphans.259 The distribution of resources to specific projects 
and programs has equally been affected, regularly benefiting those with a focus on 
                                                        
255 E.g. NEWMAN, 'Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World', 438-
439; or CALL, 'The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State’', 1494-1495, arguing that “the failed state concept has 
acted as a corrective to prevalent approaches to promoting peace, development, or humanitarian 
assistance. […] It has also enhanced the linkage not just between international security and internal 
stability among poor, peripheral societies, but also that between basic freedoms and service delivery 
within small, powerless societies and the interests of Western powers and regional powers.” 
256 An obvious example is the US Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development adopted in 
September 2010, which states that “Development is thus indispensable in the forward defense of 
America’s interests in a world shaped by growing economic integration and fragmenting political 
power, by the rise of emerging powers and the persistent weakness of fragile states”. THE WHITE 
HOUSE, 'Fact Sheet: U.S. Global Development Policy' (September 22, 2010). 
257 KHARAS & ROGERSON, 'Horizon 2025. Creative Destruction in the Aid Industry', 26, arguing that 
„[a]bsolute poverty’s dense concentration in 2025 in fragile states [...] elevates tacking fragility into a 
global as well as regional public good – indeed, perhaps the next frontier of globalization.” 
258 OECD, 'Fragile States 2013. Resource Flows and Trends in a Shifting World ', Figure 2.1 (p. 46). 
Since 2011, however, aid to fragile states has started declining somewhat. See also DAVID CARMENT, 
et al., 'State Fragility and Implications for Aid Allocation: An Empirical Analysis', 25 Conflict 
Management and Peace Science, 349 (2008). 
259 OECD, 'Fragile States 2013. Resource Flows and Trends in a Shifting World ', Figure 2.14 (p. 66). 
In 2010, by far the largest share of resources went to Afghanistan, followed by Ethiopia, DRC, 
Pakistan, Haiti, Tanzania, West Bank and Gaza, Iraq, Sudan, and Nigeria. 
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institution-building and governance reforms, often in core sectors like security and 
justice.260 
Moreover, in development cooperation, donors have been turning research 
findings into policy recommendations and subsequent action, i.e. operationalizing the 
notion of fragile states. The understanding that fragile states feature some specific 
characteristics, constraints or needs has come to inform strategies and approaches, aid 
allocation schemes, the choice of aid instruments, and the design of specific projects 
and implementation tools. All of the major bilateral donor agencies have issued 
corresponding strategies, policy documents, and guidelines. For instance, USAID has 
drafted a Fragile Sates Strategy in 2005, the same year that the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) issued a policy paper on “Why we need to work 
more effectively in Fragile States”. 261  The German Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has adopted a first concept note on engaging 
with fragile states in 2007, and, together with the German Foreign Office and the 
Federal Ministry of Defense, a set of inter-ministerial guidelines to improve policy 
coherence.262 Further, as the overview in the following section serves to illustrate, 
virtually all international development organizations have begun to adopt strategic 
and policy documents, and to adjust aid processes and instruments for engaging with 
fragile states.263  
Against this background, the question is not just on what basis states are 
designated as fragile, and what are the consequences. The aggregated effects of the 
reiteration, measurement, and operationalization of the notion of fragile states are far 
from unidirectional, but certainly substantial. The social construction of fragile states 
has often involved throwing “a monolithic cloak over disparate problems that require 
tailored solutions”, and inspired intrusive and paternalistic policy prescriptions.264 At 
                                                        
260 Ibid., Figures 2.9 and 2.10 (p. 58), on the evolving allocation of aid to fragile states per sector.  
261 See USAID Fragile States Strategy (January 2005) and the reference to fragile states in the US 
Global Development Policy Fact Sheet (September 22, 2010); DFID’s Policy Paper, Why we need to 
work more effectively in fragile states (2005); Canada's International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride 
and Influence in the World (2005); and France’s Policy Paper on Fragile States and Situations of 
Fragility (2007). 
262 BMZ Entwicklungsorientierte Transformation bei fragiler Staatlichkeit und schlechter 
Regierungsführung, BMZ Konzepte 149 (2007) and “Für eine kohärente Politik der Bundesregierung 
gegenüber fragilen Staaten - Ressortübergreifende Leitlinien” (supra note 79).  
263 Infra chapter II.3 b), and with an overview of the fragile states agenda of major development 
organizations (EU, World Bank, OECD DAC, UN), CAMMACK, et al., 'Donors and the ‘Fragile States’ 
Agenda: A Survey of Current Thinking and Practice. Report submitted to the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency', pp. 95-107. 
264 CALL, 'The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State’', 1495. 
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the same time, it has helped to direct attention to the specific needs of an often 
marginalized group of states, and allowed to expound the problems of unrealistic 
assumptions that inform the universalization of a particular model of statehood.  
We also need to turn attention to the actors that are making these judgments, and 
to the processes through which the notion of fragile states progresses from discourse 
to action. In the context of ongoing transformations from an inter-state system to a 
multi-level system of governance, international organizations emerge as important 
actors in furthering a concerted response to state fragility: both as sites for 
intergovernmental policy-making and standard-setting, and through adapting their 
own processes and instruments.  
 
2. A Challenge for International Development Organizations 
 
In recent years, there has been an unprecedented surge of reforms and regulatory 
activity in multilateral development cooperation with fragile states. Before turning 
attention to how the notion of fragile states is thus operationalized, however, it is 
necessary to consider the challenges that have prompted such a proactive response 
from international development organizations. Multilateral development cooperation 
rests on a largely state-centric paradigm, which underscores the aid objectives, 
processes and instruments. Development organizations act on the assumption that 
recipient countries have effective governments – both in a formal, juridical sense, and 
from an empirical perspective, i.e. in terms of actual capacity on the part of state 
institutions. Accordingly, international development organizations face a number of 
challenges – technical, political, and legal – when seeking to engage in the typically 
weak-capacity and often high-risk environments of conflict-affected and fragile states, 
with sometimes no effective and functioning government counterparts. 
In the subsequent section, I look in more detail at the state-centric development 
paradigm that informs multilateral development cooperation (a), and outline the 
various challenges that international organizations encounter in the context of fragile 
states (b).  
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a) The State-Centric Development Paradigm and its Premises 
 
 
The traditional regime of development cooperation is largely state-centric. 
Development cooperation essentially constitutes an intergovernmental process 
through which, in the case of multilateral development cooperation, an international 
organization provides ODA funding to one or more recipient states. 265  Recipient 
governments constitute the natural counterparts for international organizations: they 
negotiate and sign the agreements on the basis of which assistance is provided, 
participate in the design of projects and programs, and are responsible for their 
implementation. For based on the current aid orthodoxy, recipient states are expected 
to take the lead and assume responsibility for their own development. Accordingly, 
the state-centric regime of development cooperation is premised on the existence of a 
state with ‘effective government’ in a formal, juridical sense: a government with the 
legal capacity to express consent and to legally commit the country. Moreover, it is 
premised on the existence of governments with a certain level of institutional capacity 
and ‘good governance’, which are seen as preconditions for aid to be effective. Both 
aspects, juridical and empirical statehood, therefore influence under what conditions 
and how international organizations provide development funding.266               
Why juridical statehood is generally a minimum condition for access to ODA 
becomes clear when considering that the transfer of ODA is essentially an 
intergovernmental process, and as such governed by international law. International 
organizations must treat recipient countries as legal sovereigns, which principally 
implies that they can engage only with the consent of the government in power.267 
Moreover, international organizations generally provide development assistance on 
the basis of international legal treaties.268 These are negotiated and signed by the 
                                                        
265 Supra note 20. Assistance provided by a group of donor states to one or more recipient countries 
without being channeled through an international organization also constitutes multilateral 
development cooperation, but shall not be considered here. 
266 See also MACRAE, et al., 'Aid to 'Poorly Performing’ Countries: A Critical Review of Debates and 
Issues', para. 4.3 (p. xi), arguing that “development cooperation relies on three related but distinct 
conditions being in place: that a state exists; that the state is competent and legitimate; that there is an 
authority recognized and sanctioned internationally to represent that state. The status of these different 
elements of statehood influences significantly the form, channels and systems of aid management.” I 
discuss the role of the state in the law of development cooperation in MARIE VON ENGELHARDT, 
'Reflections on the Role of the State in the Legal Regimes of International Aid', 71 Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 451 (2011), pp. 454-456. 
267 Supra note 25. 
268 These treaties regulate a variety of aspects, for instance, certain obligations of recipients in 
connection with the carrying out of a development project. See MICHAEL RIEGNER & PHILIPP DANN, 
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governments of recipient countries, which possess the capacity to legally commit the 
country.269  
The premise of juridical statehood is also clearly expressed in the legal 
frameworks of international development organizations, to which we will return 
later.270 The World Bank, for instance, is required by its founding treaties to provide 
financing only to its members countries, and only states can become members.271 
When the Bank provides loans to a country, it does so on the basis of a legal 
agreement concluded with the government, which thus assumes legal liability for the 
reimbursement of loans.272 Even if the government of a member country is not itself 
the recipient of a loan, the Bank still has to conclude a guarantee agreement with the 
government, in order to create a contractual relationship under public international 
law. 273  More generally, the World Bank deals with countries only through their 
governments. 274  Any engagement with entities or stakeholders outside of the 
government is usually subject to the government’s consent, as the organization is 
further explicitly prohibited to “interfere in the political affairs of any member”.275 
                                                                                                                                                              
'Foreign Aid Agreements', in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (Oxford University Press, May 2011); and on the content of agreements and the procedural regime 
for their adoption, also DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the 
World Bank, the EU and Germany, 377-379 (on agreements concluded by the World Bank); and 391-
392 (on the EU’s financing agreements). 
269 On the role of governments as executive organs of the state, capable of entering into legal 
obligations on the part of the country, see MAGIERA, 'Governments'; and on the conclusion of 
international legal treaties, see BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, 579-583.  
270 See infra chapter III.2, where I show how the sovereignty of recipient countries is reflected in the 
legal and policy frameworks of international development organizations.  
271 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development of 1944 
(hereinafter IBRD Articles), Art. II Sect. 1 (Membership) in combination with Art. III Sect. 1 (a) “The 
resources and the facilities of the Bank shall be used exclusively for the benefit of members”; and 
Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association of 1966 (hereinafter IDA Articles) 
Art. II Sect. 1 and Art. V Sect. 1 (a). 
272 Due to the nature of the World Bank as an international financial institution that lends to its member 
countries, the conclusion of legal agreements also serves to secure the reimbursement of loans. Other 
organizations that provide non-refundable assistance, however, similarly conclude legal agreements 
with recipient states, which also  See supra note 268. 
273 IBRD Articles, Art. III Sect. 4 (i) and IDA Articles, Art. V Sect. 2 d); see also IBRAHIM F. I. 
SHIHATA, The World Bank Legal Papers (Kluwer Law International, 2000), pp. 126-127, explaining 
how only a treaty concluded with a member government qualifies as treaty under international law, and 
is hence subject to executive and legislative control within the country, and more easily insulated from 
domestic law.  
274 Member states are requested to designate the governmental agencies for the Bank to deal with. 
IBRD Articles, Art. III Sect. 2 and IDA Articles, Art. VI Sect. 10. For the IBRD, the responsible 
governmental agency is usually the “Treasury, central bank, a stabilization fund or other similar fiscal 
agency.” IBRD Articles, Art. III Sect. 2. In case of the IDA, the Articles only foresee the designation of 
an “appropriate authority” as “channel of communication” for the Association. IDA Articles, Art. VI 
Sect. 10.  
275 IDA Articles, Art. V Sect. 1 lit e), together with the political prohibition clause in IBRD Articles Art. 
IV Sect. 10 and IDA Articles Art. V Sect. 6. Restrictions on engaging with entities other than the 
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The same principally holds true for most international organizations engaged in 
operative development cooperation. The founding agreements of other Multilateral 
Development Banks (MDBs) in particular – the AfDB, the ADB, but also those with a 
thematic rather than regional focus, like the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) – contain provisions that are largely similar to those of the 
World Bank. Membership is therein confined to states,276 the governments of member 
states constitute the primary recipients of aid,277 international involvement depends on 
state consent, 278  and interventions in the political affairs of member states are 
prohibited.279 At the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the UN’s 
principal agency tasked with development cooperation, the governments of recipient 
countries approve and sign a Country Programme Action Plan with UNDP, which 
serves as a legal basis for its engagement.280 Development assistance provided by the 
European Union to the countries of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group 
of states currently rests on the Cotonou Agreement, an intergovernmental treaty.281 
The “central government” of a recipient country is therein explicitly recognized as 
“main partner” of the EU, whereas non-state actors are only eligible for financing 
“subject to the agreement of the ACP state”.282   
The state-centric paradigm hence implies that the formal primacy of the sovereign 
state translates into the way that multilateral development cooperation is negotiated 
and agreed. Recipients that have the formal attributes of juridical statehood alone, 
however, are not able to assume a decisive role in planning and implementing 
                                                                                                                                                              
government are more clearly expressed in THE WORLD BANK, 'Guidance Note on Bank Multi-
Stakeholder Engagement' (2009). 
276 Agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank (hereafter ADB Agreement), Art. 3; 
Agreement establishing the African Development Bank (hereafter AfDB Agreement), Art. 3 (1) “Any 
African country which has the status of an independent State may become a regional member of the 
Bank.”  
277 ADB Agreement, Art. 11 and AfDB Agreement, Art. 14. Moreover, the purposes of both ADB and 
AfDB are to contribute to the development of member countries (Art. 1 and 2 and Art. 1 and 2 lit. a) 
respectively).  
278 ADB Agreement, Art. 14 (iii) and AfDB Agreement, Art. 17 lit. (b). 
279 ADB Agreement, Art. 36 (2); AfDB Agreement, Art. 38 (2).  
280 The Country Programme Action Plan must be aligned with a country’s national development 
priorities and coordinated with other UN agencies through the UN Development Assistance 
Framework (UNDAF). Plans are signed by a “Government Coordinating Agency”, the designated 
government agency to coordinate with UNDP, which is regularly the government planning, finance, or 
foreign affairs ministry. See online, https://info.undp.org/global/popp/ppm/Pages/Legal-
Framework.aspx (accessed November 2014). 
281 Cotonou Agreement, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, last revision in Ouagadougou on 22 June 
2010, OJ L 287, 04 November 2010 or OJ L 317, 15 December 2000. EU development cooperation is, 
however, also committed to the principle of participation of actors outside of the central government. 
See infra chapter V.2 a). 
282 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 2 Fundamental Principles and Art. 58 (2) lit (a). 
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development projects and programs. For this purpose, international development 
organizations equally expect recipients to have certain capacities, institutions, and 
policies in place, factors associated with empirical statehood. 
The current aid orthodoxy that sustainable and inclusive development depends on 
“the existence of a unified and secure state, and a benign and competent government 
to run its institutions” is the result of a considerable evolution of the role of the state 
in development cooperation, an evolution that is paralleled with broader trends in 
international relations.283 Initially, development was understood as a mostly state-
driven process, and organizations supported a strong role for the governments of 
newly independent nations in initiating economic activity, investments, agricultural 
development and industrialization. Yet in the 1970s and 1980s, inefficient public 
administrations, weak policies, and massive corruption came to be seen as major 
homegrown and state-related impediments to economic growth. For many years, 
development organizations advocated for reducing the role of the state in the 
economic process, in line with the neoliberal ideas encapsulated in the economic 
agenda of the “Washington Consensus”.284   
Only in the late 1980s, mainstream development thinking began turning to the 
state again. Three important developments have since significantly shaped the role 
and responsibilities accorded to recipient governments in development cooperation. 
To begin with, the concept of development itself came to be conceived more 
holistically in all of its economic, social, and ultimately political facets, while a 
consensus emerged around the ultimate objectives of development cooperation: to 
                                                        
283 For an overview of the changing role of the state in development theory, see Fukuyama (supra note 
7); JOHN MARTINUSSEN, Society, State and Market. A Guide to Competing Theories of Development 
(Zed Books, 1997), chapter IV; ADRIAN LEFTWICH, States of Development. On the Primacy of Politics 
in Development (Blackwell, 2000), pp. 71-104; or JAQUES  KERSTENETZKY & CELIA LESSA 
KERSTENETZKY, 'The State as a Developmental Actor: State Forms for Social Transformation', in 
Bruce Currie-Alder, et al. (eds), International Development. Ideas, Experience, and Prospects (Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
284 The Washington Consensus refers to a set of policy prescriptions that were believed a necessary 
first step requirement for all countries to achieve economic growth, for instance, restructuring the 
bureaucratic apparatus, reducing public employment, privatizing certain industries, and deregulating 
markets. These policies go back to a study of JOHN WILLIAMSON, Institute for International Economics, 
'Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?' (1990). The World Bank and IMF used  
“structural adjustment loans” (SALs) to create incentives for such reforms. SALs often failed to 
improve the economic situation, however, and arguably contributed to the deterioration of social 
standards in many developing countries. For a critical assessment, see, for instance, PAUL MOSLEY, et 
al., Aid and Power. The World Bank and Policy-based Lending, 2 (Routledge, 1991), chapters 3 and 9; 
or TONY KILLICK, et al., Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change (Routledge, 1998), pp. 160-
172. 
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reduce poverty and increase human welfare. 285  The results were a more 
comprehensive look at the state’s actual performance in all of these areas – some of 
which traditionally belonging to the state’s domestic affairs – and a more concrete 
conception of what was expected of the state in turn.  
Second, the rise of good governance as a leitmotif in the 1990s reflects the 
emerging consensus that for aid to be effective, it requires a favorable institutional 
and policy environment.286 Macroeconomic evidence from cross-country regressions 
appeared to suggest that the impact of aid on growth and poverty-reduction was 
reduced in countries with poor policies and institutions.287  Hence, recipient states 
were expected to conduct public affairs and manage public resources in an efficient, 
transparent and responsible manner. International organizations became involved with 
an expanding agenda of political reforms to promote good governance along these 
lines, and more selective in the allocation of aid in the first place. The endorsement of 
good governance as a necessary ingredient, if not precondition for development has 
thus influenced the perceived role and expected functions of recipient states in an 
unprecedented manner. 288  For many development organizations, the ideal state 
                                                        
285 An important influence on shifting the focus to a more holistic and human-centered conception of 
development, for instance, had the work of AMARTYA SEN, Development as Freedom (Oxford 
University Press, 2001). On the broadening of the notion of development along several dimensions, 
from economic development to sustainable development, human development and political 
development, see DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World 
Bank, the EU and Germany, at 127-129; or LEFTWICH, States of Development. On the Primacy of 
Politics in Development, pp. 40-70.  
286 On the emergence of good governance in general, see the references in supra note 119; on the legal 
nature and content of good governance, DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative 
Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, 234-235; and with respect to the law of the 
European Union, DOROTHEE KUON, Good Governance im Europäischen Entwicklungsrecht (Nomos, 
2010). 
287 In 2000, US economists Craig Burnside and David Dollar furnished statistical data to undermine the 
correlation between economic growth and sound institutions and (monetary, fiscal, and trade) policies. 
BURNSIDE & DOLLAR, 'Aid, Policies, and Growth'. However, subsequent studies soon found that aid 
can still have positive outcomes in less favorable policy and institutional environments. E.g. WILLIAM 
EASTERLY, et al., Center for Global Development. CGD Working Paper # 26, 'New Data, New Doubts: 
Revisiting "Aid, Policies, and Growth”' (2003). Burnside and Dollar’s findings were also severely 
criticized by DAVID ROODMANN, 'The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development and Cross-Country 
Empirics', 21 World Bank Economic Review 255 (2007).  
288 The good governance concept does prima facie not indicate whether more or less government is 
more conductive to achieving development, nor does it prescribe a certain form of government. The 
concept’s emergence, however, has certainly entailed a growing concern with the question how 
different political systems influence governance, including considerations of democracy and human 
rights. Whether donors are explicitly committed to promoting democracy and the rule or law in 
development cooperation like the European Union, or remain focused on the more technocratic concept 
of good governance, like the World Bank, Philipp Dann therefore finds that “[t]he goal of all concepts 
is more stable and responsible statehood”. DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A 
Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, 118.  
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became one capable of fulfilling certain core functions in an effective and efficient 
manner, while cooperating both with the private sector and civil society.289 
Third, the success of the aid effective agenda, reflected in the broad endorsement 
of five principles to improve the quality and impact of aid in the 2004 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, has firmly entrenched the understanding that aid 
effectiveness requires state effectiveness. 290  In other words, not only do many 
governments rely on external aid to function effectively, for aid to be effective and 
sustainable, it is supposed to require a sufficient level of institutional capacity and 
good governance on the parts of recipients. Particularly the principle of ownership 
reflects how both the role and the according expectations of recipient states have 
grown over the last decades. Ownership prominently expresses the claim that 
recipient states should take the lead over their own development, which corresponds 
to an entitlement as well as duties and responsibilities.291 For instance, recipients are 
responsible for formulating a national development plan, to guarantee broad-based 
participation in that process, and to maintain the institutions necessary for its 
implementation.292  
These broader trends concerning the role of the recipient state find expression in a 
proliferating number of political declarations and standard-setting instruments that 
                                                        
289 See, for instance, THE WORLD BANK, 'Good Practice Note for Development Policy Lending. 
Development Policy Operations and Program Conditionality in Fragile States' (June 7, 2005), 7, 
listing revenue collection, public expenditure management and civil service appointment as desirable 
state functions, but also functions that relate to “state authority” (e.g. security services) and to “state 
legitimacy” (e.g. the holding of elections). 
290 The Paris Declaration (supra note 21), concretized and strengthened by the Accra Agenda for 
Action in September 2008, and developed further by the Busan Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation of November 2012. The Paris Declaration is not hard law, but some overlap exists 
between its five principles and norms of international law. LEONIE VIERCK & PHILIPP DANN, 'Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005)/Accra Agenda for Action (2008)', in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, April 2011), paras. 
14-17.  
291 The OECD DAC has defined “national ownership” as “[t]he effective exercise of a government’s 
authority over development policies and activities, including those that rely – entirely or partially – on 
external resources. For governments, this means articulating the national development agenda and 
establishing authoritative policies and strategies.” See the OECD’s Glossary of Statistical Terms, 
available online: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7238 (accessed October 2014). For a 
critical discussion of the idea of ownership in the practice of development cooperation, see WILLEM H. 
BUITER, '‘Country Ownership’: A Term Whose Time has Gone', 17 Development in Practice, 647 
(2007); also JOHN PENDER, 'Country Ownership: The Evasion of Donor Accountability', in Christopher 
J. Bickerton, et al. (eds), Politics without Sovereignty. A Critique of Contemporary International 
Relations (UCL Press, 2007). 
292 E.g. Paris Declaration (supra note 21), para. 14 (“developing and implementing their national 
development strategies through broad consultative processes”), or para. 20 (“ensure that national 
systems, institutions and procedures for managing aid and other development resources are effective, 
accountable and transparent”). 
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inform the conduct of development cooperation. For instance, virtually all 
international organizations engaged in development cooperation have committed to 
adhere to the principles of ownership and alignment, mutual accountability and results 
included in the 2004 Paris Declaration, or to the principles of partnership, 
transparency and shared responsibility included in the 2013 Busan Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation. 293  The Paris Principles clearly convey the 
central tenets of the state-centric development paradigm: on the one hand, that 
recipient states are recognized as equal partners with the primary responsibility for 
their own development, and on the other hand, that recipients are expected to provide 
the enabling (transparent, accountable) environment necessary for rendering aid 
effective.  
Apart from being expressed in high-level policy statements, such trends have 
profoundly affected the way in which international development organizations plan, 
manage, and deliver assistance. To a greater or lesser extent, all international 
organizations have made the fulfillment of good governance-related political and 
macroeconomic requirements a decisive factor in determining the volume of aid, the 
choice of aid instruments, or the continuation of projects and programs. For instance, 
MDBs like the World Bank, the African Development Bank, or the Asian 
Development Bank, allocate resources to low-income countries on the basis of 
assessments of their policies and institutions, including in the area of good 
governance.294 Other donor organizations like the European Union or the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), explicitly condition assistance on 
a country’s adherence to democratic principles and human rights. 295  The idea of 
country ownership, in turn, is reflected in the fact that development organizations 
increasingly build on the country’s own development objectives and priorities, which 
                                                        
293 For a full list of international organizations and states adhering to the Busan Partnership Agreement, 
see online: http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/busanadherents.htm (accessed December 2014). 
294 I will analyze this process of resource allocation based on a so-called Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) in detail in infra chapter IV.2, with regards to the World Bank. The 
ADB and the AfDB use very similar systems of performance-based allocation. See, for instance, the 
ADB’s Policy on Performance-based Allocation for Asian Development Fund Resources (February 
2001). 
295 E.g. LORAND BARTELS, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU's International Agreements (Oxford 
University Press, 2005); and infra chapter V.2 b). The EBRD may only use its resources and facilities 
and conduct its operations in countries committed to principles of democracy. See EUROPEAN BANK 
FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, 'Political Aspects of the Mandate of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development'. 
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are regularly set out in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).296 Ownership has 
also become a fundamental principle guiding the EU’s cooperation with ACP 
countries.297 Moreover, the increasing use of aid instruments that allow a greater say 
for recipient governments in determining the use of ODA, such as budget assistance, 
equally reflect the shift towards more recipient ownership in development 
cooperation.298  
The conviction that external assistance is successful and sustainable where it 
builds on effective and accountable state institutions is hence reflected in the 
objectives, processes, and instruments used in multilateral development cooperation – 
and as we will see later, in the legal and policy frameworks of international 
development organizations.299 Development organizations operate on the assumption 
that governments are in principle capable of fulfilling certain requirements in the 
development process, and can serve as a counterpart for the donor community. They 
expect that recipient governments have the capacities and institutions necessary for 
taking the lead in planning and implementing development projects, in a participatory 
manner, in line with environmental and social standards, and guaranteeing the 
transparent and accountable use of ODA. In other words, what they look for is 
literally effective governments – governments that conform to an array of 
requirements concerning their functions and expected performance in the 
development process. Such requirements are generally dependent on the particular 
ideas and preferences of different donors.  
Ultimately, the state-centric paradigm of development cooperation and its 
premises in terms of both juridical and empirical statehood lead to a peculiar paradox. 
                                                        
296 Poverty Reduction Strategies have become a central tool whereby recipient states establish their 
development priorities and plans in a country-driven process, and are referred to not just by the World 
Bank and IMF, but also other multilateral and bilateral donors. For instance, the World Bank develops 
Country Assistance Strategies on the basis of a “country’s vision of its development goals”. See the 
World Bank’s Bank Procedures (BP) 2.11 on Country Assistance Strategies, November 2011, para. 2. 
297 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 2; see also the European Consensus on Development, listing ownership, 
partnership, and in-depth political dialogue as common principles in para. 4. Joint statement by the 
Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, 
the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European 
Consensus’, (2006/C 46/01), 24.2.2006. 
298 MACRAE, et al., 'Aid to 'Poorly Performing’ Countries: A Critical Review of Debates and Issues', 12, 
stating that the “aid effectiveness literature also informed the development of new forms of aid 
instrumentation, specifically Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) and Direct Budget Support (DBS)”, 
which “require a high degree of trust between donor and recipient country and […] imply a strong 
degree of legitimisation of the recipient government.”  
299 See infra chapter III.2, where I provide an overview of the substance of rules that generally guide 
the conduct of international development organizations.  
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International organizations operate on the basis of the assumption that recipient 
counterparts have an effective government, while they are essentially concerned with 
strengthening government effectiveness. They are simultaneously bound to respect 
the sovereignty of recipients, and committed to establishing the conditions required 
for sovereignty to be exercised.300 This paradox is particularly apparent in the context 
of multilateral development cooperation with fragile states. 
 
b) On the Manifold Challenges of Engaging with Fragile States 
 
 
In 2009, the World Bank’s President declared that fragile states are “the toughest 
development challenge of our era”.301 A large consensus has emerged among donors 
that fragile states need assistance in building the capable and responsive institutions 
necessary to escape from cycles of poverty and conflict. Donors also agree, however, 
that achieving positive and lasting development results in the absence of basic 
institutional structures and capacities is exceptionally difficult. In other words, fragile 
states may be seen as the toughest development challenge because they face particular 
development challenges, and because they pose particular challenges to development 
cooperation. Many of the challenges for international organizations engaging with 
fragile states owe to the fact that they operate on the basis of a state-centric 
development paradigm.  
First, it bears repeating that the growing concern with the development challenges 
of fragile states relates to a changing global policy environment as well as shifting 
expectations of the state.302 In short, it is now much easier for a state to be regarded as 
                                                        
300 The according tension underlying donor-recipient relations is somewhat characteristic for the 
regime of development cooperation, but becomes more obvious with regards to fragile states. See, for 
instance, DOMINIK ZAUM, The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International State-
Building (Oxford University Press, 2005), 4-5, referring to a „sovereignty paradox“ with regards to the 
state-building practice of international transitional administrations, which compromise the right to self-
government as one element of sovereignty, in order to implement domestic reforms and strengthen 
local political institutions to ultimately strengthen sovereignty. See also MATTHEW SAUL, 'From Haiti 
to Somalia: The Assistance Model and the Paradox of State Reconstruction in International Law', 11 
International Community Law Review, 119 (2009); STEIN SUNDSTOL ERIKSEN, '‘State failure’ in 
Theory and Practice: The Idea of the State and the Contradictions of State Formation', 37 Review of 
International Studies, 229 (2011), 246; and with a critical perspective, WILLIAM BAIN, 'For Love of 
Order and Abstract Nouns: International Administration and the Discourse of Ability', 3 Journal of 
Intervention and State-Building, 143 (2009), 56-58. 
301 Supra note 134. 
302 On the two narratives underlying the international community’s concern with fragile states in 
general, see supra chapter I.2 b); on the changing expectations of the state in development cooperation, 
see supra chapter II.2 a).  
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fragile if the opposite – effective or resilient statehood – is seen to require not just the 
maintenance of a minimum level of law and order (‘effective government’), but also 
the transparent, accountable, participatory conduct of public affairs (‘good 
government’). 
At the same time, empirical data is readily available to substantiate the dire 
situation and elevated needs of states considered as fragile. Approaching 2015, most 
fragile states are unlikely to achieve any of the MDGs.303 Based on World Bank 
statistics, poverty rates in fragile and conflict-affected states are on average 21% 
higher than in developing countries that are not affected by conflict; their populations 
are twice as likely to be undernourished, and children are three times as likely to be 
out of school. 304  The governments of fragile and conflict-affected low-income 
countries spend less than half the amount of public resources on government services 
in the realm of education, health, security and administration than other developing 
countries. 305  The aggregated effects of these facts and figures concern about 1.5 
billion people living in fragile states, amounting to one sixth of the world’s population.  
What makes development cooperation with fragile states so challenging?306 Many 
challenges that development actors face in the context of fragile states are in one way 
or another related to the security situation. Fragile states often constitute insecure and 
politically instable environments, and many experience ongoing conflicts. Security 
concerns can complicate, if not prevent the engagement of development actors on the 
ground. Insecure or highly volatile political environments also make it difficult to 
generate or obtain reliable information required for planning development 
interventions, or to articulate longer-term objectives and priorities required for multi-
annual, strategic planning. Different and potentially conflicting objectives may prevail 
in the short term, and require, for instance, the prioritization of security and 
reconstruction needs over more long-term development goals in countries affected by 
conflict. Particularly in the context of non-linear crises, where circumstances are in 
flux and there is a constant danger that violent conflict re-erupts, projects can often 
                                                        
303 Supra note 31. 
304 THE WORLD BANK, 'World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development', 60-65. 
305 Normal developing countries are found to spend USD 267 per person every year, as opposed to 
USD 131 per person (purchasing power parity adjusted) in fragile states. Ibid., Table 7.2 (p. 236). 
306 The question why fragile and conflict-affected states constitute particularly challenging 
environments for development cooperation has been subject to extensive research and analysis. See the 
references provided in supra notes 19 and 23. The findings of the World Bank’s 2011 World 
Development Report to a large extent summarize the state of the art. See ibid..  
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not be implemented as planned. Further, in light of the often complex political 
economy of fragile states, the risk is higher not only that projects remain ineffective, 
but that funds are misused or end up exacerbating existing societal tensions or ethnic 
conflicts. In addition, non-linear crises often involve a plurality of development, 
humanitarian, and military actors that operate alongside each other. While the line 
between peace, conflict, and crisis or emergency blurs in practice, these different 
actors have competing mandates, objectives, and modi operandi, and coordination 
between them remains difficult. For instance, insufficient coordination regularly leads 
to gap between crisis response and longer-term recovery.307  
Yet fragile states do not only constitute particularly challenging environments for 
international development actors. They also bring to light a considerable disconnect 
between central tenets of the state-centric development paradigm and empirical 
circumstances. Empirical circumstances often do not conform to the assumptions in 
terms of juridical or empirical statehood that we have seen inform the processes and 
aid instruments whereby international organizations generally provide assistance. Or 
conversely, international development organizations require precisely what many 
conflict-affected and fragile states lack. They operate primarily with and through 
governments, and are usually bound to do so by the legal framework in which they 
operate. In a formal, juridical sense, international development organizations need 
national governments as contractual partners, able to legally commit the country. In 
addition, national governments are valued as principal providers of law and order, of 
security and other basic services. Development cooperation accordingly remains 
strongly focused on the formal institutions of the state. 
What if no government in power can be identified, or more than one entity claims 
power? What if the government formally in power lacks even the most basic 
capacities to exercise control beyond the capital? And what if the government that is 
supposed to serve as a counterpart in development cooperation has lost not only any 
meaningful authority, but also legitimacy in the eyes of the population?  
These questions point to the intricate blend of legal, political, and technical 
challenges that development cooperation with fragile states can involve – challenges 
that are not necessarily characteristic of fragile states, but often go along with weak 
                                                        
307 For a comprehensive account of the difficulties facing development and humanitarian actors in 
protracted crisis including policy implications, see ADELE HARMER & JOANNA MACRAE, Overseas 
Development Institute, HPG Research Report 18, 'Beyond the Continuum. The Changing Role of Aid 
Policy in Protracted Crises', July 2004 (July 2004). 
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governance, political instability and conflict. On the one hand, they engage the minds 
of international lawyers who work in the legal departments of international 
development organizations. Lawyers need to identify a government counterpart that 
can formulate an official request for assistance, or sign off the legal agreements on the 
basis of which assistance is provided. Difficulties emerge if either the juridical status 
of the state, or the legal authority or international recognition of the government is in 
doubt.308 This is not only the case in an exceptional situation like Somalia, where no 
effective government emerged for over a decade. The legal status of statehood may be 
contested, for instance, in situations immediately following state creation (e.g. 
Kosovo), in states or territories that are temporarily administered by the UN (e.g. East 
Timor, Kosovo), or in territories with relatively effective government but a 
permanently unresolved legal status (i.e. de facto regimes like Somaliland, or 
Palestine). The fact that Somaliland has not yet been recognized as an independent 
state has generally precluded the de facto regime from receiving international 
development assistance.309 Difficulties in identifying the government in power after 
an unconstitutional change of government took place, for example after a military 
coup or in a post-conflict situation (e.g. occupied Iraq in 2003), regularly lead to an 
interruption of aid flows.  
 On the other hand, even if a government or interim authority can be identified, as 
is still most often the case, weak governmental authority in fragile states is regularly 
complemented by informal, non-state forms of governance.310  In this context, the 
disproportionate focus in development cooperation on the formal institutions of the 
state and the central state level often obstructs the view at the drivers of fragility, and 
                                                        
308 Both are factors that are rarely addressed in academic literature concerned with the challenges of 
development cooperation with fragile states. An exception is the Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI) study on “poorly performing countries” quoted in supra note 24. The authors find that countries 
are likely to be difficult to assist if the “juridical or legal basis of the state is contested” or if 
“[i]nternational support and recognition of the incumbent regime is withheld or ambivalent” (p. xi-xii). 
309 Importantly, the lack of or unresolved legal status of a state or government generally precludes an 
entity from receiving traditional forms of government-to-government assistance that require the 
conclusion of an international legal agreement between donor and recipient. As we will see later, other 
forms and channels of aid can remain open, for instance, humanitarian assistance, or ODA provided 
through trust funds. See infra chapter IV.3 on the World Bank, and chapter V.1 a) and 2 c) with 
examples from the AfDB, the ADB, and the EU. 
310 On the importance of non-state actors and non-traditional forms of governance in fragile states, see, 
for instance, FISCHER & SCHMELZLE, 'Building Peace in the Absence of States - Challenging the 
Discourse on State Failure'; JAMES PUTZEL & JONATHAN DIJOHN, LSE Crisis States Research Centre 
'Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States ' (2012); LEMAY-HÉBERT, 'Statebuilding without Nation-
building? Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutionalist Approach'; and the references 
in supra note 135. 
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limited its effectiveness and reach. Identifying non-state actors to deal with can be 
challenging for intergovernmental organizations that have always been dealing with 
national governments as primary interlocutors. Particularly in post-conflict settings, 
civil society is often weak and fragmented – apart form the fact that the form and 
functions of civil society may substantially differ from its Western understanding. 
Dealing with non-traditional actors like warlords or rebel forces and choosing 
interlocutors among them is obviously extremely difficult and politically sensitive.  
No less difficult and politically sensitive for international development 
organizations is engaging with a government that is formally in power and effective 
control, but violates the human rights of its citizens. In such a situation, development 
organizations face the critical question of how to continue supporting a population in 
need, while avoiding the risk of supporting or legitimizing the government, and 
ultimately becoming complicit in its actions. Repressive governments are not a 
necessary characteristic of fragile states. Where governments appear more engaged in 
rent-seeking and clientelism than providing basic services, however, or otherwise lack 
legitimacy within the population, they are deemed by donors as “unresponsive”, 
“difficult partners”, or “spoilers”, rather than vital partners in development.311 
Apart from questions concerning the legal or legitimate authority for international 
organizations to engage with, the significant lack of capacity on the part of national 
governments in fragile states can cause many more difficulties in development 
cooperation. Fragile states are often in urgent need of external assistance, but simply 
lack the capacity to qualify for assistance in the first place, or to ensure that projects 
and programs are later implemented effectively. We have seen that international 
organizations regularly condition aid on the fulfillment of an array of requirements 
concerning the institutions and policies thought necessary for aid to be effective, to 
conform with fiduciary, environmental or social standards, or to ensure the 
accountable use of ODA.312  Safeguarding such standards may appear particularly 
warranted in countries where national standards are low. At the same time, insisting 
                                                        
311 State fragility is still primarily conceptualized in terms of the government’s lack of capacity, rather 
than legitimacy, since governments that command sufficient resources but deliberately choose to starve 
or otherwise oppress their population fortunately remain a marginal phenomenon. Weak state 
legitimacy is increasingly seen as intrinsically linked to a lack of state capacity and authority, however, 
and hence as a factor contributing to state fragility. See, for instance, OECD, 'The State’s Legitimacy in 
Fragile Situations. Unpacking Complexity'. The World Bank also increasingly focuses on the 
legitimacy of state institutions in defining fragility (see supra note 148). 
312 Supra chapter II.2 a). 
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on the same level of substantive and procedural requirements can prohibit any donor 
engagement – and donors increasingly acknowledge the risks associated with inaction 
or delayed action in already fragile states.313 Besides, for a weak government, the 
struggle to meet the aggregated requirements of various donors concerning project 
approval, implementation, and reporting will likely put a strain on its already limited 
capacities. 314  In practice, the result is often that implementation is bumpy, or 
institutions are created as mere camouflage.315 
Very weak capacity can also hamper a government’s ability to assume ownership. 
Realizing the principle of ownership regularly involves that recipients prepare a 
comprehensive national development plan on the basis of broad-based consultations, 
and seek an active role in planning, implementing, and monitoring projects – 
activities that all presume considerable institutional and administrative capacities and 
human resources.316 Accordingly, even relatively extensive and formalized guarantees 
of national decision-making power and participation in processes of multilateral 
development cooperation are only as effective at ensuring national autonomy as 
governments have the capacity – and intent – to realize them.  
Ultimately, engagement with fragile states often involves a dilemma. In light of 
their limited capacity or weak governance, substituting or bypassing state institutions 
appears warranted in the short term. Yet, bypassing state institutions reduces national 
autonomy and risks undermining the longer-term objective of strengthening their 
capacity. 
In sum, fragile states pose a challenge to multilateral development cooperation 
since in accordance with the state-centric development paradigm, development 
                                                        
313 On the risk of inaction and how it can outweigh the risks associated with action in fragile states, see, 
for instance, OECD, 'Managing Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts. The Price of Success?' 
(2011); or THE WORLD BANK, 'IDA 17. IDA’s Support to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States' (March 
2013), paras. 5, 21.  
314 In general, see KINGSBURY & DAVIS, 'Obligation Overload: Adjusting the Obligations of Fragile or 
Failed States'. 
315 LANT PRITCHETT, et al., Center for Global Development Working Paper 234, 'Capability Traps? 
The Mechanisms of Persistent Implementation Failure' (December 2010), referring to ‘isomorphic 
mimicry’ as a tactic of states to adopt certain organizational forms or best practices that are successful 
elsewhere as a mere camouflage, hiding their actual dysfunction. 
316 Forms of engagement that rely on country ownership or that favor the use of conditionality to ensure 
the effective use of ODA therefore face restrictions in fragile states. E.g. LAURENCE CHANDY, The 
Brookings Institution, Global Economy and Development Policy Paper 2011-12, 'Ten Years of Fragile 
States. What Have We Learned?' (2011), p. 6. On particular constraints concerning the application of 
aid effectiveness principles in fragile states, see also OXFORD POLICY MANAGEMENT AND THE IDL 
GROUP, 'Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration: Thematic Study. The Applicability 
of the Paris Declaration in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations. ' (August 2008). 
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objectives, processes, and instruments usually rely on the presence of an effective and 
authorized, capable, and responsive government. The finding that international 
development organizations are challenged to a significant extent because of their own 
reliance on, or mandated obedience to fixed assumptions in terms of juridical and 
empirical statehood, has an important implication. It is not only – and perhaps not 
even primarily – internal factors that make these states a development challenge.317 
Rather, fragile states are perceived and singled out as exceptionally challenging 
environments on the basis of an analysis that is inevitably influenced by different 
interests, policy goals, and eventually mandate constraints. Behind the identification, 
conceptualization, and response to fragile states as a development challenge stand 
actors that are, within the confines of their particular mandates, making judgments 
and taking decisions – for instance, on the legal status or effectiveness of a 
government, on the capacity of institutions, or on the quality of governance. On this 
basis, the following section sketches how international development organizations are 
responding to the challenges associated with engaging in fragile states.  
 
3. An Evolving Response  
 
Specific attention to fragile states in the development community commenced 
with the World Bank’s establishment of a taskforce on “Low Income Countries Under 
Stress” (LICUS) in 2001. Since then, the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC), a forum composed of the most important, traditional donor organizations, has 
assumed a central role in developing general principles and guidelines concerning the 
design, management, and delivery of ODA to fragile states.318 Broadly speaking, such 
principles and guidelines are concretized by international organizations engaged in 
operative development cooperation: international financial institutions and regional 
                                                        
317 See also MACRAE, et al., 'Aid to 'Poorly Performing’ Countries: A Critical Review of Debates and 
Issues'. The authors analyze the performance of different developing countries against two sets of 
indicators, economic growth and infant mortality, and find that few countries appear consistently 
across indicators and time as performing poorly. Therefore, country performance alone does not 
explain why certain countries are perceived as particularly challenging environments – rather, “the 
problem of poorly performing countries must also be understood as relational, in other words that the 
labeling of a country as poorly performing is in part a reflection of the political, security and aid 
relations between that country and the international community.” (p. xi). On external factors that 
influence fragility, see also OECD, 'Think Global, Act Global: Confronting Global Factors that 
Influence Conflict and Fragility' (September 2012). 
318 Importantly, the OECD does not itself provide ODA to developing countries, but is only engaged in 
development policy-making. On the understanding of international development organizations that I 
use in this thesis, see supra note 3.  
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development banks, the UN, and the EU. These organizations do not only refer to the 
outcomes produced by high-level policy fora. Responding to the practical and – 
depending on the mandate – legal challenges they face when engaging with fragile 
states, many have revisited their own strategies, processes, and financial instruments 
for dealing with fragile states, sometimes long before the phenomenon came to be 
termed as such. The lessons from research and reform initiatives in turn influence the 
development of more general principles for dealing with fragile states in high-level 
policy fora like the OECD DAC. Although the regime of development cooperation is 
not structured hierarchically and composed of organizations with different mandates, 
through such processes of mutual influence or ‘cross-fertilization’ between 
institutions, their understanding of and emerging response to fragile states becomes 
increasingly consistent.319  
To get a better sense of these processes and outcomes, the following section 
studies the development policy-making and standard-setting activities concerning 
fragile states in the context of the OECD DAC (a), and provides a first overview of 
the type of strategic shifts and operational reforms undertaken by selected 
international organizations (b).  
 
a) Policy-making and Standard-setting in the Context of the OECD DAC 
 
The OECD DAC is a grouping of the traditionally most important donors of 
development aid, that is 28 OECD member countries and the EU.320  Created by 
Ministerial Resolution in 1960, the intergovernmental committee does not itself 
provide ODA, but is mandated to promote cooperation by reviewing, analyzing, and 
providing guidance on development policies and practices.321 The OECD DAC is not 
                                                        
319 With a systematic analysis of the processes whereby the World Bank and OECD have shaped the 
concept of fragile states, see NAY, 'International Organisations and the Production of Hegemonic 
Knowledge: How the World Bank and the OECD helped invent the Fragile State Concept'. Nay argues 
that the concept was originally invented by a small group of bilateral donors, but successfully promoted 
and disseminated through international organizations, acting as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in constant 
interaction with other organizations, policy forums, and knowledge networks. 
320 On the functions and functioning of the OECD DAC, see OECD, 'Inside the DAC' (2009-2010). A 
list of participating member states is accessible online: http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacmembers.htm 
(accessed December 2014). The World Bank, the IMF, and UNDP have permanent observer status.  
321 See OECD DAC, DAC Mandate 2011-2015, Resolution of the Council Revising the Mandate of the 
Development Assistance Committee, October 18, 2010 (Doc. DCD/DAC(2010)34/FINAL). On the 
influential role of the OECD DAC in defining and monitoring standards for development assistance 
rendered by traditional donor countries, see JULIA SATTELBERGER, 'Authority Through Regulation 
(Working Title)' (forthcoming); and in general, MARTIN MARCUSSEN, 'OECD Governance through Soft 
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vested with the power to enforce compliance with its decisions either, but exerts 
influence by promoting certain policies and standards. It is assisted by the 
Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD), which acts as its Secretariat and 
provides technical expertise and operational capacity. 
As a norm entrepreneur, the OECD DAC has also significantly contributed to 
development policy-making and standard-setting regarding fragile states.322 Already 
the landmark Paris Declaration of 2005 expresses the idea that fragile states require a 
differentiated approach, given their weak capacity and poor governance.323 In 2007, 
OECD ministers formally adopted a special set of guidelines to complement the Paris 
Declaration, the “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and 
Situations”.324  
The ten principles reflect the emerging international consensus that state-building 
is the central objective in fragile states. To support this objective, international actors 
should focus on strengthening the capacity, legitimacy, and accountability of state 
institutions, and refrain from bypassing state institutions and building parallel 
systems. 325  Further, the Principles demand international actors to tailor their 
operational response to the specific situation of each country, namely the “different 
constraints of capacity, political will and legitimacy”.326 International actors should 
adapt to different contexts through the choice of (more or less government-centered) 
aid instruments, and by reaching out to actors outside of the government to align with 
local priorities in the absence of strong government leadership and good 
                                                                                                                                                              
Law', in Ulrika Mörth (ed) Soft Law in Governance and Regulation. An Interdisciplinary Analysis 
(Edward Elgar, 2004), highlighting that the OECD does not produce much hard law, but exerts 
considerable influence in the form of normative and cognitive governance. 
322 See also NAY, 'International Organisations and the Production of Hegemonic Knowledge: How the 
World Bank and the OECD helped invent the Fragile State Concept'; BARANYI & DESROSIERS, 
'Development Cooperation in Fragile States: Filling or Perpetuating Gaps?'; and on the DAC’s 
evolving thinking on fragile states in particular, MEGAN M. GLEASON, 'OECD’s Evolving Engagement 
on Development and Security', in JAKE SHERMAN, et al., New York University Center on Internatinal 
Cooperation, 'Engagement on Development and Security: New Actors, New Debates' (September 2011). 
323 Paris Declaration (supra note 21), paras. 7, 37-39. The OECD’s focus on the specific development 
challenges of countries with weak institutional capacity or political commitment began in 2001, with a 
serious of discussions on “poor performers” and “difficult partnerships”, resulting in the creation of a 
Fragile State Group in 2003. 
324 Fragile States Principles (supra note 144). The Principles were first agreed at a Senior Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness in Fragile States in January 2005, which was co-sponsored by the World Bank 
and OECD-DAC. They were piloted before being adopted in April 2007, together with an OECD 
Ministerial Policy Commitment to improve development effectiveness in fragile states 
(DCD/DAC(2007)29).  
325 Fragile States Principles, paras. 3 and 7.  
326 Fragile States Principles, para. 1: “Take context as a starting point”. 
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governance.327 In addition, the “Do no harm” principle requires all international actors 
to adopt a cautious approach and avoid exacerbating societal tensions or conflict 
when engaging in fragile states. 328  Originally developed to guide the work of 
humanitarian organizations during conflict, the principle’s extension to a range of 
international actors and beyond conflict reflects how aiding fragile states is 
understood to require a concerted response and synthesis approach from humanitarian, 
development, and other actors.329  
Though the Fragile States Principles are stipulated in a non-binding policy 
declaration, they have become a central reference and yardstick for international 
actors engaging in fragile and conflict-affected states.330 The Principles are, however, 
formulated in relatively vague terms: instead of stating concrete requirements for 
donors, they put forth certain objectives and considerations to be taken into account. 
Although donors subsequently agreed a number of more concrete steps as part of the 
Accra Agenda for Action in 2008,331 implementation of the Fragile States Principles 
in practice has therefore remained patchy.332  
                                                        
327 Fragile States Principles, para. 7, stating that if it is not possible or desirable to align with local 
priorities as conveyed by the government due to weak governance or violent conflict, international 
actors should seek to consult with national stakeholders outside of the government. 
328 Fragile States Principles, para. 2, also requesting donors to consider the potential consequences of 
an abrupt suspension or termination of aid flows, for instance in response to serious cases of corruption 
or human rights abuses.  
329 Several of the Fragile States Principles state the need to recognize linkages between political, 
security and development objectives (para. 5), as well as to improve policy coherence and practical 
coordination between political, security, development and humanitarian actors (para. 8). On the relation 
between different rules and principles for humanitarian and development aid, and on their overlapping 
in situations of fragility, see, for instance, VON ENGELHARDT, 'Reflections on the Role of the State in 
the Legal Regimes of International Aid', at 460, 471; HARMER & MACRAE, 'Beyond the Continuum. 
The Changing Role of Aid Policy in Protracted Crises'; or ADELE HARMER & DEEPAYAN BASU RAY, 
Overseas Development Institute, 'Study on the Relevance and Applicability of the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness in Humanitarian Assistance' (March 2009). 
330 Policy documents adopted by bilateral and multilateral donors regularly refer to the OECD’s Fragile 
States Principles, for instance, the AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND, 'Strategy for Enhanced Engagement 
in Fragile States' (2008) (at para. 7.1). The British Department for International Development (DFID) 
has produced a series of papers that offer detailed guidance on each of the ten Fragile States Principles. 
See DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (DFID), 'Working Effectively in Conflict-
affected and Fragile Situations. Summary Note' (2010).  
331 The Accra Agenda for Action was adopted at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in 
Ghana in 2008, and had one roundtable focusing on situations of fragility. In the follow-up document 
to the Paris Declaration, donors pledged to assist in building capacities for core state functions, to use 
more rapid and flexible financing instruments, and to work towards more realistic state-building 
objectives. The Accra Agenda also contains some requirements for recipient governments, e.g. to work 
with donors on a set of peace- and state-building objectives. 
332 So far two voluntary surveys through which the implementation of the principles is monitored yield 
that international practice of aid delivery and management in fragile states has not significantly 
improved in line with the principles. The two monitoring surveys of 2009 and 2011 are available online, 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/monitoringthefragilestatesprinciples.htm (accessed December 2014). 
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Since 2008, international policy-making and standard-setting processes 
concerning fragile states have become gradually more institutionalized. In Accra, a 
number of fragile states had demanded a greater say in policy-making processes that 
directly affect them – e.g. the setting of state-building objectives. In response, the 
“International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding” was initiated as an 
intergovernmental forum that brings together donor organizations and fragile states 
representatives, mostly from ministries of finance and development.333 The Dialogue 
was set up to elaborate and agree on common objectives and approaches, and is 
supported by a steering group and a Secretariat hosted by the OECD. In addition, the 
OECD DAC established the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) 
as a subsidiary body in 2009. INCAF is mandated to review donor practices in line 
with the Fragile States Principles, to provide operational guidance, and to set 
international norms for development cooperation with conflict-affected and fragile 
states.334 In turn, a number of fragile states founded the g7+, a forum to advocate for 
their interests and to speak with a stronger, more uniform voice to international 
partners.335 The g7+ is supported by a Secretariat that acts as a counterpart to the 
International Dialogue’s Secretariat. 
At high-level meetings, the participants of the International Dialogue – with the 
participation of the g7+ and decisive inputs from both Secretariats and INCAF – have 
since adopted a number of policy declarations that all build on the Fragile States 
Principles, but go further in formulating concrete commitments for donors and 
recipients alike. The 2010 Dili Declaration, for instance, expresses the common 
aspiration to develop “capable, accountable states that respond to the expectations and 
needs of their population”.336  The Declaration was still formulated without much 
participation from governments in fragile states, but the g7+ made unilateral 
commitments in a separate statement – using strikingly similar language.337 In 2011, 
                                                        
333 The International Dialogue was set up in 2008 and meets once per year at the ministerial or senior 
level. On the organization and functions of the Dialogue, as well as its participants, see online: 
http://www.pbsbdialogue.org (accessed December 2014). 
334 INCAF convenes experts from governments and international organizations to provide analysis on 
cross-cutting issues of development, peace and security, and governance. See the INCAF Factsheet, 
available online: http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/44282247.pdf (accessed December 2014).  
335 On the g7+, see also supra note 139.  
336 Dili Declaration – A New Vision for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, adopted at the first meeting 
of the International Dialogue on April 10, 2010.  
337 The “Statement of the g7+”, Annexed to the Dili Declaration, contains unilateral political 
commitments of fragile states governments towards their population, for example regarding the 
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the surge of policy-making and standard-setting concerning fragile states finally 
culminated in the adoption of an international action plan, the “New Deal”, at the 
fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan.338   
The New Deal so far constitutes the most ambitious attempt of donors and 
recipients to commit to common objectives, and to implement a changed approach to 
the design, management, and delivery of ODA in fragile and conflict-affected states. 
It was endorsed by 35 countries, including all traditional donor countries and the g7+, 
as well as by a number of international organizations, namely the OECD, the UN 
Development Group, the World Bank, the AfDB, the ADB, and the EU.339 Though 
adopted in the form of a policy declaration, not an international legal treaty, the New 
Deal formulates explicit actions and is complemented by piloting, monitoring, and 
reporting mechanisms.340  
Mutual commitments contained in the New Deal concern three areas. First, the 
document establishes five Peace- and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), which formulate 
the broad objectives of strengthening “legitimate politics”, security, and justice, while 
creating economic foundations and enabling the state to deliver basic services. The 
PSGs shall inform development cooperation with fragile states, from donors’ funding 
decisions to country-level and country-led planning and implementation processes. 
Progress is measured against a set of indicators, which are developed and piloted 
jointly by fragile states and donors. Second, the New Deal promotes “new ways of 
engaging”, namely on the basis of a country-owned assessment of the causes and 
symptoms of fragility, which informs a country-owned national plan. The national 
plan is again implemented through a country-specific “compact”, a sort of strategic 
partnership agreement to which different donors commit in order to coordinate and 
harmonize their engagement. 341  Third, the New Deal contains commitments 
                                                                                                                                                              
transparency of public administration and financial management. The Statement also serves as the 
Charter of the g7+. 
338 The New Deal, endorsed on the 30th of November 2011, at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea. See online: http://www.newdeal4peace.org/ (accessed December 
2014).  
339 For a list of supporters, see online http://www.newdeal4peace.org/world-commitments/ (accessed 
December 2014).  
340 The New Deal document itself mentions, but does not further specify the design and functioning of 
monitoring and reporting. Piloting of the New Deal takes places in a number of self-nominated 
countries, including Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and 
Timor-Leste. 
341 A compact constitutes a basic agreement between national governments and international partners 
on what should be delivered, and how, by interventions aimed at supporting a transition from fragility. 
It is not an international legal treaty, and does not contain any sanction mechanism. See, for instance, 
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concerning how aid is provided and managed, with the aim of making aid to fragile 
states more timely, reliable, and sustainable, the latter through strengthening country 
capacities and the use of country systems. Notably, capacity-building should balance 
support to state institutions and civil society actors, and enhance the capacity of the 
latter to participate in and monitor public decision-making. This balancing act informs 
the whole model for ODA delivery and management put forth in the New Deal: It is 
strongly committed to supporting “country-owned and -led pathways out of fragility”, 
while making equally strong demands concerning the participatory nature and 
inclusiveness of the processes and outcomes of such pathways.  
Most of the recommendations concerning donor policies in fragile states 
contained in the New Deal are thus not new. They were already set out in the Fragile 
States Principles, and in a large number of research reports and policy guidance 
produced by INCAF, as well as international development organizations that operate 
in fragile states.342  Whereas the Fragile States Principles consist of rather vague, 
political commitments made by donors unilaterally, however, the New Deal was 
agreed by donors and a coalition of fragile states. On the one hand, it prominently 
captures the evolving understanding and increasing convergence of international 
development actors on the particular characteristics and challenges of fragile states, 
together with concrete pledges to respond with a differentiated approach. On the other 
hand, the New Deal contains far-reaching commitments also by the governments of 
the g7+ countries, including on such matters as fostering “legitimate politics” – 
though with the push of the g7+, the language actually used in the New Deal’s 
implementation was watered down to “inclusive politics”.  
In sum, particularly since the establishment of the International Dialogue and the 
g7+, we see a clear trend towards more inclusive processes of development policy-
making and standard-setting concerning fragile states, together with more tangible 
commitments. Both the Fragile States Principles and the New Deal are political 
declarations, not international legal treaties, but they have received high-level 
                                                                                                                                                              
the Somali Compact for 2014-2016, available online: 
http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/The%20Somali%20Compact.pdf (accessed December 2014). 
342 For instance, the emphasis on state-building and the linkage between political, security, and 
development objectives, as well as donor commitments to ensure more sustainable and predictable aid 
flows, were all set out in the Fragile States Principles (supra note 144). Further, significant parallels 
exist with the INCAF publication OECD, 'The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations. Unpacking 
Complexity', and the OECD DAC Guidelines OECD, 'Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of 
Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance' (2011). 
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endorsement and emerged as a key reference for development agencies operating in 
fragile states. Like with the Fragile States Principles, to what extent donor and 
recipient governments will deliver on the New Deal commitments remains to be 
seen.343 Still, it is safe to say that both have contributed to establishing concerns about 
conflict and the need for legitimate institutions firmly on the mainstream development 
agenda.344 At the same time, both documents have reinforced the role that a number 
of deeply political questions concerning the structure and functions of the state, as 
well as state-society relations, assume on this agenda. Even if the broad principles and 
policy recommendations developed and promoted in the context of the OECD DAC 
have not always led to significant changes in donor practice, they have inspired 
strategic shifts and operational reforms of international development organizations, to 
which we turn now.345  
 
b) Strategic Shifts and Operational Reforms of International Development 
Organizations 
 
In parallel and also prior to the OECD DAC-driven elaboration of general 
principles for engaging with fragile states, virtually all international development 
organizations that operate in fragile and conflict-affected states have embarked on 
their own research and reform initiatives. Often supported through the establishment 
of dedicated policy units within the institution, many have begun to review past 
experiences, and adapt aid strategies, processes, and instruments to facilitate or 
expedite operations in fragile states. These changes serve not only the strategic 
                                                        
343 A first monitoring report was released in June 2014, essentially stating that progress is scattered and 
has to intensify. See INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE SECRETARIAT, International Dialogue on 
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 'New Deal Monitoring Report 2014' (June 2014). With a critical 
assessment of implementation progress so far, see also JACOB HUGHES, et al., The Brookings 
Institution, 'Implementing the New Deal for Fragile States' (July 2014); and FRIENT, 'Report of the 
FriEnt-Workshop on “A New Deal for Fragile States. International Engagement after Busan”' 
(January 19, 2012 ), voicing the concern that donors will continue to focus on the formal institutions of 
the state or by-pass the state completely, in particular where the consequences of local ownership and 
the pace of progress in fragile states will not correspond to their preferences, or to international 
standards they support.  
344 A further, more universal endorsement would be the inclusion of peace and capable institutions as 
stand-alone goals in the Post-2015 Development Agenda, as advocated for by the g7+. See online, 
http://www.g7plus.org/news-feed/2014/9/22/high-level-side-event-completed-in-new-york-city 
(accessed December 2014). With an analysis, also L. RIBEIRIO PEREIRA, Friedrich Eberst Stiftung 
(FES), 'What's Peace Got To Do With It? Advocating Peace in the Post-2015 Sustainable Development 
Agenda' (September 2014). 
345 On the still significant gap between policy and practice, BARANYI & DESROSIERS, 'Development 
Cooperation in Fragile States: Filling or Perpetuating Gaps?', 452; ALINA ROCHA MENOCAL, 'Aid in 
Fragile States', in David Chandler & Timothy Sisk (eds), Routledge Handbook on International 
Statebuilding (Routledge, 2013), 393. 
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alignment with state-building objectives, such as those agreed between donors and 
recipients in the New Deal. Changes also concern operational development 
cooperation: for instance, regarding the allocation of resources, requirements for 
project approval, or the role accorded to recipient governments in planning and 
implementation.  
In the following section, I provide an overview of strategic shifts and operational 
reforms undertaken by international organizations that belong to the largest 
contributors of ODA to fragile states. According to OECD DAC statistics, in 2011, 
fragile states received the largest share of multilateral aid from the EU institutions, 
followed by the International Development Association (part of the World Bank 
Group), and the African Development Fund (ADF, part of the African Development 
Bank).346  Other important donors with a development mandate include the Asian 
Development Bank and UNDP.347 Similar to other countries, the largest percentage of 
ODA to fragile states is still provided in the form of bilateral aid.348 The share of 
multilateral aid, however, is significantly higher in fragile states than in non-fragile 
states (50% over 37%). 349  Accordingly, international development organizations 
assume a particularly important role as resource providers in fragile states, including 
through catalyzing aid from more risk-averse, bilateral donors. Moreover, they are 
central actors in developing, promoting, and implementing a differentiated approach 
to development cooperation with fragile states. 
i. World Bank  
 
The World Bank has always been at the forefront of the international efforts to 
enhance development cooperation with fragile states. 350  Specific attention to the 
challenges of states with weak policies, institutions, and governance in the 
                                                        
346 OECD, 'Fragile States 2014. Domestic Revenue Mobilization in Fragile States', p. 93, Figure A.4 
(providers of development co-operation to fragile states (total ODA, 2011).  
347 ADB was the fifth largest contributor of multilateral ODA in 2010, but its contributions 
significantly reduced in 2011. Besides, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is mandated to 
promote international monetary cooperation, supports fragile states through certain concessional funds, 
and a number of UN agencies, particularly UNRWA, UNICEF, WFP, provide humanitarian aid to 
fragile states.  
348 The first by far in the OECD’s ranking that includes bilateral as well as multilateral donors are the 
United States, with a contribution of USD 13.291 Million. Supra note 346. 
349 OECD, 'Fragile States 2014. Domestic Revenue Mobilization in Fragile States', p. 32. It is also 
notable that while half of all ODA is usually implemented through governments (donor, recipient, or 
third country), in fragile states, only around 35% is delivered that way, which is partly owed to the fact 
that a large proportion of ODA that fragile states receive is humanitarian aid, delivered by UN agencies.  
350 For a detailed analysis of the World Bank’s engagement with fragile states, see infra chapter IV. 
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development community commenced with the World Bank’s establishment of a 
taskforce on “Low Income Countries Under Stress” (LICUS) in 2001.351 The LICUS 
initiative was initially intended to improve the effectiveness of the Bank’s operations 
in weak capacity environments, but soon began focusing more prominently on peace- 
and state-building. 352  To acknowledge that peace- and state-building are in fact 
complementary processes, the World Bank subsequently consolidated its approach to 
conflict-affected and fragile states, and created a State- and Peace-Building Fund 
(SPF) in 2008. 353  Since then, the organization has produced a lot of influential 
research, and contributed to a dynamic standard-setting process concerning fragile 
states in the context of the OECD DAC – most recently as an active participant of the 
New Deal process.354 Being the third largest provider of all ODA to fragile states, the 
World Bank has also sought to enhance its own work in weak-capacity and conflict-
affected environments, by modifying rules and procedures that concern the planning, 
management, and implementation of development cooperation.355  
We return to a detailed analysis of the World Bank’s engagement with fragile 
states, which also reveals that it started well before the establishment of the LICUS 
taskforce in 2001, and its scope goes far beyond what the use of the fragile states 
terminology suggests.356 At this point, I focus on a preliminary highlight of the World 
Bank’s engagement with fragile states, the publication and subsequent 
                                                        
351 See also supra chapter I.2 b). The research findings and policy implications of the LICUS taskforce 
were later taken up and elaborated by the OECD DAC, as well as by the UN and various bilateral 
donors, most notably the UK Department for International Development. 
352 The LICUS approach was set out in 2002 LICUS Task Force Report, the 2003 LICUS 
Implementation Overview, and the 2005 Low-Income Countries Under Stress Update. The LICUS 
initiative ran from June 2002 to December 2007, when the Bank adopted the fragile states terminology. 
During that time, the Bank adopted, for instance, the THE WORLD BANK, 'Good Practice Note for 
Development Policy Lending. Development Policy Operations and Program Conditionality in Fragile 
States'. To make additional grants available to countries that would otherwise have limited or no 
involvement, the Bank established the LICUS Implementation Trust Fund with Resolution 2004- 0001, 
adopted on January 15, 2004.  
353 The Bank therefore merged its to units working on conflict and fragility in a new Fragile and 
Conflict-Affected Countries Group (OPCFC). The SPF was established by a Resolution of March 25, 
2008 (IDA/R2008-43149). See also OPCS, Establishment of a State- and Peace-Building Fund (March 
25, 2008).  
354 For instance, the categorization of different fragile states developed by the World Bank’s LICUS 
task force is reproduced almost literally in the first of the OECD’s Fragile States Principles (supra note 
144). The Principles were agreed following a process led by the World Bank and DFID as co-chairs of 
the OECD DAC’s Fragile States Group. On the role of the Bank in promoting and applying the concept 
of fragile states, see also NAY, 'International Organisations and the Production of Hegemonic 
Knowledge: How the World Bank and the OECD helped invent the Fragile State Concept'. 
355 The IDA provided USD 4.613 Million to fragile states in 2010, only slightly less than the EU 
institutions with USD 5.041 Million. See supra note 346.  
356 The World Bank adopted the “fragile states” terminology as of fiscal year 2008. Development 
Committee Communiqué, Washington, DC, April 13, 2008, para 6. In detail, see infra chapter IV. 
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operationalization of the World Development Report (WDR) on “Conflict, Security, 
and Development” in 2011.357  
The WDR constitutes the analytical backbone and centerpiece of the World 
Bank’s approach, and calls for nothing less than a paradigm shift in development 
cooperation with fragile states. It finds that the legacy of violence, weak institutions 
and other challenges plaguing fragile states cannot be resolved by short-term or 
partial solutions, and by operating on the basis of rules and procedures that were 
originally developed for more stable and high-capacity countries. Accordingly, a new 
approach to guide the Bank’s work in these settings should accept the links between 
security and development outcomes; balance the risk of action with the risk of 
inaction; adapt requirements to the conditions found in fragile states; and ultimately, 
expect a degree of failure in weak capacity, high risk environments.  
Fuelled by the insights of the WDR, the organization has embarked on a major 
reform effort that affect virtually all areas of its work: from pushing new frontiers in 
terms of security-sector involvement, to re-allocating resources, adapting aid 
instruments, reforming human resource policies, and improving inter-agency 
relations.358 The reform program is set out in a staff paper on operationalizing the 
WDR 2011, which calls on the Bank “to significantly adjust its operations model 
while remaining within its established mandate”.359  Moreover, the conviction that 
fragile states require special support and a differentiated approach has received the 
highest-level endorsement at IDA’s sixteenth Replenishment meeting. At the meeting 
held in March 2011, the Executive Directors tasked the organization with rethinking 
its business models in fragile states, and reforming its legal and policy framework 
                                                        
357 THE WORLD BANK, 'World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development'. The World 
Development Report is the World Bank’s annual flagship publication. The WDR 2011 was prepared by 
a team of World Bank researchers over a period of two years, which involved many exchanges with 
government representatives and national stakeholders in developing and donor countries, as well as 
other international organizations, in particular the UN as the organization traditionally responsible for 
political and security-related forms of cooperation. 
358 At the institutional side, the World Bank launched a Global Center on Conflict, Security, and 
Development (CCSD) in 2012, to provide support to staff working in fragile states, and design and 
advocate for more flexible and responsive operational policies and practices.  
359 The World Bank, Operationalizing the 2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and 
Development, DC2011-0003 (April 4, 2011), p. iii. Further reform proposals were made by the IEG in 
its 2013 review of the Bank’s engagement in fragile states. See INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP, 
'World Bank Assistance to Low-Income Fragile- and Conflict Affected States', recommending, for 
instance, the development of a more suitable classification of fragile states. The response of 
Management to the IEG findings is available online: 
https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/chapters/fcs_man_response.pdf (accessed December 
2014).   
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accordingly.360 Fragile states have moved from the margins to the mainstream of the 
World Bank. 
The operationalization of the WDR further illustrates how mutual influences 
between different institutions foster a shared understanding of state fragility, and 
contribute to a gradually more consistent approach to engaging with fragile states. 
The report largely reflects and concentrates the findings of earlier publications not 
just of the World Bank, but in particular of the OECD DAC, and was drafted in close 
collaboration particularly with the UN.361 In turn, the report’s recommendations – and 
how the Bank defines and addresses state fragility more generally – have not only 
influenced high-level policy making at the OECD DAC, but also the strategies and 
approaches of other bilateral and multilateral donor organizations.362 This influence 
becomes most apparent with regards to other MDBs, which often look to the World 
Bank when considering new policies. 
ii. African Development Bank  
The African Development Bank has been very active in operationalizing a 
differentiated approach to fragile states. 363  Given that a large majority of states 
considered as fragile are currently located in Sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for more 
than a third of AfDB member countries, this comes as no surprise.364 Like the World 
Bank, the AfDB keeps a list of fragile states, which includes countries with 
particularly weak policies and institutions, or the presence of a UN peace operation 
within the past three years.365  
                                                        
360 THE WORLD BANK, 'Additions to IDA Resources: Sixteenth Replenishment - IDA 16: Delivering 
Development Results' (2011), paras. 84-92. A signal that the Bank’s focus will remain on fragile states 
is the increase by over 50% of IDA’s resources made available to fragile states in the period from 
2014-2017. THE WORLD BANK, 'Additions to IDA Resources: Seventeenth Replenishment - IDA17: 
Maximizing Development Impact' (March 25, 2014). 
361 See only the bibliography of the 2011 World Development Report, which refers to 22 OECD 
documents and publications; more specifically, see BARANYI & DESROSIERS, 'Development 
Cooperation in Fragile States: Filling or Perpetuating Gaps?', 449-451, arguing that the WDR’s open 
concern with legitimate institutions and “politics of transformation” would not have been possible 
without earlier OECD publications focusing on fostering state legitimacy and state-society relations in 
fragile states. 
362 On mutual influences, see also supra note 354. 
363 For a more detailed analysis of the AfDB’s engagement with fragile states in comparison with other 
development organizations, see infra chapter V.1. 
364 Besides, DFID appears to have played a significant role in supporting a more active engagement of 
the AfDB with fragile states. See DFID’s Annual Report 2008, stating that has “secured key 
commitments” from the AfDB as well as the World Bank, as part of the negotiations on the 
replenishments of the respective organizations (at paras. 8.7 and 8.6).  
365 The quality of institutional arrangements and governance is assessed in the AfDB’s Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). All countries that score low on the CPIA are automatically 
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AfDB’s development of a more explicit and systematic approach to fragile states 
began with a focus on the specific constraints and needs of post-conflict countries, 
encapsulated in the 2001 Post-Conflict Assistance Policy Guidelines and the creation 
of a Post-Conflict Facility in 2004. In 2008, following the adoption of the OECD 
Fragile States Principles, the Board of Directors formally approved a “Strategy for 
Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States”.366 Now explicitly focused on fragile states, 
the Strategy outlines the basic parameters of a differentiated approach to planning and 
implementing projects in these settings. It should include the adaptation of AfDB’s 
business processes and procedures to allow for more flexibility in responding to 
different country contexts, namely to situations of severely degraded institutional and 
administrative capacity.367 The Strategy is considered binding on the organization’s 
staff, which have to follow the strategic orientation and concrete actions set out 
therein. The Strategy’s implementation is monitored against a set of indicators, and 
Management has to report on progress made to the Board of Executive Directors.368  
Further, AfDB’s growing concern with the special needs of fragile states went 
along with the allocation of significant, additional resources to these countries. Also 
in 2008, the AfDB established a Fragile States Facility (FSF) in order to provide 
financial and technical assistance specifically targeted at building state capacity and 
accountability in fragile states. 369  In financial and operational terms, the FSF is 
largely autonomous and operates with its own rules and procedures, for instance 
permitting funds to be disbursed directly to non-state actors.370 At the institutional 
level, a Fragile States Unit (later renamed in Transition Support Unit) is tasked with 
the implementation of the Strategy and the administration of the FSF.  
                                                                                                                                                              
classified as fragile states. Since 2007, the World Bank, the AfDB and the ADB use a harmonized 
average of their individual CPIA processes and rankings to classify fragile states.  
366 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND, 'Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States'. The Strategy 
states that “fragile state circumstances take different forms in different countries and in the same 
country at different times” (para. 2.1), and hence chooses a continuum approach rather than a clear-cut 
definition of fragile states (Figure I). In contrast, the classification on the basis of the CPIA has a clear 
cut-off. Supra note 366. 
367 Ibid., Part 8.  
368 Ibid. paras. 9.2 and 9.3. Implementation of the Strategy was subject to an independent review in 
2012, the OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT, African Development Bank, 'Evaluation of the 
Assistance of the African Development Bank to Fragile States' (2012), vii, which finds that the 
ambitious vision articulated in the 2008 Strategy had not been accompanied by the organizational 
changes and institutional commitments required to make it reality. 
369 The FSF was created by means of a Resolution of the Executive Directors, B/BD/2008/05-
F/BD/2008/03, adopted on 28 March 2008. Criteria, decision-making process and implementation 
arrangements for grants under the FSF are set out in the AfDB Operations Guidelines of the Fragile 
States Facility (hereinafter FSF Operations Guidelines). 
370 For an analysis of the particularities of the FSF, see infra chapter V.1 b). 
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The AfDB is thus strongly committed to using a differentiated approach when 
engaging with fragile states – in line with the OECD DAC’s Fragile States Principles, 
and adhering to the New Deal. As the formal adoption of a Fragile States Strategy and 
creation of a legally autonomous financing instrument suggest, such an approach is 
already being implemented in the AfDB’s legal and policy framework.371 This trend is 
likely to continue: to support its claim to become a leader on issues of state fragility in 
Africa, the AfDB has adopted a new Fragile States Strategy for 2014-2019.372 The 
Bank-wide Strategy provides authoritative guidance on how to change the way AfDB 
engages in fragile states, and adapt policies and processes to the specific 
circumstances and needs of countries in a “condition of elevated risk of institutional 
breakdown, societal collapse or violent conflict.”373   
   
iii.  Asian Development Bank  
The Asian Development Bank, too, acknowledges that “policies, principles, and 
operational approaches that development agencies normally apply” are inadequate 
and require adaptation in fragile states. 374  Based on a CPIA-based classification 
process largely similar to that of the World Bank and the AfDB, approximately a third 
of ADB’s low-income member countries were considered fragile or conflict-affected 
in 2012.375 These include post-conflict countries like Afghanistan and East Timor, as 
well as a number of particularly vulnerable, small island states.  
Following the adoption of the OECD’s Fragile States Principles in 2007, the ADB 
reviewed its own operations in fragile states accordingly, and drafted a policy paper 
that sets out its “Approach to Engaging in Weakly Performing Countries”. 376  In 
                                                        
371 In detail, see infra chapter V.1. 
372 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa: The 
African Development Bank Group Strategy 2014–2019' (June 2014), which will be supplemented by 
revised Operational Guidelines for the FSF. Moreover, fragile states remain a core focus area under the 
African Development Fund’s Thirteenth Replenishment Report, which determines the organization’s 
financial envelope and strategic priorities until 2016. ADF 13 Report, Supporting Africa’s 
Transformation (March 12, 2014). 
373 Ibid., Annex 1: Fragility, its drivers and manifestations, para. 1. 
374 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Working Differently in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations - The 
ADB Experience: A Staff Handbook' (2012), 1. For a more detailed analysis of the ADB’s engagement 
with fragile states in comparison with other development organizations, see infra chapter V.1. 
375 See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Annual Report on the 2012 Country Performance Assessment 
Exercise' (April 2013). The ADB has committed to align its fragile states classification methodology 
with that of the World Bank and AfDB. 
376 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Achieving Development Effectiveness in Weakly Performing 
Countries. The Asian Development Bank’s Approach to Engaging with Weakly Performing Countries' 
(April 2007). The ADB first became concerned with “weakly performing countries” in 2004, when it 
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essence, the paper recommends that ADB responds to the capacity constraints of 
government counterparts in fragile states by focusing on realistic objectives, while 
relaxing certain requirements for project approval and implementation in order to 
allow for more rapid engagement. Though not formally binding, the approach laid out 
in the paper has since proven influential in guiding ADB’s internal processes and 
interactions with fragile states.377  
ADB’s focus on fragile states has further intensified in line with the political 
momentum that has been gathering after the publication of the WDR by the World 
Bank in 2011, and the broad endorsement of the New Deal for fragile states in 2012 –
two milestones that the ADB understands as expressions of a new international 
paradigm for development cooperation. In response, the organization has adopted a 
Staff Handbook and an Operational Plan to adjust or otherwise improve its internal 
processes.378 The Staff Handbook is an informal guide that explicitly draws on the 
WDR recommendations. It offers comprehensive guidance to staff on why and how to 
work differently in fragile states, though rather than establishing new policies or 
procedural requirements, it points attention to the menu of available options for 
operating in fragile states under existing policies.379 In turn, ADB’s Operational Plan 
for fragile states has not been formally adopted, but the concrete set of actions agreed 
therein come with specific implementation and monitoring arrangements, including 
time frames, results, and indicators.380 
The paradigm shift in engaging with fragile states for the ADB essentially 
consists in adopting a conflict-sensitive approach, while focusing more strongly on 
strengthening state capacities and working through country systems even in more 
                                                                                                                                                              
presented a paper on the subject to donors at the Asian Development Fund IX negotiations. “Weakly 
performing countries” correspond to what ADB now refers to as “fragile and conflict-affected 
situations”. 
377 For instance, the basic tenets of the Approach are also reiterated in ADB’s long-term strategic 
framework: ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Strategy 2020. The Long-term Strategic Framework of the 
Asian Development Bank 2008-2020' (April 2008), pp. 17-18 and 24. 
378 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Working Differently in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations - The 
ADB Experience: A Staff Handbook' and ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Operational Plan for 
Enhancing ADB's Effectiveness in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations' (April 2013) (see paras. 4 
and 5 therein on an emerging new paradigm of development cooperation). 
379 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Working Differently in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations - The 
ADB Experience: A Staff Handbook', 3. 
380 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Operational Plan for Enhancing ADB's Effectiveness in Fragile and 
Conflict-Affected Situations', Part IV and Appendix I (Results Framework for ADB’s Operational Plan). 
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difficult settings.381 Moreover, it entails a review of all processes and instruments of 
aid delivery, with the objective of making them more adapt to weak-capacity or 
insecure environments: for instance, by easing demanding fiduciary requirements that 
must be met for project approval, or by considering implementation arrangements that 
offer an alternative to the traditional way of working through governments in 
exceptional circumstances. Similar to the World Bank and the AfDB, the ADB has 
accordingly committed to the strategic priority of state-building, and to internal 
reforms of processes and financing instruments considered inappropriate in the 
context of conflict and fragility. Yet, as the comparative analysis in chapter V shows, 
the ADBs approach is less far-reaching and formalized as that of the World Bank and 
the AfDB.382 
 
iv. European Union  
The European Union is the second largest provider of ODA to fragile states after 
the US, and the largest provider of multilateral aid.383 As a supranational organization 
with a broad, political mandate that extends far beyond poverty reduction and 
development, the European Union’s approach to fragile states is characteristically 
multi-faceted, combining political and diplomatic, security, development and 
humanitarian instruments.384 In fact, the EU became concerned with fragile states first 
as a security, and then as a development challenge: the 2003 European Security 
Strategy identifies state failure as a key threat before the 2005 European Consensus 
on Development formulates the commitment to more effectively address state 
fragility.385 The EU has also a specific development mandate, however, and within its 
                                                        
381 Ibid., para. 6, stating that “ADB will implement a comprehensive set of actions to mainstream 
fragility- and conflict-sensitive approaches” and “bring the importance of statebuilding and 
institutional strengthening to the center stage” of its engagement with fragile states. 
382 Infra chapter V.1 and V.3. 
383 Supra note 346. For a more detailed analysis of the EU’s engagement with fragile states in 
comparison with other international organizations, see infra chapter V.2. 
384 This is where the EU sees its main comparative advantage. For an overview of the EU policy and 
legal framework concerning fragile states, see EUROPEAN COMMISSION & EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY 
INSTITUTE, 'European Report on Development. Overcoming Fragility in Africa. Forging a New 
European Approach' (2009), chapter 8.  
385 European Security Strategy “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, Brussels, 12 December 2003, 
wherein state failure is defined in largely similar terms as nowadays state fragility, namely “[b]ad 
governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability - and civil 
conflict” (p. 4); and the Joint declaration by the Council and the representatives of the governments of 
the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the 
development policy of the European Union entitled “The European Consensus” (hereinafter European 
Consensus on Development), OJ C 46/1 of February 24, 2006, at paras. 20-22; 89-92. 
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role as a multilateral donor organization, it has committed to implementing the 
OECD’s Fragile States Principles, and modified its own policy framework and aid 
instruments accordingly. Although the EU has not been a driving force in the fragile 
states agenda and does not specifically classify and keep a list of fragile states, its 
legal and policy framework has thus evolved in tune with the emerging practices of 
other donors.386  
To set out the analytical and conceptual grounds for the EU’s response to 
situations of fragility, the EU first adopted a series of policy documents in 2007, 
including a Communication of the European Commission and Conclusions of the 
Council of the European Union.387 Both documents identify building the capacities of 
state institutions, as well as strengthening state-society relations and democratic 
governance, as key objectives in fragile states. Major importance is also accorded to 
enhancing coordination and policy coherence when engaging with fragile states, 
namely between the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
humanitarian assistance, and development cooperation.388 In 2009, the first European 
Report on Development was dedicated to “Overcoming Fragility in Africa”. The 
Report proposed to reforms the EU’s current policy framework for engaging in fragile 
states, for instance, by qualifying the principle of ownership in fragile states, and 
according a greater role to non-state actors in cooperation. 389  The “Agenda for 
Change”, a policy statement and reform plan presented by the EU Commission in 
2011 to increase the impact of EU development aid, too, calls for “differentiated 
development partnerships”, specific forms of support, and greater flexibility when 
dealing with fragile states. 390  Moreover, the EU’s “Comprehensive Approach to 
                                                        
386 See MARKUS FURNESS, German Development Institute, Discussion Paper 5/2014, 'Let’s Get 
Comprehensive. European Union Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries' (2014), 7, 
describing the EU “as a ‘norm taker’ rather than a ‘norm maker’ with regard to its engagement with 
FCA [fragile and conflict-affected] countries”. 
387 Communication from the Commission, Towards an EU Response to Situations of Fragility – 
Engaging in Difficult Environments for Sustainable Development, Stability and Peace, Brussels, 
25.10.2007, COM(2007) 643; and Council Conclusions on a EU Response to Situations of Fragility, 
2831st External Relations Council meeting in Brussels, 19-20 November 2007.  
388 See the Council Conclusions on Security and Development, adopted at the 2831st External 
Relations Council meeting in Brussels, 19-20 November 2007, para. 2, determining that “the nexus 
between security and development should inform EU strategies and policies in order to contribute to 
the coherence of EU external action”. 
389 EUROPEAN COMMISSION & EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, 'European Report on Development. 
Overcoming Fragility in Africa. Forging a New European Approach', 4. 
390 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Increasing 
the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change, Brussels, 13. October 2011, 
COM(2011) 637 final, at p. 9-10. 
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External Conflicts and Crisis” of 2013 establishes a set of concrete measures and 
processes to enhance the coherence, effectiveness, and speed of the EU’s response 
specifically in fragile and conflict-affected countries.391 
In parallel, the EU has begun to reform some of its aid instruments and 
procedures, with the aim of making them more adapt to situations of conflict and 
fragility. For instance, the Instrument for Stability (IfS) was created in 2007 
specifically to enable the EU to provide timely financial support to countries in 
situations of crisis or emerging crisis.392 Both at the level of general principles and 
concrete rules, the EU’s reforms have also concerned its legal framework for 
development cooperation, consisting of the Cotonou Agreement for ACP states, and 
the Regulation establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation (DCI 
Regulation) for non-ACP states. A detailed analysis of these binding legal sources 
follows in chapter V. 
v. United Nations Development Programme 
A central actor is still missing in the overview: the UN. The UN’s main 
programme responsible for development cooperation is the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), which also leads the United Nations Development 
Group (UNDG), consisting of 32 UN programmes and funds, departments and offices, 
as well as UN specialized agencies that all play a role in development cooperation. 
For a meaningful account of the UN’s approach to development cooperation with 
fragile states, we would thus need to consider a plethora of institutions with different 
legal status and mandates, which exceeds the scope of this thesis.393 Nonetheless, at 
                                                        
391 Joint Communication of the European Parliament and the Council, The EU's Comprehensive 
Approach to External Conflict and Crises, Brussels, December 11, 2013, JOIN(2013) 30 final. 
392 Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 15, 
2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability (OJ L 327/1), hereinafter IfS Regulation. 
393 There are a number of additional reasons why I do not include just UNDP in my comparative 
analysis of different international development organizations. First of all, UNDP is no international 
organizations, but a programme established by UN-General Assembly Resolution 2020 (XX) of 22 
November 1965, which reports to the General Assembly. For the same reason, it is nearly impossible to 
consider UNDP’s policies and procedures concerning development cooperation with fragile states 
independent of broader UN policies and procedures. In addition, from a methodological perspective, 
UNDP’s legal and policy framework is less comprehensive, less formalized, and ultimately less 
transparent than those of the MDBs or the EU, making it considerably more difficult to analyze how it 
has been adapted vis-à-vis fragile states. On the specific characteristics of UNDP as a donor agency, 
see PHILIPP DANN, 'Grundfragen eines Entwicklungsverwaltungsrechts', in Christoph Möllers, et al. 
(eds), Internationales Verwaltungsrecht: Eine Analyse Anhand von Referenzgebieten (Mohr Siebeck, 
2007); and on UNDP’s evolution, mandate, and modes of operation in general, CRAIG N. MURPHY, The 
United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way? (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
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least a quick look at UNDP is necessary to complement our preliminary overview of 
strategic and operational reforms.  
UNDP has long been engaged in many fragile and conflict-affected states, which 
have gradually come to account for a dominant part of its programming activity.394 
Unlike other international development organizations, UNDP generally refrains from 
using the fragile states terminology to label challenges associated with weak 
institutions, poor governance, conflict, or the breakdown of effective government in 
developing countries.395 Rather, its engagement with fragile states forms part of a 
broader agenda of addressing crisis in developing countries, whether caused by 
conflict, disaster, or other. Nonetheless, UNDP’s efforts to improve the work on 
“crisis prevention and recovery” show similarities with those of other development 
organizations focused on conflict and fragility. 
Already in 2000, UNDP established a quick-disbursing and flexible tool to more 
effectively respond to the fluid circumstances and urgent needs of crisis-affected 
countries, the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. In 2001, the 
Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) was set up to manage the Fund, 
and to lead UNDP’s expanding work on post-conflict development. The BCPR is 
since responsible for mainstreaming peace-building objectives throughout all 
operations, and concentrates UNDP’s efforts of building effective and responsive 
state institutions, restoring democratic processes, and strengthening justice and 
security systems.  
The focus on peace- and state-building objectives so strongly advocated in the 
Fragile States Principles and the New Deal is hence not new to UNDP. In fact, with 
its core competency in areas like security, justice, and rule of law reforms, UNDP 
often implements development projects and programs in fragile states that are 
financed by the EU and the World Bank. In recent years, all three organizations have 
                                                        
394 Since 1996, UNDP has committed to fund crisis prevention and recovery activities by setting aside a 
part of its budget towards a specific, rapid and flexible financing. Moreover, UNDP was the official 
partner of the World Bank in the implementation of the LICUS initiative in Africa, for instance in 
Somalia. For an overview of UNDP’s early engagement, see also BRUCE D. JONES, 'The Changing Role 
of UN Political and Development Actors in Situations of Protracted Crisis', in HARMER & MACRAE, 
'Beyond the Continuum. The Changing Role of Aid Policy in Protracted Crises'; or BRUCE JONES & 
BEN TORTOLANI, New York University, Center on International Cooperation, 'Deep Dive on Fragile 
States' (August 2013), 3-5. 
395 In later publications, UNDP starts referring to ‘fragility’, ‘fragile situations’, and ‘fragile settings’. 
E.g. ROBERT MUGGAH, et al., UNDP, 'Governance for Peace. Securing the Social Contract' (2012). 
Fragility is therein defined not as a characteristic of states, but rather with reference to specific 
circumstances like armed conflict, or chronic violence (p. 19). 
 105 
concluded formal agreements to facilitate such inter-organizational cooperation.396 
The fact that UNDP’s own financial contributions to fragile states are comparatively 
minor is thus deceiving – it has an operational presence in more fragile states than the 
World Bank.397 Moreover, to strengthen operations in conflict-affected and fragile 
states, UNDP has adopted a long-term strategy of “resilience-building”, 398  and 
developed specific “fast track policies and procedures” to get there.399  
In turn, UNDP’s importance in contributing to general policy-making and 
standard-setting concerning fragile states is reflected in the fact that it has been 
chairing the OECD’s INCAF for many years, and is an active participant of the New 
Deal processes, which it supports through a dedicated funding facility to enable quick 
and flexible support.400 Finally, UNDP significantly contributes to shaping new ways 
of dealing with fragile states in the context of the Post-2015 development agenda that 
succeeds the Millennium Development Goals, and will likely include specific state- 
and peace-building objectives.401  
vi.  Summary and Disclaimer 
In this section, I provided an overview of how different international development 
organizations have sought to address some of the challenges they associate with 
operating in fragile states. I showed that the majority have developed strategies for 
engaging with fragile states, which essentially reorient their activities towards 
establishing, reforming, or strengthening state institutions. Moreover, several 
organizations have set out to develop and implement a differentiated approach to the 
                                                        
396 With the World Bank, the UN has established a United Nations-World Bank Partnership Framework 
for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations in 2008. In 2009, several UN agencies concluded a Fiduciary 
Principles Accord with the World Bank to facilitate cooperation and avoid implementation delays 
caused by competing fiduciary requirements. With the EU, UNDP collaborates through a special 
partnership on crisis prevention and recovery since 2003, whereby both institutions engage in a regular 
dialogue, share best practices and jointly develop operational guidance. Almost half of the EU’s 
funding to UNDP in 2011 was to support its work on crisis prevention and recovery.  
397 UNDP’s financial contributions to fragile states amount to merely 5% of the EU’s (supra note 346). 
For a comparison of UNDP’s and the World Bank’s involvement in fragile states, see JONES & 
TORTOLANI, 'Deep Dive on Fragile States', 5. 
398 UNDP, 'Changing With the World. UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017' (2014), 34-37. In development 
speak, resilience constitutes the opposite of fragility. See also THE WORLD BANK, 'World Development 
Report: Conflict, Security, and Development'. 
399 UNDP Fast Track Policies and Procedures, available online: 
https://info.undp.org/global/popp/ft/Pages/Fast-Track.aspx (accessed November 2014). For instance, 
Fast Track Policies enable more flexible recruitment and procurement in situations of crisis, and 
therefore include specific procedures, triggers and accountability mechanisms. 
400 On UNDP actions to implement the New Deal, see the monitoring report published by the 
International Dialogue’s Secretariat (supra note 343). 
401 See UNITED NATIONS, 'A New Global Partnership. Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent 
Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda' (2013); and supra note 344.   
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design, management, and delivery of aid in fragile states, often supported by the use 
of specific financing instruments and more flexible procedures. Abstract principles 
and high-level political commitments emerging from the context of the OECD DAC 
are thus concretized and operationalized by international organizations with an often 
significant part of their operations in fragile states. These developments are reinforced 
through mutual exchange, efforts at harmonization, and enhanced cooperation 
between organizations, for instance regarding the use of similar classification 
schemas.402  
These observations are still preliminary. They are based on a cursory overview of 
policy-making and reform initiatives of selected organizations, and they refer to 
processes that are still ongoing. Many organizations have begun focusing on the 
particular development challenges of countries emerging from conflict or caught in 
protracted crisis since the early 1990s. It is only in the last decade, however, that this 
concentration has entailed an unprecedented surge of reforms across organizations, 
which is new and noteworthy. The rapid spread of the “fragile states” terminology in 
development discourse and practice since mid-2000 may reflect this trajectory. 
However, efforts to reconsider unrealistic assumptions and adjust policies, procedures, 
and aid instruments in the context of states with ineffective government do not always 
explicitly address “fragile states”. Such efforts neither begin, nor end, with the 
increasing use of this terminology, which marks just the tip of the iceberg.  
A more thorough analysis is hence required to get to a comprehensive 
understanding of how, and to what effect individual organizations engage with fragile 
states, as well as to identify possible (in)consistencies in the approaches chosen. Such 
an analysis needs to account for specific mandates, membership structure, or 
institutional culture – factors that influence not only how to respond, but also why. 
For now, it is sufficient to note that the understanding of fragile states constituting a 
unique challenge for development cooperation is increasingly shared, and translates 
into an emerging consensus on the need for a differentiated approach. To different 
extents and through various means, all international development organizations have 
                                                        
402 An obvious example is the Report of the MDB Working Group, Towards a More Harmonized 
Approach to MDB Engagement in Fragile Situations, adopted in 2007, wherein the heads of the AfDB, 
ADB, the Islamic Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank and the IMF agree to develop common definitions 
and operating principles, and effective and participatory procedures. On cooperation between the UN, 
the World Bank, and the EU on issues of conflict and fragility, see also supra note 397. 
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therefore begun to revisit development objectives, processes, and instruments when 
engaging with fragile states.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a tour d’horizon of the evolving engagement of 
international development organizations with fragile states. I started from the 
observation that the notion of fragile states, through its constant reiteration, 
quantification, and ultimately operationalizing in international development discourse 
and practice, has become a basis for action. International organizations assume a 
prominent role in this process. Operating on the basis of a state-centric development 
paradigm, they normally expect to find an effective government in recipient countries, 
both in a formal, juridical sense, and in terms of basic capacities. Seeking to address 
the various challenges – legal, political, technical – that complicate engagement in 
weak-capacity, politically unstable environments, development organizations 
contribute to general standard-setting and policy-making, and develop and implement 
differentiated approaches to the design, management, and delivery of ODA vis-à-vis 
fragile states. Not least since such processes are becoming more systematic and 
coherent within and across different organizations, they begin to yield certain patterns. 
Broadly speaking, development cooperation becomes more focused on the strategic 
objective of state-building, while aid processes and instruments are being adapted to 
account for the limited capacity of government counterparts. 
I have indicated some of the implications of this development policy shift before: 
the overall volume and share of aid to fragile and conflict-affected states has 
increased considerably, with activities in the realm of institution-building and good 
governance reforms receiving a larger portion of available resources. 403  The 
increasing entanglement of development and security-related objectives has provided 
the grounds for development organizations to gradually expand their mandate and 
field of engagement into the realm of peace- and state-building.404 Apart from getting 
                                                        
403 See supra chapter II.1. 
404 This entanglement is often viewed critically, as political and security actors may in turn seek to 
influence the means and ends of development cooperation, particularly in countries considered of 
strategic importance. E.g. BOON, '"Open for Business": International Financial Institutions, Post-
Conflict Economic Reform, and the Rule of Law'; or EVA NIEUWENHUYS, 'Development Aid by Tank 
Viewed in the Light of the Globalisation of the Western Development Model', in Bruce Currie-Alder, 
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involved in often highly politicized contexts of conflict, or alongside humanitarian 
actors in complex emergencies, development organizations have become more 
concerned with deeply political subject matters, such as fostering inclusive political 
settlements, or constructive state-society relations.  
In turn, how development organizations plan, manage, and deliver ODA in fragile 
states can have significant implications for the states concerned, and for their 
populations. Fragile states are typically among the most aid-dependent countries: not 
only the economy, but also the functioning of the bureaucratic apparatus and the 
ability of state institutions to deliver basic services rely on steady, incoming resource 
flows in the form of ODA. Accordingly, upon what terms and conditions international 
organizations decide to engage or disengage, to increase, suspend or terminate 
development funding is likely to have considerable material implications for 
governments, and have important humanitarian implications for an already vulnerable 
population. Even where a government is not so much materially dependent on aid, 
whether development organizations engage with a country, and through what forms 
and channels of aid more particularly, can send important political messages.405 Such 
decisions are regularly seen to reflect whether donors deem a government as reliable 
or legitimate counterpart, an implicit endorsement that becomes especially relevant 
where the legal status of a state or a government’s claim to power are in doubt.406 
In light of the conceptual weaknesses and ambiguities of the fragile states agenda, 
as well as the potentially significant implications just outlined, it becomes even more 
important to scrutinize how it is operationalized and ultimately formalized in 
multilateral development cooperation. The preceding overview of policy-making and 
standard-setting, strategic shifts and operational reforms concerning fragile states 
suggested that development objectives, processes and instruments are increasingly 
modified vis-à-vis fragile states. Objectives, processes, and instruments, however, are 
in turn informed by rules and procedures, which determine for what purposes and 
                                                                                                                                                              
et al. (eds), International Development. Ideas, Experience, and Prospects (Oxford University Press, 
2014). 
405 MACRAE, et al., 'Aid to 'Poorly Performing’ Countries: A Critical Review of Debates and Issues', at 
44; also BOON, '"Open for Business": International Financial Institutions, Post-Conflict Economic 
Reform, and the Rule of Law'. 
406 See MACRAE, et al., 'Aid to 'Poorly Performing’ Countries: A Critical Review of Debates and 
Issues', at 44, arguing that there is “a link between aid, the capacity of political authorities to govern 
and claims to juridical status.” Further, the authors suggest that bilateral donors are likely to be 
influenced in their decision on the initiation or continuation of aid flows by broader, political 
considerations concerning the desired status of a state or territory, and that they moreover exert 
influence on international development organizations in this regard. 
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how aid is designed, managed, and delivered. Ultimately, how international 
organizations assess the “type and quality of statehood” can therefore affect not just 
the scope and content of aid, but also the way it is governed – and what roles and 
responsibilities are accorded to recipient governments in the process.407 To grasp how 
the evolving engagement of international development organizations with fragile 
states may hence be legally significant, I provide a brief interlude on the legal nature 
of rules and substance of analysis in the following chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
407 Ibid., 41, highlighting the powerful role of donors in analyzing “the type and quality of statehood”, 
and thus deciding on the volume of aid, the form of aid, and the channels through which it is delivered.  
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III. The Law of Development Cooperation – Interlude on the 
Nature of Rules and Substance of Analysis 
 
A certain supposition has inspired and informed the preceding elaborations: that 
the phenomenon of fragile states perhaps deserves more attention from legal 
scholarship than suggested by the fact that it is not easily amenable to a juridical 
translation. Fragile state is no legal term or concept, but this does not mean that how 
they are dealt with is necessarily beyond law. By shifting the focus away from the 
question what fragile states are, to the question what role they are accorded by other 
legal subjects, using different legal instruments, we may learn more about the actual 
significance of state fragility from the perspective of international law.  
Multilateral development cooperation already proved to be a fruitful field for 
analysis in this regard. International development organizations generally assume the 
existence of effective government counterparts in recipient countries, an assumption 
that may turn out fictitious and hence could stand in the way of assisting fragile states 
and their populations. Therefore, they have sought ways of working more effectively 
in weak-capacity, politically unstable environments, and of overcoming a variety of 
legal and operational constraints that often complicate engagement in such settings. 
Interestingly, we have seen that international organizations have not always settled for 
responding ad hoc, on a case-by-case basis. Instead, many organizations have 
apparently decided on a more systematic and consolidated approach. They have 
sought to modify rules and procedures that guide the transfer of ODA, and determine 
the roles and responsibilities of fragile states in the process.  
The previous chapter has thus provided preliminary evidence to support the 
assumption that fragile states may be a phenomenon beyond law, but the evolving 
response of international development organizations is not. Yet, it has also shown that 
a much more thorough and well-grounded investigation is needed to understand how, 
and to what effect international development organizations adapt their legal and 
policy frameworks vis-à-vis fragile states. In fact, approaching these questions first 
requires a basic understanding of the sources, legal nature, and effects of rules that 
inform the objectives, processes and instruments of multilateral development 
cooperation. As noted before, the law of development cooperation is a field of law 
that has long escaped the attention of legal scholars, which is due in part to its relative 
informality, or more precisely, the combination of traditional sources of international 
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law and some more informal sources. With a view to multilateral development 
cooperation, it is safe to say that not all, or perhaps not even most of the strategies, 
policies, and guidelines that international organizations produce to guide operations in 
fragile states are legally significant, let alone formally binding. The expanding scope 
and depth of international regulation and the evolving role of international 
organizations as “law-makers”, however, demands consideration of practices and 
instruments of governance that do not fit neatly with established categories and 
sources of international law.408 With a clearer understanding of the (more and less 
formal) rules that guide how international organizations plan, manage, and implement 
development cooperation, it is also possible to discern the potential legal significance 
of their adaptation vis-à-vis fragile states.  
Further, to grasp the outcome of such adaptations and make out how development 
cooperation with fragile states differs from that with other countries, it is necessary to 
determine a baseline: the basic, normative ideas that guide how international 
organizations normally plan, manage, and implement aid. The legal and policy 
frameworks of international organizations engaged in development cooperation have 
a number of very similar rules, concerning their objectives and purposes, how they 
usually carry out functions, and how they deal with recipient countries. For instance, 
all organizations are naturally mandated to foster development. We have also seen 
that international organizations operate on the basis of a state-centric paradigm, and 
are often explicitly required to respect the sovereignty of recipient states. Drawing 
from the legal and policy frameworks of various international organizations engaged 
in development cooperation, it is hence possible to identify a number of basic ideas 
that all have in common. In that they capture regularities in different legal and policy 
frameworks, these basic ideas help to structure a diversity of rules – and ultimately, to 
assert the broader effects of how international organizations adapt rules vis-à-vis 
fragile states.  
This chapter accordingly sets the grounds and provides the necessary tools for 
examining how, and to what effect international organizations adapt rules that govern 
the transfer of ODA vis-à-vis fragile states. I begin by analyzing the nature of rules 
that govern how international organizations provide ODA, with a particular focus on 
the legal effects and potential significance of internal, secondary rules (III.1). Turning 
                                                        
408 ALVAREZ, International Organizations as Law-Makers. 
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from legal nature to substance, I draw on the legal frameworks of international 
organizations engaged in development cooperation to outline basic, normative ideas 
that generally guide their conduct – and which can serve as a baseline to analyze legal 
adaptations vis-à-vis fragile states. (III.2). I conclude by highlighting the inherent 
restrictions, but also the significant value that a legal perspective can bring to the 
study of how international organizations engage in development cooperation with 
fragile states (III.3).  
 
1. The Law of Development Cooperation as a Law of International 
Development Organizations – On the Legal Nature and Effect of its 
Rules  
 
Development cooperation is not only subject to technical considerations and 
political decision-making. It is increasingly guided by rules. At the international, 
supranational, and national level, a diverse set of institutions and instruments define 
the terms and regulate the process whereby financial resources flow to developing 
countries.409 Seen from the perspective of their common subject matter, they converge 
to a body of law that can be referred to as the law of development cooperation. Dann 
has defined the law of development cooperation as the set of rules that regulate the 
transfer – the allocation, programming, and implementation – of ODA.410 Although 
this definition excludes a rapidly growing variety of forms and actors through which 
financing is increasingly provided to developing countries, it still aptly describes the 
law that governs the provision of development assistance through international 
organizations, which is the focus of this thesis.411 
                                                        
409 Though various aspects of development cooperation have been studied, there are still only few legal 
scholars that systematically engage with the processes and procedures through which development 
cooperation is provided. E.g. DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of 
the World Bank, the EU and Germany; or with a broader perspective on the law of development 
financing, DAVIS, '‘Financing Development’ as a Field of Practice, Study and Innovation'; KEVIN 
DAVIS & MARIANA MOTA PRADO, 'Law, Regulation, and Development', in Bruce Currie-Alder, et al. 
(eds), International Development. Ideas, Experience, and Prospects (Oxford University Press, 2014); 
and with a more narrow perspective on international financial institutions, BRADLOW & HUNTER (eds), 
International Financial Institutions and International Law. Before, the law of development or 
international development law was typically associated with the normative agenda of the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) and Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). 
E.g. B. S. CHIMNI, 'Third World Approaches to International Law. A Manifesto' International 
Community Law Review, 3 (2006). Beyond, international law scholars have considered development at 
most for its notable absence of law. E.g. CHRISTINE M. CHINKIN, 'The United Nations Decade for the 
Elimination of Poverty: What Role for International Law?', 54 Current Legal Problems, 553 (2001). 
410 Supra note 51. 
411 Moreover, the focus on ODA over other sources of financing is particularly relevant with regards to 
fragile states, where compared with other external sources of financing, ODA remains by far the most 
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Inasmuch as the law of development cooperation concerns the transfer of ODA at 
different levels of governance and through various actors, its rules vary greatly in 
terms of the sources and legal nature. There is no coherent international legislation 
that regulates most, or even the principal terms and conditions of development 
cooperation. Rather, development cooperation involves international, supranational or 
national actors providing ODA, with each essentially establishing its own rules to 
govern under what conditions and how.412 What is more, a considerable number of 
rules that govern how development cooperation is planned, managed, and delivered, 
is only partially formalized law. This does not mean that they cannot be effective.413 
As Dann has pointed out: “To ignore the law of development cooperation simply 
because of its informality would be shortsighted”.414  
Looking only at the rules that govern the transfer of ODA by international 
organizations, the variety is reduced at first. By far the largest part of the rules that 
establish purposes and objectives, and inform processes of multilateral development 
cooperation form part of the legal and policy frameworks of international 
organizations – or in the case of the European Union, EU law.415 Accordingly, this 
‘law of multilateral development cooperation’ constitutes not only an important 
subfield of the law of development cooperation. It could also be approached as a 
thematic subfield of international institutional law, which is generally concerned with 
the common rules and practices of public international organizations. 416  In fact, 
international institutional law provides a useful starting point for examining the 
                                                                                                                                                              
important resource flow. See OECD, 'Fragile States 2013. Resource Flows and Trends in a Shifting 
World', 47. In contrast, Davis suggests looking beyond the transfer of ODA and study the field of 
development finance more comprehensively. DAVIS, '‘Financing Development’ as a Field of Practice, 
Study and Innovation'. 
412 DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU 
and Germany, 200, 217, stating that the law of development cooperation is largely donor-set law. 
413 Scholarly literature concerned with the functions and effects of various non-traditional, informal, or 
non-binding rules, often referred to as ‘soft law’, is extensive. See, for instance, JAN WOUTERS, et al. 
(eds), Informal International Lawmaking (Oxford Universty Press, 2012); and the references provided 
in supra note 56. 
414 DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU 
and Germany, 29, adding that “the mixing of formal and informal law can actually be seen as a 
characteristic feature of this area”. 
415 Besides, it is mostly non-binding multilateral agreements or policy declarations like the Paris 
Declaration (supra note 21) that contain specific rules concerning the transfer of ODA through 
international organizations. 
416 Generally, HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS BLOKKER, International Institutional Law. Unity within 
Diversity, 4. rev. (Nijhoff, 2003); SANDS & KLEIN, Bowett's Law of International Institutions; and JAN 
KLABBERS, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, 2nd Edition (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009).  
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sources and legal nature of the rules that guide international organizations in 
providing development assistance.417  
The first source of international institutional law are the founding treaties or 
statutes of international organizations, i.e. their primary law. The statutes of 
international organizations are international legal treaties, which at the same time 
constitute quasi-constitutional frameworks for all activities.418 Generally binding, they 
establish the functions of the organization, and some basic rules on how they ought to 
be exercised. 419  Since statutes are usually formulated in rather broad terms and 
without necessarily anticipating all subsequent developments, however, they need to 
be concretized and at times adapted to changing realities. Rather than through 
amendments, i.e. a formal change to the statute following the procedures established 
therein, concretization and adaptation is regularly done through interpretation. Few 
statutes of international organizations contain explicit rules on interpretation, which 
would explain a deviation from the general rules of interpretations established in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 420  In practice, however, statutes are 
regularly construed in a dynamic or ‘purposive’ manner, i.e. allowing for a broad 
interpretation of the organization’s purposes, with due regard to the dynamic 
evolution of the environment in which it operates.421  This is a practice in which 
international development organizations, too, are generally well-versed. 
Further to concretize or adapt the statutes, international organizations produce 
additional rules that form part of secondary law. In fact, many of the concrete rules 
                                                        
417 Although the European Union features in major textbooks on international institutional law (e.g. 
supra note 416), the perspective of international institutional law may appear less fitting to study the 
rules of the European Union, which is a supranational organization. However, the particularities of the 
European Union’s mandate and legal framework for development cooperation that I address in this 
thesis have in fact little to do with its supranational decision-making procedures in some areas. Rather, 
it is important to note that part of the EU’s cooperation, namely that with ACP countries, rests on the 
basis of a multilateral treaty, the Cotonou Agreement. In detail, infra chapter V.2 a).  
418 The understanding of the statutes of international organizations as international legal contracts 
and/or constitutions gives rise to different arguments on how they should be interpreted, how they 
relate to general international law, and concerning the relation of the organization to its member states. 
For an overview of the discussions on the dual nature of statutes, see AHLBORN, 'The Rules of 
International Organizations and the Law of International Responsibility', pp. 6-13. 
419 On the substance of rules governing the conduct of international development organizations, see 
section 2 of this chapter. 
420 Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties, Doc. No. A/Conf39/28 (1969), Art. 31. Klabbers 
questions why the interpretation of statutes should be particularly goal-oriented, rather than balancing a 
textual and teleological approach to interpretation as is the general rule. KLABBERS, An Introduction to 
International Institutional Law, 86-90. 
421 E.g. E. ALVAREZ JOSÉ, 'Constitutional Interpretation in International Organizations', in Jean-Marc 
Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen (eds), The Legitimacy of International Organizations (New York 
University Press, 2001). 
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that inform the processes whereby international organizations provide ODA are 
adopted by their various organs, and hence prima facie belong to secondary law. 
Nevertheless, they are important sources of the law of development cooperation, and 
thus deserve more attention.422 
In a broad sense, all secondary law derives its normative effect from primarily 
law, just as it must conform to the rules of competence, substantive, and procedural 
limitations contained in the organization’s statute.423 With the exception of the EU, 
however, most statutes only scarcely regulate the processes whereby secondary rules 
are set and applied.424 Secondary rules come with a variety of denominations, ranging 
from resolutions, decisions, declarations and recommendations, to operational policies, 
guidelines, or best practice notes. Such different denominations only exemplify the 
variety of forms and functions secondary rules may take, and often provide little 
insights into their legal effects. A basic distinction is often drawn between external 
and internal secondary law. External secondary law refers to rules that are addressed 
to (member) states, other subjects of international law, or individuals, and which 
assume effects outside the organizational structure of the institution. In addition, all 
international organizations – either through an explicit authorization in their statutes 
or as an “implied power” – have the competence to regulate internal procedure and 
organizational structure, and to adopt rules to govern their operations on a daily 
basis.425 These rules are addressed to organs (or staff) of the organization and their 
                                                        
422 DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU 
and Germany, at 29; 217-218; BRADLOW, 'International Law and the Operations of the International 
Financial Institutions', at 26-27; and KINGSBURY, 'Global Administrative Law in the Institutional 
Practice of Global Regulatory Governance'. 
423 See BENZING, 'Secondary Law', paras. 1-2: “secondary law derives from primary law in that its 
normative effect formally depends upon a primary source of international law.” “Normative effect” 
must be understood in a broad sense, as secondary rules can be binding or not, of an executive or 
legislative character, address states, individuals, or rather organs of the organization. See also 
AHLBORN, 'The Rules of International Organizations and the Law of International Responsibility ', 14-
21, adding that not only written rules, but also internal customary law resulting from established 
practices of the organization count as secondary law. In contrast, Matthias Goldmann proposes a more 
narrow definition, whereby secondary law comprises only “deontic, general instruments by 
international institutions addressed to states or other public entities that are subject to hard 
enforcement”. MATTHIAS GOLDMANN, 'Inside Relative Normativity: From Sources to Standard 
Instruments for the Exercise of International Public Authority', in Armin  von Bogdandy, et al. (eds), 
The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions (Springer, 2010), 697.   
424 SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, International Institutional Law. Unity within Diversity, § 1215; or 
KLABBERS, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, p. 203, who finds that it is not unusual 
for international organizations to issue instruments which were not foreseen in their statutes with such 
rule-making taking place “outside constitutionally controlled conditions.”  
425 BENZING, 'Secondary Law', para. 36 On the doctrine of implied powers, see the ICJ in Reparation 
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, ICJ Reports 1949, pp. 182-183: “Under 
international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly 
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effect is prima facie internal, which is why they are referred to as internal secondary 
law, or internal rules.426 
Looking a bit closer at the legal nature and effects of secondary rules of 
international organizations, however, the distinction between external and internal 
effects starts blurring. It gives way to a much more complex picture, wherein the rules 
that different organs of international organizations usually develop autonomously in 
more or less formalized processes can assume a number of legal effects within and 
outside their institutional structures – for which the institutional law of international 
organizations engaged in development cooperation provides ample evidence.  
The primary function of the internal rules of international organizations is still to 
regulate their own, effective functioning. International organizations engaged in the 
provision of development assistance adopt internal rules to structure and guide the 
allocation, programming, and implementation of aid. They adopt internal rules to 
guide staff, for instance, in the use of specific financial instruments, the conduct of 
environmental assessments, or in procurement. 427  Besides providing substantive 
guidance, internal rules are used to structure the according decision-making processes, 
and regulate which actors within or outside the organization must be involved.428 
Some of these rules are explicitly non-binding and have a recommendatory character. 
Other rules, however, organizations consider to be binding on their organs and staff. 
The World Bank’s Operational Policies (OPs) and Bank Procedures (BPs) are a 
common example. OPs/BPs are abstract, general rules that are prepared in a relatively 
                                                                                                                                                              
provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the 
performance of its duties.” 
426 There is some ambiguity surrounding the concept of secondary rules as opposed to internal rules in 
international legal scholarship, which is related to the fact that both concepts have been described more 
or less broadly, and their relationship is not always clear. In principle, secondary law refers to the 
origin of a rule, whereas internal law rather refers to its subject matter and scope. Internal rules have 
been broadly defined as “the body of rules governing the functioning of the organization”, and as such 
can include rules both of primary law as well as institutional acts and more informally the practice of 
organs, if consistent and well established. E.g. PIERRE KLEIN, 'Internal Law and Rules'in 
ibid.November 2006), para. 1. In the context of the present study, “internal rules” is used to refer to the 
rules of internal secondary law only, and not primarily law.  
427 Rather than strictly internal rules, the EU therefore adopts Regulations, a particularly formalized 
form of secondary legislation that is applicable to the institution, but also its member states and 
addressed individuals. See Art. 189 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and on 
the EU’s legal framework in detail, infra chapter V.2 a).  
428 JOCHEN VON BERNSTORFF, 'Procedures of Decision-Making and the Role of Law in International 
Organizations', in Armin von Bogdandy, et al. (eds), The Exercise of Public Authority by International 
Institutions (Springer, 2010), 797. 
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structured process by the Bank’s Management, and which are subject to a quasi-
judicial review mechanism, the Inspection Panel.429  
In addition to regulating the conduct of international organizations in 
development cooperation, however, internal rules can have significant external effects 
on the recipient countries with which they engage. For instance, some rules are 
adopted as internal rules but later incorporated in the financing agreements that the 
organization concludes with recipients. The environmental and social safeguard 
policies of the World Bank and other MDBs are a prominent example. By means of 
reference, they are incorporated in the international legal treaties that the MDBs 
conclude with borrowing countries, and thus create direct obligations under 
international law for borrowers concerning the implementation of approved 
projects.430  
In other cases, international organizations use internal rules to consolidate 
organizational practices or authoritative interpretations of their statutes – and hence as 
a more or less informal tool to adapt existing international law.431 As we will see later, 
such practices of adaptation are rather common among international development 
organizations such as the World Bank.432 The relative informality of internal rules, as 
opposed to the demanding process usually required for formal amendments, can 
facilitate the consolidation of organizational practices or interpretations. Although 
only very few organizations are explicitly authorized to adopt secondary rules to 
change the rights or obligations of member states as contained in the statute, internal 
rules can thus in principle have such an effect.433  
                                                        
429 See infra chapter IV.1 a) for a detailed analysis of the legal nature and effects of OPs/BPs. 
430 E.g. LAURENCE BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, 'Policy Guidance and Compliance: The World Bank's 
Operational Standards', in Dinah Shelton (ed) Commitment and Compliance (Oxford University Press, 
2000), pp. 289-90. 
431 Importantly, organizational practice, i.e. the practice of the organs of the organization, is not the 
same as “subsequent practice” as defined in Art. 38 lit. c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. The latter generally refers to the practice of (all) contracting parties of the organizations’ 
founding treaties, whereas organizational practice regularly involves only a fraction of the 
organization’s membership. See AHLBORN, 'The Rules of International Organizations and the Law of 
International Responsibility', 20-21.  
432 On this practice, see A. RIGO SUREDA, 'Informality and Effectiveness in the Operation of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development', 6 Journal of International Economic Law, 
565 (2003); and infra chapter IV.1 a). 
433 VON BERNSTORFF, 'Procedures of Decision-Making and the Role of Law in International 
Organizations', 796, elaborating that operational decisions that are taken outside the plenary bodies of 
an organization to apply internal rules can contribute to the concretization and creation of new norms, 
not least where they contribute to an emerging organizational practice. Schermers and Blokker find it 
“somewhat anomalous” that internal rules with external effects can in principle be adopted even against 
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These are instances where internal rules can assume an external, binding effect 
through interacting with ‘hard law’ – with international legal rules contained in the 
statute, or in international legal treaties concluded between an organization and a 
recipient country. Yet it is also increasingly acknowledged that rules can constrain 
legal subjects without even directly binding them, simply by building up sufficient 
pressure – economic, reputational, or other – to comply.434 This can also be true for 
internal rules of international organizations. In fact, particularly in the context of 
development cooperation, it is not unlikely that recipient states in need of financial 
assistance are in practice compelled to abide by an internal rule, although it is not 
formally binding on them, and actually not even addressed to them.435 For instance, 
the terms and conditions for the use of specific financing instruments are regularly set 
out in internal rules addressed to an organization’s staff. Recipient states that want to 
qualify for development funding must nonetheless meet these terms and conditions, 
all the more if they crucially depend on external aid.436 Their structural dependency 
can at least reduce the freedom not to engage with an organization on the terms and 
conditions set out in its internal rules.  
Looking at the internal rules of international organizations, it is thus safe to say 
that the traditional doctrine of sources fails to “satisfactorily explain their legal effect 
and significance.”437 In fact, particularly rules that are formally binding only in the 
organization’s internal sphere have for a long time largely fallen off the radar of 
                                                                                                                                                              
the will of member states, while the procedure for their adoption is scarcely regulated. SCHERMERS & 
BLOKKER, International Institutional Law. Unity within Diversity, § 1215.  
434  ARMIN VON BOGDANDY, et al., 'Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a 
Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities', in Armin von Bogdandy, et al. (eds), The 
Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions (Springer, 2010), 12, arguing that “the 
capacity to determine another legal subject can also occur through a non-binding act which only 
conditions another legal subject. This is the case whenever that act builds up pressure for another legal 
subject to follow its impetus”. In the context of fragile states, Kingsbury and Davis speak of 
“normative requirements and regulatory templates set by global governance institutions which the state 
has little practical choice but to accept, whether or not there is a formal international legal obligation.” 
KINGSBURY & DAVIS, 'Obligation Overload: Adjusting the Obligations of Fragile or Failed States', at 
4. 
435 DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU 
and Germany, 216-218, and on the resulting legitimacy concerns, 510-511. 
436 It is important to recall that actual development projects and programs are usually still governed by 
international legal agreements concluded between donor organizations and recipients, and thus based 
on state-consent. As Dann points out, however, these legal agreements are “intensely ‘pre-structured’ 
by the donors’ own rules”. Ibid., 217. Besides, this pre-structuring also concerns the rules that 
determine to what extent national governments or other actors can participate in the processes whereby 
development organizations approve and implement projects. Supra note 428. 
437 BENZING, 'Secondary Law', paras. 49 and 51, pointing to a “major deficit in doctrine”; with a similar 
conclusion, PIERRE KLEIN, 'Internal Law and Rules'in ibid.November 2006), para. 12; on the question 
whether internal rules belong to the traditional sources of international law, see already supra note 54. 
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international law. Yet, independent of the question if and when internal rules actually 
constitute “law”, legal scholars and experts need to grapple with such informal or 
partly formalized rules if they want to understand how international organizations 
operate.438 In other words, they may refuse to call them law, but they cannot afford to 
ignore their effects – a statement that we have seen assumes particular relevance with 
regards to multilateral development cooperation.  
At least two good reasons speak for considering not only the statutes, but also the 
internal rules of international development organizations, when analyzing the legal 
significance and effects of their regulatory activity on fragile states. First, particularly 
binding internal rules can be potent instruments in steering the conduct of 
organizations. Looking at the often abstract (if not outdated) rules contained in the 
statutes alone, it is nearly impossible to comprehend how they operate, how and by 
whom operational decisions are taken, and what factors matter. This is not to say that 
statutes are irrelevant – but the rules set out therein are often only concretized in 
internal rules, which thus reflect how organizations understand and operationalize 
their legal mandate. Moreover, internal rules reflect how organizations seeks to adapt 
or further develop their legal mandate in response to challenges that were not foreseen 
in the founding treaties – including the challenges they associate with engaging in 
fragile states. 
Second, whether binding or non-binding, internal rules regularly assume external 
effects: they formulate the terms and conditions, including procedural rights, for the 
transfer of ODA to recipient countries. They are sometimes incorporated in financing 
agreements and thus become formally binding, or they are used to codify 
organizational practices or interpretations and thus informally adapt existing rules in 
the statute. Arguably, organizational practice that follows repeated patterns – as can 
be expected where it is instructed by rules – can contribute to the development of 
                                                        
438 For a compelling discussion of the question whether informal rules in general can constitute law, see 
JOOST PAUWELYN, 'Is it International Law or Not, and Does It Even Matter?', in Jan Wouters, et al. 
(eds), Informal International Lawmaking (Oxford Universty Press, 2012). In the same volume, Jean 
d’Aspremont argues that international lawyers should scrutinize processes of informal law-making 
without necessarily elevating their products to the status of international law. JEAN D’ASPREMONT, 
'From a Pluralization of International Norm-making Processes to a Pluralization of the Concept of 
International Law', in Jan Wouters, et al. (eds), in ibid.. Similarly, SABINO CASSESE, 'Is There a Global 
Administrative Law? ', in Armin von Bogdandy, et al. (eds), The Exercise of Public Authority by 
International Institutions (Springer, 2010). 
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(customary) international law in certain matters. 439  Clearly, the adoption or 
modification of internal rules can thus directly or indirectly affect the conduct of 
development cooperation with fragile states, and their roles and responsibilities in the 
process. 
As we embark on a more thorough investigation of the rules that govern 
multilateral development cooperation with fragile states in the following chapters, we 
can rely on legal approaches that have already grappled with global governance 
phenomena, including activities of international organizations that reach beyond 
traditional, formal sources of public international law.440 They respond precisely to 
the fact that international institutional law faces certain limitations in grasping the 
legal effects and significance of internal rules, and of a plurality of normative outputs 
that international organizations increasingly produce. Particularly the Global 
Administrative Law (GAL) project and the International Public Authority (IPA) 
approach seek to understand and conceptualize the forms, functions, and effects of 
various instruments, and thus to enhance international institutional law.441 The GAL 
perspective illuminates that many of the internal rules produced by international 
development organizations can be understood as different forms of regulatory 
administration.442 As such, GAL propose how they could be organized and shaped by 
                                                        
439 IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, The World Bank in a Changing World, 3 (Nijhoff, 2000), 429, speaking 
about the practice of the World Bank on matters of state succession; also DANIEL BRADLOW & ANDRIA 
NAUDÉ FOURIE, 'The Operational Policies of the World Bank and the International Finance 
Corporation. Creating Law-Making and Law-Governed Institutions?' International Organizations Law 
Review, 3 (2013), 7; and on the contribution of secondary law to the formation of customary 
international law in general, see BENZING, 'Secondary Law', paras. 4 and 32.  
440 The ubiquitous and still difficult-to-grasp notion of ‘global governance’ generally refers to diverse 
processes and means whereby power and authority are increasingly exercised by a variety of actors 
beyond the nation state. The present focus on international organizations, however, allows putting aside 
some of the vexing questions that various global governance phenomena pose to international law. For 
this thesis, the relevance of the notion consists mostly in drawing attention to an increasing informality 
in many rules and procedures through which international organizations operate.  
441 Other projects have somewhat similar objectives, for instance, the “Informal International Law-
making” project of the Graduate Institute in Geneva, which adds a fine analytical dissection of various 
forms of international policy-making. For a comparison of GAL, IPA, and Informal Law-making, see 
PHILIPP DANN & MARIE VON ENGELHARDT, 'Legal Approaches to Global Governance and 
Accountability: Informal Lawmaking, International Public Authority, and Global Administrative Law 
Compared', in Joost Pauwelyn, et al. (eds), Informal International Lawmaking (Oxford University 
Press, 2012). In addition, the central proposal of International Constitutionalism to conceive the 
international legal order as a vertical structure with overarching principles also constitutes a proposal to 
constrain the governance activities of international organization. E.g. ANNE PETERS, 'Compensatory 
Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures', 19 
Leiden Journal of International Law, 579 (2006). 
442 BENEDICT KINGSBURY, et al., 'The Emergence of Global Administrative Law', 68 Law and 
Contemporary Problems, 15 (2005), 16, referring to “rulemaking, administrative adjudication between 
competing interests, and other forms of regulatory and administrative decision and management.” 
Notably, the focus of GAL extends far beyond the activities of public international organizations, and 
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reference to administrative law principles familiar from domestic legal orders. 443 
Following the IPA approach, any act of an international organization constitutes an 
exercise of international public authority if it serves to determine other legal subjects, 
i.e. “to unilaterally shape their legal or factual situation.”444 From a specific public 
law perspective, IPA thus explains the effects that more or less formalized rules of 
international development organizations can have, no matter whether they are binding 
or conform to established sources of international law.445 Moreover, both GAL and 
IPA draw attention to the importance of various interactions between formal and 
informal instruments, between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law, which are also characteristic of 
the law of development organizations.446  
Legal approaches like GAL and IPA thus bolster my initial claim to take the 
internal rules of international development organizations seriously, in order to draw a 
more comprehensive and realistic picture of their regulatory and operational 
activities. 447  This is not only because these approaches emphasize the variety of 
processes and more or less formal legal instruments through which international 
                                                                                                                                                              
includes private and hybrid actors. GAL is generally critical of the effectiveness of international 
institutional law “in providing a deep structure for the operational or administrative-type activities of 
IOs”. BENEDICT KINGSBURY & LORENZO CASINI, 'Global Administrative Law Dimensions of 
International Organizations Law', 6 International Organizations Law Review, 319 (2009), 329. 
443 Developing procedures that can enhance transparency, knowledge of motives, and participation of 
the affected constitutes the central proposal of GAL to enhance both the effectiveness and legitimacy 
of governance activities beyond the state. See, for instance, DANIEL C. ESTY, 'Good Governance at the 
Supranational Scale. Globalizing Administrative Law', 115 The Yale Law Journal, 1493 (2006); and 
infra chapter VI.3. 
444 VON BOGDANDY, et al., 'Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal 
Framework for Global Governance Activities', 11. IPA is thus deliberately more selective than the 
GAL project, and follows the conviction that demanding accountability for governance activities 
requires a clear determination of whether or not an act amounts to an exercise of international public 
authority. In contrast to GAL, IPA still values international institutional law as a “firm disciplinary 
basis” for IPA (ibid. 26). For more information and a list of publications emerging from this ongoing, 
multi-year project based at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public and International Law in 
Heidelberg, see online: 
http://www.mpil.de/de/pub/forschung/forschung_im_detail/projekte/voelkerrecht/ipa.cfm (accessed 
December 2014). 
445 Matthias Goldmann proposes a doctrine of standard instruments (Handlungsformenlehre) that 
further systematizes the form, function, and effect, for instance, of international secondary law as 
opposed to internal operational rules. See MATTHIAS GOLDMANN, 'Inside Relative Normativity: From 
Sources to Standard Instruments for the Exercise of International Public Authority', in Armin  von 
Bogdandy, et al. (eds), in ibid.. 
446 Supra note 414. On the various interactions between hard law and soft law promulgated by 
international organizations in general, see MARIE VON ENGELHARDT, 'Opportunities and Challenges of 
a Soft Law Track to Economic and Social Rights. The Case of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Right 
to Food', 42 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee, 502 (2009).  
447 Other international legal scholars also refer to approaches like IPA and GAL to study the law and 
governance of development cooperation. E.g. DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A 
Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, pp. 510-513; DAVIS, '‘Financing 
Development’ as a Field of Practice, Study and Innovation', pp. 176-177; or KINGSBURY, 'Global 
Administrative Law in the Institutional Practice of Global Regulatory Governance', at 6. 
 122 
organizations exercise governance. They also highlight and somewhat concretize the 
various legitimacy concerns that may arise in this context, particularly regarding rule- 
and decision-making processes. Again, while its effects may be significant, a large 
part of international organizations’ rule- and decision-making is internal, subject to 
few legal constraints – and in the case of the World Bank, based on tenuous structures 
of representation. 448  Whereas statutes are often “notoriously unclear” about the 
division of competences and procedures for rule- and decision-making, in practice, 
rule-making processes have long moved beyond formalized, political processes in 
plenary organs that are dominated by governments.449 They rather take the form of 
informal processes of administrative rule-making, involving an interplay of different 
organs of the organization. Similarly, organizations typically enjoy large discretion in 
making operational decisions that concern the implementation of rules, and ultimately 
of the organization’s mandate.450 Accordingly, while rule- and decision-making in 
international organizations may show some similarities with domestic administrative 
processes, they largely lag behind the structures and procedural standards available in 
domestic administrative law.451  
Such concerns must be born in mind when examining the rules of international 
organizations engaged in development cooperation, including how they are made or 
modified. We will later return to these concerns, and the proposals made for 
addressing them.452 For now, it is sufficient to emphasize that even rules that are 
prima facie internal may be legally significant, whereas decision-making processes 
concerning the adoption and implementation of rules often remain relatively informal 
and subject to few legal constraints. If internal rules are relatively formalized and 
considered binding on the organization’s staff, as is the case with the World Bank’s 
OPs/BPs, they can be considered a part of the organization’s legal framework. If not, 
                                                        
448 On the World Bank’s governance structure and its system of weighted voting, see infra chapter IV.1 
a). 
449 VON BERNSTORFF, 'Procedures of Decision-Making and the Role of Law in International 
Organizations', 778. On international organizations as “law-makers”, see the important study of 
ALVAREZ, International Organizations as Law-Makers. Also ALAN E. BOYLE & CHRISTINE M. 
CHINKIN, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), chapters 3 and 5. 
450 This is even if international organizations increasingly choose to adopt internal rules or put up 
managerial controls to structure and guide their decision-making. See VON BERNSTORFF, 'Procedures of 
Decision-Making and the Role of Law in International Organizations', pp. 798-802, and infra chapter 
VI.3. 
451 KINGSBURY, et al., 'The Emergence of Global Administrative Law', pp. 37-42, showing how 
accountability mechanisms, rights to procedural participation and transparency, requirements of 
reasoned decisions, or entitlements of review, for instance, are less developed outside of domestic 
administrative law.  
452 Infra chapter VI.2 and 3. 
 123 
they still belong to its broader policy framework, which I understand to include the 
various non-binding instruments that are produced by the organs of the organization 
to provide further guidance to staff in carrying out the activities of the organization. 
With such a basic understanding of the legal nature and potential effects of the rules 
that make up the legal and policy frameworks of international development 
organizations beyond their founding treaties, we are well equipped to study how they 
are adapted with regards to fragile states.  
  
2. Basic Ideas of the Law of International Development Organizations  
 
In this thesis, I ask not just how international development organizations adapt 
rules for engaging with fragile states, but also to what effect. In other words, I am 
concerned also with the specific outcomes of the processes whereby international 
organizations adapt their legal and policy frameworks. In order to analyze what a 
differentiated approach to development cooperation with fragile countries may consist 
of, we first need a basic understanding of the substance of rules that normally govern 
the transfer of ODA. Accordingly, having looked at the rules of international 
development organizations from the perspective of international institutional law to 
understand their legal nature and effects, I know approach the same body of rules 
through the prism of their common subject matter.  
How do legal scholars gain a systematic understanding of a diversity of rules? 
They typically look for “significant regularities” that assist in structuring and better 
understanding the predominant ideas of a particular field. 453  For the law of 
development cooperation, a relatively new field of legal research, probably the only 
legal scholar that has so far attempted to identify the leading ideas that permeate this 
                                                        
453 ARMIN VON BOGDANDY, 'General Principles of International Public Authority: Sketching a Research 
Field', in Armin von Bogdandy, et al. (eds), The Exercise of Public Authority by International 
Institutions (Springer, 2010), at 729; also ARMIN VON BOGDANDY, 'Prolegomena zu Prinzipien 
internationalisierter und internationaler Verwaltung', in Hans-Heinrich Trute, et al. (eds), Allgemeines 
Verwaltungsrecht - Zur Tragfähigkeit eines Konzepts (Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 692. However, the use of 
principles to define the regularities in a legal field is also controversial, both from a methodological 
perspective, and considering that the construction of principles can be said to involve “investing the 
law with evaluative and goal-rational meanings and thus carries normative consequences”. See in 
particular MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, 'General Principles: Reflexions on Constructivist Thinking in 
International Law' Oikeustiede-Jurisprudentia (Yearbook of the Finnish Law Society), 360 (1985), 367; 
or MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, 'Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about 
International Law and Globalization', 8 Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 9 (2006), arguing that the 
formulation of “legal” principles from scattered materials shows a “constitutional mindset at work” (p. 
21). 
 124 
field as a whole is Philipp Dann.454 He uses principles to systematize a diversity of 
legal sources, and to describe their common objectives and structure. Dann’s work 
provides an important foundation, including for this thesis. It is also much broader 
and more ambitious however, than what we need to get a basic understanding of the 
substance of rules contained in the legal and policy frameworks of development 
organizations. Dann identifies principles that transcend not only particular 
organizations, but also levels of governance, considering a diversity of sources from 
the domestic law of donors to general international law. Moreover, he establishes not 
only structural principles that serve to describe basic ideas of the law of development 
cooperation, but also legal principles, which are legally binding and serve an 
evaluative function.455 In contrast, this thesis focuses on the rules stipulated in the 
legal and policy frameworks of international development organizations. 456  My 
objective is first of all to outline their common substance, not to make general 
statements about their bindingness.457 It is therefore sufficient to concentrate on the 
institutional law of development organizations – and less confusing to refer not to 
principles, but to basic, normative ideas. 
                                                        
454 DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU 
and Germany, chapter 4. Other authors have not yet attempted to identify the leading ideas of a law of 
development cooperation in a similarly comprehensive manner. Kevin Davis initially establishes 
specific directions for legal research in the field of development financing. Daniel Bradlow and David 
Hunter, in turn, focus more on the general international law applicable to development cooperation, 
than on the law of organizations engaged in development cooperation. In the traditional school of 
international development law again, scholars are concerned with making out principles that should 
ideally shape the relations between developed and developing countries, and thus with making 
normative claims rather than describing the existing law. For references, see supra note 409. 
455 On the distinction between structural and legal principles and the according question of how they 
are derived, see in general VON BOGDANDY, 'General Principles of International Public Authority: 
Sketching a Research Field', pp. 729-734; or KOSKENNIEMI, 'General Principles: Reflexions on 
Constructivist Thinking in International Law', at 361-367; and with regards to the law of development 
cooperation, DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, 
the EU and Germany, pp. 222-224. 
456 This is not to say that international development organizations cannot be bound by rules outside of 
their own legal frameworks. Development organizations are bound by international legal treaties they 
conclude with recipient states, for instance, and also by principles of customary international law, 
insofar as these are relevant and applicable to their conduct. See, for instance, DANN, The Law of 
Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, pp. 267-
272, arguing that the World Bank is required to respect human rights; also BRADLOW, 'International 
Law and the Operations of the International Financial Institutions'. My objective is not, however, to 
construct a general legal framework applicable to the activities of international development 
organizations. Rather, it is to describe the substance of rules contained in their own legal and policy 
frameworks, and later to assess how these rules are adapted vis-à-vis-fragile states. There is thus no 
need to look beyond the institutional law of international development organizations at this point. 
457 Referring to principles could connote that the common substance of rules is necessarily binding for 
all organizations, or of a higher normativity. In contrast, I assess the precise content and bindingness of 
a particular rule only with regards to the legal frameworks of individual organizations.  
 125 
Are there basic ideas that emerge from the legal and policy frameworks of various 
international organizations engaged in development cooperation? What do they tell us 
about the usual objectives, processes, and role of recipient states in multilateral 
development cooperation? International organizations that engage in development 
cooperation have some rules and practices in common simply by virtue of being 
international organizations. Rules that can be found in the legal frameworks of all 
international organizations concern, for instance, their legal status and immunities, 
institutional structure and decision-making, conditions for membership, and 
funding.458 Beyond, the statutes and secondary rules of international organizations 
diverge in substance, in line with their respective objectives. Looking only at 
international organizations engaged in development cooperation, however, which 
share a common purpose and assume similar functions, the diversity is significantly 
reduced. It is hence possible to spot substantive commonalities, which are increasing 
as organizations with similar mandates tend to take “mimetic steps” and adopt similar 
rules.459   
To identify and describe these commonalities, I refer to the four organizations 
that are subject to a more detailed analysis in the subsequent chapters: the World 
Bank, the AfDB, the ADB, and the European Union. My analysis hence focuses on 
two broad types of international development organizations: rather technocratic 
organizations with a specific development mandate like the World Bank, the AfDB, 
and the ADB, and in contrast the European Union, an organization with a much 
broader and essentially political, not technocratic mandate. 460  Since the specific 
aspects of their respective legal and policy frameworks will be covered in more detail 
below, showing more nuances, the following overview focuses on three basic ideas 
that are common to all. First, the legal and policy frameworks of all organizations 
express what constitutes their common objective – fostering development. Along with 
this objective, they typically contain requirements as to how it should be pursued – 
                                                        
458 These rules where the statutes of different organizations show the most commonalities are also the 
principal subject of international institutional law. SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, International Institutional 
Law. Unity within Diversity, §7. 
459 E.g. KINGSBURY, 'Global Administrative Law in the Institutional Practice of Global Regulatory 
Governance', 22, referring to the “[i]somorphism among clusters of institutions with similar missions, 
taking informal mimetic steps to resemble each other institutionally or to adopt similar operational 
policies.” 
460 On the two types of development organizations, one with a “specialized technocratic” and one with 
a “diplomatic-heteronomous focus”, see DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative 
Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, at 200-202. I explain above why I do not also 
include UNDP in the comparative analysis (supra note 393). 
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namely, by respecting standards of effectiveness. Finally, a most direct expression of 
the state-centric paradigm of development cooperation, all organizations are required 
to respect the sovereignty and ownership of recipient counterparts.  
To begin with the obvious, the statutes of all international organizations that 
provide development assistance stipulate their purposes and objectives, which (by 
definition) is to support development. For instance, the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank’s concessional 
lending arm, establish that the organization shall “promote economic development, 
increase productivity and thus raise standards of living in the less-developed areas of 
the world”.461 The AfDB was established “to contribute to the sustainable economic 
development and social progress” of its members, 462  and the ADB “to foster 
economic growth and co-operation […] and to contribute to the acceleration of the 
process of economic development”.463 As noted before, the European Union is an 
organization with a much broader mandate than development – which is why it would 
be more accurate to refer to the EU as an organization engaged in development 
cooperation, not an international development organization. 464  Still, the European 
Union’s primary law stipulates “the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of 
poverty” as the principal goal of EU development cooperation.465 
For international organizations engaged in development cooperation, the 
requirement to support development or contribute to poverty reduction serves an 
important role in delineating the permissible scope of their activities, and in 
preventing the misuse of ODA for other purposes. In principle, international 
organizations with a development mandate must ensure that all their activities are 
ultimately directed at supporting development. Otherwise, an organization risks acting 
                                                        
461 IDA Articles, Art. I. The development mandate is further concretized in Operational Policy (OP) 1.0 
on Poverty Reduction, a secondary rule that formulates a broad conception of development 
underscoring the work of the World Bank. On the legal nature of the World Bank’s OPs in detail, see 
infra chapter IV.1 a). For a more detailed discussion of the meaning of development in the World 
Bank’s mandate, see STEFANIE KILLINGER, The World Bank's Non-Political Mandate (Heymanns, 
2003), pp. 55-66.  
462 AfDB Agreement, Art. 1. See also the Agreement establishing the African Development Fund 
(signed on 29.11.2972), which is tasked “to assist the Bank in making an increasingly effective 
contribution to the economic and social development […] the promotion of co-operation […] and 
increased international trade” (Art. 2). 
463 ADB Agreement, Art. 1. 
464 For the sake of simplicity, I nonetheless refer to the EU as an international development 
organization. See supra note 3. 
465 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Art. 208 (1). See also Art. 209 TFEU and 
Treaty on European Union (TEU), Art. 21 (2) lit. f).  
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ultra vires, i.e. outside the scope of its competence. 466  This also means that 
international development organizations must ensure the projects and programs they 
finance – even if proposed and implemented by recipient governments – support 
development objectives, and not unrelated purposes.  
The crucial question is then: what is development? The statutes of international 
development organizations typically do not define what precisely development entails, 
but leave it open to interpretation.467 As noted before, this is not unusual. Statutes in 
general, and the objectives and purposes of an organization in particular, are rarely 
phrased in narrow terms, to allow organizations to adapt to changing circumstances or 
demands. 468  In fact, mainstream development thinking on what constitutes 
development has shifted considerably over the last decades: initially equated by and 
large with economic growth, development is now seen as a comprehensive concept, 
including a wide range of aspects related to socio-economic well-being, 
environmental sustainability – and increasingly, peace and security. 469  Such 
conceptual shifts are regularly reflected in more or less formalized secondary rules, 
which international development organizations adopt to interpret and concretize what 
the broad notion of development contained in the statute entails for the activities of 
the organization. For example, all MDBs have adopted social and environmental 
safeguard policies, a reflection of the conceptual shift from development to 
(environmentally) sustainable development since the late 1980s.470  
                                                        
466 On the ultra vires doctrine, see VON BERNSTORFF, 'Procedures of Decision-Making and the Role of 
Law in International Organizations', 784-785. Bernstorff also highlights the doctrine’s limited 
effectiveness and scope of application in view of the fact that international organizations can deduce 
“implied powers” from their mandated purposes. On “implied powers”, see supra note 425. 
467 An exception is the specification of “poverty reduction” in the EU’s primary law. Supra note 465. 
468 See supra chapter III.1. 
469 On the shifting understanding of development, see supra note 285. Conceptual shifts are also 
reflected in multilateral agreements and international policy declarations like the UN Millennium 
Declaration, from which the Millennium Development Goals emerged. See United Nations Millennium 
Declaration, UN-GA, Res. 55/2 (September 18, 2000). The Post-2015 Development Agenda, which 
will succeed the Millennium Development Goals, is likely to reflect the shifting understanding of peace 
and security as preconditions and important aspects of development. See supra note 345. 
With a broader look at possible legal bases for a “principle of development” in the law of development 
cooperation, see DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World 
Bank, the EU and Germany, at 227-230. 
470 The World Bank began introducing environmental standards in 1989, following the publication of 
the Brundtland Report in 1987, wherein ““environmental sustainability” was rechristened as 
“sustainable development,” hence forging a direct link between development and sustainability.” Ibid., 
103. On the AfDB’s and the ADB’s environmental and social safeguards, see PHILIPP DANN & JOCHEN 
VON BERNSTORFF, Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 'Reforming the World Bank’s 
Safeguards. A Comparative Legal Analysis' (July 2013).  
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Together with the shifting understanding of development, the scope of activities 
of international development organizations has thus expanded well beyond the 
original mandates – sometimes into realms that originally belonged to the state’s 
domestic affairs.471 In the light of this dynamic referred to as ‘mission creep’, drawing 
a strict line between activities that fall within or outside the scope of an organization’s 
development mandate is increasingly difficult, and the original wording of the statute 
does not provide much guidance.472 As the following chapters will show, this is also 
true with regards to the evolving engagement of international development 
organizations in conflict-affected and fragile states. The understanding that 
development requires security, capable institutions, and functioning state-society 
relations has entailed a further expansion of the scope of activities of international 
development organizations, and influenced what is expected from recipient states. 
Second, the legal and policy frameworks of all development organizations contain 
rules that require operations to be economically reasonable, cost-effective, and 
results-oriented, that is, broadly speaking, to adhere to standards of effectiveness. The 
respective rules can be seen as procedural add-ons to the substantive objective of 
development. They are contained both in the statutes and secondary rules of 
international development organizations.473 Perhaps not surprisingly, requirements of 
effectiveness, economy, and efficiency are particularly prominent in the mandates and 
internal rules of the World Bank and other MDBs. The World Bank must direct its 
resources towards “productive purposes”, and ensure the economic efficiency of its 
                                                        
471 See supra chapter II.2 a), where I argue that the broadening notion of development implied that 
international organizations became concerned with (improving) the state’s actual performance in areas 
that go well beyond factors that directly concern its economic development. 
472 Mission creep refers to the gradual expansion of the activities of international organizations beyond 
the confines of the original mandate. In general, see VON BERNSTORFF, 'Procedures of Decision-
Making and the Role of Law in International Organizations' at 784-785; and with regards to the World 
Bank, IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, 'The Dynamic Evolution of International Organizations: The Case of the 
World Bank', 2 Journal of the History of International Law, 217 (2000); or JESSICA EINHORN, 'The 
World Bank's Mission Creep', 80 Foreign Affairs, 22 (2001). 
473 Besides, standards of effectiveness are also expressed in international policy declarations, most 
prominently the Paris Declaration (supra note 21), to which all major international development 
organizations adhere. In this context, however, the notion of ‘aid effectiveness’ has received a much 
broader meaning, as expressed in the five principles that aim to make aid more effective: ownership, 
alignment, harmonisation, results, and mutual accountability. Whereas the latter two still appear most 
closely related to standards of effectiveness, particularly ownership we will address as a separate idea, 
namely as tribute to the sovereignty of recipient countries. For an overview of (mostly non-binding) 
sources that express standards of effectiveness beyond the instituional law of development 
organizations, see DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World 
Bank, the EU and Germany, 284-195 (referring to a “principle of efficiency and coherence”). 
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loans. 474  The statutes of the World Bank, AfDB and ADB require making 
“arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan made or guaranteed by it are 
used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to 
considerations of economy and efficiency”. 475  Similar rules on economic 
effectiveness and financial oversight can be found in the law of other development 
organizations, and are typical components of budgetary laws more generally. For 
instance, the EU must use the resources of the European Development Fund “in 
accordance with the principles of sound financial management, namely in accordance 
with standards of economy, efficiency and effectiveness.”476  
On the one hand, international organizations are thus bound to ensure the cost-
effective use of ODA. After all, at issue are public resources for which the donors of 
multilateral aid are themselves accountable to their taxpayers.477 On the other hand, 
development organizations are bound to ensure the effective and responsible use of 
ODA by recipients. Particularly the MDBs have therefore concretized standards of 
effectiveness in internal rules that establish detailed fiduciary, financial management, 
and other accountability requirements for the transfer of ODA. Such requirements 
may be addressed to the organizations’ staff, but ultimately fall on recipient states that 
seek to qualify for assistance, which therefore need a significant level of institutional 
and administrative capacity. Arguably, requirements have become more demanding, 
since aid effectiveness is increasingly seen to depend on recipients having competent, 
well-governed institutions that assume ownership of the development process. 478 
Against this background, governments with weak public financial management 
systems or high levels of corruption – conditions that are often associated with fragile 
states – are prima facie less likely to qualify for development assistance.479 
                                                        
474 IBRD Articles, Art. I (i). On the productive purpose requirement, see also infra chapter IV.1 b). 
475 AfDB Agreement, Art. 17 lit. h), and with almost identical wording ADB Agreement, Art. 14, lit. 
xi) and IDA Articles, Art. V Sect. 1 lit. g).  
476 See Art. 11 of the Financial Regulation applicable to the 10th European Development Fund, Council 
Regulation (EC) No 215/2008 of 18 February 2008. The EDF is a special budget used to finance 
development cooperation with ACP states. Similar “principles of sound financial management” are 
also established in TFEU Art. 317 (I), concerning the implementation of the EU’s general budget 
(including for development cooperation with non-ACP states). On the dual legal framework and 
separate budgets of EU development cooperation with ACP and non-ACP states, see infra chapter V.2 
a). 
477 DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU 
and Germany, 238, 501. 
478 See supra chapter II.2 a), on how the rise of the good governance concept and the aid effectiveness 
agenda have influenced what is expected from recipient states in the development process. 
479 Supra chapter II.2 b). 
 130 
Last but not least, next to the objective of development and standards of 
effectiveness, the legal and policy frameworks of all international organizations that 
engage in development cooperation contain rules that require them to respect the 
sovereignty of recipient counterparts. Not only are international organizations 
generally bound by the fundamental legal principle of sovereignty, which of course 
pertains to recipient as well as donor states.480 What interests us is how the principle 
of sovereignty finds concrete expression in the rules of international development 
organizations, and determines the roles and responsibilities accorded to recipient 
states.  
As noted before, development cooperation is largely state-centric.481 The primacy 
of the sovereign state translates into the way that development cooperation must be 
requested, negotiated, and approved by national governments, which also assume the 
primary responsibility for planning and implementing development projects. In this 
context, we have already seen how the legal frameworks of international 
organizations protect recipient countries’ sovereign right to consent to assistance.482 
We have also seen how the statutes of the MDBs contain provisions that expressly 
prohibit interference with the domestic (political) affairs of member states, a 
particularly noteworthy expression of the principle of non-intervention.483 Moreover, I 
have indicated that the principle of ownership – the idea that national governments 
should assume a lead role in planning and implementation – is not only expressed in 
international policy declarations that all major development organizations adhere to, 
but also incorporated in the legal and policy frameworks of international development 
organizations.484 For example, ownership constitutes a fundamental principle in the 
legally binding Cotonou Agreement, which regulates the EU’s cooperation with ACP 
countries,485 while the World Bank has a dense set of internal rules that define the 
roles and responsibilities of recipient countries in the development process.486  
                                                        
480 Supra note 25. 
481 Supra chapter II.2 a).  
482 See the legal references provided in supra notes 274 (World Bank), 278 (AfDB and ADB), and 280 
(EU). 
483 See the legal references provided in supra notes 274 (World Bank) and 279 (AfDB and ADB); and 
for a comparison of the general legal principle of non-intervention and the political prohibition clause 
of the World Bank, see DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the 
World Bank, the EU and Germany, 255-256. 
484 Supra notes 21 and 293. 
485 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 2, and also EC Regulation No 1905/2006 of 18 December 2006 L 378/41, 
establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation, i.e. binding EU secondary law. See 
also the European Consensus on Development, wherein ownership, partnership, and in-depth political 
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Broadly speaking, different aspects of the legal principle of sovereignty are thus 
concretized in the substantive and procedural rules of international development 
organizations: autonomy and self-determination regarding decisions that concern the 
core of domestic affairs, non-intervention, and formal equality.487 With regards to the 
latter, however, it must be noted that it is not unusual for international (development) 
organizations to differentiate between member states on the basis of functional or 
other considerations, to their advantage or detriment.488 For instance, the statutes of 
the MDBs do not formulate a principle of equal treatment of all member states, like 
the UN Charter in Art. 2 (1).489 Considering that all MDBs use a system of weighted 
voting, the protection of sovereignty in the legal and policy frameworks of 
international development organizations does not embrace a general right to 
procedural equality in the processes of development organizations either.490 However, 
such deviations from formal equality in the strict sense are based on mutual consent, 
insofar as they go back to the statutes that each member state chose to ratify at one 
point.  
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that the legal and policy frameworks of 
international development organizations do not simply translate the legal principle of 
                                                                                                                                                              
dialogue are listed among common principles in para. 4. Joint statement by the Council and the 
representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’, 
(2006/C 46/01), 24.2.2006. 
486 For instance, the World Bank’s BP 2.11, para. 2 requires its staff to start “from the country’s vision 
of its development goals” when devising a strategy of how to assist a country. See also infra chapter 
IV.4, on the role of recipient governments in the World Bank’s legal regime for project lending, budget 
assistance, and Program-for-Results (PfoR) financing.  
487 On the different aspects of the principle of sovereignty, see, for instance, JULIANE KOKOTT, 
'Sovereign Equality', in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (Oxford University Press, April 2011), paras. 20-54; BROWNLIE, Principles of Public 
International Law, 287; or CRAWFORD, The Creation of States in International Law, 32-33. 
488 E.g. BENEDICT KINGSBURY, 'Sovereignty and Inequality', 9 European Journal of International Law, 
599 (1998), 605, pointing out that sovereign equality in the design of new international organizations is 
regularly compromised, since it is balanced with functional concerns, the need for efficacy, as well as 
the political interests of powerful member states. For a comprehensive analysis of the principle of 
sovereign equality in the decision-making of international financial and political institutions, see 
ATHENA DEBIIE EFRAIM, Sovereign (In)Equality in International Organizations (Martinus Nijhoff, 
2000). 
489 E.g. LEONIE GUDER, The Administration of Debt Relief by the International Financial Institutions. A 
Legal Reconstruction of the HIPC Initiative (Springer, 2009), 158-161, pointing out that unlike the 
IMF, the World Bank has never explicitly recognized a principle of equal treatment in its legal 
framework. In contrast, the EU is principally bound to treat its member countries equally, but the 
recipients of EU aid are not included in the EU’s membership. In fact, In fact, the EU’s legal 
framework for development cooperation even makes differentiation between different recipient 
countries a key principle. See Cotonou Agreement, Art. 2; DCI Regulation, Art. 3 (2); or the European 
Consensus on Development, paras. 56-66; and in detail, infra chapter V.2. a) and d). 
490 See EFRAIM, Sovereign (In)Equality in International Organizations, Part IV and pp. 365-366; and 
on the World Bank’s system of weighted voting, infra chapter IV.1 a). 
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sovereignty, but in some respects also reformulate it.491 This becomes most apparent 
when we look again at the principle of ownership. The principle suggests that 
recipient states should take the lead over and the responsibility for their own 
development, and hence reaffirms the freedom to determine their own political, 
economic, and social system.492 Yet, ownership is not just an entitlement, but also 
entails duties for recipient states, like formulating a national development strategy, 
and taking responsibility for its implementation – duties that presuppose a certain 
level of capacity on the parts of state institutions, which is not always given.  
Further, the ownership principle is often formulated to address actors outside of 
the national government, such as parliaments, local authorities, or civil-society 
representatives. For instance, Article 2 of the Cotonou Agreement between the EU 
and ACP countries states that their “partnership shall encourage ownership of the 
development strategies by the countries and populations concerned”.493 In this sense, 
ownership in development cooperation could be seen to draw not just on the principle 
of state sovereignty, but also on the international legal principle of self-determination 
of peoples. 494  In the World Bank’s legal framework, however, ensuring the 
participation of actors at the sub-state and non-state level is just a further requirement 
on national governments, which thus remain the primary addresses of ownership.495  
In sum, the objective of development, standards of effectiveness, and the 
protection of recipient sovereignty and ownership constitute basic ideas expressed in 
the legal and policy frameworks of all international organizations engaged in 
development cooperation. Others could perhaps be added – for instance, 
accountability, a somewhat elusive term that has become central to many policy 
discussions concerning development cooperation in the last decade, and which also 
informs a number of rules contained in the legal and policy frameworks of 
                                                        
491 Dann refers to the principle of ownership as a regime-specific reformulation of the principle of 
sovereignty, and thus acknowledges that it is not fully congruent with the more comprehensive legal 
principle of sovereignty. DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the 
World Bank, the EU and Germany, 241. 
492 For a definition of ownership, see supra note 291. 
493 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 2. 
494 The principle of self-determination is prominently expressed in the UN Charter, Art. 1 (2) and 55, as 
well as Art. 1 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) respectively. See also 
DANIEL THÜRER & THOMAS BURRI, 'Self-Determination', in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
495 BP 2.11 on Country Assistance Strategies, para. 8. 
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international organizations.496 More nuances will also emerge from the subsequent 
analysis of the legal and policy frameworks of selected organizations. For example, 
human rights are a central idea in the rules that govern the EU’s development 
cooperation, but are hardly reflected in those of the MDBs.497 Accordingly, human 
rights have perhaps become an important, normative yardstick for processes and 
outcomes of development cooperation, where it is increasingly discussed to what 
extent they are binding on international organizations. 498  The legal and policy 
frameworks of most international development organizations, however, do not reflect 
this paradigm shift.499 
The basic ideas that inform the law of international development organizations 
relate to each other, just as they may conflict with each other.500 Accordingly, typical 
goal conflicts that occur in the practice of development organizations can also involve 
conflicts between different rules of their legal and policy frameworks. For example, 
national ownership is regularly considered key to the effectiveness of multilateral 
development cooperation.501 Yet where international organizations impose detailed 
conditionality on recipient states, e.g. concerning the design of public financial 
management systems to ensure the effective use of ODA, they also restrict 
autonomous decision-making in recipient countries. Similarly, the objective of 
development comes into conflict with the sovereignty of recipients as soon as 
organizations and national governments hold diverging views on what development 
                                                        
496 For an overview, including of the legal sources and avenues of accountability in the law of the 
World Bank and EU, see DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the 
World Bank, the EU and Germany, chapter 9. 
497 Ibid., 272-273, and infra chapter V.2. Regarding the MDBs, some of their internal rules are at least 
informed by or promote human rights concerns – usually not explicitly, but there are some exceptions. 
For instance, the World Bank’s Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples explicitly refers to the 
human rights of indigenous people (at para.1), and the umbrella policy of AfDB’s Integrated 
Safeguards System states that “The Bank is committed to respecting and promoting Human Rights on 
the African continent” (at para. 11). 
498 On the relevance and applicability of human rights to the activities of international organizations in 
general, see SANDS & KLEIN, Bowett's Law of International Institutions, 458-59; regarding the World 
Bank, SIGRUN I. SKOGLY, The Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (Cavendish, 2001); and regarding the UN, MAC DARROW & LOUISE ARBOUR, 'The 
Pillar of Glass: Human Rights in the Development Organizations of the United Nations', 103 American 
Journal of International Law 446 (2009). 
499 Accordingly, Philipp Dann argues that human rights constitute the basis for a legal principle in the 
law of development cooperation, but with regards to international organizations, he draws mainly on 
international human rights law, rather than their own rules. See DANN, The Law of Development 
Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, pp. 267-272, on the 
international human rights obligations of the World Bank. 
500 On typical, normative tensions in the law of development cooperation, see also ibid., 295-298. 
501 The Paris Declaration therefore formulates national ownership as one of five principles of aid 
effectiveness (supra note 21). 
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entails. Indeed, development organizations increasingly curtail the realm of exclusive 
domestic decision-making as they become engaged with essentially political subject 
matters such as good governance and state-building, based on a broad interpretation 
of their mandate. The objective of development can in turn conflict with standards of 
effectiveness, considering situations where external assistance is vital for supporting a 
country’s development, but weak state institutions cannot guarantee the cost-effective, 
results-oriented, and accountable use of ODA. 
Such inherent tensions and potential conflicts in the legal and policy frameworks 
of international development organizations will reappear when we look at their 
engagement with fragile states. For instance, one central conflict that has already 
emerged from the previous chapters is that between safeguarding the sovereignty and 
ownership of recipient states with barely effective government, and making sure that 
standards of effectiveness in development cooperation are upheld. It is a conflict that 
could also be expressed in terms of long-term versus short-term goals. How 
international development organizations address this and other goal conflicts – or 
conflicts between different rules of their legal and policy frameworks – will be a 
question addressed in the subsequent chapters. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
This chapter sought to provide a basic understanding of the legal nature and 
common substance of rules that make up the legal and policy frameworks of 
international development organizations. As the body of rules that governs how 
international organizations usually transfer ODA to recipient countries, it also 
provides a basis for studying how, and to what effect, they adapt their legal and policy 
frameworks vis-à-vis fragile states. Within the broader field that constitutes the law of 
development cooperation, my focus was therefore more narrowly on the law of 
international development organizations. In order to clarify the legal nature and 
effects of its rules, I first approached the law of international development 
organizations through the prism of international institutional law. I drew particular 
attention to the significance of secondary rules, namely internal secondary rules, in 
instructing the conduct of development organizations. They can have a critical impact 
on the outcomes of decision-making for which they provide the set-up, and further 
sizeable, external effects on recipient states. Subsequently, I approached the same 
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body of rules through the prism of their common subject matter, development 
cooperation, and identified a number of substantive commonalities in the rules of 
different development organizations. The identified basic ideas – the objective of 
development, standards of effectiveness, and protections of sovereignty and 
ownership – serve to broadly describe the substance of analysis, the law of 
international development organizations. At the same time, they could be seen as a 
baseline for analysis, when it comes to asserting in what respect the rules of 
international development organizations differ for fragile states. 
With this basic understanding of the legal nature and common substance of the 
law of international development organizations, we are well equipped to study how 
they respond to the challenges of engaging with fragile states – from a legal 
perspective. But what is the value, one may ask, of studying from a legal perspective 
an issue that has been repeatedly shown to challenge or exceed the scope of law? 
Fragile state is no legal term or concept, and law generally does not account for state 
fragility as in varying degrees of government effectiveness. Moreover, its contribution 
to the “real debate about development and governance” (Crawford) is limited.502 
Certainly, not all of the challenges that international development organizations 
encounter when seeking to engage with fragile states concern their legal mandates. 
They face an intricate blend of technical, political, and legal questions when dealing 
with fragile states, and their response needs to be conceived in light of such different 
reasoning.503 What is more, in focusing on the rules of international development 
organization, we tend to forget that they are not necessarily implemented, or that 
implementation may be sketchy. In this sense, the focus on rules could be seen to 
obstruct the view at the activities of development organizations in practice, and 
ultimately divert attention away from questions that ought to be at the center of 
inquiry instead. 
It is important to acknowledge these constraints, and yet a legal analysis that 
structures and describes, interprets and evaluates the rules that international 
development organization make or modify to engage with fragile states remains 
immensely significant. First, legal scholars can explain the substance of rules, which 
in itself is a relevant task considering that many of the rules at issue here have so far 
                                                        
502 Supra note 232. 
503 See supra chapter II.2 b) for an overview of the different challenges that development organizations 
face when aiding fragile states. 
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received little to no attention. For instance, the internal rules of international 
development organizations like the World Bank are often not on the radar even of 
those that may be directly affected by them. In this regard, analyzing the rules that 
govern under what conditions and how ODA is provided specifically to fragile states 
contributes to greater transparency.  
Second, how organizations adapt their legal and policy frameworks – e.g. whether 
they prefer to adopt new rules or modify existing rules, whether they introduce 
exceptions specifically for fragile states or make changes that concern all potential 
recipient states, whether they prefer detailed rules or instead favor greater room for 
discretion – are all important questions to answer from a legal perspective. But the 
answers equally shed light on key parameters of how international development 
organizations seek to address fragile states. In essence: Is it a through a systematic 
approach that acknowledges their special circumstances and needs – or rather a half- 
hearted attempt to circumvent legal constraints to engage in countries of special 
interest?  
Last but not least, law naturally serves an evaluative function, which is why we 
will consider whether the rules that international organizations make or modify to 
govern engagement with fragile states are in conformity with their primary law. But 
oftentimes, my focus will be on the processes through which they adapt their legal 
and policy framework, as much as on specific outcomes.504 For legal scholars are also 
well placed to scrutinize competences, and to dissect more or less formalized 
processes of rule- and decision-making, looking at who has the right to participate and 
who has not. They are thus well placed to shed light on distributions of power, and 
these are important to consider in a policy field that may appear technical at first, but 
essentially concerns a political process. Ultimately, in this political process, it also 
matters what questions are subjected to regulation, and which are deliberately left 
unregulated.  
 
 
                                                        
504 In fact, Kevin Davis finds that the most valuable role for lawyers in analyzing the “law of financing 
development” and how it evolves is precisely in “processes by which the law of financing development 
adapts and innovates, rather than on specific outcomes of that process. DAVIS, '‘Financing 
Development’ as a Field of Practice, Study and Innovation',183. 
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IV. The World Bank’s Engagement with Fragile States – A 
Legal Perspective 
 
The World Bank is the largest and the most influential international development 
organization, both in terms of financial resources and knowledge. In fiscal year 2014, 
the organization committed a total of USD 40.8 billion in financial assistance globally 
to low- and middle-income countries.505 Seventy years after its establishment, in a 
global political landscape that has profoundly changed, the World Bank’s role as an 
important agenda-setter in the international development community remains largely 
undisputed. 506  This is also due to the organization’s track record of adapting to 
changing demands and needs – turning from a financier of infrastructural 
development to a promoter of good governance, and more recently, from a 
“Knowledge Bank” to a “Solutions Bank”.507 Moreover, an organization still largely 
absent from countries affected by conflict three decades ago, the World Bank has 
become the second most important contributor of multilateral ODA to fragile states – 
and is second to none when it comes to promoting and operationalizing the notion of 
fragile states.  
In light of its financial leverage, intellectual influence, and role as a policy 
pioneer, there is ample reason to focus on the World Bank for a detailed analysis of 
how, and to what effect international development organizations adapt their legal and 
policy frameworks to engage with fragile states. In addition, the World Bank makes 
for an interesting and rewarding case study because it has a comparatively well-
structured and transparent legal and policy framework. Lawyers constitute a small 
minority in an organization largely run by economists, but they play an important role 
in interpreting the Bank’s mandate in light of changing circumstances. Emerging 
practices are often captured and consolidated in internal rules, which are publically 
                                                        
505 THE WORLD BANK, 'Annual Report 2014' (2014), 7. 
506 See CHRISTOPHER L. GILBERT, et al., 'Positioning the World Bank', in Christopher L. Gilbert & 
David Vines (eds), The World Bank. Structure and Policies (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
characterizing the Bank as a global player in development; also NICOLAS STERN & FRANCISCO 
FERREIRA, 'The World Bank as “Intellectual Actor”', in Devesh Kapur, et al. (eds), The World Bank. Its 
First Half Century. Volume 2: Perspectives (Brookings Institution, 1997); or DANNY LEIPZIGER, 'The 
Role and Influence of International Financial Institutions', in Bruce Currie-Alder, et al. (eds), 
International Development. Ideas, Experience, and Prospects (Oxford University Press, 2014), at 836-
839.   
507 For a critical discussion of whether the strategic shift to a “Knowledge Bank” has brought 
substantial change, see JOHN TOYE & RICHARD TOYE, UN Research Institute for Social Development, 
Programme Paper Series 11, 'The World Bank as a Knowledge Agency' (November 2005), pp. 6-12. 
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available and amenable to legal analysis. Certainly, a change in the rules does not 
always result in behavioral changes: staff incentives and institutional culture matter, 
and particularly the latter is slow to change in a huge bureaucracy like the World 
Bank. There may sometimes be a gap between de jure and de facto practice, which is 
important to acknowledge.508 The focus of this thesis, however, is on the former: how 
international organizations make or modify rules to consolidate or formalize a 
differentiated approach to fragile states. For this, the World Bank provides important 
evidence.  
This chapter begins with an outline of the World Bank’s legal framework and 
mandate, highlighting how internal rule-making and legal opinions have paved the 
way for the organization’s growing involvement in fragile states (IV.1). Next, I 
explore how the Bank defines and classifies fragile states, and what consequences 
attach to the classification under the legal and policy framework (IV.2). On this basis, 
the subsequent two sections analyze and assess how the Bank has adapted its legal 
and policy framework to engage in countries that appear to lack effective government 
counterparts – in a formal, juridical sense (IV.3), or in terms of empirical capacity 
(IV.4). In conclusion, I examine whether being seen as fragile constitutes an 
advantage, or a disadvantage for a member state in its dealings with the World Bank 
(IV.5). 
 
1. The World Bank and its “Law”   
 
What is commonly referred to as the “World Bank” in fact consists of two 
international organizations, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), and the International Development Association (IDA).509 Both 
organizations have separate legal personalities and were founded by two different 
international legal treaties that set out their respective mandates, the IBRD Articles of 
Agreement of 1944, and the IDA Articles of Agreement of 1960. The two 
organizations have an analogous organizational structure, however, which largely 
                                                        
508 See, for instance, BRADLOW & NAUDÉ FOURIE, 'The Operational Policies of the World Bank and the 
International Finance Corporation. Creating Law-Making and Law-Governed Institutions?', 27. 
509 The “World Bank Group” in turn consists of five institutions: the IBRD; the IDA, as well as the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The World Bank Group as 
such has no legal personality. MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, 'World Bank Group', in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, March 2010), para. 5. 
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resembles the tripartite model of other organizations. The organ that is responsible for 
general policy-making and vested with the highest decision-making authority is the 
Board of Governors, where all member states are typically represented by their 
finance or development ministers. 510  The Board of Governors has delegated far-
reaching powers to the Board of Directors (or Executive Board), which consists of 25 
member state representatives that together preside over the organizations’ day-to-day 
business.511 Notably, the same representatives constitute the Board of Governors and 
the Executive Board of both the IBRD and the IDA.512 The World Bank’s President 
heads the staff of civil servants, and is responsible for the “ordinary business” of both 
organizations.513 
The following section introduces the World Bank and its “law”.514 I begin by 
looking a bit closer at the rules that make up its legal framework, and at the means 
available for its adaptation (a). Next, I outline the substance of the World Bank’s 
mandate in light of dynamic interpretations, which have prepared the grounds for the 
organization’s growing engagement in fragile states (b).   
 
a) Legal Framework and Means of Adaptation 
 
The World Bank legal framework is primarily determined by its statutes, the 
Articles of Agreement of the IBRD and the IDA. Like the statutes of most 
international organizations, they are formulated in relatively broad terms, and need to 
be concretized through the adoption of secondary rules that govern operations on a 
                                                        
510 IBRD Articles Art. V, Sect. 2 lit. (a) and (b) and IDA Articles Art. VI, Sect. 2 lit. (a) and (c).  
511 IBRD Articles Art. V, Sect. 5 (a) and IDA Articles Art. VI, Sect. 4 (a). The Executive Directors 
work on-site at the World Bank’s headquarters, where they meet twice per week to determine its 
general policies, decide on all loans or grants to be awarded, and exercise oversight. 
512 IBRD Articles Art. V, Sect. 5 and IDA Articles Art VI, Sect. 5. 
513 IBRD Articles Art. V Sect. 5; IDA Articles Art. VI Sect. 5. The Articles of Agreement regulate that 
the President is elected by the Executive Directors and executes his tasks under their “direction”, just 
as his time in office depends on their verdict. At the same time, he chairs their meetings and thus 
participates in all their discussion, even if he is not allowed to vote. On the division of competencies 
between the Board of Directors and the President, see SHIHATA, The World Bank Legal Papers, 639 ff. 
514 Whereas the legal nature of the Bank’s founding treaties as international legal treaties is undoubted, 
it is subject to controversy whether its internal rules qualify as “law”. As noted in chapter III.1, I will 
not hinge on the question whether or not we want to call these rules “law”, but rather demonstrate why 
international lawyers should study them. See also BRADLOW & NAUDÉ FOURIE, 'The Operational 
Policies of the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation. Creating Law-Making and Law-
Governed Institutions?', 7-9, with a convincing argument for assessing the World Bank’s internal rules 
in legal terms – even if the Bank itself may not do so. 
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daily basis. 515  The Articles explicitly authorize the Board of Governors and the 
Executive Board “to adopt such rules and regulations as may be necessary or 
appropriate to conduct the business of the Bank”.516 Accordingly, the World Bank has 
adopted By-Laws to complement the Articles of Agreement, and General Conditions 
that are incorporated by reference in all financing agreements concluded with a 
country. Both the Board of Governors and the Executive Board also adopt 
Resolutions, which are of a more executive character, but equally binding.517  
It is a different instrument that forms part of the legal framework – the “law” – of 
the World Bank, however, that is of particular interest and importance in guiding the 
conduct of its activities: Operational Policies (OPs) and Bank Procedures (BPs). OPs 
are internal rules of an abstract, general character, which typically “establish the 
parameters for the conduct of operations”, while BPs lay out the according procedural 
requirements. 518  What makes the World Bank’s OPs and BPs so interesting and 
important, and explains why they have received much more attention in legal 
scholarship than the internal rules of other organizations?519  
                                                        
515 On the primary and secondary law of international (development) organizations, see also supra 
chapter III.1.  
516 IBRD Articles Art. V, Sect. 2 lit. (f) and IDA Articles Art. VI, Sect. 2, lit. (h). The Executive 
Directors may adopt rules only “to the extent authorized”, i.e. in the context of exercising their 
functions delegated by the Board of Governors. Besides, some other provisions contain explicit 
authorizations for an organ, usually the Board of Governors, to adopt regulations for a specific purpose 
(e.g. IBRD Articles, Art. 5, Sect. 2 lit. (e) and Sect. 4 lit. (h)).  
517 On the bindingness of decisions of the Board of Governors and the Executive Board, GUDER, The 
Administration of Debt Relief by the International Financial Institutions. A Legal Reconstruction of the 
HIPC Initiative, 137-140; and on the World Bank’s secondary law more generally, MATTHIAS MOSLER, 
Finanzierung durch die Weltbank. Grundlegung und anwendbares Recht der vertraglichen Instrumente 
(Duncker & Humblot, 1987), chapter 2. 
518 See the definition of OPs in the World Bank’s Operational Manual, which contains all OPs and BPs. 
BPs accordingly “explain how Bank staff carries out the policies set out in the OPs”, in that “[t]hey 
spell out the procedures and documentation required to ensure Bank-wide consistency and quality.” 
The Operational Manual is available online: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,co
ntentMDK:20249090~menuPK:64142516~pagePK:64141683~piPK:64141620~theSitePK:502184,00.
html (accessed November 2014).  
519 On the Bank’s OPs in general, see ALVAREZ, International Organizations as Law-Makers, pp. 235-
241; or BRADLOW & NAUDÉ FOURIE, 'The Operational Policies of the World Bank and the International 
Finance Corporation. Creating Law-Making and Law-Governed Institutions?', at 5, defining OPs as 
“internal documents […] that contain normative prescriptions (some ‘binding’ on IFI staff, others not) 
concerning the manner in which these development institutions’ operations ought to be performed.” On 
the emergence of OPs, see BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, 'Policy Guidance and Compliance: The World 
Bank's Operational Standards'; on their normative quality, DANN, The Law of Development 
Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, 189-192; and on their 
particular effects, BENEDICT KINGSBURY, 'Operational Policies of International Institutions as Part of 
the Law-Making Process. The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples', in Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan 
Talmon (eds), The Reality of International Law. Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (Oxford University 
Press, 1999).  
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To begin with, they are comparatively elaborate and formalized internal rules. 
Unlike many other international organizations, the World Bank clearly differentiates 
between internal rules that are binding for staff, and those that are only of a 
recommendatory nature, for instance, Good Practice Notes. Approved by the 
Executive Board, OPs and BPs are considered binding and must be published.520 They 
may show varying levels of concreteness, and are not always “applied 
legalistically”.521 However, staff’s compliance with OPs and BPs in the project cycle 
can be subject to a quasi-judicial review mechanism, the Inspection Panel. 522 
Deviations from OPs/BPs in the form of waivers need to be requested and formally 
approved by the Executive Board.523  
Although OPs/BPs have a comparatively high level of formality and act as 
binding rules within the internal sphere of the Bank, the Articles do not contain 
procedural requirements for their formulation and adoption. 524  OPs and BPs are 
developed in a largely internal process that has gradually merged into a coherent 
organizational practice. 525  They are usually prepared by the Bank’s Operational 
Policies and Country Services (OPCS) department, and examined by Management in 
                                                        
520 World Bank, Access to Information Policy (July 1, 2013), para. 6. This may include draft versions 
of OPs (para. 23, lit. (b) (i)). 
521 KINGSBURY, 'Operational Policies of International Institutions as Part of the Law-Making Process. 
The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples', 329. 
522 The Inspection Panel has the power to control whether staff members have complied with the OPs 
and BPs during the planning and implementation stages of Bank-financed operations, and can receive 
complaints directly from a party affected by the Bank’s operational activities in a country, where those 
have caused harm. On the powers of the Panel, see IBRD Resolution 93-10 of September 22, 1993, 
para. 12. Notably, the Panel only reviews policies that govern the project cycle in a more narrow sense. 
On other institutional guarantees for the implementation and monitoring of the Bank’s policies, see 
BRADLOW & NAUDÉ FOURIE, 'The Operational Policies of the World Bank and the International 
Finance Corporation. Creating Law-Making and Law-Governed Institutions?', 37-40. 
523 In April 2014, the World Bank has adopted a new Bank Policy on Operational Policy Waivers, to 
codify a previously informal practice. In essence, policy waivers are approved by the Board if they are 
proposed prior to the approval of a loan to which the policy deviation relates. The Board approves the 
waiver at the same time as the loan itself. If a waiver is required during project implementation, i.e. 
after Board approval, it is approved by the Managing Director with the advice of the General Counsel 
and the Vice President of OPCS.  
524 See ALVAREZ, International Organizations as Law-Makers, 235, who finds that OPs and BPs “are 
not the product of any explicit provision in the Bank’s charter”. However, it is not necessarily unusual 
for international organizations to issue instruments that were not foreseen in their statutes. See supra 
note 433. 
525 On the rule-making process, see DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative 
Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, 188-189; and RIGO SUREDA, 'Informality and 
Effectiveness in the Operation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development', 580- 
581; on the roles of the respective roles of the Executive Board and Management, SHIHATA, The World 
Bank Legal Papers, chapter 27. Notably, the World Bank has embarked on a reform and consolidation 
of its system of internal rules in a new “Policy & Procedure Framework” (P&PF), which could also 
entail the codification of the rule-making process. See The World Bank, The Bank’s Operational Policy 
Manual: Issues and Prospects for Reform, Approach Paper (April 1, 2011). 
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consultation with the Board of Executive Directors. Typically, the Executive Board 
will approve the basic principles of a Policy, while Management remains responsible 
for elaborating the details. Besides, the World Bank has increasingly invited affected 
or interested parties to comment on drafts of its Policies.526  
Member states are thus principally involved in the rule-making process through 
the Executive Board, but the influence of recipient states is limited given the 
composition and weighted voting procedures of the Executive Board. At the World 
Bank, how much a country contributes financially formally translates into its 
decision-making influence. 527  Only the World Bank’s five largest financial 
contributors – the US, Japan, Germany, France, and the UK – have the right to 
appoint their own Director in the Executive Board.528  The remaining 183 member 
countries elect the 20 Directors representing them every two years, according to 
regional alliance. Further, decisions are taken on the basis of a weighted system of 
voting. Member states that contribute more to the capital base of the organizations are 
thus allocated a higher percentage of votes.529 The fact that the World Bank’s voting 
and representation rules do not strictly reflect the principle of sovereign equality is 
                                                        
526 The revision of the Bank’s policy on Indigenous People is a prominent example, which involved a 
relatively extensive process of external consultation. See BRADLOW & NAUDÉ FOURIE, 'The 
Operational Policies of the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation. Creating Law-
Making and Law-Governed Institutions?', 24-27; and in detail DAVID HUNTER, 'International Law and 
Public Participation in Policy-making at the International Financial Institutions', in Daniel Bradlow & 
David Hunter (eds), International Financial Institutions and International Law (Kluwer, 2010). 
527 This is particularly true for the IDA, since it almost exclusively relies on financial contributions 
from its members. In contrast, the IBRD can also raise its own money on the capital market and is thus 
less dependent on its members. DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis 
of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, 184. 
528 Besides, based on an informal agreement between the USA and European member states, the 
President of the World Bank has always been an American citizen nominated by the USA, the 
organization’s most powerful shareholder. On the role of the United States as the largest shareholder of 
the World Bank, see BARTRAM S. BROWN, The United States and the Politicization of the World Bank. 
Issues of International Law and Policy (Kegan Paul International, 1992); or JOHN W. HEAD, 'For 
Richer or For Poorer: Assessing the Criticisms Direct at the Multilateral Development Banks', 52 
Kansas Law Review, 241 (2004), pp. 267-268, 299. 
529 IBRD Articles, Art. V, Sect. 3 and IDA Articles, Art. VI Sect. 3. The unequal influence of the 
Bank’s largest shareholders on the organization’s decision-making is widely canvassed in the scholarly 
debate, and has drawn much criticism given the Bank’s leverage over many developing countries. E.g. 
EFRAIM, Sovereign (In)Equality in International Organizations, 212-214; or NGAIRE WOODS, 'The 
Challenges of Multilateralism and Governance', in Christopher L. Gilbert & David Vines (eds), The 
World Bank. Structure and Policies (Cambridge University Press, 2000). In response to its critics, the 
Bank has increased the voting power of all developing countries and provided for one more Executive 
Director to represent countries from Sub-Saharan Africa. See the Report of the High-Level 
Commission on Modernization of World Bank Group Governance, Repowering the World Bank for the 
21st Century (2009); and with a critical assessment: DANIEL BRADLOW, 'The Reform of Governance of 
the IFIs: A Critical Assessment', in Hassane Cissé, et al. (eds), The World Bank Legal Review. Volume 
3. International Financial Institutions and Global Legal Governance (The World Bank, 2012). 
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thus important to bear in mind when considering the role of the Executive Board in 
processes of rule-making and adaptation.530 
Despite the relative informality of the rule-making process, OPs/BPs have 
assumed an enormous significance in steering the Bank’s operations, and also 
constitute a prime example for the external effects of internal rules.531 We have seen 
that environmental and social safeguard policies, for instance, are regularly 
incorporated in the financing agreements that the Bank concludes with recipient 
countries, and thus create direct obligations under international law.532 Even if they do 
not become directly binding on a country, with many OPs and BPs forming part of the 
legal and policy framework that governs how projects are approved, any government 
seeking financing from the World Bank must in practice respect them – all the more if 
they dependent on external assistance. 533  Besides, other international financial 
institutions often copy the Bank’s Ops/BPs, which arguably become “de facto global 
standards among other development banks”.534 
Finally, it is important to note that the World Bank uses OPs/BPs to consolidate 
organizational practices and mandate interpretations, and thus as a means to adapt its 
legal framework. The principal avenues for adapting the Articles of Agreement are 
formal amendment or interpretation. The Bank has rarely modified its statute by 
means of amendment, which would require a qualified majority in the Board of 
Governors.535 Instead, it relies on interpretation, a task that is incumbent upon the 
Executive Directors.536 As an instrument of adaptation, interpretation is less inclusive 
                                                        
530 Notably, the principle of sovereign equality is regularly compromised in the decision-making 
structure of international (development) organizations. See supra chapter III.2.  
531 In general, see supra chapter III.1; and on the effects of OPs and BPs beyond regulating staff 
behavior, see, for instance, KINGSBURY, 'Operational Policies of International Institutions as Part of the 
Law-Making Process. The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples', pp. 338-342; BOISSON DE 
CHAZOURNES, 'Policy Guidance and Compliance: The World Bank's Operational Standards', pp. 289-
90; or ALVAREZ, International Organizations as Law-Makers, pp. 237-238 
532 Supra note 430. 
533 On the constraining potential of non-binding rules, see already supra chapter III.1. 
534 GALIT A. SARFATY, 'The World Bank and the Internationalization of Indigenous Rights Norms', 114 
Yale Law Journal, 1791 (2004-2005), 1792; also LAURENCE BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, 'Partnerships, 
Emulation, and Coordination: Toward the Emergence of a Droit Commun in the Field of Development 
Finance', in Hassane Cissé, et al. (eds), The World Bank Legal Review. Volume 3. International 
Financial Institutions and Global Legal Governance (The World Bank, 2012). 
535 IBRD Articles Art. VIII lit. (a) and IDA Articles Art. IX lit. (a). Amendment procedures are 
typically much more cumbersome than interpretations, not least since the plenary organs of 
international organizations are often blocked by political struggles and considered as less productive or 
effective. VON BERNSTORFF, 'Procedures of Decision-Making and the Role of Law in International 
Organizations', 786. 
536 IBRD Articles Art. IX lit. (a); IDA Articles Art. X lit. (a). On interpretation and amendment of the 
Articles of Agreement, see also SHIHATA, The World Bank in a Changing World, pp. 3-19; and on the 
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than amendment, since a simple majority of member countries that are (unequally) 
represented in the Board can basically change the Articles. The World Bank’s practice 
of interpretation makes it an instrument that is also less transparent.537 Why? 
The Executive Directors have rarely ever issued a formal interpretation of a 
provision in the statute, but the Articles are instead adapted through informal or 
“implied interpretation”.538 The Directors will discuss and approve a loan, an OP/BP 
suggested by Management, or a legal opinion prepared by the Bank’s General 
Counsel – and given that they have the power of interpretation – their approval is 
considered to imply conformity with the Articles of Agreement. Through the 
formulation of OPs/BPs, the Bank’s Management has thus actively contributed to the 
dynamic interpretation of the organization’s mandate – just as the Bank’s General 
Counsel has done through the preparation of legal opinions. Internal rule-making and 
legal opinions have also paved the way for the World Bank’s evolving engagement in 
fragile states. 
 
b) The Mandate in Light of Dynamic Interpretations 
 
Besides the analogous organizational structure of the IBRD and the IDA, the 
Articles of Agreement determine their different purposes and functions. The IBRD 
was founded to assist in the “reconstruction and development” of war-torn European 
economies after the Second World War.539 Its major task consists in assisting middle-
income and credit-worthy poorer countries in achieving sustainable growth and 
development through credit investments at discounted market rates and advisory 
services. In the two decades after its establishment, newly independent nations joined 
the ranks of sovereign states that had massively underdeveloped economies, and were 
                                                                                                                                                              
World Bank’s preference of interpretation as a means of legal adaptation, ANDRES RIGO SUREDA, 'The 
World Bank and Institutional Innovation', in Edith Brown Weiss & Ibrahim F. I. Shihata (eds), The 
World Bank, International Financial Institutions, and the Development of International Law. 
(American Society of International Law, 1999). 
537 See HASSANE CISSÉ, 'Should the Political Prohibition in Charters of International Financial 
Institutions be Revisited? The Case of the World Bank', in Hassane Cissé, et al. (eds), The World Bank 
Legal Review. Volume 3. International Financial Institutions and Global Legal Governance (The 
World Bank, 2012), 86. 
538 On this practice of interpretation, see RIGO SUREDA, 'Informality and Effectiveness in the Operation 
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development', 593-595, explaining how the Bank has 
preferred “informal interpretations” of its mandate, “made possible by the fact that the organ approving 
new policies or operations has the power to interpret formally the Articles of Agreement.”; ARON 
BROCHES, Selected Essays. World Bank, ICSID, and Other Subjects of Public and Private 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), chapter 2. 
539 IBRD Articles, Art. I (i). 
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far from being creditworthy for IBRD borrowing. Consequently, the IDA was 
established in 1960 to complement the IBRD’s activities in particular in the realm of 
development – an acknowledgment of the immensely different needs and capacities 
among the Bank’s recipient countries.  
The IDA is mandated to assist the poorest countries “to promote economic 
development, increase productivity and thus raise standards of living“.540 It provides 
countries where private or IBRD financing is not available with loans that come with 
zero or very low interest charges, or with grants that do not have to be reimbursed.541 
The IDA is thus more explicitly mandated to promote development, and only the 
highly concessional lending of the IDA actually qualifies as ODA.542 Moreover, the 
IDA is the World Bank’s principal arm and source of financing for fragile and 
conflict-affected countries.543 
What “development” or “standards of living” means was left deliberately open in 
the Articles of Agreement. As the Bank’s former General Counsel Roberto Dañino 
explained, the Articles have to be “examined against the back-drop of the current 
international legal regime and the evolving understanding of development”, an 
understanding that the organization is continuously challenged to refresh.544 While 
focused on economic growth in the beginning, today, the World Bank sees 
development as a comprehensive concept and all-encompassing goal, including a 
wide range of aspects related to socio-economic well-being and environmental 
sustainability.545 This understanding is captured in OP 1.00 on Poverty Reduction, 
which states the Bank’s mission is poverty reduction, and defines poverty as a “lack 
                                                        
540 IDA Articles, Art. I. 
541 On the permissible use of IDA resources, see also IDA Articles, Art. V Sect. 1 (a), (b), (c). 
Eligibility and terms of repayment for IDA’s lending are laid out in Annex D of OP 3.10, last updated 
in September 2013.  
542 On the OECD’s definition of ODA, see supra note 51. 
543 Of the 78 countries and territories eligible for IDA assistance in 2015, 26 are considered fragile. In 
addition, the World Bank’s Harmonized List of Fragile Situations (supra note 1) includes two blend 
and three middle-income (i.e. IBRD-only) countries.  
544 R. Dañino, Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World Bank (Jan. 27, 2006), para. 
3. The Bank’s legal department accordingly understands itself as “problem-solver and innovator”, 
committed to “lawyering that is proactive, creative, flexible and responsive.” LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY, 
The World Bank, 'Annual Report FY 2011: The World Bank and the Rule of Law' (2011), p. v, 10.  
545 For an overview of the Bank’s evolving development approaches and activities, see IBRAHIM F. I. 
SHIHATA, The World Bank in a Changing World, 2 (Nijhoff, 1995), pp. 33-70; or DEVESH KAPUR & 
DAVID VINES, 'The World Bank and Poverty Reduction: Past, Present and Future', in Christopher L. 
Gilbert & David Vines (eds), The World Bank. Structure and Policies (Cambridge University Press, 
2000). 
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of opportunities (including capabilities), lack of voice and representation, and 
vulnerability to shocks.”546  
The evolving understanding of development has also encompassed a growing 
acknowledgement of the inextricable link between peace, security, and development. 
We have seen that from the 1990s, the international community became increasingly 
concerned with civil wars and complex emergencies that deeply affected societal 
structures. 547  Though largely absent from the high-risk environments of conflict-
affected states in the decades following its establishment, the World Bank now sought 
a greater role in the international community’s efforts at post-conflict reconstruction, 
and could therefore rely on the purposes of “reconstruction and development” in the 
IBRD Articles.548  
An interpretation of the Articles of Agreement was nonetheless necessary to 
clarify the boundaries of the Bank’s development mandate in the context of conflict 
and emergencies.549 In 2001, the Executive Directors approved Operational Policy 
2.30 on Development Cooperation and Conflict, which confirms that violent conflict 
adversely affects the Bank’s development mandate, and establishes guiding principles 
for engagement in conflict-affected areas that are partly derived from the Articles.550 
In addition, OP 8.00 on Rapid Response to Crisis and Emergencies of 2007 provides 
the basis for the Bank’s involvement in activities that may transgress the boundaries 
between development, humanitarian assistance, and security activities.551  A Legal 
Opinion on “Peace-Building, Security, and Relief Issues” prepared by the General 
                                                        
546 Operational Policy 1.00 on Poverty Reduction (updated in July 2014), para.1. The Policy goes back 
to an Operational Directive first adopted in 1991, which was since revised several times to reflect the 
Bank’s evolving understanding of poverty. 
547 Supra chapter I.2 a). 
548 Supra note 539.  
549 It became necessary not least when the World Bank increased its narrow focus on rebuilding 
infrastructure and began supporting demobilization and disarmament, community-based rehabilitation 
programs, and broader issues of governance in post-conflict countries. THE WORLD BANK, 'The Role of 
the World Bank in Conflict and Development. An Evolving Agenda' (2004), 5. 
550 See OP 2.30, paras. 1 and 3; and in detail infra section 3 a) of this chapter. The link between peace 
and development was first elaborated in the “Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction”, endorsed by the Executive Directors in May 2007. The Framework provided the first 
conceptual and operational guideline for staff working in post-conflict situations, at a time when USD 
400 million in grants had already been given to post-conflict countries and to support humanitarian 
operations of United Nations agencies. See THE WORLD BANK, 'Post-Conflict Reconstruction. The Role 
of the World Bank' (1998), v. 
551 OP 8.00, approved by the Executive Directors on March 1, 2007, lists the activities that the Bank 
can pursue with an emergency operation. This includes support to partners in carrying out activities 
that fall outside of its own mandate, in order to bridge the gap between short-term relief and 
reconstruction activities (para. 5).   
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Counsel in 2007 confirms the broad lines established in both Policies.552 Accordingly, 
the Bank can principally engage in activities related to peace-building, security, and 
relief issues, an important precondition for operating in the fluid environments of 
fragile states. 553  The organization must, however, remain focused on its core 
economic competences (i.e. comparative advantages), and respect other provisions of 
the Articles.554 Rather than establishing a bright line-test, the Legal Opinion thus 
demands careful consideration of legal, operational, and reputational risks in each 
case.555 
The two principal restrictions of the Articles that hence remain relevant in 
delineating the scope of the Bank’s mandate are economic and efficiency 
requirements, and the political prohibition clause. Economy and efficiency 
requirements make up the so-called “fiduciary duty” of the World Bank. As noted 
before, they assume a prominent role in the legal framework of a “Bank” that strives 
to uphold its good credit ratings.556 The fiduciary duty provides the basis for a range 
of Bank policies in areas like procurement, financial management, disbursement, and 
anti-corruption. Notably, while the Bank has begun to reform these policies to move 
“from strict-rules to principles-based approach”, and towards greater reliance on 
country systems (i.e. recipient laws and institutions), the underlying provisions in the 
Articles of Agreement have never been subject to a holistic interpretation.557 
Further, we have seen that the Articles of Agreement, like the statutes of all 
MDBs, establish that the organization “shall not interfere in the political affairs of any 
member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of 
the member or members concerned.”558 The political prohibition clause applies to the 
                                                        
552 Legal Opinion on Peace-Building, Security, and Relief Issues under the Bank’s Policy Framework 
for Rapid Response to Crises and Emergency, prepared on request of the Committee on Development 
Effectiveness on March 22, 2007, and annexed to the Report “Toward a New Framework for Rapid 
Bank Response to Crises and Emergencies” (revised version R2007-001012, dated March 2007).  
553 For instance, the Legal Opinion highlights the linkages between the United Nation’s concept of 
peace-building and the Bank’s own development mandate. See para. 12, referring to Boutros Boutros-
Ghali’s Agenda for Peace (supra note 117). 
554 Legal Opinion on Peace-Building, Security, and Relief Issues, paras. 17-18. 
555 Legal Opinion on Peace-Building, Security, and Relief Issues, para. 22.  
556 IBRD Articles Art. III Sect. 5, lit. (b); IDA Articles Art. V, Sect. 1, lit (g). Moreover, IBRD Articles 
Art. I (i) state that the IBRD must direct its resources towards “productive purposes”. The provision 
figures prominently in the travaux preparatoires of the Articles, and has been reiterated and 
concretized in World Bank policies ever since. On standards of effectiveness in the law of international 
development organizations in general, see supra chapter III.2. 
557 As General Counsel Anne-Marie Leroy points out: LEROY, 'The Bank's Engagement in the Criminal 
Justice Sector and the Role of Lawyers in the "Solutions Bank": An Essay', 97. 
558 It goes on: “Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these 
considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I.” IBRD 
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Executive Directors as well as the Bank’s Management and staff. It contains two 
individual, but related aspects: the duty to refrain from interfering in the political 
affairs and be influenced by the political character of member states, and the 
requirement to ensure that only economic considerations are relevant to the 
organization’s decisions.559  
Certainly, a clear separation between political and economic spheres is not always 
possible. Starting with the 1990 Legal Memorandum of Ibrahim Shihata that clarified 
the permissible scope of engagement with good governance, the World Bank has 
increasingly recognized that political circumstances within a member country – 
perhaps rather than its “political character” per se – can have economic effects.560 To 
the extent they have a “direct and obvious” economic effect on the outcomes of Bank-
funded operations, Shihata argues, the organization should be able to assess 
governmental institutions and their performance in deciding about loans. 561  In 
principle, the Bank can thus consider the structure, functioning, and effectiveness of 
national institutions, including in areas that belong to the core of political affairs.562  
The interpretation of governance as falling within the scope of the Bank’s legal 
mandate thus constitutes another important stepping stone for the organization’s 
involvement with state-building in fragile states. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Articles, Art. IV Sect. 10 and with almost identical wording, IDA Articles, Art. V Sect. 6. For an 
analysis and discussion of the meaning and significance of the political prohibition clause, see 
KILLINGER, The World Bank's Non-Political Mandate; and for a voice from within the Bank, CISSÉ, 
'Should the Political Prohibition in Charters of International Financial Institutions be Revisited? The 
Case of the World Bank', pp. 59-92. 
559 Moreover, the World Bank understands the clause to imply that it can only engage in a country upon 
the request of the government in power (supra note 275), and that it must be careful not to engage with 
actors outside of the government without its approval. This becomes clearer in THE WORLD BANK, 
'Guidance Note on Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement', which provides guidance to staff on how to 
engage with a broad range of non-governmental actors, including parliaments, the media, civil society, 
the private sector, or community members. 
560 Issues of ‘Governance’ in Borrowing Members: The Extent of their Relevance under the Bank’s 
Articles of Agreement, Legal Memorandum of the General Counsel, dated December 21, 1990 
(SecM91-131), at 79-85 (on mandate conformity), and 81-96 (on the delineation between permissible 
and impermissible activities). The Memorandum is reproduced in SHIHATA, The World Bank Legal 
Papers, chapter 10. The Memorandum informs the Bank’s subsequent legal reasoning on governance 
issues, for instance, Shihata’s Legal Opinion on the Prohibition of Political Activities in the Bank’s 
Work, dated July 11, 1995 (SecM95-707). Moreover, it informs a number of key policy documents, 
like the Guidance Note on Multi-Stakeholder Engagement (June 2009); or the updated Governance and 
Anticorruption (GAC) strategy, endorsed by the Executive Board on March 27, 2012. 
561 See, for instance, the Legal Opinion of the General Counsel, dated 11 July 1995 (SecM95-707, July 
12, 1995), reprinted in ibid., 229. Shihata further argues that Bank-supported reform policies always 
depend on the existence of a “system which translates them into workable rules and makes sure they 
are complied with”, a system constituting “a basic requirement for a stable business environment; 
indeed for a modern state.” (p. 273).  
562 For an in-depth analysis of the mandate conformity of good governance-related activities the Bank 
undertakes, see KILLINGER, The World Bank's Non-Political Mandate. 
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Finally, since the World Bank was called upon “to position fragility, conflict, and 
violence at the core of its development mandate“ following the publication of the 
WDR 2011, the legal department has begun to develop a more elaborate approach to 
assessing risks and differentiating between permissible and impermissible activities 
on the basis of the Articles.563 In the 2012 “Legal Note on Bank Involvement in the 
Criminal Justice Sector”, the General Counsel therefore outlines a two-part test.564 
First, activities should be grounded in an “appropriate and objective economic 
rationale”. Second, the risk of political interference should be carefully assessed and 
managed through a number of proposed measures, for instance, ensuring that 
activities are based on “a specific request or consent from the borrowing government”, 
are subject to a special review mechanism if they involve a high risk, and are closely 
monitored.565 The approach thus offers some decision-making parameters grounded in 
the Articles, while encouraging staff to carefully assess individual cases. At least in 
theory, it appears commensurate to the task of ensuring the World Bank remains a 
law-governed organization, even as it responds to the changing demands of the 
environment in which it operates.566 
 
2. Definition and Classification of Fragile States in the Legal and 
Policy Framework 
 
We have seen by now that the World Bank’s engagement with weak-capacity, 
poorly governed, and conflict-affected countries extends far beyond what the use of 
                                                        
563 The World Bank, Operationalizing the WDR 2011 (supra note 359), iii. 
564 The Legal was issued by General Counsel Anne-Marie Leroy on February 9, 2012. For an overview 
of the Bank’s growing involvement with justice sector reforms in fragile states, see KLAUS DECKER, 
'World Bank Rule-of-Law Assistance in Fragile States: Developments and Perspectives', in Amanda E. 
Perry (ed) Law in the Pursuit of Development. Principles into Practice? (Routledge, 2010), pp. 228-
232. 
565 On the economic rationale, see paras. 17-24 of the Legal Note; on the country ownership as a 
threshold step to avoid political interference, para. 28; and on the assessment of legal risks in three 
categories, paras. 31-34. At the time of writing, the legal department was considering a further legal 
note that would take a similar approach in outlining the permissible scope of Bank involvement with 
security-related activities. For a preview, see LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY, The World Bank,, 'Annual 
Report FY 2014. Legal Aspects of the World Bank’s Involvement in the Security Sector' (2014), vii-x. 
566 One could question, however, why the World Bank adopts such a considerate approach when it 
comes to justifying increasing involvement in justice- and security-related activities, while it insists on 
a rather bright line approach to determine that human rights are beyond its mandate. One explanation is 
that the political prohibition clause serves an important function for the Bank, namely, to prevent a 
“creeping politicization” or over-ambiguous expansion of its original development mandate. Arguably, 
the Bank uses this function at its discretion. On the role of the political prohibition in the evolution of 
the Bank’s mandate, CISSÉ, 'Should the Political Prohibition in Charters of International Financial 
Institutions be Revisited? The Case of the World Bank', 81. 
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the “fragile states” terminology suggests. Many of the challenges that were eventually 
associated with fragile states had preoccupied the Bank already in the 1990s, when it 
became more involved in post-conflict countries.567  When the organization began 
addressing the particular challenges of countries with weak institutions, policies, and 
governance more systematically in 2001, it referred to “low-income countries under 
stress”.568 Only in 2008 did the Bank officially endorse the fragile states terminology 
– by now, it prefers to speak of “fragility” or “fragile situations”.569   
Still, it is important to ask how the World Bank defines and classifies fragile 
states, not least since its “Harmonized List of Fragile Situations” has become a 
habitual reference point in the development community. 570 Definition and 
classification reflect the organization’s understanding of the ‘problem’, and may also 
shape its response. What consequences automatically attach to the term fragile state 
under the World Bank’s legal and policy framework? Could “fragile state” qualify as 
a regime-specific, legal term?  
In this section, I briefly describe the criteria and process of the Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), an indicator-based, diagnostic tool that the Bank 
uses to classify fragile states (a). Next, I examine the consequences attached to the 
classification under the World Bank’s legal and policy framework. I show that the 
classification can have important signaling effects far beyond the organization, while 
it is grossly inadequate and out of sync even with the Bank’s own, evolving 
understanding of fragility. Its role in determining the Bank’s operational response and 
resource allocation to fragile states is, however, mostly informal (b).  
 
 
 
                                                        
567 See, for instance, THE WORLD BANK, 'Post-Conflict Reconstruction. The Role of the World Bank', 5, 
defining conflict-affected countries with reference to situations “where the state has failed”, identifying 
“limited government capacity, fragile political balances, and extreme time pressures” as characteristic 
challenges. In 2007 the Bank officially merged its post-conflict and fragile states agenda. 
568 The LICUS initiative was the first time the Bank used an official designation for countries with 
weak governance and institutions, which were classified on the basis of their (low) score in the Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). LICUS countries were further distinguished in four 
groups: countries experiencing deterioration; countries facing prolonged political crisis or impasse; 
post-conflict countries or countries or in political transition; and countries experiencing gradual 
improvement. See, for instance, the THE WORLD BANK, 'Good Practice Note for Development Policy 
Lending. Development Policy Operations and Program Conditionality in Fragile States'. 
569 Supra note 356. 
570 Supra note 16. 
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a) The CPIA-Based Classification – Criteria and Process  
 
Various types of World Bank documents express how the organization 
understands the notion of fragile state or situations, mostly for analytical purposes.571 
More decisive for the overall volume and types of development assistance a country 
receives from the Bank is the classification of fragile states on the basis of the 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). Based on the CPIA, “fragile 
situations” are officially defined as having either a composite World Bank, AfDB and 
ADB rating of 3.2 (out of 6) or less, or the presence of a United Nations and/or 
regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission during the past three years, not 
including border monitoring missions.572 Post-conflict countries are thus addressed as 
a sub-group of fragile states. 573  The Bank’s list of all countries and territories 
classified as fragile is updated once a year and publically available on its website. 
In contrast to numerous other indicators used to classify and rank fragile states, 
for instance, based on the state’s capacity to deliver certain core functions, the CPIA 
was not designed to measure fragility.574 Quite the contrary, the Bank primarily uses 
the CPIA to determine how favorable the political and structural environment of a 
country is to the effective use of aid – where aid is likely to reach development 
outcomes, and what channels and instruments of aid are therefore most appropriate. 
The 16 criteria that make up the CPIA country score essentially reflect what the 
World Bank requires from a state with good policies and institutions, i.e. the “good 
governance state”.575 In using the CPIA to classify fragile states, the Bank frames 
                                                        
571 See, for instance, the THE WORLD BANK, 'Good Practice Note for Development Policy Lending. 
Development Policy Operations and Program Conditionality in Fragile States', para. 3, according to 
which “fragile states are characterized by weak policies, institutions and governance, and may be in 
conflict or at risk of conflict, resulting in poor economic and poverty reduction performance.”; or the 
definition in the WDR 2011, quoted in supra note 148. 
572 Information Note: The World Bank’s Harmonized List of Fragile Situations’, available online: 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Fragilityandconflict/FragileSituations_I
nformation%20Note.pdf (accessed December 2014). The Note was only added to the Bank’s website in 
2014, arguably to enhance transparency following an increasing acknowledgement of the 
classification’s significance, and of its limitations. 
573 Almost two-thirds of the countries included on the Bank’s list of fragile situations in 2015 had the 
presence of either a peace-building or peace-keeping mission. Though the automatic inclusion of post-
conflict countries in the list of fragile situations was considered to be useful for identifying fragility at 
the sub-national level, except for Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Kosovo, Liberia, Mali, and Sierra Leone, all 
post-conflict countries also have a (country-wide) CPIA score of 3.2 or below. Countries or territories 
that are on the list without an available CPIA score are the West Bank & Gaza, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Iraq, Libya and Syria, for which no CPIA score is published since they are IBRD and not 
IDA-eligible countries. See The World Bank, Harmonized List of Fragile Situations (supra note 1). 
574 Supra chapter II.1. 
575 MICHAEL RIEGNER, Global Administrative Law Working Papers 6/2012, 'Measuring the Good 
Governance State: A Legal Reconstruction of the World Bank’s “Country Policy and Institutional 
 152 
fragility as a mathematical difference of the ideal of good governance expressed 
therein. 
The assessment criteria of the CPIA are contained in the so-called CPIA 
Questionnaire, an internal document that does not follow a particular form under the 
Bank’s secondary law. The 16 criteria are grouped into four clusters, which intend to 
cover all determinants that have a positive correlation with economic growth: 
economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, 
and public sector management and institutions.576 The same Questionnaire is used for 
all countries regardless of their particular conditions and challenges. A certain 
measure of country specificity can be taken into account, however, and countries with 
particularly weak institutions and policies be ranked higher than they otherwise 
would.577  
The conduct of CPIA assessments follows an internal administrative practice that 
is laid out in the Questionnaire effective at a time, not an Operational Policy. All 
CPIA ratings are conducted by staff, who make subjective judgments based on 
country knowledge, analytical work and policy dialogue, information provided by 
partners, and publicly available indicators.578 Government representatives from the 
countries assessed only need to be consulted when Bank staff prepare their initial 
ranking proposals, and are later informed of the CPIA score and its implications for 
the Bank’s operations. The final CPIA score of all IDA-eligible countries are 
                                                                                                                                                              
Assessment”' (2012). For a critique of the World Bank’s approach to good governance, see MICK 
MOORE, 'Declining to Learn from the East? The World Bank on ‘Governance and Development’', 24 
IDS Bulletin (1993), arguing that it is very much shaped by a liberal-pluralist paradigm and a Western 
model of political and social order. 
576 The CPIA 2011 Questionnaire is available online: 
http://www.worldbank.org/ida/papers/CPIAcriteria2011final.pdf (accessed December 2014). The CPIA 
criteria have been revised several times in order to reflect changing development paradigms over time, 
for instance concerning the role of the state.  
577 In determining CPIA scores, staff are advised to take into account that different policies and/or 
institutions can generate similar development outcomes. The Questionnaire further asks staff to take 
into account a country’s development stage in implementing the guidelines (CPIA 2011 Questionnaire, 
para. 17). The IEG’s 2009 review of the CPIA criticizes this qualification, since it is subjective and has 
been used very differently across the Bank. INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP, The World Bank, 'The 
World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment' (June 30, 2009), paras. 3.35-3.43. 
578 CPIA 2011 Questionnaire, paras. 8-9, 15. During the first phase, the Benchmarking Phase, a 
representative sample of countries from all regions is selected and assessed. Their scores serve as an 
anchor for the relative ranking of all other countries. Country teams propose ratings for each of the 16 
criteria and provide a written justification (the “write-ups”), which are subjected to several internal 
reviews by different departments of the Bank. In the Second Phase, all other countries are ranked 
according to a similar process of country team proposals and Bank-wide review, and using the 
benchmark countries as guideposts to help ensure consistency within and across regions.  
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published, but no information on the preceding deliberation process is made 
available.579 
There is thus little room for national authorities to participate in the ranking, to 
contest its results, or to contribute to the development of the CPIA criteria in the first 
place. Particularly countries with weak capacities are restricted in their ability to 
follow, influence, or challenge the CPIA process whereby they are classified as 
“fragile”. This is on purpose. By minimizing avenues of political influence on the 
assessment process, the Bank aims to safeguard the objectivity of knowledge 
production, and of the decisions taken on that basis. But what are the consequences 
attached to the CPIA score and classification as fragile state? 
 
b) Consequences for Operational Decision-Making, Resource Allocation, 
and Beyond 
 
In general, the CPIA serves two main functions. First, it is a source of knowledge 
that the Bank relies on for operational decision-making at various stages of planning 
and implementing development projects. 580  The CPIA thus constitutes an avenue 
through which considerations of a government’s institutions and policies influence 
how the organization decides to engage with a country. This influence is largely 
informal. Second, the CPIA informs the performance-based allocation of resources 
between IDA-eligible countries, with those countries with a higher score receiving a 
higher per-capita allocation.581 Countries with good governance are thus rewarded.582  
                                                        
579 Documents that furnish information on the deliberation process such as the write-ups are not 
publically available for scrutiny, since they fall under an exemption in the World Bank’s Policy on 
Access to Information (July 1, 2010), para. 16 lit. c. 
580 For instance, staff refer to the CPIA when preparing the Country Partnership Framework (CPF, 
formerly Country Assistance Strategy), the principal programming tool wherein the Bank analyzes a 
country’s development challenges and determines the level and instruments of its support. They also 
rely on the CPIA when deciding on a country’s eligibility for direct budget support, with countries that 
score low being less likely to receive budget support. 
581 Next to the CPIA score, a country’s performance in implementing Bank-financed operations enters 
into the equation. The so-called Project Performance Ratings of fragile states are on average lower than 
those of other countries, but the gap has recently become smaller (CHANDY, 'Ten Years of Fragile 
States. What Have We Learned?', 8). The performance ranking is again adjusted to reflect a country’s 
needs in terms of population size and GNI per capita. 
582 How a country scores in the CPIA’s governance-related criteria is counted more than other criteria 
in the IDA’s allocation formula, which accordingly rewards good governance. IDA’s Performance-
based Allocation System is thus an immediate expression of the aid orthodoxy that well-governed and 
capable institutions are a precondition for aid effectiveness. See supra chapter II.2 a). 
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This effect is formal, in that the equation that makes the CPIA a determining factor in 
allocating IDA’s resources is included in a legally binding resolution.583  
Both of these functions the CPIA assumes for all IDA-countries, whether fragile 
or not. To get to the role of the classification of fragile states under the World Bank’s 
legal and policy framework, we need to look closer at the specific consequences 
attached to the classification of countries as fragile based on a CPIA score of 3.2 or 
less. 
Indeed, the World Bank has recently started referring to “fragile states” or 
“fragility” in binding OPs/BPs, namely OP 9.00 on Program-for-Results Financing 
and OP 10.00 on Investment Project Financing.584 Under OP 10.00 on Investment 
Project Financing, countries experiencing “fragility” may be subject to “specific 
policy requirements and special consideration”. As I analyze in detail below, this 
means that staff must refer to the list of fragile states when deciding on the use of 
special arrangements for project lending.585 However, a country’s CPIA score is not 
the only factor that staff need to consider, nor does a CPIA score lower than 3.2 mean 
that a country automatically qualifies for such special arrangements. OP 9.00, in turn, 
mentions “fragile states” without attaching any operational consequences. 
Accordingly, the CPIA-based classification of fragile states does not have formal 
consequences for the Bank’s operational decision-making. 
Looking at the role of the CPIA in the allocation of IDA’s resources, it is clear 
that with their score below 3.2, fragile states by definition receive a smaller share. 
Again, the material effect of the CPIA is not specific, though particularly severe for 
fragile states – it entails that countries with the highest needs may receive the lowest 
levels of aid allocations. To alleviate this effect, the IDA’s member states have 
formally approved a number of exceptions to the performance-based allocation 
system. Are these exceptions addressed to fragile states? 
In the past, exceptional allocations were made available to a broadly defined 
category of post-conflict countries, countries “re-engaging” with the IDA after a long 
                                                        
583 A legally binding Resolution is by the Board of Governors every three years on the occasion of the 
Replenishment meetings. See THE WORLD BANK, 'Additions to IDA Resources: Sixteenth 
Replenishment - IDA 16: Delivering Development Results', Annex 2.  
584 OP 9.00 on Program-for-Results Financing (February 2012), at para. 8 lit. (f); and OP 10.00 on 
Investment Project Financing (April 2013), at para. 11, together with BP 10.00, paras. 11 and 14.  
585 Infra chapter IV.4 a). 
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period of (politically) disrupted relations, and countries in arrears.586 This “piece-meal 
approach” was subsequently found too “complex, opaque and prone to 
arbitrariness”.587  In fact, additional funding remained relatively concentrated on a 
small number of countries, and on post-conflict reconstruction rather than prevention 
activities.588  
To make additional financing available to countries that are considered fragile, 
though they have not necessarily experienced conflict or accumulated significant 
arrears, a new exceptional allocation regime was introduced in 2014.589  The new 
regime still does not allocate extra resources to countries based on their CPIA-based 
classification as fragile, but to countries facing “turn-around” situations. Closely 
aligned with the findings of the WDR 2011, a “turn-around” situation is defined as a 
“critical juncture in a country’s development trajectory providing a significant 
opportunity to building stability and resilience”. 590  Among other, countries can 
qualify for funding if there has been “major shift in a country’s policy priorities 
addressing critical elements of fragility.”591  Besides, the State-and Peace-Building 
Fund provides extraordinary financing for projects in “fragile, conflict-prone, or 
                                                        
586 THE WORLD BANK, 'Additions to IDA Resources: Sixteenth Replenishment - IDA 16: Delivering 
Development Results', Annex 2 para. 8, providing for exceptional allocations to „countries emerging 
from severe conflict“ (special post-conflict allocations); „countries re-engaging with IDA after a 
prolonged period of inactivity“; countries „in the aftermath of severe natural disasters or economic 
crises“, and countries qualifying for pre-arrears clearance (according to OP 13 para 1, lit. b), the Bank 
is usually prohibited from lending to countries in arrears). These exceptions are in the same document 
as the allocation formula that receives binding legal effect through adoption in a Board of Governors 
resolution. On the meaning of these categories and their relation to the group of fragile states, see 
RACHEL FOLZ & MANUELA LEONHARDT, Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 'The 
Engagement of the International Development Association in Fragile States. Proposals for a Reform 
Agenda' (April 2012), 13. 
587 See THE WORLD BANK, 'IDA 17. IDA’s Support to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States', paras. 42-
55, at para. 44.  
588 For instance, in the fiscal year of 2009, USD 1.049 were allocated to nine post-conflict states, USD 
118 million to three re-engaging states, and only USD 228 million to 21 other fragile states. See THE 
WORLD BANK, The World Bank, 'IDA15 Mid-Term Review. IDA’s Support to Fragile and Conflict-
Affected Countries: Progress Report 2007-2009' (November 2009), pp. 24-25.  
589 It is too early to judge whether the new regime will lead to a more predictable and transparent 
allocation of exceptional resources to fragile states. At least on paper, the new eligibility criteria still 
look rather vague, and potentially prone to political selectivity.   
590 THE WORLD BANK, 'Implementation Arrangements for Allocating IDA Resources to Countries 
Facing "Turn-around" Situations. Background Note' (October 2013), para. 9. A “turn-around” situation 
can be marked either by the end of conflict, or “the commitment to a major change in the policy 
environment”. The definition of conflict is relatively broad, including international conflict, civil war, 
as well as “cycles of violence that significantly disrupt a country’s development prospects”.  
591 The Bank’s Management, under the oversight of the Executive Directors, decides on a country’s 
eligibility on the basis of an eligibility note, in which Bank staff lay out how a country meets the 
eligibility criteria. Ibid., para. 12. Besides, to guide the allocation of additional resources between those 
countries qualifying for exceptional allocations, the IDA uses a “Post-Conflict Performance Indicators” 
(PCPI) Framework, which functions similar to the CPIA, but with criteria more sensitive to security-
related development challenges.  
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conflict-affected” countries, i.e. including countries not classified as fragile, though 
those with a low CPIA score are given priority.592 In sum, inclusion on the Bank’s list 
of fragile states per se does not give a country access to additional financing, though 
the mentioned exceptions have certainly benefited fragile states.  
The CPIA-based classification of fragile states thus does not automatically enjoin 
the World Bank as a matter of law on how to engage with a country. The organization 
has refrained from using “fragile state” as a regime-specific legal term, in the sense of 
attaching formal consequences to its application, or creating a specific category of 
member state.593  We will see in the following sections that the organization has 
adapted its legal and policy framework to cope with specific circumstances (e.g. weak 
capacity) or situations (e.g. conflict) associated with fragile states, but mostly without 
referring to the CPIA-based classification.  
Even if not legal consequences, the Bank’s CPIA-based classification of fragile 
states can still have significant reputational and political effects. It is increasingly 
acknowledged that indicator-based assessments and rankings like the CPIA have the 
potential to considerably impact on individual or collective behavior, political 
decision-making, and on perceptions more broadly.594 Where indicators are used for 
evaluating the performance of state institutions, they make implicit assumptions on 
the appropriate standards against which to measure effective statehood or governance. 
Seen in this light, the Bank’s classification of fragile states concretizes, stabilizes and 
to a certain extent enforces the normative standards the Bank puts to the “good 
                                                        
592 Resolution Establishing the SPF (supra note 353), para. 18 (Eligibility Criteria) and para. 3.  
593 Notably, judged on the basis of the legal principle of sovereign equality, international development 
organizations can (and often do) define or categorize certain groups of recipient countries for various 
purposes, as long as their equal legal status is maintained. On the legal boundaries concerning the 
classification of states under international law, see PETRA MINNEROP, 'The Classification of States and 
the Creation of Status within the International Community', 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
Law, 79 (2003); and on differentiation between recipient countries in the law of development 
cooperation, DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, 
the EU and Germany, 207-209. 
594 In recent years, international legal scholars have hence begun addressing indicators as a “technology 
of global governance” and sought to conceptualize the effects of indicators in terms of an exercise of 
international public authority, or “governance by information”. See, for instance, DAVIS, et al., 
'Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance'. The authors agree with von Bogdandy and 
Goldmann that indicators can constitute a form of “governance by information” that may raise 
concerns in terms of transparency, participation and review. ARMIN  VON BOGDANDY & MATTHIAS 
GOLDMANN, 'The Exercise of International Public Authority through National Policy Assessment. The 
OECD’s PISA Policy as a Paradigm for a New International Standard Instrument', 5 International 
Organizations Law Review, 241 (2009). See also supra chapter II.1. 
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governance state”.595 Since several other donor institutions use the Bank’s list as a 
basis for determining fragility, such effects are amplified beyond the organization.596  
This is while even the World Bank has come to acknowledge the gross mismatch 
between the CPIA-based classification and its own, increasingly sophisticated 
understanding of fragility – a mismatch that renders the classification of limited 
diagnostic and predicative value. The Bank describes fragility as a development 
challenge of a different kind, not merely degree, and one that does not concern the 
capacity of formal state institutions alone.597 Based on the CPIA, however, fragile 
states are countries with policies and institutions that are little conductive to economic 
growth, or a poor track record in implementing Bank projects – they essentially 
equate with least-developed countries. 598  The CPIA does not allow capturing the 
existence of regionally confined fragile situations, either. And with its focus on 
formal policies and institutions, it cannot reflect how informal, traditional institutions 
may assume a considerable role in fulfilling state functions.599  
In line with the recommendations of a 2013 IEG evaluation, the World Bank has 
therefore set out to develop a “more suitable and accurate mechanism” to define 
fragile states.600 What role such a definition should play in deciding how the Bank 
                                                        
595 Aid-dependent states in particular could be pressured to introduce policy and institutional changes 
to comply with these standards in order to access financing according to the terms of IDA’s 
Performance-based Allocation system. Whether or not the categorization of fragile states on the basis 
of the CPIA constitutes an act of “governance by information” or exercise of public authority, however, 
is controversial, not least because the effects of the categorization and the extent to which it unilaterally 
determines or compromises the liberty of the addressee are difficult to establish. See RIEGNER, 
'Measuring the Good Governance State: A Legal Reconstruction of the World Bank’s “Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment”', 10. 
596 For instance, for its annual report on resource flows to fragile and conflict-affected states in 2014, 
the OECD relied on the harmonized list of fragile states put together by the World Bank, AfDB, and 
ADB, in combination with the 2013 Failed State Index. The European Union in turn relied on the 
OECD’s combined list in EUROPEAN COMMISSION & EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, 'European 
Report on Development. Overcoming Fragility in Africa. Forging a New European Approach '. The 
AfDB and the ADB have adopted the Bank’s model of defining fragile states on the basis of their CPIA 
score, although they conduct their own CPIA. 
597 See the WDR’s definition of fragility, quoted in supra note 148. 
598 Of the 32 countries or territories that the World Bank in 2015 considers fragile based on their CPIA 
score, only 8 were not also Least Developed Countries (LDCs) according to UNCTAD’s official 
classification of “states that are deemed highly disadvantaged in their development process” (on the 
criteria and process of UN recognition of LDCs, see online, 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/ALDC/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-recognition-of-LDCs.aspx, 
accessed November 2014). Since the events of the Arab Spring have drawn attention to the fragility of 
middle-income countries, however, the World Bank has begun to add middle-income countries, namely 
Iraq, Libya, and Syria, to its list of fragile situations. World Bank, Harmonized List of Fragile 
Situations (supra note 1). 
599 See supra chapter I.2 b) on the role of non-state actors in fulfilling traditional state functions. 
600 INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP, 'World Bank Assistance to Low-Income Fragile- and Conflict 
Affected States', 128. 
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engages with fragile states is, however, controversial. Should it act as a formal trigger 
for either a differentiated approach to planning and implementing development 
cooperation, or for allocating extra resources? On the one hand, a clear definition 
could perhaps add transparency and consistency to the Bank’s engagement with 
fragile states, and provide the basis for a more systematic approach.601 If so, given 
what significant consequences it would have, the process of classifying fragile states 
would need to be made more transparent and inclusive than the CPIA process at 
present.602 On the other hand, the danger is that a clear definition would provide the 
Bank’s decision-making only with “an allure of sophistication while absolving actors 
of the need to engage substantively with the detailed idiosyncrasies of marginal or 
specific cases“.603 After all, it also remains controversial whether fragile states have 
something in common that defines them as substantially different from other Bank 
member countries – and whether these differences can be described clearly enough to 
trigger automatic conclusions for the Bank’s response. 
 
3. Juridical Statehood and Dealings with (In)Effective Government  
 
We have seen that the World Bank’s legal and policy framework rests on a state-
centric development paradigm, and the organization is accordingly attuned to dealing 
with official government counterparts – as interlocutors, signatories, and owners of 
the development process.604 The political prohibition clause thereby defines to what 
extent the organization can consider the structure or performance of government 
institutions.605 
                                                        
601 The following sections will show that the Bank’s approach is not very systematic at present. See 
also FOLZ & LEONHARDT, 'The Engagement of the International Development Association in Fragile 
States. Proposals for a Reform Agenda', 15, arguing that a definition of fragility would constitute “[a] 
first step towards systematising the access of fragile states to IDA funding”.  
602 Over the last years, the CPIA process has already become increasingly being structured, and 
mechanisms have been designed to ensure a certain level of transparency, reason-giving, and review. 
With concrete proposals on how to increase the process’ conformity with such standards known from 
domestic administrative law, see RIEGNER, 'Measuring the Good Governance State: A Legal 
Reconstruction of the World Bank’s “Country Policy and Institutional Assessment”', 17-21.  
603 MICHAEL WOOLCOCK, UNU WIDER Working Paper 2014/097, 'Engaging with Fragile and 
Conflict-affected States. An Alternative Approach to Theory, Measurement and Practice' (July 2014), 4. 
604 See supra chapter II.2 a) on the state-centric paradigm of development cooperation, and chapter 
III.2. on the protection of recipient sovereignty in the legal and policy framework of international 
development organizations, including the World Bank. 
605 Supra section 1 b) of this chapter. 
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With its growing involvement in conflict-affected and fragile states, the World 
Bank has increasingly faced situations where an effective government counterpart in a 
formal, juridical sense could not be identified. Protracted crises and outright conflicts 
quite often entail a partial breakdown of government authority, if not the temporary 
absence of government counterparts, for instance in post-war Afghanistan or Iraq. In 
Somalia, the prolonged absence of any reasonably effective government prevented the 
Bank from engaging for more than a decade, despite the country’s enormous 
development needs.606 Disorderly transfers of power in the context of conflicts or 
political turmoil can also raise doubts as to the effectiveness or legitimacy of 
unelected, interim authorities – or lead to a situation where more than one entity 
claims to be the government in power. Such doubts can delay Bank assistance when it 
appears most needed. Besides, in post-conflict situations involving the dissolution of 
states, not just the legal status of a government, but also that of (member) states or 
their dissolving units can be in question, like in Kosovo or South Sudan. Aid 
effectiveness concerns are thus very much bound up with the settlement of legal 
questions that, broadly speaking, pertain to the identification of effective government 
counterparts in a formal, juridical sense.607 
In dealing with such a complex reality and the political questions it invariably 
entails, the World Bank has not only sought ad hoc solutions to work around the 
constraints posed by its legal and policy framework, which makes juridical statehood 
a minimum condition for development cooperation. The Bank has consolidated its 
evolving, organizational practice through the adoption of internal rules. These rules 
reflect how the organization seeks to strike a balance between the political prohibition 
clause, its fiduciary duty as a creditor, and the need to assist in the development and 
reconstruction of fragile states in concert with the international community.  
In this section, I describe and analyze the two internal rules that together 
determine the World Bank’s approach to the legal obstacles it faces in countries that 
                                                        
606 The World Bank disengaged in 1991 when Somalia stopped paying its debts, and remained 
disengaged for more than a decade, due to the continuous insecurity but mostly the lack of a fully 
functioning government. Somalia’s development and humanitarian indicators are among the lowest in 
the world. See, for instance, UNDP, 'Somalia Human Development Report 2012: Empowering Youth 
for Peace and Development' (2012), 26-32.  
607 On the problems for Bank engagement in situations of severe political crisis, disorderly transfers of 
power, state dissolution, or state failures, see already ROBERT MUSCAT, The World Bank, 'Conflict and 
Reconstruction. Roles for the World Bank' (1995), chapter 2; and the summary of Board discussions on 
the Bank’s evolving engagement in post-conflict reconstruction, in THE WORLD BANK, 'The Role of the 
World Bank in Conflict and Development. An Evolving Agenda', 6-8. 
 
 160 
have no government, or where an official government cannot easily be identified. 
Operational Policy 2.30 on Development Cooperation and Conflict essentially 
redefines on what legal grounds the Bank can engage in case there is no government, 
and in non-member states or territories with an unresolved legal status (a). 
Operational Policy 7.30 on Dealings with De Facto Governments establishes under 
what conditions the Bank decides to engage with a de facto government, including in 
countries emerging from conflict (b). I conclude by analyzing the World Bank’s 
approach as evident from the two Policies, and evaluate its outcomes in terms of 
balancing the objective of development, standards of effectiveness, and the protection 
of recipient sovereignty in the Articles of Agreement (c). 
 
a) Operational Policy on Development Cooperation and Conflict – State 
Consent and Community Interests 
i. Background and Precedents 
 
In the 1990s, the World Bank sought a more proactive role in the reconstruction 
and development of post-conflict countries.608 Many times, however, an unresolved 
legal status or the absence of an effective and internationally recognized government 
made it difficult for the Bank to engage on the basis of the Articles. Even the UN 
Secretary General recognized the typical restrictions that international development 
organizations face in such settings – and consequently asked for ingenuity and 
flexibility in handling their respective legal provisions.609 
The World Bank was first challenged to prove its ingenuity when it was asked by 
the cosponsors of the Oslo peace process to provide assistance to the West Bank and 
Gaza. The dire economic situation in the Palestinian Territories left no doubt as to the 
humanitarian need for engagement, but even after the establishment of an interim self-
                                                        
608 For a detailed account of the Bank’s evolving post-conflict work, see JOHN D. CIORCIARI, 
'Prospective Enlargement of the Roles of the Bretton Woods Financial Institutions in International 
Peace Operations', 22 Fordham International Law Journal, 292 (1998), 297 ff.; PIETER VAN HOUTEN, 
'The World Bank's (Post-)Conflict Agenda: The Challenge of Integrating Development and Security', 
20 Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 639 (2007); and on the Bank’s incentives and 
motivation for taking up post-conflict work, see IRFAN NOORUDDIN & THOMAS EDWARD FLORES, 
'Financing the Peace: Evaluating World Bank Post-Conflict Assistance Programs', 4 Review of 
International Organizations, 1 (2009), 7-8. 
609 Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, UN-Doc. S/1999/882 (16 August 
1999), para. 72. See also the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (“Brahimi 
Report”) presented to the Secretary General on 21 August 2000 (UN- Doc. A/55/305–S/2000/809), 
paras. 45-46, which explicitly called on international financial institutions to assume a role in the 
international community’s post-conflict reconstruction efforts. 
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governing arrangement, they were neither a sovereign state, nor part of a member 
state’s territory.610 The Bank’s Articles of Agreement establish that the organization 
can provide financing only for projects or programs in the territory of a member 
state.611 Its resources are to be used “exclusively for the benefit of members.”612 
Accordingly, there appeared to be no legal basis for the extension of loans. 
In this context, General Counsel Ibrahim Shihata argued that the Bank could 
provide assistance to the West Bank and Gaza if the Executive Directors, who are 
competent to render an interpretation of the Articles, approved such engagement on 
the grounds that it was “for the benefit of members”.613 The Executive Directors 
passed a Resolution to confirm that due to the significant consequences of the 
economic circumstances of the Palestinian Territories for the Middle East peace 
process and development, the Bank’s involvement was in the interest of the 
organization’s membership as a whole.614  
Though the organization was thus authorized to provide assistance, it could not 
provide loans, which still required the existence of a government capable of assuming 
legal responsibility for reimbursement. Therefore, two trust funds were established, 
one with resources from the Bank, and one with resources from various donors.615 
                                                        
610 Ever since the war in 1967, the Bank had treated the West Bank and Gaza as “occupied territories” 
and refused Israel’s requests to engage “until such time as the legal status of such territories had been 
internationally decided and hostilities therein had ceased”. SHIHATA, The World Bank in a Changing 
World, Legal Aspects of the World Bank’s Assistance to the West bank and the Gaza Strip, p. 362-363. 
611 This requirement is implicit in IBRD Articles I lit. i), Art. III Sect. 1 lit. i) and v), Art. IV Sect. 3 lit. 
a) and c) and Art. V Sect. 7, as well as in the IDA Articles, Art. I (Purposes) and Art. V Sect. 1 lit. a). 
In contrast to the IBRD, the IDA can also provide financing to a dependent or associated territory 
within the meaning accorded to Art. V Sect. 1, but the Bank did not recognize the West Bank and Gaza 
as such. 
612 IBRD Articles, Art. III Sect. I lit. a).  
613 On the Shihata’s legal reasoning in detail, see IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, et al., 'Legal Aspects of the 
World Bank's Assistance to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip' The Palestine Yearbook of International 
Law, 19 (1992). The Bank had used the same reasoning before, in order to provide technical assistance 
to countries that had applied for membership, e.g. to the Soviet Union in 1991. The case of the West 
Bank and Gaza was more complicated, however, since its legal status could not be expected to be 
resolved soon, permitting full accession to membership of the World Bank. 
614 Resolution of the Executive Directors of the IBRD No. 93-11 and Resolution of the Executive 
Directors of the IDA No. 93-7 establishing a Trust Fund for Gaza (October 19, 1993). A further 
Resolution No. 483 (November 11, 1993) adopted by the Board of Governors approved the transfer of 
IBRD surplus to the Trust Fund.  
615 The Trust Fund for Gaza was primarily financed from IBRD surplus, i.e. funds that the Bank has 
generated on the capital markets, rather than received from member states, and which it has more 
discretion in using. The Holst-Fund was a multi-donor trust fund that provided an extra USD 265 
million to cover the start-up and recurrent costs of the PLO. The Holst Fund was formally managed by 
the PLO, but in light of the severely restricted capacities of the nascent Palestinian administration, 
under the close scrutiny of an international accounting firm hired by the World Bank. See THE WORLD 
BANK, 'Post-Conflict Reconstruction. The Role of the World Bank', p. 38. On the legal bases of trust 
funds in general and the contractual relationships with donors and trustees, see Ilias Bantekas, Trust 
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Trust funds are largely autonomous funding mechanisms, where contributions from 
one or more donors are hold in trust by an administrator, a task assumed by the 
IDA.616 Being separate from the Bank’s normal lending, trust funds provide greater 
flexibility regarding the use of funds and the recipients of aid, for instance, countries 
in arrears to the Bank, non-member countries, or in this case, territories with an 
unresolved legal status.617 As a trust fund administrator, the Bank still had to conclude 
grant agreements with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), but these grant 
agreements concerned only the implementation of grant-financed projects, not the 
legal commitment to reimburse loans.618  Grants are non-reimbursable, so that the 
Bank was released from the fiduciary duties associated with ensuring the repayment 
of loans.619 With the authorization of the Executive Directors and through the use of 
trust fund arrangements, the World Bank ultimately provided assistance to a non-
member territory with an unresolved legal status, and instead of a de jure government, 
to the PLO.  
The organization subsequently relied on the same legal reasoning and a similar 
trust fund arrangement to become engaged in Bosnia, where the US administration 
under President Clinton sought a decisive role for the Bank in post-conflict 
reconstruction. 620  Both cases paved the way for the organization’s growing 
operational engagement in fragile states, and became important legal precedents.621 
                                                                                                                                                              
Funds under International Law. Trustee Obligations of the United Nations and International 
Development Banks (TMC Asser Press, 2009), chapter 2. 
616 Though not mentioned in the Articles of Agreement, the World Bank has the ‘implied power’ to 
establish and administer trust funds. See Operational Policy 14.40 (July 2008), which states, however, 
that as trust fund administrator, the Bank must still act in line with its mandated purposes and 
depending on the type of trust funds, other applicable policies and procedures (para. 3 lit. a).  
617 For instance, trust funds can disburse not only to governments, but also to international 
organizations or non-governmental organizations, and can finance activities that are executed by the 
World Bank itself. Moreover, trust funds usually come with their own governance structure, lending 
criteria, processing procedures and implementation modalities.  
618 For a trust fund, the World Bank usually enters into a legal agreement with one or more donors, the 
administration agreement, in which it accepts to administer the resources they provide. In addition, 
however receives disbursements from the trust fund to carry out specific activities needs to sign a grant 
agreement with the World Bank as the trust fund administrator. On different types of donor agreements, 
see BANTEKAS, Trust Funds under International Law. Trustee Obligations of the United Nations and 
International Development Banks, 99-110. 
619 On the Bank’s fiduciary duty, see section 1 b) of this chapter. 
620 Bosnia is a successor state of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The SFRY 
seized to be a member of the Bank in 1993, but Bosnia had not yet succeeded in its membership in 
1994. On the role of the USA in convincing the Bank to become involved in Bosnia, see SEBASTIAN 
MALLABY, The World's Banker. A Story of Failed States, Financial Crises, and the Wealth and Poverty 
of Nations (Penguin Press, 2004), chapter 5 (Mission Sarajevo), pp. 116-144. 
621 THE WORLD BANK, 'Post-Conflict Reconstruction. The Role of the World Bank', 4. In 1997, nearly a 
quarter of the IDA’s commitments (excluding China and India) were already going to countries 
emerging from conflict, e.g. Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Balkan states (p. 1). 
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By the time the World Bank was asked to engage in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999, 
the legal department did not bother to provide a comprehensive, legal justification for 
assistance to non-members, which had already become an established practice.622  
Yet Kosovo and East Timor challenged the ingenuity of the Bank’s jurists in 
more regards. Both had recently emerged from conflicts that eventually involved the 
secession from a member state of the Bank. With state institutions not yet existent or 
having suffered total collapse, Kosovo and East Timor were placed under the 
authority of a UN administration for an interim period.623 During that time, both had 
no fully functioning, elected government. Instead, the respective UN administrations 
exercised far-reaching, sovereign powers, acting as trustee on behalf of the 
administered populations. 624  Under these circumstances, it was not only an issue 
whether the Bank could provide financing given their non-member status. It was not 
clear who could request the Bank’s assistance, serve as legal counterpart, receive 
disbursements, and assume responsibility for implementation. 
In Kosovo, the World Bank became engaged following the adoption of Security 
Council Resolution 1244, which called for a coordinated international effort to 
support Kosovo’s reconstruction. 625  Financial resources initially came from the 
Bank’s Post-Conflict Trust Fund and a newly created Trust Fund for Kosovo.626 In the 
absence of a fully effective, national government, the World Bank decided to 
                                                        
622 World Bank Assistance to Kosovo – A Legal Analysis. Legal Memorandum by the Acting Vice 
President and General Counsel, Annex I of the Transitional Support Strategy for Kosovo, R99-1 
(September 16, 1999), at 3, referring to the developed “approaches and mechanisms allowing the Bank, 
in exceptional cases, to assist non-members”. 
623 Kosovo was placed under a UN administration that should enable its people to enjoy substantial 
autonomy and self-government within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, pending the final settlement 
of its legal status. See Security Council Resolution 1244, UN Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). East 
Timor had voted for independence in 1999, but was put under UN administration for an interim period 
before independence was to become effective in 2002. See Security Council Resolution 1272, UN Doc. 
S/RES/1272 (October 25, 1999). 
624 On their respective competences, see, for instance, CARSTEN STAHN, 'The United Nations 
Transitional Administrations in Kosovo and East Timor: A First Analysis', 5 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law, 105 (2001). 
625 UN SC Res. 1244 (supra note 623) was adopted under Chapter VII. The Security Council therein 
“encourages all […] international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction” 
(para. 13). See also the World Bank’ Transitional Support Strategy for Kosovo, Progress Report 2000, 
para. 1.  
626 Given that no resolution of Kosovo’s legal status was in sight any time soon, the IDA was later 
authorized by its member states to also provide grants from IDA’s regular resources to UNMIK. Unlike 
the IBRD, the IDA has the mandate to provide financing to an international or regional organization, 
and therefore treated UNMIK as part of an international organization, the UN. The authorization to 
extend grants to UNMIK was given at the 13th Replenishment of IDA’s Resources. See Additions to 
IDA Resources: Thirteenth Replenishment, IDNSecM2002-0488 (September 17, 2002), para 85. In 
June 2009, Kosovo became a member of the World Bank and the IMF, while at the time of writing, it 
had still not joined the UN.  
 164 
conclude grant agreements on the basis of which the trust funds’ resources could be 
disbursed with the United Nations Interim Administration of Kosovo (UNMIK). In 
East Timor, the Bank entered into grant agreements with the United Nations Interim 
Administration for East Timor (UNTAET).627 Given its far-reaching competences, the 
World Bank decided to treat UNTAET as a government for the purposes of extending 
assistance to East Timor. 628  Notably, both UNMIK and UNTAET received only 
grants, not loans from the Bank, which would have implied the UN administration 
incurring long-term financial obligations on behalf of the administered territory and 
people. 
In the course of the 1990s, the World Bank had demonstrated its readiness to 
overcome mandate restrictions to partake in the international community’s joint 
efforts at post-conflict reconstruction. From the Bank’s perspective, this involved 
finding an entity that could request and authorize its involvement, and perhaps more 
importantly, making sure that no financing was extended to an entity that could not 
legally guarantee its repayment. The Bank’s evolving organizational practice was 
eventually consolidated with the adoption of OP 2.30 in January 2001.629  
ii. Content and Consequences 
 
OP/BP 2.30 on “Development Cooperation and Conflict” sets out the basic 
principles for engagement in countries affected by or in transition from conflict, and 
introduces specific instruments and considerations for planning or maintaining 
operations in these settings.630 Two provisions in OP 2.30 deserve special attention, 
                                                        
627 See, for instance, the Trust Fund for East Timor Grant Agreement concerning an Economic 
Institution Capacity Building Project, dated February 26, 2001. Agreements were concluded first with 
UNTAET, then with “East Timor as administered by [UNTAET]”, and following its independence in 
2002, with East Timor itself. 
628 Chopra recalls that whereas “the UN tried to circumvent the issue by reducing the status of the grant 
agreement to a memorandum of understanding between the two institutions”, “[t]he Bank refused and 
demanded that the agreement be accorded the stature of an international treaty between the IDA and a 
sovereign government.” JARAT CHOPRA, 'The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor', 42 Survival, 27 (2000), 
pp. 29-30. The Legal Memorandum on World Bank Assistance to East Timor (Sec M99-666, dated 
September 30, 1999) does not reveal the Bank’s legal reasoning in this regard. However, when General 
Counsel Shihata decided in the case of Cambodia in 1993 to enter into a loan agreement with its 
official but unelected interim authority, the Supreme National Council, rather than the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), he did so on the basis of an assessment of their 
respective competences and decision-making structures. See SHIHATA, The World Bank Legal Papers, 
213. UNTAC had, however, far less competences than UNTAET and UNMIK.  
629 OP 2.30 on Development Cooperation and Conflict was first adopted in January 2001 and has so far 
been subject to only minor revisions in 2005, 2009, and 2013.  
630 On the role of OP 2.30 in outlining the scope of the Bank’s mandate concerning operations in 
conflict-affected states, see supra section 1 b) of this chapter; and MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, 'The Role of the 
 165 
since they modify the legal grounds and permissible scope of Bank engagement on 
the basis of organizational practices developed over the 1990s. 
 The first provision concerns situations where there is no government in power. 
OP 2.30 expressly reaffirms that the Bank only operates in the territory of a member 
upon request of the government. The principal tenor is clear: the World Bank “is not a 
world government”. 631  Yet the Policy introduces a noteworthy exception to this 
fundamental principle of Bank involvement. If there is no government in power, 
“Bank assistance may be initiated by requests from the international community, as 
properly represented (e.g., by UN agencies), and subject in each case to the prior 
approval of the Executive Directors.”632 Assistance can only be provided in the form 
of non-refundable grants or non-financial assistance, so that the Bank does not have to 
consider a country’s creditworthiness. 
Second, OP 2.30 codifies the Bank’s practice of engaging in non-member 
countries, or in territories with an unresolved status. The Policy establishes that the 
organization’s “resources and facilities may be used for the benefit of a country that is 
not a member”, if such an engagement was found to be “beneficial to the Bank and its 
members”.633 Again, each such engagement requires approval from the Executive 
Directors. 
OP 2.30 does not establish objective criteria for determining at what point a 
country has no government in power, what constitutes a “request”, who is authorized 
to represent the “international community” (apart from UN agencies), or when Bank 
engagement would benefit the membership as a whole. Moreover, neither OP 2.30 nor 
the corresponding BP 2.30 establish procedural requirements, for instance, regarding 
the decision-making process or form of approval required from the Executive 
Directors. The two provisions in the Policy have thus a primarily enabling nature. 
They grant full decision-making authority and discretion to the Executive Directors. 
The fact that the Executive Directors have to approve any operation in the 
absence of a government in power or in non-member countries is important also for 
understanding the consequences of the Policy’s application. OP 2.30 itself does not 
                                                                                                                                                              
World Bank in Conflict-Afflicted Areas', 95 American Society of International Law Proceedings, 240 
(2001). 
631 OP 2.30, para. 3 lit. a). 
632 OP 2.30, para. 3 lit. b).  
633 OP 2.30, para. 3 lit. c). It is notable that the wording again refers to non-member countries, not 
territories. Strictly speaking, the provision would thus not apply to the West Bank and Gaza unless they 
were understood to belong to the territory of another (member or non-member) country. 
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modify the Bank’s legal framework, i.e. provide a legal basis for such operations. It 
articulates and codifies a specific approach for staff to follow, and thus creates certain 
normative expectations as to the Bank’s response. Only an approval from the 
Executive Directors, however, would make such operations conform to the Articles of 
Agreement. Since they have the power to interpret the Articles, their approval 
amounts to an implied interpretation.634 In the case of Bank operations in non-member 
states, we have seen that the relevant purposive interpretation of the Articles was 
provided by the General Counsel.635 In contrast, neither the General Counsel, nor the 
Bank’s Management or Executive Board have apparently submitted an interpretation 
that reveals how they justify Bank operations at the request of the international 
community if there is no government in power. We will return to an evaluation of OP 
2.30, but not before looking at the second Policy that is relevant in this context – OP 
7.30 on Dealings with De Facto Governments. 
 
b) Operational Policy on Dealing with De Facto Governments – Non-
political Consideration of Political Circumstances 
i. Background and Rationale 
A rather common phenomenon the World Bank has to deal with are situations 
where a government comes to power by unconstitutional means, and possibly more 
than one entity purports to be the government in power.636 This may be the case after 
a coup d’état, where the Bank has to weigh the competing claims of the ousted and 
the coup government to represent the member country. Military coups alone, though 
not necessarily characteristic of fragile states, occur on average three times every 
year.637 In addition, doubts as to the de facto or de jure government of a country can 
arise in post-conflict situations, where transitions of power are often not orderly. For 
                                                        
634 IDA Articles Art. X lit. a). In practice, the World Bank’s Legal Department has rendered an 
interpretation of the Articles to justify engagement, and these interpretations were then authorized 
through a Resolution of the Executive Board. On the Bank’s practice of implied interpretations, see 
supra section 1 a) of this chapter. 
635 See, for instance, the Legal Memorandum on World Bank Assistance to the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, R-93-163 IDA/R93-134, dated September 20, 1993. Perhaps more critical is an ensuing 
question that is not mentioned in the Bank’s legal reasoning. To what extent would the Articles apply 
to operations outside the territories of member states, when many provisions, e.g. the political 
prohibition clause, refer only to member states? 
636 On the high practical relevancy of unconstitutional changes of government for development 
organizations, see IFAD, Guidelines on Dealing with De Facto Governments, Draft document EB 
2009/98/R. 16 for approval by the Executive Board, Rome, 15-17 December 2009, at paras. 1-8. 
637 The occurrence of coups in many developing countries has, however, been associated with low 
income and low growth more generally. See PAUL COLLIER & ANKE HOEFFLER, Coup Traps: Why does 
Africa have so many Coups D'état? (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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instance, conflict may result in an unconstitutional change of power to an interim or 
transitional authority that is not yet confirmed through a general election, as was the 
case in post-conflict Iraq. The link between conflict and unconstitutional changes of 
government is confirmed through mutual reference in OP 2.30 and OP 7.30.638  
Though there is no established meaning of “de facto government” under 
international law, the term is often used to refer to a government that comes into 
power by means not provided for in the country’s constitution.639 It is not recognized 
by the majority of the international community, but exercises control over substantial 
parts of the territory. Since the choice of government is a matter of domestic law 
exclusively, only the effectiveness of a government, not its international recognition, 
affect the legal status of the state. 640  Where a change of government is not in 
conformity with domestic law, however, international organizations still face 
difficulties in determining what entity to deal with, and what entity has the right to 
represent the member country in the organs of the organization. 
International development organizations face an additional challenge: they need 
to decide whether to continue financing or extend new financing to an entity in a 
situation of legal uncertainty. 641  Particularly the World Bank, an international 
financial institution that provides loans, has an interest and indeed obligation to 
ensure their repayment. Hence, the Bank must assure itself that the loan-receiving 
government is actually able to enter into legal obligations for the country.642 How it 
decides has potentially far-reaching material as well as political consequences for the 
                                                        
638 OP 2.30, para. 3 lit. b) and OP 7.30, note 4 (“The issues addressed in this OP may arise in the 
context of a country emerging from conflict”). 
639 Other definitions are listed in STEFAN TALMON, Recognition of Governments in International Law: 
With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile (Clarendon Press, 1998), 60. For instance, it is not 
entirely clear whether “de facto” government refers to an entity in effective control that is not 
recognized, or whether doubts may also extent to the effectiveness or permanence of a government. In 
contrast to a de facto regime, however, the legal status of the state itself is not affected by the de facto 
nature of the government.  
640 The Tinoco Arbitration case from 1924 confirms that the doctrine of effective control alone, not the 
recognition of a government on other grounds, e.g. illegitimacy or illegality of origin, are constitutive 
for the establishment of power. Anguilar-Armory and Royal Bank of Canada Claims (Great Britain v 
Costa Rica) (1923) 1 RIAA 369. Arbitration between Great Britain and Costa Rica (1924) 18 AJIL147.  
641 Unconstitutional changes of government often go along with a suspension or abrogation of the 
constitution, and consequently entail not just a period of political instability, but also of legal 
uncertainty. 
642 E.g. IBRD Articles, Art. III Sect. 4 lit. v) (“the Bank shall pay due regard to the prospects that the 
borrower, and, if the borrower is not a member, that the guarantor, will be in position to meet its 
obligations under the loan), and IDA Articles, Art. V, Sect. 1 lit. g). 
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entity concerned, not least because the decision has a signaling effect concerning the 
legitimacy of a de facto government at home and abroad.643 
The World Bank was therefore the first international organization to formally 
establish criteria for determining under what conditions to engage with a de facto 
government for the purposes of development cooperation.644 In an attempt to codify 
the organization’s best practice developed in response to a large number of cases, the 
Bank adopted OP/BP 7.30 in 2001.645 
 
ii. Content and Consequences 
 
OP 7.30 defines “de facto government” as one that “comes into, or remains in, 
power by means not provided for in the country’s constitution, such as a coup d’état, 
revolution, usurpation, abrogation or suspension of the constitution”.646 In such cases, 
the Policy highlights that the decision of the Bank to continue or discontinue 
operations does not amount to an “approval”, i.e. recognition, of the government.647 
Recognition is essentially a political act, and as such outside of the Bank’s mandate. 
OP 7.30 does not concern who is entitled to represent a country at the Bank either, 
                                                        
643 The decision to engage with a de facto government becomes especially relevant where the legal 
status of a state or territory are in doubt, or a government’s claim to power has not been universally 
recognized. See also MACRAE, et al., 'Aid to 'Poorly Performing’ Countries: A Critical Review of 
Debates and Issues', at 44 and note 30, who identify “a link between aid, the capacity of political 
authorities to govern and claims to juridical status.”  
644 The UN General Assembly has discussed the question of how to deal with situations where there is 
more than one government claiming power in its early days, but never agreed on specific criteria to be 
followed. See the UN General Assembly Resolution 396 (V) on Recognition by the United Nations of 
the Representation of a Member State (December 14, 1950), para. 1, stating that “the question should 
be considered in light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case”, 
rather than in light of a specific set of criteria such as “effective control”. In contrast then 
United Nations Secretary-General Trygve Lie had previously suggested certain principles to guide the 
United Nations decision in such situations, namely the assertion “whether the new government 
exercises effective authority within the territory of the State and is habitually obeys by the bulk of the 
population.” See his Memorandum on the Legal Aspects of the Problem of Representation in the 
United Nations, 1950, UN Doc. S/1466 (March 9, 1950). 
645 Prior to the adoption of OP 7.30, a first policy-framework for dealing with de facto governments 
was outlined in the Bank’s Operational Manual in 1964, and subsequently updated in 1978, 1991, and 
1994. This illustrates that the Bank’s original concern with de facto government situations did not have 
to do with its growing engagement with conflict-affected and fragile states. On the emergence of OP 
7.30, see also CISSÉ, 'Should the Political Prohibition in Charters of International Financial Institutions 
be Revisited? The Case of the World Bank', at 64. 
646 OP 7.30, para. 1. The definition’s focus on coup situations reflects that these were considered the 
most obvious examples, while other situations can also be considered under the policy. The application 
to interim or transitional authorities in the context of conflicts, for instance, gained in importance only 
after the policy was drafted in 1994. 
647 OP 7.30, paras. 2 and 3. Despite this assurance, the Bank’s decision to engage with a country can 
nonetheless be seen as an implicit endorsement of a government as legitimate and reliable counterpart. 
Supra note 643. 
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which is dealt with under the organization’s credentials procedures. It solely regulates 
under what conditions the Bank can process new projects or administer existing ones, 
after an unconstitutional transition of power raises questions as to the ability and 
commitment of the de facto government to honor its obligations with the Bank.  
For this purpose, OP 7.30 distinguishes between the handling of existing 
operations and of new operations. In the first case, the Bank has already concluded 
legal agreements with the ousted government, which it cannot unilaterally suspend or 
terminate other than under the conditions established in existing agreements. 
Accordingly, the Bank generally deals with the new, de facto government, provided 
that it is in effective control of the country; recognizes the country’s past obligations 
and specifically its obligations towards the Bank; and is capable of implementing 
development projects and programs. 648  The first criterion of effective control is 
particularly crucial in situations where more than one entity claims to be the 
government in power, as the Bank has to ascertain not only whether, but with whom 
to continue working.649  
For new operations, the criteria are more demanding, reflecting the Bank’s 
discretion in deciding on new operations. First of all, staff should allow “a certain 
time to pass”. When carrying out assessments, they should consider not only whether 
the de facto government is in effective control, but also if it “enjoys a reasonable 
degree of stability and public acceptance”.650 In order to assess the government’s 
international acceptance, staff must consider how many countries, especially 
neighboring countries, have recognized the de facto government, and how other 
international organizations have responded to the situation.651  In other words, the 
Bank does not want to be a trend-setter when deciding on whether to engage with a de 
facto government. Finally, staff are required to assess whether the government honors 
its financial obligations towards the Bank, or whether it is likely to challenge the 
previous government’s competence or legitimacy to enter into such obligations – i.e. 
refusing its “odious debts”.652  
                                                        
648 OP 7.30, para. 4 lit. a) – e), including further the requirement that the “government duly authorizes a 
representative for the purpose of requesting withdrawals”. 
649 In this context, if the ousted, de jure government of the country still exercises partial control or has 
some meaningful potential to regain power, the Bank must also be careful no to subvert its claim to 
power by engaging prematurely with a de facto government.  
650 OP 7.30, para. 5 lit. b). 
651 OP 7.30, para. 5 lit. d) and e). 
652 OP 7.30 para. 5 lit. a) and note 6 concordantly, explicitly referring to the “general but not 
unqualified principle of international law” that obligations must be honored by successor governments. 
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Next to the decision-making criteria established in OP 7.30, BP 7.30 regulates in 
detail the decision-making process. It is a decentralized process that accords the 
ultimate decision-making authority to Bank staff, as they are most familiar with the 
situation on the ground. The Country Director first ensures that no further 
disbursements are made under existing loans, pending consultation with the de facto 
government. He is responsible for gathering all relevant information about the new 
government and situation in the country, and initiates an internal, consultative process, 
including with the legal department.653 The final decision rests with the Regional Vice 
President.654 Though Management is not required to inform or consult the Executive 
Board, in practice, it usually does. Both the Bank’s assessments and its final decisions 
under OP 7.30, however, are considered as deliberate information and hence not 
disclosed to the public. 
What follows from the World Bank’s assessment of the de facto government’s 
nature? As soon as a de facto government takes power in a country, and prior to a 
final decision on the Bank’s response, the Country Director may put the large 
majority of payments on hold. Initially, the suspension of disbursements occurs as a 
temporary measure, for which staff should seek an “informal agreement with the new 
authorities in the country”.655 In the event that the Bank’s internal assessment yields 
that it cannot continue engaging with the de facto government, it tries to suspend or 
terminate its existing legal commitments. Suspension or termination, however, are 
legal remedies that can be applied only on the basis of well-argued grounds, which are 
valid under the applicable financing agreement, the General Conditions, as well as 
provisions on suspension in applicable OPs/BPs.656  Suspension or termination are 
                                                                                                                                                              
For instance, it has occurred that governments refuse to meet the obligations incurred by a previous, de 
facto government, on the grounds that it did not have the competence or legitimacy to enter into long-
term obligations for the country. In the famous Tinoco Arbitration Case (supra note 640), Costa Rica 
failed to fend off obligations under a contract concluded by the previous coup government (the Tinoco 
regime) with a British company. For a summary of the debate concerning the odious debts doctrine, 
which holds that debt incurred by a regime for purposes that do not serve the interests of the nation 
should not be enforceable, see LEE C. BUCHHEIT & G. MITU GALATI, 'Odious Debts and Nation-
Building: When the Incubus Departs', 60 Maine Law Review, 478 (2008), pp. 480-485; and the overall 
affirmative contributions in ASHFAQ KHALFAN, et al., Centre for International Sustainable 
Development Law (CISDL) Working Paper, 'Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine' (2003).  
653 BP 7.30, paras. 1-3. 
654 BP 7.30, para. 6. The Vice President needs to take into account the recommendation made by the 
Country Director, which again needs to be cleared by the legal department. 
655 BP 7.30 para. 4. The legal basis for this temporary measure is not specified in BP 7.30, but in 
practice, the Bank can claim, for instance, that the new government’s representatives must first obtain a 
new authorization to make withdrawals.  
656 Namely, OP /BP 8.60, Development Policy Lending, OP/BP 9.00, Program-for-Results Financing, 
and OP/ BP 10.00, Investment Project Financing. See also IDA’s General Conditions on credits and 
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thus no automatic consequences of an OP 7.30 assessment. After all, OP 7.30 remains 
an internal rule that yields to the financing agreement as an international legal treaty, 
as well as the General Conditions that are incorporated by reference in all financing 
agreements.  
Still, Operational Policy 7.30 has the legal effect of authoritatively guiding Bank 
staff in their immediate response to unconstitutional changes of government. At least 
concerning the decision to take up new operations in such contexts, OP 7.30 
essentially expands the criteria and modifies the process whereby projects and 
programs are usually processed, according a greater role to factors pertaining to a 
government’s effectiveness and legitimacy. Moreover, the application of OP 7.30 
turns the burden of proof to the de facto government, which has to demonstrate it 
meets the criteria for continued disbursement or new lending. 
 
c) Comparison and Evaluation  
 
Operational Policy 2.30 and 7.30 are of central importance to the Bank’s 
engagement in fragile states. Together, they determine how the organization engages 
in non-member countries or in countries with no effective government, and how it 
identifies an effective government counterpart in the first place. The two Policies 
reflect the Bank’s approach where questions concerning the juridical aspects of 
statehood in the broadest sense have posed legal obstacles to its involvement in fragile 
states. How, and to what effect has the World Bank adapted its legal and policy 
framework?  
Beginning with the first part of the question, the World Bank has not only sought 
to deal with the legal obstacles it encountered in conflict-affected and fragile states ad 
hoc, on a case-by-case basis, for example by making use of policy waivers.657 Instead, 
                                                                                                                                                              
Art. VI, in particular Sect. 6.02 lit. e), since an unconstitutional change of government could constitute 
an “extraordinary situation”, “which makes it improbable that the Project can be carried out or that the 
Recipient or the Project Implementing Entity will be able to perform its obligations under the Legal 
Agreement to which it is a party.” 
657 Other international development organizations have in fact prepared the use of waivers when faced 
with similar questions like the World Bank. For example, the IFAD has extended loans and grants (i.e. 
not only trust fund resources) to the West Bank and Gaza, though it was equally restricted from using 
its resources in non-member territories. Therefore, IFAD’s Governing Council, the equivalent to the 
World Bank’s Board of Governors, waived the application of the concerned Article 7, Section 1 (b), of 
the Agreement Establishing IFAD, by passing a decision with the same majority that is required for a 
formal amendment. With a discussion in detail, see RUTSEL MARTHA, 'Mandate Issues in the Activities 
of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)', 6 International Organizations Law 
Review, 447 (2009), pp. 465-472. 
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the organization has codified organizational practices and mandate interpretations in 
internal rules, which authoritatively guide its decision-making thereafter.658 Whether 
it is in spite of, or rather because of, the often complex and deeply political nature of 
the challenges at hand, it is remarkable that the World Bank has chosen to formalize 
its response. After all, how to deal with the absence of government or determine the 
effectiveness or legitimacy of de facto authorities are controversial questions even 
under general international law.  
The Bank’s decision to adopt OPs/BPs points to a demand for practicable 
guidance, and comes with the promise of enhancing the predictability, consistency, 
and transparency of decision-making on such matters. Whether this inherent promise 
of internal rule-making is met, however, depends on a number of factors pertaining to 
the Policies’ design. To whom do they accord decision-making authority? To what 
extent do they determine decision-making criteria and process, and incorporate checks 
and balances – for instance, enabling public scrutiny through public disclosure?  
In these regards, OP 2.30 and OP 7.30 show important differences, which 
partly reflect the different objectives for which they were adopted. The relevant 
provisions in OP 2.30 were introduced to justify Bank involvement despite mandate 
restrictions in certain post-conflict situations. Wanting to act quickly and in 
concurrence with the international community in such exceptional situations, the 
Bank required a simple authorization mechanism. Therefore, OP 2.30 grants the sole 
decision-making authority to the Executive Board. The Executive Directors approve 
an operation and imply it conforms to the Bank’s mandate, without rendering a formal 
interpretation of the Articles of Agreement.659 The absence of any objective decision-
making criteria or procedural demands in OP/BP 2.30, e.g. to hold internal 
consultations prior to taking a decision, confirms the impression that Bank 
involvement is left entirely to the purview of the political organ. The Executive 
Directors can use the granted discretion to respond swiftly to the circumstances of 
each case – or they can misuse it for politicized decision-making and selectivity, 
authorizing Bank involvement if it fits their interests. The fact that the deliberations 
                                                        
658 Notably, the consequences of a decision taken under OP 2.30 or OP 7.30 emanate from a different 
legal basis – an Executive Board approval that serves as an implied interpretation in the first case, or 
contractual remedies in second case. Still, it is these Policies that predetermine how the Bank addresses 
a certain situation, establishing decision-making criteria and process. 
659 See supra note 634, and on the practice of implied interpretations, supra section 1 a) of this chapter. 
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are kept secret does not help to render the (informal interpretation) process more 
transparent.    
Against this background, it is also difficult to assess the application of the Policy 
in practice. The Bank has engaged quite frequently outside the territories of member-
states, for instance in newly-independent South Sudan prior to becoming a member.660 
In contrast, there seems to be only one case where it relied on OP 2.30 to engage in a 
country with no government in power: Somalia. It is beyond doubt that Somalia was 
without an effective government for several years following 1991, and that it had and 
still has enormous development needs.661 In this context, the Bank’s ingenuity seems 
laudable. In accordance with OP 2.30, requests from the international community and 
approval of the Executive Directors allowed the organization to provide trust fund 
resources to support at least a limited number of operations in Somalia, in close 
collaboration with the UN. 662  It is not clear, however, why the decision-making 
process and underlying legal reasoning had to remain secret. After all, there may be 
more controversial cases concerning the application of OP 2.30 in the future – while 
the consequences of the Bank’s decision to engage in a country with no government 
(consent) are significant. At second glance, even the case of Somalia is not 
uncontroversial. The AfDB, for example, chose to deal with Somalia’s Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) formed in 2004, whereas the World Bank only 
acknowledged the Federal Government of Somalia, established in 2012.663 The TFG 
                                                        
660 EVARIST BAIMU, South Sudan: A New State is Born, The World Bank - Law, Justice and 
Development (September 2011), at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/0,,contentMDK:22994
807~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:445634~isCURL:Y~isCURL:Y,00.html (accessed 
December 2014). 
661 Many international legal scholars have analyzed the case of Somalia and confirmed the breakdown 
of effective government as a defining element of juridical statehood. E.g. ALEXANDROS YANNIS, 'State 
Collapse and Prospects for Political Reconstruction and Democratic Governance in Somalia', 5 African 
Yearbook of International Law, 23 (1997); or KOSKENMÄKI, 'Legal Implications Resulting from State 
Failure in Light of the Case of Somalia'. On Somalia’s development needs, see supra note 606. 
662 THE WORLD BANK, 'Interim Strategy Note for Somalia for the period of FY 08-09 ' (June 21, 2007), 
para. 18: “Now and in the foreseeable future the Bank’s engagement in Somalia is based on an explicit 
request from the international community.” Requests were sought from the Special Representative of 
the UN Secretary General for Somalia, or the UN’s Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator. They took 
the form of letters that described the humanitarian need in Somalia, and echoing the language of OP 
2.30, called on the Bank’s Management and Executive Board to approve a particular project. Approved 
projects were mostly small-scale, concentrated on Somalia’s more stable regions Somaliland and 
Puntland, and were financed through trust funds like the SPF. At no point did the organization enter 
into legal relations with Somalia’s transitional authorities, nor were any funds disbursed to or 
channeled through the government. Instead, funding was provided mostly to the UN, and in some cases 
for activities implemented by the Bank itself. 
663 See AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Somalia Country Brief 2013-2015' (March 2013), Annex 10 on 
the AfDB’s activities in Somalia since 2010. 
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was largely unable to exercise effective control over the territory during 2004 and 
2012, but the Federal Government of Somalia still struggles to exert effective 
control.664 
OP 7.30 was adopted with a rather different objective in mind than OP 2.30. The 
Policy aims to provide guidance to staff on how to deal with de facto governments 
without interfering in the political affairs of members – or for that matter, without 
having members interfere in the apolitical affairs of the Bank. In order to insulate the 
Bank’s loan decisions from the political preferences of its shareholders, OP 7.30 does 
not foresee a role for the Executive Board or Board of Governors – in contrast, for 
instance, to the practice of the IMF.665 At the World Bank, decisions are taken by the 
country and regional management, based on a list of decision-making criteria that are 
supposedly relevant to the economic viability of its operations, and following a 
comprehensive process of internal consultations. 
Looking a bit closer, however, many of the criteria offer little practical guidance, 
and appear vague beyond a degree that is necessary to leave room to respond to 
individual cases. Particularly the “effective control” test is difficult to apply for the 
Bank’s staff, and so is determining the “stability and public acceptance” of a de facto 
government.666 For instance, what degree of public acceptance would be sufficient for 
the Bank to resume its engagement with an unelected, post-conflict government? And 
is there a hierarchy of importance between the different criteria, whereby the 
acceptance of a government can compensate for its limited effectiveness? It is also 
striking that while BP 7.30 regulates the assessment process and internal consultations 
in relative detail, the Country Director is free to decide when to invoke the Policy in 
the first place – i.e. whether or not an event constitutes an unconstitutional change of 
                                                        
664 The Bank’s decision to acknowledge the Federal Government of Somalia as the de jure government 
of the country and effective counterpart for the Bank is based on a confidential assessment of the Legal 
Department conducted in 2013. The decision is apparently based not so much on the government’s 
effectiveness at present, but rather on certain promising developments like the adoption of a 
constitution at last, which were seen as important steps towards asserting effective control, and had let 
to the wide endorsement of Somalia’s government within the international community. 
665 The IMF leaves the decision of how to deal with a de facto government entirely to its member states. 
It conducts an informal poll among the Executive Directors, whose views are seen to reflect the 
majority view (in terms of voting power) of all members, and who determine. 
666 GEORGIA HARLEY, 'To Disburse or Not to Disburse? Strengthening the World Bank’s Response to 
Revolutions and Coups d’Etat', 3 Sanford Journal of Public Policy, 20 (2012), 24, adding that it does 
not help that the term “effective control” has different meanings even under international law. 
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government.667 Moreover, decision-making under OP 7.30 is not subject to any form 
of independent monitoring or disclosure.668 
Against this background, it is doubtful whether the Policy’s objective – to decide 
an essentially political question through technical assessments that are free from 
member states’ political meddling – can be attained. There are only very few studies 
that provide insights on the application of OP 7.30 in practice. 669  Those studies 
suggest, however, that the World Bank indeed applies the Policy in a manner that is 
inconsistent beyond a measure that can be explained on the grounds that every case is 
unique.670 Rather, it seems that the position of regional (political) organizations and 
major bilateral donors, if not the geo-political and strategic relevance of a country in 
the eyes of the Executive Directors, have often influenced how the Bank deals with a 
de facto government.671 
To address the second part of the question – to what effect has the World Bank 
adapted its legal and policy framework – I look to three fundamental provisions of the 
Articles of Agreement as reference points. First, the organization is mandated to assist 
its member countries in achieving development objectives. OP 2.30 confirms that 
conflict has an adverse effect on the Bank’s development mandate, and accordingly, 
that activities aimed at conflict prevention or mitigation fall within the Bank’s 
                                                        
667 Moreover, once triggered, the Country Director can decide at what point he wants to apply the 
criteria and conduct an assessment, and only after the assessment has been made does the Bank decide 
whether or not to suspend a loan “in a matter of days” (BP 7.30, para. 4). In practice, most countries 
have remained under OP 7.30 with loan disbursements withheld only for shorter periods of about three 
months. In principle, however, the decision whether to resume normal operations with a de facto 
government could be postponed endlessly, leaving a state of limbo that concerns the Bank’s operations 
and the de facto government. 
668 The World Bank’s Inspection Panel, for instance, reviews staff compliance with OPs/BPs during the 
planning and implementation stages only if a party directly affected by the Bank’s operational activities 
in a country files a complaint. The (de facto) governments of member states cannot call for an 
investigation. See supra note 522. 
669 For an analysis of the application of OP 7.30 in Afghanistan and Iraq, see MICHAEL NESBITT, 'The 
World Bank and De Facto Governments. A Call for Transparency in the Bank's Operational Policy', 32 
Queen's Law Journal, 641 (2007); and for an analysis of Bank practice in Honduras 2009, Cote 
d’Ivoire 2010, Tunisia 2011, and Mali 2012, HARLEY, 'To Disburse or Not to Disburse? Strengthening 
the World Bank’s Response to Revolutions and Coups d’Etat'.  
670 E.g. NESBITT, 'The World Bank and De Facto Governments. A Call for Transparency in the Bank's 
Operational Policy', 643, arguing it “has not been applied with any degree of clarity or transparency”. 
671 Harley thus explains why the World Bank rapidly continued its disbursements to Tunisia and Egypt 
following the Arab Spring revolutions, but was equally quick to suspend disbursements following 
coups in seemingly less important countries like Mauritania, Mali, and Niger. HARLEY, 'To Disburse or 
Not to Disburse? Strengthening the World Bank’s Response to Revolutions and Coups d’Etat', 28. Also 
NESBITT, 'The World Bank and De Facto Governments. A Call for Transparency in the Bank's 
Operational Policy', who concludes from his analysis of the Bank’s practice with regards to 
Afghanistan and Iraq that “the Bank has hurried to the aid of Western-oriented post-conflict societies” 
(at 671).  
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mandate.672 Next to expanding the thematic scope of lawful Bank involvement, the 
Policy also expands its geographic scope, as it provides a basis for the organization to 
engage outside the territories of member states. OP 2.30 thus appears to reflect that 
the World Bank is increasingly prepared to overcome restrictions of its state-centric 
mandate that stand in the way of assisting fragile states and their populations in 
achieving development objectives. The Policy allows the objective of development to 
override other concerns, in that it emphasizes the need to stay engaged in the most 
difficult circumstances – political, or legal. Notably, the same cannot be said for OP 
7.30. Applied legalistically, the Policy does not support (continuous) Bank 
involvement in a country with a post-conflict government that is not considered 
effective or legitimate.  
In terms of standards of effectiveness, both Operational Policies cater to the 
World Bank’s duty under the Articles of Agreement to ensure the effective use of 
resources and repayment of loans. This is most evident from the criteria in OP 7.30, 
which seek to ensure that Bank’s decisions on how to deal with a de facto government 
take into account its interest as a creditor in the legal liability of its counterparts.673 In 
turn, the principle tenor of OP 2.30 appears to be in favor of enabling (continuous) 
Bank involvement in conflict-affected countries, where it is often difficult to 
guarantee the effective use of resources. Still, in both cases of extraordinary 
engagement under OP 2.30, we have seen that the organization usually engages not 
with its normal lending instruments, but as an administrator of trust funds. 674 
Particularly where the Bank’s own resources are not involved and the organization 
provides grants, not loans, it has more flexibility concerning how, and to whom it can 
provide assistance.675 Accordingly, trust funds are perhaps the World Bank’s principal 
tool to reconcile engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states with its fiduciary 
duties.676 
                                                        
672 See already supra section 1 b) of this chapter. 
673 Consider, for instance, the requirement for staff to assess the government’s commitment to honor its 
obligations under international here, i.e. financial obligations towards the Bank. See supra note 652. 
674 See section 3 a) of this chapter on the use of trust fund arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza, 
Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, and Somalia.   
675 E.g. supra notes 617 and 618. Importantly, following a trust fund reform initiative approved by the 
Board in October 2007, the Bank has sought to gradually align the processes and procedures used for 
trust funds it administers with the requirements applicable to normal Bank lending. For a 
comprehensive legal analysis of trust funds, see BANTEKAS, Trust Funds under International Law. 
Trustee Obligations of the United Nations and International Development Banks. 
676 There are many more reasons why trust funds have become an increasingly popular financing 
instrument particularly in conflict-affected and fragile states, e.g. the associated benefits – at least 
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Finally, how do the two Policies relate to the protection of recipient sovereignty 
in the Articles of Agreement, the political prohibition clause? The political 
prohibition implies that the World Bank can only engage in a country upon the 
request of the government in power. 677  To this fundamental principle of Bank 
involvement, OP 2.30 introduces an exception: engagement at the request of the 
international community in countries with no government. Though the Policy 
suggests that the exception needs to be authorized through an implied interpretation of 
the Executive Directors, it is not clear what provision of the Articles such an 
interpretation would rely on – or whether a formal amendment would be needed 
instead. 678  Purposive interpretation is a common tool to adapt the statutes of 
international organizations to changing circumstances and demands, but is not without 
limits.679 An amendment of the Articles would have required a qualified majority in 
the Board of Governors, the organ where all member states are represented.680 This is 
certainly a higher barrier than an implied interpretation of the Executive Board, where 
only 25 member states are represented – but with its system of weighted voting, also 
not quite equal.681  
                                                                                                                                                              
theoretically – of better donor coordination and risk sharing, funding predictability, transparency, and 
other principles of aid effectiveness. See, for instance, LEONIE GUDER, 'Multi-Donor Trust Funds: 
Instruments of First Choice for Post-Crisis Situations?' Development Outreach, 36 (February 2009); 
OLIVER WALTON, Governance and Social Development (GSD) Resource Center, 'Helpdesk Research 
Report: Trust Funds in Fragile and Low Capacity States' (2011); and with a more critical assessment 
of actual trust fund performance, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP, 'World Bank Assistance to Low-
Income Fragile- and Conflict Affected States', pp. 115-120. 
677 Supra note 559. 
678 At least some provisions in the Articles of Agreement could have served as a basis for such a 
purposive interpretation. For instance, the IDA Articles generally accommodate the idea that there may 
be territories with no sovereign government, as the territorial application of the Articles extends to “all 
territories for whose international relations [each member] is responsible” (Articles, Art. XI, Sect. 3). 
Moreover, IDA may provide financing not only to a government, but also to “a public, or private entity 
in the territories of a member or members, or to a public international or regional organization” (Art. V 
Sect. 2 lit. c). And if the IDA cannot provide assistance to a country if the government objects, it is 
prima facie subject to interpretation what happens if there is no government to object.  
679 See, for instance, MARTHA, 'Mandate Issues in the Activities of the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD)', 474, arguing that one limit for the use of interpretation as a means 
for adapting the statutes of international organizations consists in the statutes’ amendment procedures, 
which shall not be undermined by an excessive use of interpretation. Further limits can be found in the 
Articles’ provision on interpretation itself. For instance, in the case that a question of interpretation 
arises that particularly affects a member that is not currently represented by an Executive Director, it 
has the right to attend their meeting. Any member state can require a controversial question of 
interpretation to be referred to the Board of Governors. IDA Articles Art. X lit. a), in accordance with 
Article VI, Sect. 4 lit. g) and lit. b). However, both provisions are of limited use to member states with 
no government in power or non-member states – which underscores how problematic the Bank’s 
reliance on interpretation is in this context, and even more informal interpretation. 
680 Supra note 535. 
681 Notably, an earlier formulation of the Bank’s evolving practice in its 1998 Report on Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction required the Board of Governors to approve Bank operations in such cases, not the 
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OP 7.30 was introduced to guide Bank staff in responding to situations that 
require navigating exceedingly close to the political prohibition clause. Virtually all 
of the criteria that staff need to consider when deciding about new loans or 
administering existing ones involve the consideration of political circumstances. As 
noted before, the Bank can take political circumstances into consideration if it is 
sufficiently clear that they could affect the viability of a project or program in 
economic terms.682 Whether this is always the case concerning the criteria of OP 7.30 
is, however, doubtful. For instance, there is no sufficiently clear link between the 
number of states that have recognized the de facto government and the success of the 
Bank’s operations. The World Bank argues that a non-recognized government would 
be internationally isolated and as a consequence, projects could no longer successfully 
be implemented. Yet this is not always the case, and international recognition should 
thus be a decision-making factor only if it is clearly relevant for the economy or 
efficiency of a project.683 Similarly, OP 7.30’s criteria do not only require the Bank to 
ascertain the effectiveness of a de facto government, but also its “public 
acceptance”. 684  Perhaps the public acceptance of a government increases the 
likelihood that World Bank loans will be put to use in a way that benefits the 
population. Nonetheless, the link between the legitimacy of a government and its 
ability to serve as an effective partner for the Bank is not always obvious. The 
problem with OP 7.30, it seems, is that the Policy emphasizes the technical nature of 
the relevant assessments, but it cannot disguise the quintessentially political nature of 
the issue at hand. 
If the political prohibition clause has thus been sidelined in both Policies, it is by 
a somewhat vague reference to the interests of the international community. The 
World Bank has often engaged in post-conflict countries when it was called to partake 
                                                                                                                                                              
Executive Board. See THE WORLD BANK, 'Post-Conflict Reconstruction. The Role of the World Bank', 
30, requiring “prior approval of the Board, where all Bank members are represented.” 
682 See supra section 1 b) of this chapter. 
683 The IFAD has drafted a similar policy for dealing with de facto governments than the World Bank, 
but has explicitly sought to modify its criteria “to emphasize the practical over the political”, and 
therefore consider international recognition only where it directly impacts on the likelihood that 
IFAD’s projects can be carried out successfully. IFAD, Guidelines on Dealing with De Facto 
Governments, EB 2009/98/R.16 (17 November 2009), para. 12. The final draft of IFAD’s Guidelines 
approved in 2011, however, does not include such a specification, apparently because it was not in the 
interest of Executive Board members. 
684 Notably, while many states consider a government’s internal legitimacy when deciding to enter into 
diplomatic relations, traditionally, international legal doctrine knows only the “effective control” test to 
identify the government of a country E.g. MAGIERA, 'Governments', para. 18; and on ‘effective 
government’ as a criterion of statehood under international law, supra chapter I.3 a).  
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in the broader reconstruction and state-building efforts of the international community. 
The notion of community interests features prominently in both of the examined 
provisions in OP 2.30 – Bank engagement may be requested by the “international 
community”, or be approved if “beneficial” to the Bank’s membership as a whole. 
Such collective expressions of interest can substitute for a request from the 
government – that is, state consent. In a similar vein, Deputy General Counsel 
Hassane Cissé has noted that the Bank’s approach under OP 7.30, though it may seem 
to involve political considerations, would be “consistent with the Bank’s will to act as 
a good and responsible international citizen.”685  
At the same time, the World Bank has demonstrated some flexibility in accepting 
entities other than the de jure government of a country as counterparts for some 
restricted purposes. In a country like Somalia, this sort of legal ingenuity seems 
vindicated, and may even be grounded in the emerging legal concept of responsibility 
to protect.686 Yet institutions that claim to represent the international community in 
post-conflict countries, for instance UNTAET in East Timor or UNMIK in Kosovo, 
can also suffer from doubtful democratic legitimacy. How far should the Bank go 
with long-term development plans for a country with no sovereign government? 
Ultimately, it appears vital that the World Bank will strive to ensure the maximum 
leadership and participation of the local population in such circumstances. 
 
4. Empirical Statehood and the Regulation of Operations in Countries 
with Weak Capacity  
 
The World Bank does not only require national governments as legal counterparts. 
The state-centric development paradigm further translates into the way the Bank plans 
and implements development projects and programs.687 Recipient governments are 
expected to draft long-term, national development strategies, to prepare concrete 
projects, and to ensure their implementation in accordance with the Bank’s economic 
and fiduciary, environmental and social standards. The roles and responsibilities of 
national governments and the Bank in the development process are outlined in the 
Articles of Agreement, and concretized in a comprehensive set of internal rules. The 
                                                        
685 CISSÉ, 'Should the Political Prohibition in Charters of International Financial Institutions be 
Revisited? The Case of the World Bank', 66. 
686 On the responsibility to protect, see supra chapter I.3 b) 
687 On the state-centric paradigm of development cooperation and its premises in terms of juridical and 
empirical statehood, see supra chapter II.2 a)  
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World Bank hence requires government counterparts that are literally effective – 
governments with basic levels of institutional and administrative capacity and 
political commitment. 
In the weak-capacity, politically unstable environments of many fragile and 
conflict-affected states, however, these conditions are not always met. Governments 
may lack the capacity to meet the Bank’s ex ante requirements, for instance, or fail to 
implement projects and programs as agreed, resulting in the suspension of aid.688  
How does the Bank operate in countries with weak capacity or commitment to assume 
ownership? More specifically, where have rules that govern the process of 
development cooperation proven inadequate or ineffective when engaging with fragile 
states, and how did the organization adapt? 
To effectively engage and achieve development objectives in fragile states, the 
World Bank has included special provisions in the rules that regulate how its staff 
normally plan and implement operations. Through these provisions, the organization 
has essentially postponed or reduced requirements for governments with weak 
capacities, while scaling up capacity-building and implementation assistance. 
Although the Bank has thus introduced a sort of differential treatment, its approach 
has not always been systematic, and not explicitly targeted at fragile states. 
In this section, I look at the substantive and procedural rules that regulate the 
World Bank’s normal lending operations, and examine how, and to what effect they 
have been adapted for fragile states. I distinguish between the organization’s three 
financial instruments, which serve different purposes and are therefore subject to 
different requirements: 689  Investment Project Financing (a), Development Policy 
Lending (b), and Program-for-Results Financing (c). To conclude, I summarize and 
compare the approach chosen under each of the three regimes, considering how each 
of them balances the World Bank’s mandated objective of development, standards of 
effectiveness, and the protection of recipient sovereignty (d). 
 
                                                        
688 It must be noted, however, that while implementation rates have often been lower in fragile states 
than in other countries in the past, more recent trends suggest otherwise. See JOEL HELLMAN, 
Surprising Results from Fragile States, World Bank Blog (October 15, 2013), at 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/futuredevelopment/surprising-results-fragile-states . 
689 Which of the three instruments the Bank uses in a country generally depends on the circumstances 
of a country, including donor relations with the government. The respective reasoning is laid out in the 
Country Partnership Framework (CPF), which is prepared by the Bank’s staff in consultation with 
national authorities. The CPF is a medium-term strategy that establishes the basic parameters of Bank 
assistance to a country.  
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a) Investment Project Financing – A Kind of Differential Treatment 
i. Background 
 
The largest share of the IDA’s concessional loans or grants is provided for 
concrete development projects and programs that pursue specified results. Project 
lending, called Investment Project Financing or IPF at the Bank, is the organization’s 
original and still central financing instrument, which accounted for 75 to 80 percent of 
all lending over the past two decades.690  
IPF operations are subject to a complex and dense regime of substantive and 
procedural requirements, which result from the Articles of Agreement, as well as 
more detailed stipulations in Bank-internal rules, particularly OP/BP 10.00 on 
Investment Project Financing.691 OP/BP 10.00 forms the core of the Bank’s project 
lending regime, regulating the process from project identification to approval. The 
regime is structured by the dual objective of assisting member states in achieving their 
own development objectives, while ensuring the purposeful and effective use of the 
Bank’s resources. 692  Accordingly, recipient governments can formally request the 
Bank to become active, determine the design of the project, and render approval to the 
terms and conditions under which it is financed.693 Whether the World Bank agrees to 
finance and continues financing a project depends, however, on the ability of the 
government to meet a number of requirements.  
To qualify for investment lending, governments have to propose a project that 
meets the Bank’s standards in terms of, inter alia, economy and effectiveness, 
financial management and procurement, as well environmental protection, protection 
of indigenous people, and protection from involuntary resettlement.694 For each of the 
latter, safeguard policies prescribe thorough assessments to be conducted by every 
country applying for funding, including, for instance, the consultation of certain 
                                                        
690 THE WORLD BANK, 'Annual Report 2014', Table 19 (p. 58). On the historic evolution of the Bank’s 
project lending regime, see SHIHATA, The World Bank in a Changing World, pp. 85-109. 
691 OP/BP 10.00 on Investment Project Financing, April 2013, replacing OP/BP 10.00 on Investment 
Lending: Identification to Board Presentation (June 1994), subsequent to a major reform of the Bank’s 
investment lending operations. On the reforms, see infra note 707. 
692 See supra section 1 b) of this chapter on standards of effectiveness in the Bank’s legal framework, 
and chapter III.2 on effectiveness as a basic idea in the law of international development organizations. 
693 IDA-Articles Art. V Sect. 1 lit. d) and e) and in detail, OP/BP 10.00.  
694 OP 10.00, paras. 3-9 and BP 10.00 regulate in detail the respective roles of the Bank and the 
borrower in the process from the initial project proposal and preparation, through its appraisal by the 
Bank according to Bank-determined standards (paras. 15-25), up to its approval.  
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vulnerable groups and the preparation of comprehensive risk-mitigation strategies.695 
Further, the Bank imposes an entire regime of procurement guidelines on the recipient. 
The Bank’s financial management arrangements at least rely on the country’s existing 
institutions and systems guidelines where feasible. By signing the legal agreements 
after which an operation proceeds to implementation, recipients further commit to 
implement projects “with due diligence”, and to maintain appropriate implementation, 
monitoring, and evaluation arrangements.696  
For fragile states that lack the necessary institutional and administrative capacities, 
meeting the accumulated requirements to qualify for project lending from the World 
Bank is particularly difficult and cumbersome, and can put a further strain on their 
already scarce resources and capacities. Non-compliance during implementation, in 
turn, can result in the suspension or termination of operations, contributing to the high 
level of aid volatility that constitutes a major problem for fragile states.697 For the 
Bank, the demanding standards, procedures, and accountability mechanisms for IPF 
operations create stumbling for rapid engagement in countries with weak capacity, 
physical insecurity, and political instability.698 At the same time, the Bank introduced 
safeguard policies and enhanced its pre-approval assessments and supervision 
requirements precisely to respond to the criticism that the projects it financed were 
violating environmental and social standards, or were not effectively implemented.699 
                                                        
695 Safeguard policies are Bank-internal policies aimed at preventing and mitigating potential harm to 
people and the environment caused by Bank-financed projects. Safeguards are contained in separate 
OPs/BPs, most notably OP/BP 4.01 on Environmental Assessment; OP/BP 4.10 on Indigenous 
Peoples: and OP/BP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement. At the time of writing, the Bank’s safeguard 
policies were undergoing major reforms, which are likely to result in the adoption of an integrated 
framework of safeguard policies. See THE WORLD BANK, 'The World Bank’s Safeguard Policies. 
Proposed Review and Update – Approach Paper' (October 2012), and with an analysis of the current 
system and a proposal for reform, DANN & VON BERNSTORFF, 'Reforming the World Bank’s Safeguards. 
A Comparative Legal Analysis'. 
696 OP 10.00, para. 18. OP/BP 13.60 on Monitoring and Evaluation imposes further procedural 
obligations on the recipients of loans, who are asked to self-evaluate and report on the project’s 
implementation. Additional sanctions mechanisms are provided for in separate OPs, depending on the 
violated standard. 
697 In case of non-compliance, the Bank has an array of options to respond, from temporary suspension 
to cancellation of disbursements, and the demand for reimbursement of credits or grants. See in 
particular the IDA General Conditions, Art. VI on Cancellation; Suspension; Acceleration; Grant 
Refund.  
698 See The World Bank, Toward a New Framework for Rapid Bank Response to Crises and 
Emergencies (supra note 552), stating that operational delays have been problematic in many countries 
with very weak capacities and fiscal difficulties. 
699 The safeguard policies were introduced in response to the mounting criticism that Bank-financed 
project were causing environmental harm, contributing to displacements, or violating indigenous 
peoples’ rights (see supra note 470). Ex ante assessments and ongoing supervision of Bank-financed 
projects were increased in response to the Wapenhans Report of 1992, which found that Bank staff 
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In countries where national environmental and social standards, for example, are low 
or unenforced, or where public resource management is fraught with corruption, the 
high standards of the investment project lending regime thus seem particularly 
warranted.  
How has the organization addressed the dual challenge of rendering assistance to 
weak capacity and poorly governed countries, without compromising its development 
mandate and standards of effectiveness?  
 
ii. Special Provisions for Investment Project Operations in Fragile 
States  
 
In order to avoid delays or suspensions of aid in fragile states, the World Bank 
first began referring to its emergency policies and procedures, namely OP/BP 8.00 on 
Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies. 700  Though adopted with single-event 
emergencies in mind, with the Bank’s increasing engagement in post-conflict 
situations in the mid 1990s, the Policy gradually became its preferred tool for 
avoiding the procedural and material requirements of normal lending operations.701 
On the basis of the broad definition of “crises or disasters” in OP 8.00, World Bank 
staff argued that conflict-affected or post-conflict countries suffered from severe 
social and economic distortions, which needed to be addressed with emergency 
operations.702 Once triggered, the Policy permitted the Bank to engage more rapidly 
by reducing ex ante requirements for project approval or modifying fiduciary and 
safeguard requirements to facilitate implementation. 703  Additionally, BP 8.00 
established special procedural arrangements for the entire project cycle, with the 
declared objective of enhancing speed, flexibility and simplicity. In return, staff were 
                                                                                                                                                              
often approved loans without paying proper attention to their supervision implementation (‘approval 
culture’).  
700 OP/BP 8.00 on Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies (March 2007) is here referred to as “old 
OP 8.00”, since it was considerably revised in April 2013, to reflect the fact that some of its provisions 
on exceptional treatment of emergency operations are now mainstreamed in the new OP 10.00. 
701 THE WORLD BANK, 'Post-Conflict Reconstruction. The Role of the World Bank', at 33. 
Approximately two-thirds of countries recognized in the Bank’s list of fragile situations in 2012 had 
emergency operations between 2005 and 2012, and these were seldom in response to natural disaster. 
For instance, in Haiti, the World Bank used OP 8.00 to work with the government and the UN 
Peacekeeping mission to improve road access and refuse collection in highly insecure urban slams of 
the capital. See The World Bank, Toward a New Framework for Rapid Bank Response to Crises and 
Emergencies (supra note 552), at 23, also noting that the Bank often engaged on the basis of a case-by-
case, de facto expansion of the narrow definition of emergency in OP 8.00. 
702 Old OP 8.00, para. 2. Notably, the use of OP 8.00 for post-conflict operations is made explicit by 
means of reference in OP 2.30 on Development Cooperation and Conflict, footnote 1.  
703 Old OP 8.00 para. 7.  
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required to exercise more intense supervision, thus shifting the balance between 
(reduced) ex ante requirements and (enhanced) ex post control.704  
By continuously invoking OP 8.00, a Policy designed for emergencies, in fragile 
states, the World Bank essentially treated a possibly permanent condition of weak 
state capacity as exceptional. In other words, state fragility was addressed as an 
exceptional deviation from a normal condition that could be returned to once crisis 
had ceased – while the Bank’s evolving conceptual understanding of state fragility 
suggested the opposite.705 In practical terms, the reliance on OP 8.00 also meant that 
staff constantly had to justify the persistence of an “emergency” situation. And while 
the Policy allowed to temporarily shift requirements from ex ante to ex post, it did not 
allow to adjust them to the fact that “business as usual” may not be returned to in the 
medium-term.  
In light of these constraints, the World Bank decided to formalize its 
organizational practice of using emergency policies and procedures in fragile states. 
In 2013, in the wake of a major reform of the investment lending regime, it 
substantially revised OP 10.00 and mainstreamed the option of downsizing 
requirements for all countries experiencing capacity constraints.706 The changes to OP 
10.00 must be understood as part of a broader effort to consolidate a complex and 
incoherent set of policies and procedures for investment lending.707 For instance, the 
new Policy involves a general shift of the World Bank’s role, from supervising how 
recipient countries implement projects on the basis of prescribed standards, to 
providing implementation support.708 The introduction of more flexible requirements 
specifically for conflict-affected and fragile states, however, was also a central 
recommendation of the WDR 2011.709  
                                                        
704 Old OP 8.00 para. 1 lit d) and BP 8.00 para 7. 
705 See, for instance, The World Bank, Operationalizing the WDR (supra note 359), Annex A, para. 4, 
explaining that fragility is “a long-term challenge rather than an episodic emergency”. 
706 The purpose of OP 8.00 remains to outline the basic principles, objectives, and limits of Bank 
engagement in the context of crises and emergency, and the Policy was accordingly revised in April 
2013.  
707 On the purpose, the principle parameters, and concrete policy changes of the first major reforms to 
the Bank’s most important financial instrument since the 1960s, see the concept note on „Investment 
Lending Reform“ (January 26, 2009) and the Board paper “Investment Lending Reform: Modernizing 
and Consolidating Operational Policies and Procedures” (November 1, 2012). 
708 BP 10.00, paras. 30-46. 
709 For instance, the Report recommends that demanding procedures for project supervision and 
procurement be “distilled to the simplest level of due process”, and that fiduciary safeguards should be 
revised to avoid that disbursements be automatically suspended or terminated in case of delays or 
failures. THE WORLD BANK, 'World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development', at 277.  
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The revised Policy establishes that not only projects in countries that are deemed 
“in urgent need of assistance because of natural or man-made disaster or conflict”, but 
also those that “experience capacity constraints because of fragility or specific 
vulnerabilities (including small states)” are eligible for certain exceptions.710 Fragility 
is determined on the basis of the Bank’s CPIA-based list of fragile situations, or in the 
case of sub-national fragility in an otherwise stable country, if it pertains to an area 
with “very low capacity, unstable and rapidly changing conditions and limited or no 
functional state presence.” 711  As previously under OP 8.00, exceptions from the 
Bank’s normal project lending regime concern the deferral of fiduciary, 
environmental and social requirements to the implementation phase; the use of 
simplified and accelerated procedures; and the use of alternative implementation 
arrangements in countries with limited capacity. 712  Alternative implementation 
arrangements imply that the Bank can, instead of working through national 
institutions, rely on other international agencies or implement projects itself, for 
instance through the use of trust fund. 713  Such arrangements must, however, be 
limited in time and supplemented with capacity-building measures.714  
How such exceptions are approved and applied is subject to Bank Procedures 
10.00. Exceptional arrangements must be requested by the recipient’s government and 
approved by the Bank’s Management, if it determines that the country meets the 
Policy’s eligibility criteria.715 In addition to BP 10.00, the World Bank has issued 
detailed, though non-binding instructions that provide further guidance on the use of 
exceptional arrangements.716  Once approved, Bank staff can accordingly access a 
menu of options that are not available under the Bank’s normal investment lending 
regime, from deferring substantive requirements under the safeguard policies, to 
                                                        
710 OP 10.00, para. 11. 
711 Instructions: Preparation of Investment Project Financing – Situations of Urgent Need of Assistance 
or Capacity Constraints  (2013), p. 6. Instructions are issued by the Bank to provide more detailed step-
by-step guidance than contained in BPs, to help staff process a transaction. On the Bank’s classification 
of fragile states, see supra section 2 of this chapter. 
712 All exceptions are established in OP 10.00, para. 11 lit. (a) - (e), and the procedural modifications 
particularly in BP 10.00, para. 47 lit. (c). With these exceptions now included in OP 10.00, the old OP 
8.00 was accordingly revised and is now focused on establishing guiding principles and objectives, as 
well as the permissible forms and scope of Bank engagement in response to crises and emergencies. 
713 OP 10.00, para. 11 lit. (d) permits the Bank to “enter into agreements with relevant international 
agencies, including the United Nations, national agencies, private entities, or other third parties”, or use 
grants or trust funds arrangements to implement activities itself. On the flexibilities associated with the 
use of trust funds, see section 3 a) and c) of this chapter. 
714 OP 10.00, para. 11 lit. (e) and BP 10.00 para. 47 lit. (b). 
715 BP 10.00, para. 47. 
716 Supra note 711. 
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simplified procedures, and alternative implementation arrangements for start-up 
activities. Which of these measures they apply is subject to discretion, and the 
recipient state in whose territory the project is implemented gains no entitlement to a 
certain treatment.  
Arguably, the World Bank has thus introduced a kind of differential treatment in 
the legal regime for investment project lending – it uses differentiated standards and 
differentiates at the implementation level, with the explicit aim of acknowledging and 
addressing material differences between its member states.717 
 
b) Development Policy Lending – Ownership as an Objective, not a 
Precondition 
i. Background 
 
Through Development Policy Lending, more commonly known as budget 
assistance, the World Bank provides financial assistance to the general budget of 
recipient countries, to support pro-development policy and institutional reforms. In 
contrast to project lending, budget assistance constitutes a source of untied funding 
for country-owned programs, which are managed and implemented through the 
country’s national systems. Development Policy Operations (DPO) thus allow larger 
sums of money to be disbursed quicker, at minimal administrative burden for 
recipient states, in exchange for the promise of introducing policy change.  
In some regards, Development Policy Lending thus appears particularly suitable 
for fragile states. By channeling aid through national systems, DPOs focus on 
strengthening the capacity of state institutions to carry out basic functions. Because 
donors align with government-owned programs when providing budget assistance, the 
burden on weak governments to meet the requirements of various donor-imposed 
parallel systems is reduced.718 And since budget assistance is disbursed quicker, it is 
                                                        
717 See the definition of differential treatment by PHILIPPE CULLET, Differential Treatment in 
International Environmental Law (Ashgate, 2003), 19, and on forms and instruments of differential 
treatment, pp. 32-36. I elaborate this thought in infra chapter VI.1. 
718 The Bank’s shift to Development Policy Lending (previously known as Structural Adjustment 
Lending) in the 1980s is partly owed to the experience that financing specific projects alone is 
ineffective or insufficient in countries with weak capacities and poor policies. See CAROL LANCASTER, 
'The World Bank in Africa since 1980: The Politics of Structural Adjustment Lending', in Devesh 
Kapur, et al. (eds), The World Bank. Its First Half Century. Volume 2: Perspectives (Brookings 
Institution, 1997). 
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more suitable than project lending to address urgent financing needs in times of 
crisis.719  
For the World Bank, however, budget assistance generally involves higher 
fiduciary, economic, and political risks than project lending, risks that can be 
amplified in fragile states.720 With resources going directly to the national budget of a 
country, for reform programs implemented through national systems in their entirety, 
the organization has fewer means of ensuring they are used effectively to achieve 
development objectives. It is no coincidence that budget assistance is permitted under 
the Articles of Agreement only under “special circumstances”, and still accounts for 
only 20% of overall Bank lending.721  
Two central components of the Bank’s legal regime for DPOs aim at mitigating 
these risks – and both make it prima facie unlikely that budget assistance is used in 
fragile states. First, more than any of the Bank’s financing instruments, DPOs are 
predicated on the existence of a government with capable institutions, good 
governance, and the political commitment to assume ownership. OP 8.60 makes the 
decision to provide budget assistance to a country dependent on a thorough appraisal 
of its policy and institutional framework, as well as commitment to propose and 
implement a national reform program. 722  Based on the CPIA, fragile states by 
definition score low on most of these aspects, and are less likely to fulfill the Bank’s 
                                                        
719 For instance, the World Bank approved USD 750 million of budget support to the government of 
Ukraine, as the government was facing continued tensions on the eastern border with Russia in May 
2014. While there were only five Development Policy Lending operations in fragile states in the fiscal 
years 2005-2007, by 2008, the number had already increased to almost 40. Still, fragile states received 
only 10% of assistance as direct budgetary contributions between 2009 and 2011, whereas the overall 
portion of Bank funding disbursed through budget assistance is 20%. THE WORLD BANK, '2012 
Development Policy Lending Retrospective' (2013), para. 17.   
720 THE WORLD BANK & AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Providing Budget Aid in Situations of 
Fragility: A World Bank - African Development Bank Common Approach Paper' (2011), at 15-17; and 
THE WORLD BANK, '2012 Development Policy Lending Retrospective', 34-37. 
721 IDA Articles, Art. V, Sect. 1 (b). The Bank’s legal department argues that special circumstances are 
generally given when loans other than for specific projects are used in accordance with the productive 
purposes requirement of the Bank’s mandate. The Executive Directors must establish for each 
Development Policy operation whether this is the case. SHIHATA, The World Bank Legal Papers, pp. 
163-167 and 179-182. 
722 OP 8.60 on Development Policy Lending (February, 2012), paras. 2, 3, and 5. The criteria 
established in OP 8.60 are further elaborated in Good Practice Notes, non-binding guidelines on 
various aspects of Development Policy Lending. Moreover, recipients are required to commit in a 
separate document annexed to the loan agreement, the so-called Letter of Development Policy, to the 
broad objectives and policy, institutional, or legislative measures of government programs for which 
they seek Bank funding. The self-commitment contained in the Letter addressed to the World Bank’s 
President is a prerequisite for budget assistance to be approved by the Executive Board.  
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general “governmental conditionality”.723 Second, budget assistance is provided only 
upon fulfillment of specific, mutually agreed conditions – that is, policy or 
institutional actions that need to be completed before disbursements are made.724 
Countries with weak institutions and poor governance often lack the capacity to 
deliver on the accumulated set of conditions, or fail to attain the agreed results in 
circumstances of political instability or conflict. Consequently, budget assistance must 
be temporarily suspended or terminated.  
How has the World Bank adapted its legal and policy framework to extend 
Development Policy Lending to fragile states?  
 
ii. Special Considerations for Development Policy Lending in 
Fragile States 
 
In order to facilitate the extension of Development Policy Lending to post-
conflict and fragile states, the World Bank has introduced an exceptional provision in 
OP 8.60 in 2004.725 In “crisis and post-conflict situations”, where countries may need 
rapid assistance, but lack the capacity to design Development Policy operations that 
meet the usual requirements, budget assistance may be approved by the Executive 
Boards “on an exceptional basis”.726 Bank staff must therefore explain in the program 
document when and how the usual requirements – e.g. environmental standards, 
fiduciary arrangements, or requirements to consult national stakeholders outside of 
                                                        
723 DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU 
and Germany, 417. Whereas SALs relied on relatively specific “policy-change conditionality”, the 
Bank later began to shift to “policy-level conditionality”, in the sense of aid selectivity based on the 
existence of a good policy and institutional framework and country ownership. See RAUL HOPKINS, et 
al., 'The World Bank, Conditionality, and the Comprehensive Development Framework', in 
Christopher L. Gilbert & David Vines (eds), The World Bank. Structure and Policies (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 288. On the CPIA-based classification of fragile states, see supra section 2 of 
this chapter. 
724 OP 8.60, para. 13 (Conditions): “The Bank makes the loan funds available to the borrower upon 
maintenance of an adequate macroeconomic policy framework, implementation of the overall program 
in a manner satisfactory to the Bank, and compliance with these critical program conditions.” The 
Bank supervises the implementation of government programs supported through Development Policy 
Lending and verifies the fulfillment of the agreed conditions.  
725 OP 8.60 replaced Operational Directive OD 8.60 of December 1992, which contained no such 
exception. The old Directive instead explicitly stated “Adjustment lending is not advisable when the 
political commitment to adjustment is weak or highly uncertain”, which could be determined on the 
basis of the “capacity and willingness of country authorities to prepare acceptable Letters of 
Development Policy.” (para. 39). 
726 OP 8.60, para. 32. The term “crisis” here refers to financial crisis “with substantial structural and 
social dimensions”, or economic shocks. Post-conflict countries are those with urgent reconstruction 
needs but lacking a medium-term reform agenda usually required for the Bank to assess the 
government’s policies and commitment.  
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the government – would be addressed at a later stage. Besides defining situations of 
“crisis” and “post-conflict”, neither the Policy, nor the according Bank Procedures 
specify decision-making parameters or procedures to be followed.  
More elaborate, though non-binding guidance is contained in the Good Practice 
Note for Development Policy Operations in Fragile States, which was prepared by 
Bank staff in 2005.727 Accordingly, the use of budget assistance should be considered 
once a country has a legitimate government, adopted a budget, and has a reasonably 
functioning treasury system. In addition, the Note makes specific recommendations 
for adapting the design and implementation of Development Policy Operations to the 
weak capacity and volatile environment of fragile states, namely, using fewer 
performance- or outcome-based conditionality, and contemplating the consequences 
for the country’s stability before suspending aid flows in response to non-compliance. 
In turn, the risks of providing budget assistance to fragile states should be managed 
through more rigorous ex ante analysis, additional safeguards, and intensified 
monitoring. 728  Similar recommendations were later formulated in a Common 
Approach Paper of the World Bank and African Development Bank.729  
Based on the exceptional provision in OP 8.60, and following the specific 
guidance laid out in the Good Practice Note and Common Approach Paper, the World 
Bank has developed an organizational practice of using budget assistance as a state-
building tool in the high-risk environments of fragile states. In essence, the Bank 
therefore appears prepared to consider capable institutions, good governance, and 
strong ownership on the part of national governments not as preconditions, but 
objectives of Development Policy Lending.  
 
c) Program-for-Results Financing – A Flexible Legal Framework 
i. Background 
 
In early 2012, the World Bank introduced a new financing instrument, Program-
for-Results Financing (PfoR). The new instrument was developed in the context of the 
                                                        
727 THE WORLD BANK, 'Good Practice Note for Development Policy Lending. Development Policy 
Operations and Program Conditionality in Fragile States'. 
728 Ibid., paras. 47-50. 
729 THE WORLD BANK & AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Providing Budget Aid in Situations of 
Fragility: A World Bank - African Development Bank Common Approach Paper',11. 
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World Bank’s investment lending reforms,730 and in response to recipients demands 
for less bureaucratic and cumbersome, more program-based and country-owned 
financing.731 PfoR is a true novelty in the toolbox of development finance: the Bank 
supports government programs, not specific projects or development policies. The 
programs are those of the recipient government, governed by national laws and 
implemented through country systems.732 The World Bank only provides co-funding, 
and its role is focused on providing capacity-building and implementation support. 
Most importantly, the disbursement of funds is directly linked to the achievement of 
concrete results. Since PfoR accordingly differs both from investment project and 
development policy operations, the Board of Directors approved a new OP/BP 9.00, 
which forms the core of the legal regime for PfoR operations.733 
OP/BP 9.00 was drafted at a time where fragile states had already achieved full 
prominence on the World Bank’s agenda, and the shortcomings of traditional aid 
instruments vis-à-vis fragile states were widely acknowledged. Hence, it is little 
surprising that it is the first of the Bank’s internally binding rules to explicitly refer to 
“fragile states”.734 More importantly, from the outset, the rules and procedures for 
PfoR financing contain some notable features that have the potential of making the 
instrument particularly suitable for states with very weak capacities.  
 
ii. General Provisions that Facilitate PfoR Operations in Fragile 
States  
 
Among the most outstanding features of the legal framework for PfoR is its 
adaptability to different contexts, and countries with different stages of development. 
This adaptability is reflected not just in the fact that PfoR financing can be provided 
as grants or loans, for small and large programs, and for programs that are carried out 
                                                        
730 Supra note 707. 
731 At a time where the emergence of new (non-traditional) donors and new (private or public-private) 
sources of financing are rapidly changing the international aid landscape in which the World Bank 
offers its services, the organization was pressured to respond to the demands of its clients. See THE 
WORLD BANK, 'A New Instrument to Advance Development Effectiveness: Program-for-Results 
Financing ' (December 29, 2011), paras. 8 and 14-15. 
732 In particular, PfoR is very much a brainchild of the Paris aid effectiveness agenda, and provides 
donors with a tool to increase the results-focus, effectiveness and leverage of their funds. On the 
considerations leading to the adoption of PfoR and its design features in detail, see ibid., paras. 16-24. 
733 For an early, legal analysis of the legal framework for PfoR, from which the present section draws 
extensively, see DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World 
Bank, the EU and Germany, chapter 8.  
734 Operational Policy and Bank Procedures 9.00 on Program-for-Results Financing (February 2012), 
para. 8 lit. (f). 
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by nongovernmental or governmental parties.735  More importantly, the instrument 
appears suitable for countries with weak institutions since with OP/BP 9.00, the Bank 
shifts the emphasis from ex ante requirements to ongoing and ex post controls, and 
focuses on building a country’s capacity.  
Ex ante requirements still exist for PfoR lending, and the Bank assesses the 
adequacy of country systems – i.e. national institutions and laws – based on its 
standards of economic effectiveness, financial management, and environmental and 
social protection.736  Yet the organization uses only a lighter, ‘core standards’ version 
of the comprehensive standards contained in the environmental and social 
safeguards.737 Its financial management and procurement guidelines do not apply to 
co-financed government programs.738 Moreover, the results of the Bank’s ex ante 
assessments are understood as reference point for monitoring, and a benchmark for 
identifying activities that are necessary to strengthen the relevant national capacities 
and arrangements.739 Where country systems currently fall behind these standards, the 
country is not automatically excluded from financing. Instead, the Bank provides 
implementation support through activities that are aimed precisely at strengthening 
country systems in areas where its assessments have identified.740  
Against this background, a dominant concern surrounding the adoption of OP 
9.00 was that the Bank would abandon its own financial management, social, and 
environmental standards when relying on country systems.741 Yet, it is particularly in 
those countries with weak institutions and lower standards that the Policy’s approach 
also presents an opportunity. By using country systems for implementation, rather 
                                                        
735 OP 9.00, paras. 2 and 3. 
736 OP 9.00 paras. 5-10 and BP 9.00 para. 9, referring to paras. 19-32. 
737 The core standards deduced from the Bank’s comprehensive set of safeguard policies are condensed 
into one paragraph, OP 9.00, para. 8. Moreover, these standards are considered only to the extent that 
they are “applicable or relevant in a particular country, sector, or Program circumstances”. Programs 
that could have “significant adverse impacts” on the environment or affected people are, however, 
generally excluded from PfoR Financing.  
738 OP 9.00, para. 7. 
739 BP 9.00, paras. 27 and 30. As part of implementation support, the Bank provides technical 
assistance for capacity- and institution-building in a broad range of areas, including fiduciary, 
environmental and social systems. See THE WORLD BANK, 'A New Instrument to Advance Development 
Effectiveness: Program-for-Results Financing ', para. 100. 
740 OP 9.00 paras. 1 lit. c) and 12; BP 9.00 para 30, which foresees that the Bank identifies the aspects 
of a country’s environmental and social systems that require strengthening, which can become part of 
the Program’s action plan and will be taken on during preparation and implementation of the program. 
741 See THE WORLD BANK, 'A New Instrument to Advance Development Effectiveness: Program-for-
Results Financing ', Annex A: Summary of Consultations, paras. 6, 9. Or The Guardian, Poverty 
Matters Blog: NGOs criticize World Bank Lending (October 21, 2011), available online: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/oct/21/ngos-criticise-world-
bank-lending (accessed December 2014). 
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than insisting on its own standards and procedures from the outset, the Bank can focus 
on strengthening the country’s capacity to maintain standards in the medium-term, 
and in the entire government program.742 Capacity-building is a key objective of PfoR, 
and achieving the standards outlined in OP/BP 9.00 accordingly becomes the 
objective of Bank assistance, rather than a precondition. 
Moreover, OP 9.00 seeks to balance the risk of using country systems and overall 
simplified ex ante requirements by putting more emphasis on ex post controls, namely 
more rigorous monitoring and results-oriented controls during implementation.743 The 
central feature of PfoR is that disbursements of Bank funds depend on the 
achievement of results, which are measured on the basis of “specific, measureable, 
and verifiable” indicators. Indicators are formulated by recipients and assessed by the 
Bank. 744  The major burden for recipient countries under the PfoR regime 
consequently consists in preparing credible results frameworks, designing appropriate 
indicators, and, above all, monitoring, achieving, and verifying achievement. This is 
no easy task, considering the limited availability and reliability of data particularly in 
fragile states. 
A last feature of the legal regime for PfoR that is particularly notable with regards 
to fragile states, where the abrupt suspensions of aid flows can cause significant, 
negative disruptions, concerns the handling of non-compliance. If a country fails to 
fulfill its obligations, the Bank can refer to the same legal remedies as applicable to 
other financing instruments. However, OP 9.00 commits the organization to exercise 
self-restraint, using remedies only after having paid due regard to the country- and 
program-specific circumstances, the severity of non-compliance, and a country’s 
commitment to tackle the identified problems, for which the Bank first engages in 
consultations with the country.745 Certainly, the World Bank has generally refrained 
                                                        
742 See also the formulation in ibid., para. 20, recognizing that “while maintaining the Bank’s overall 
commitment to high international standards, Program-for-Results will not seek procedural equivalency 
to the Bank’s policies and procedures designed for IL operations.” 
743 OP 9.00, para. 9; BP 9.00, para. 5. Commensurate to the recipient country’s capacities, the Bank 
continues its own risk assessments and monitoring during implementation, particularly to prevent and 
mitigate fraud and corruption. In connection with OP 9.00, the Bank has therefore adopted Guidelines 
on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption, which become binding through the reference 
made in OP 9.00, para. 15. 
744 BP 9.00, paras. 13 and 34 and note 10 
745 OP 9.00 para. 14 and BP 9.00 para. 43. Also THE WORLD BANK, 'A New Instrument to Advance 
Development Effectiveness: Program-for-Results Financing ', para. 78. 
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from automatically using its legal remedies – OP/BP 9.00, however, codifies this 
informal, organizational practice.746  
 
d) Comparison and Evaluation 
 
Three Operational Policies – OP 10.00 on Investment Project Financing, OP 8.60 
on Development Policy Lending, and OP 9.00 on Program-for-Results Financing – 
regulate how the bulk of the World Bank’s lending operations are planned, approved, 
and implemented. The Policies determine under what conditions recipient countries 
get access to the Bank’s resources, and what roles and responsibilities they assume in 
the process of development cooperation.747 How, and to what effect has the World 
Bank sought to adapt this regulatory framework for operations in weak capacity, high-
risk environments? 
In designing a more agile framework for engaging in fragile states, the World 
Bank has taken a different approach for each of its three financial instruments. OP 
10.00 on Investment Project Financing has recently undergone a major overhaul. In 
this context, the Bank has introduced a new section that allows for the use of 
exceptional arrangements when planning and implementing operations in conflict-
affected or fragile states.748 The organization has thus mainstreamed exceptions that 
were previously available only under its emergency policy – though it had long 
become an organizational practice to make ample use thereof outside of traditional 
emergencies.749 In the past, staff often relied on an overly broad interpretation of the 
condition of state fragility as an instance of emergency in order to trigger OP 8.00. In 
contrast, the new OP 10.00 formalizes and makes transparent under what conditions a 
                                                        
746 RIGO SUREDA, 'Informality and Effectiveness in the Operation of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development', 585-588, arguing that the World Bank has been reluctant to use its 
legal remedies, and hardly any loan was suspended up to the 1970s. While the organization has since 
shown more ready to suspend loans on the grounds of non-performance or non-compliance with 
contractual obligations, it has often preferred to reach an informal agreement with the recipient country. 
Recipients agree not to make withdrawals until the causes giving rise to legal remedies have been 
removed. 
747 Besides, Operational Policy 2.30 provides an overarching framework to guide the Bank’s work in 
countries affected by or in transition from conflict. OP 2.30 establishes a number of general principles, 
but does not affect the rules whereby operations are planned and implemented. On OP 2.30, see supra 
section 3 a) of this chapter. 
748 Examples of Bank operations “in situations of urgent need or capacity constraints” include an 
involvement in the CAR to support a food response and to pay salaries of public servants; an operation 
in Somalia equally to pay salaries of public servants; and Bank support to the reconstruction of 
Northern Mali. 
749 See supra note 701. 
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member state can qualify for special considerations. Exceptional arrangements must 
be requested by the recipient country and approved by the Bank’s Management, on 
the basis of objective, detailed eligibility criteria, and following a process of internal 
consultations. The revision of OP 10.00 has thus the potential to strengthen the 
consistency, predictability, and transparency of the Bank’s decision-making. 
In contrast to the relatively comprehensive, exceptional regime available for 
Investment Project Financing in fragile states, OP 8.60 on Development Policy 
Lending contains only one, broad provision concerning crisis and post-conflict 
situations. It enables the Bank to put aside certain requirements in order to use budget 
assistance on an exceptional basis, if approved by the Executive Board. Which design 
considerations can be put aside, and under what conditions, is not regulated in detail, 
but apparently determined on a case-by-case basis. In principle, this room for 
discretion can facilitate a flexible and country-specific approach to tailor DPOs to the 
specific constraints of fragile states, which is the objective of the accompanying Good 
Practice Note. In practice, however, when the World Bank is prepared to provide 
funding directly to a country’s budget is thus not necessarily predictable and 
consistent. A study commissioned by the German Ministry for Development criticized 
that most operations were conducted in states that also received exceptional resource 
allocations from the IDA.750 The according imbalance within the group of fragile 
states was difficult to explain on the basis of technical considerations alone, and 
suggests that the decision to use budget assistance could be politically influenced.751 
This is while the decision to channel resources directly to a country’s budget has 
significant consequences for the countries concerned, since it is usually seen as a 
signal of political endorsement.  
In turn, OP 9.00 on Program-for-Results Financing does not contain any special 
provisions for fragile and conflict-affected. The Policy does, however, establish a 
legal framework for Bank operations that appears more flexible and adaptable to 
different circumstances in recipient countries, including fragile states. Notably, due to 
                                                        
750 FOLZ & LEONHARDT, 'The Engagement of the International Development Association in Fragile 
States. Proposals for a Reform Agenda', 41-43, suggesting that the World Bank develops clear criteria 
for determining when it considers project lending the only adequate financing instrument in fragile 
states, and accordingly rules out the use of budget assistance. Between Fiscal Year 2006 and 2009, the 
World Bank implemented 13 Development Policy Operations in nine countries: in Afghanistan, 
Burundi, the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Laos, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Togo.  
751 At least prior to the introduction of a new exceptional allocation regime for “turn-around” situations 
in 2014, exceptional allocations of IDA resources were considered “complex, opaque and prone to 
arbitrariness” See supra note 587, and in detail, section 2 b) of this chapter. 
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the novelty of the instrument and the scarcity of implementation experience,752 it is 
too early to assess the suitability of PfoR financing for conflict-affected and fragile 
states in practice.753  
Judged on the basis of the three Policies, the World Bank’s approach thus reveals 
some patterns, but remains little systematic overall. For all types of operations, the 
Bank has sought to make its legal and policy framework more flexible and give 
recognition to the fact that its “clients” have significantly different capacities. It has 
avoided the use of differential treatment for a clearly defined group of countries, as 
does, for instance, the World Trade Organization (WTO) for Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs).754 Instead, to acknowledge that fragility may occur in otherwise 
stable or middle-income countries, the Bank has preferred a situations-based approach, 
and used differential treatment in any country that faces specific constraints or 
circumstances.755 While OP 10.00 was accordingly revised to establish a detailed, 
exceptional regime, OP 9.00 instead counts on establishing a legal framework flexible 
enough to be used in any country or situation. OP 8.60 contains only one rather vague 
provision that enables the exceptional use of budget assistance, but leaves the details 
of when and how to be sorted out in practice. Considering these differences, it is not 
clear to what extent the World Bank deems fragile states to require a systematic and 
targeted response – or rather aims to make is legal and policy framework generally 
more flexible. After all, we have seen that there is a larger trend at the World Bank 
that favors a principles-based approach over adhesion to strict rules, and instead of 
rigid, ex ante requirements, puts more emphasis on implementation assistance and 
building the capacity of states to meet standards.756 
To what effect has the organization adapted the rules that regulate how 
development projects and programs are approved, planned, and implemented? To 
address this question, I refer again to three fundamental provisions of the Articles of 
                                                        
752 PfoR was introduced in 2012 without broad prior piloting. To limit its risks, the World Bank 
decided to provide only a maximum of 5% of IDA or IBRD funding through the new instrument during 
the first two years. Management reviews the implementation of the policy, publishes a progress report, 
and engages in discussions with the Executive Directors. At the time of writing, this process was still 
ongoing.  
753Arguably, the success of results-based disbursements in fragile states ultimately depends on the use 
of realistic indicators that are commensurate to the countries’ limited capacities, so as not to cause the 
abrupt suspension of aid in the case of non-compliance.  
754 See, for instance, HENNING JESSEN, WTO-Recht und "Entwicklungsländer" (Berliner Wissenschafts-
Verlag, 2006); and on the concept of differential treatment, infra chapter VI.1. 
755 On the minor role of the classification of fragile states in guiding the World Bank’s operational 
decision-making, see already supra section 2 b) of this chapter. 
756 See already supra section 1 b) of this chapter, and for a discussion, infra chapter VI.1.  
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Agreement – the objective of development, standards of effectiveness, and the 
political prohibition clause. As noted before, the World Bank increasingly 
understands peace- and state-building objectives as part of its core development 
mandate.757  The Bank has therefore become more prepared to take risks, and to 
postpone or put aside some of its substantive and procedural requirements in order to 
engage in conflict-affected and fragile states. Arguably, the World Bank has even 
prioritized the objectives of preventing or mitigating conflict and building capable and 
legitimate states over other development objectives. For instance, OP 8.60 allows 
staff to put aside certain design considerations that aim to ensure that budget 
assistance does not just further development, but equitable, broad-based, and 
sustainable development.758 Under OP 10.00, environmental and social requirements 
for project lending can be postponed to the implementation phase, so that the 
organization can finance projects in countries in urgent need of assistance or facing 
capacity constrains. At least in the short term, the ability to respond rapidly to 
conflicts and crises, or to stay engaged and contribute to state-building under the most 
difficult circumstances, can thus override other concerns relating to the outcomes of 
development cooperation. This prioritization in the context of fragile states is in line 
with the OECD’s Fragile States Principles, and the Bank’s commitments under the 
New Deal.759 
How does the World Bank strike a balance between the need for a rapid response, 
and ensuring the effectiveness of its operations? The Articles of Agreement require 
the IDA not only to ensure the purposive use of resources, but also their effective use 
– and many provisions of the three Policies that regulate the Bank’s financing 
instruments serve precisely this objective.760 As OP 10.00 and OP 8.60 were adapted 
to ease some of these requirements in order to facilitate, speed up, or otherwise 
enhance operations in fragile states, the risk that resources are misappropriated or not 
used effectively could increase. Yet, the Articles do not specify the means through 
which the World Bank must ensure that its resources are used effectively. Based on 
OP 10.00 and OP 8.60, the World Bank compensates for the postponement or 
reduction of certain ex ante, fiduciary requirements with intensified ex post 
                                                        
757 See supra section 1 b) of this chapter.  
758 OP 8.60, para. 32, suspending design considerations that relate to the distributional effects or effects 
on natural resources and the environment of operations.  
759 On the objective of state-building prioritized in the Fragile States Principles and the New Deal, see 
supra chapter II.3 a). 
760 On standards of effectiveness in the Bank’s legal framework, see supra section 1 b) of this chapter. 
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controls.761 A similar a model is also set forth in OP 9.00 for Program-for-Results 
operations, though not specifically for fragile states. Weaknesses and according risks 
that the Bank identifies in its ex ante assessment of a country’s systems are addressed 
through specific capacity-building measures and supervision arrangements during 
implementation.762 In essence, the World Bank thus shifts to an approach that strives 
not to avoid, but to better manage the risks associated with working in fragile 
states.763 This shift has been codified in internal rules, while an interpretation of the 
meaning and scope of the Articles’ fiduciary duty in light of the risk-management 
credo is still pending.764 
It remains to consider how the changes introduced in OP 10.00 and OP 8.60 relate 
to the protection of sovereignty in the legal and policy framework of the World 
Bank. 765  Looking at the political prohibition clause as a protection of recipient 
autonomy in the development-process, it is notable that OP 10.00 permits the Bank to 
implement certain activities on behalf of the country, or enter into agreements with 
third parties for that purpose.766 In the latter case, the Bank provides funding not 
directly to the government as it usually does, but instead to international organizations 
(mostly the UN) or NGOs.767 It is no news that in practice, the World Bank regularly 
assumes a “more hands-on approach of assisting counterparts” in countries that lack 
the capacity to conceive and implement development projects and programs single-
                                                        
761 Besides, the use of trust fund arrangements instead of the Bank’s normal lending instruments can be 
seen as an alternative strategy to ensure the effective use of resources in fragile and conflict-affected 
states. See supra section 3 a) and c) of this chapter. 
762 OP 9.00, para. 12.  
763 While particularly relevant for operations in fragile states, the credo that risks need to be managed, 
not avoided, also constitutes a pillar of the Bank’s updated Governance and Anticorruption strategy 
(supra note 560), and the subject of the 2014 WDR, THE WORLD BANK, 'Word Development Report. 
Risk and Opportunity. Managing Risk for Development' (2014). Notably, given the Bank’s institutional 
culture that is often accused of being front-loaded and neglecting implementation, it remains to be seen 
whether the shift from ex ante requirements to ex post controls materializes in practice. 
764 Supra note 557.  
765 OP 9.00 includes no specific provisions for fragile states. Since PfoR finances government 
programs that are implemented through country systems, it is generally supportive of recipient 
ownership. 
766 Where governments request the Bank to execute certain activities on their behalf, this is usually 
accomplished using financing from trust funds like the SPF, which can support knowledge-related 
activities, but also fund the preparation and supervision of smaller projects. For an overview of SPF-
funded activities, see THE WORLD BANK, 'State and Peacebuilding Fund Progress Report' (May 21, 
2009). 
767 For example, the majority of Bank-financed projects in Somalia rely on alternative implementation 
arrangements, often UN agencies. It was also considered to hire a third party monitoring agent 
independent of the national government, which can ensure and validate project delivery to allow the 
Bank and the UN to better oversee the use of their funds. THE WORLD BANK, 'Interim Strategy Note for 
the Federal Republic of Somalia' (November 11, 2013), paras. 56.   
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handedly.768 Seeing arrangements that prima facie reduce recipient ownership of the 
development process codified in an Operational Policy is perhaps more unusual.769 
However, the revised OP 10.00 permits the use of alternative implementation 
arrangements only at the request of the government, and the Bank is at the same time 
required to strengthen the government’s ability to implement in the medium term. 
While prepared to substitute for national governments for as long as necessary to 
establish or restore national capacity, the overriding objective thus remains fostering 
the capacity and ownership of national institutions – that is, state-building.770  
The World Bank increasingly seeks to support state-building objectives through 
DPOs, too. OP 8.60 therefore permits the exceptional use of budget assistance in 
countries that fail to meet the usual ex ante requirements in terms of institutional 
capacity and commitment to assume ownership. Arguably, ownership thus turns from 
a precondition into an objective of DPOs in fragile states. It must be noted, however, 
that the World Bank generally wields considerable influence in supporting domestic 
policy and institutional reforms through conditionality.771 The Bank’s leverage vis-à-
vis nascent post-conflict governments with limited capacity and domestic support is 
even greater.772 In this context, broad-based ownership of domestic reform programs, 
though always difficult to assess for external actors, appears crucial – and yet it is one 
of the requirements that OP 8.60 permits the Bank to dispense with in fragile states.773  
 Looking at the political prohibition clause and the changes introduced in OP 
10.00 and OP 8.60 prompts one further question. Both Policies make exceptional 
provisions for fragile and conflict-affected states, which can thus be treated 
differently from other member states. Differential treatment concerns the level of 
                                                        
768 THE WORLD BANK, 'IDA 15. Operational Approaches and Financing in Fragile States ' (June 2007), 
para. 25. 
769 Notably, prior to the revision of OP 10.00, alternative implementation arrangements could already 
be used for emergency operations under OP 8.00. 
770 I discuss the shift to state-building as a strategic objective and regulatory theme in infra chapter 
VI.1. 
771 For an assessment of the instrument of budget support in light of recipients’ collective autonomy, 
see DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU 
and Germany, 426-428, concluding that “the level of autonomy in budget support depends on the 
individual case and the “strength” of the recipient”. 
772 Working with the nascent government of a post-conflict country is thus not necessarily a guarantee 
for local ownership. See, for instance, MATTHEW SAUL, 'Local Ownership of Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction in International Law: The Initiation of International Involvement' Journal of Conflict & 
Security Law, 1 (2011); and criticizing the Bank’s extraordinary influence in supporting domestic 
reforms in post-conflict countries, BOON, '"Open for Business": International Financial Institutions, 
Post-Conflict Economic Reform, and the Rule of Law' (supra note 777). 
773 OP 8.60, para. 32. 
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requirements that need to be fulfilled, at what point in time, and in the case of OP 
10.00, also extends to the use of different implementation arrangements. Does the 
political prohibition in the Articles of Agreement encompass a duty for the Bank to 
treat all member states equally, which would forbid the use of differential treatment?  
The political prohibition does not only permit interference in the political affairs 
of member states, but also requires the organization to be impartial in its 
considerations.774 In this sense, the clause perhaps entails a duty to treat all member 
states equally with regards to their political character. It does not, however, extend to 
economic considerations that are covered by the stated purposes of the organization. 
Economic considerations can actually require the Bank to differentiate not just 
concerning the pricing of loans, but also the choice of financing instrument, or 
implementation arrangements. 775  Accordingly, the Articles do not provide strong 
footing for a strict principle of equal treatment of all member states.776  
Against this background, the question of equal treatment only directs our 
attention to an important accomplishment of the new OP 10.00 – in comparison with 
the Bank’s previous organizational practice, and also with OP 8.60. As noted before, 
OP 10.00 formalizes and makes transparent under what conditions a member state – 
any member state, at any time – can qualify for special considerations. The Policy 
thus reduces the likelihood that differential treatment is extended in an inconsistent 
manner, to one member state but not another, on the basis of political and not 
economic considerations.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 
In this chapter, I investigated the processes and outcomes of how the World Bank 
has adapted its legal and policy framework vis-à-vis fragile states. I began by 
outlining how internal rule-making and dynamic interpretations of the Articles have 
paved the way for the organization to become concerned with state-building in fragile 
                                                        
774 Supra note 558. 
775 For instance, the World Bank differentiates between countries eligible for IDA’s concessional loans 
or only IBRD loans. Some IDA-eligible countries receive loans with different maturities, and others 
can receive non-refundable grants. On differentiation between recipient countries at the operational 
level, see also DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World 
Bank, the EU and Germany, 207-209.  
776 Also GUDER, The Administration of Debt Relief by the International Financial Institutions. A Legal 
Reconstruction of the HIPC Initiative, 158-161; and supra chapter III.2. 
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states. I examined how the World Bank classifies fragile states, and found that the 
classification has no legal consequences concerning the Bank’s operational decision-
making or resource allocation. On this basis, I engaged in a systematic reconstruction 
of the mostly internal rules that govern how the World Bank negotiates, plans, and 
implements development assistance – analyzing to what extent they are premised on 
the existence of effective government counterparts, and were therefore adapted to 
facilitate engagement in countries with very weak or no government.  
What emerges from this analysis, and what does it tell us about the World Bank’s 
approach to fragile states? To begin with, it is safe to say that the Bank has 
successfully extended its mandate and area of engagement – both in geographic, and 
in thematic terms. It is by now well-established that peace, security, and functioning 
state institutions are preconditions for development, and arguably, that a 
predominantly technical development organization like the World Bank has a role to 
play in (more or less internally-driven) processes of state-building. For example, the 
2013 IEG review of the World Bank’s engagement with fragile and conflict affected 
states no longer raises the same, fundamental question as the 2006 IEG review of the 
LICUS initiative did.777 Since the Bank increasingly understands state fragility as a 
matter not just of weak state capacity, but weak state-society relations, it remains to 
be seen how far the organization will go in embracing an openly political agenda, 
assisting countries in fostering political settlements and building legitimate 
institutions.778 For now, state-building remains a rather state-centric enterprise, and 
the Bank thus attuned to working with governments – though not only effective 
governments.  
                                                        
777 INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP, 'World Bank Assistance to Low-Income Fragile- and Conflict 
Affected States'. In contrast, the LICUS evaluation had questioned what the Bank’s declared state-
building objective entailed; whether it was aware of the political and ideological connotations of such 
an agenda; and whether it had a response to the central state-building dilemma of balancing support for 
central government and non-state actors. INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP, The World Bank, 
'Engaging with Fragile States. An IEG Review of World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries under 
Stress' (2006), 26. Nevertheless, critical voices remain, questioning the Bank’s competence and/or 
legitimacy to engage in the highly politicized environments of fragile and conflict-affected states. See, 
for instance, NOORUDDIN & FLORES, 'Financing the Peace: Evaluating World Bank Post-Conflict 
Assistance Programs', arguing that the Bank had no positive effect on recovery in post-conflict settings, 
but did not worsen the situation either (22-23); or BOON, '"Open for Business": International Financial 
Institutions, Post-Conflict Economic Reform, and the Rule of Law', 515, stating that the “absence of 
representative and functioning governmental counterparts that can bargain over proposed policy and 
legislative changes” made any type of Bank engagement in post-conflict environments per se more 
intrusive. 
778 THE WORLD BANK, 'World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development', at 84. 
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The concern with state-building in fragile states has come with an increasing 
acknowledgement that institutional capacities in many areas required by the Bank first 
need to be established or strengthened, and are in that sense rather ill-suited as 
conditions for assistance. What does this mean, for instance, for standards of 
effectiveness that the World Bank is required to uphold? As illustrated, they often 
translate into ex ante requirements concerning a country’s public financial 
management, fiduciary, and procurement systems, requirements that have often 
prevented or complicated engagement in countries with weak capacities. Broadly 
speaking, the World Bank has responded to this challenge not by abandoning its 
standards, but by shifting to a decidedly different approach: reducing strict ex ante 
requirements in favor of differentiated requirements or generally more flexible, 
principles-based regulation, while placing more emphasis on implementation 
assistance and capacity-building. To say it in the language of the Bank: it has moved 
from risk avoidance to risk management, through regulatory adaptations that have yet 
to show effect on its institutional culture.779  
A more complex picture emerges when considering how the Bank’s approach to 
engaging with fragile states relates to the basic idea of recipient sovereignty, 
expressed, for example, in the political prohibition clause. In the most extreme and 
exceptional cases, there is not even a government to refer to. This has led the World 
Bank to adopt an internal rule, OP 2.30, which allows it to engage upon the request of 
the international community instead – arguably, a similarly extreme and exceptional 
departure from the principle of sovereignty enshrined in its mandate. At the same time, 
Bank staff are not formally required to engage with sub-national or non-state actors in 
the absence of a government capable of representing the population.780 Beyond – and 
with the consent of the government – the Bank has modified the legal framework for 
project lending to allow it to entrust other international organizations or NGOs with 
implementing projects and programs in countries with insufficient capacity for 
implementation. Whereas ownership of the government may be reduced somewhat as 
a consequence, the relevant rule (OP 10.00) also requires staff to invest in capacity-
building and thus foster the conditions for full government ownership.  
                                                        
779 Supra note 763. 
780 In practice, the World Bank has often sought to consult and involve actors outside of the 
government, e.g. civil society representatives or local community stakeholders, e.g. in Somalia and 
East Timor. From an operational as well as a legal perspective, however, engaging with non-state 
actors remains a “frontier issue” for the World Bank. CISSÉ, 'Should the Political Prohibition in 
Charters of International Financial Institutions be Revisited? The Case of the World Bank', 63. 
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Against this background, it is difficult to say whether from the perspective of 
recipients, being seen as a fragile state constitutes an advantage or rather a 
disadvantage. How the Bank has remodeled some of its internal rules to more 
effectively engage with fragile states has certainly affected the terms and conditions 
upon which they receive, participate, and command over the use of development 
funding. Access to the Bank’s resources is facilitated through an extension of the 
legal basis for engagement, and through the lifting or postponing of certain 
requirements that recipient governments are expected to fulfill to be eligible for 
funding. Potential recipient countries could benefit from such modifications, in so far 
as they require assistance but have previously been unable to fulfill the Bank’s terms 
and conditions. At the same time, we have seen that how the Bank has adapted its 
legal and policy framework may concern not just the requirements that fragile state 
must meet, but also the right to consent and to “own” the development process. The 
said omission of state consent as a legal basis for engagement is certainly an 
exceptional case. Nonetheless, the impression that national ownership is not 
unconditional and may necessarily turn into an objective to be reached can be traced 
throughout the Bank’s engagement with fragile states. In some instances, internal 
rules thereby serve to condition the roles and responsibilities usually accorded to 
national governments in the process of development cooperation on the government’s 
effectiveness. 
Another reason why it is so difficult to say whether being seen as fragile state 
constitutes an advantage or disadvantage has to do with the way the World Bank has 
been adapting its legal and policy framework. In many regards, the Bank has shown a 
preference for not responding ad hoc, but consolidating emerging practices. It has 
done so through mostly internal and only partly formalized processes of rule-making, 
sometimes codifying implied interpretations. At the same time, we have seen that the 
Bank’s response is far from systematic, and often rests on rules that are formulated in 
ambiguous terms, leaving considerable discretion to decision-makers, be it the 
Executive Board or Management. Whether such rules provide practical guidance and 
enhance the predictability and consistency of decision-making is not always clear. 
Nor is it clear whether the World Bank actually seeks to systematically adapt to the 
special circumstances and needs of fragile states, or rather to evade certain mandate 
constraints to engage in countries that are of particular concern to its major 
shareholders. 
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We will return later to a discussion of the potentials and perils of regulation in 
instructing and formalizing a differentiated approach to dealing with fragile states. 
For now, we can be maintain that an analysis of the World Bank has provided 
sufficient evidence for both, the potentials and perils, to be able to say that the answer 
(as always) depends – in this case, on the design of rules and the rule-making process.  
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V. The African Development Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, and the European Union – A Short Comparison 
with the World Bank  
 
The World Bank is not the only international development organization that has 
come to acknowledge and respond to the specific challenges of engaging with fragile 
states. Fragile states have emerged as a key priority for the international development 
community as a whole. Inasmuch as other organizations operate on the premise that 
recipient countries have an effective government, they, too, face difficulties in fragile 
environments. Many have also sought to respond with strategic and operational 
reforms that concern the design, management, and delivery of ODA vis-à-vis fragile 
states – and ultimately, how it is governed.781 
To what extent and how different organizations have adapted the rules and 
procedures that govern their operations naturally varies. After all, a great variety of 
international organizations engage in development cooperation. Some have universal 
membership like the World Bank, some regional, like the African or Asian 
Development Bank. Some consist of donor and recipient countries, others only of 
donors, like the EU. A notable difference between the MDBs and the EU is also that 
the former mostly provide concessional loans, whereas the EU usually provides 
financing in the form of grants. Accordingly, despite some notable commonalities in 
the law of development organizations, their legal frameworks and mandates still show 
significant and sometimes quite fundamental differences.782 For example, we will see 
that one fundamental difference consists in the fact that the World Bank, the AfDB, 
and the ADB, have a focused development mandate that is explicitly non-political, 
whereas the EU is a political organization to the core, with a much broader mandate. 
It is those differences in the mandates of international organizations that largely 
determine what legal constraints they face when engaging in development 
cooperation with fragile states – and how they may respond. Besides, even if the legal 
constraints they face are somewhat similar, to what extent an organization chooses to 
address them could also depend on other factors – the interests of strong member 
states and their decision-making power within the organization, for example, or the 
                                                        
781 For an overview, see already supra chapter II.3 b).  
782 I outline substantive commonalities in the legal frameworks of international development 
organizations in supra chapter III.2.  
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institutional culture of an organization more generally.783 In comparing the World 
Bank’s approach towards fragile states with that of other organizations, my objective 
is thus not only to paint a broader picture of how the law of international development 
organizations is adapted vis-à-vis fragile states. The short comparison also yields a 
better understanding of the factors that may influence how different organizations 
respond – and why.  
In the following chapter, I examine how, and to what effect other international 
development organizations have adapted their legal and policy frameworks to engage 
with fragile states. I begin with a closer look at the rules and practices of the African 
Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank, both organizations of a similar 
type and with mandates similar to the World Bank (V.1.). Next, I turn to the EU, 
which in many regards stands in marked contrast to the World Bank and the other 
MDBs (V.2.). Comparing apples to apples, and apples to oranges, so to speak, I 
conclude with a reflection on the factors that may account for the similarities and 
differences in their respective approach (V.3.). 
 
1. The African Development Bank’s and the Asian Development 
Bank’s Approach To Fragile States 
 
 
Like the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank are MDBs, a specific type of development organization that is concentrated on 
the award of loans and grants. In contrast to the World Bank, AfDB and ADB have a 
regional focus in their operations.784 Apart from that, however, not only are all MDBs 
engaged in similar types of activities, they also have a comparable organizational 
structure, funding mechanism, and system of (weighted) voting.785  
                                                        
783 I explore these factors in section 3 of this chapter. 
784 Other so-called development banks with a regional focus (Regional Development Banks) include 
the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the 
Caribbean Development Bank, or the Islamic Development Bank. Partly since their regional focus 
implies that they have less engagement with fragile states, none of them has developed a particular 
strategy, policy, or instrument for that purpose. 
785 Compared to the World Bank, the AfDB and the ADB are woefully understudied – not only, but 
also by international lawyers. See, for instance, ANDRÉS RIGO SUREDA, 'The Law Applicable to the 
Activities of International Development Banks', 308 Recueil des Cours, 13 (2004), chapter I, with a 
comparison of the IBRD with Regional Development Banks; ROY CULPERER, Titans or Behemoths?, 
The Multilateral Development Banks, Volume 5 (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997); EISUKE SUZUKI, 
'Regional Development Banks', in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press, April 2011), paras. 37-46; or JOHN WHITE, Regional 
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The similarities between the MDBs go back to their legal frameworks and 
mandates, which also have much in common regarding the substantive rules that 
regulate purpose and conditions of assistance to a country. As noted before, the 
Agreements establishing the ADB, the AfDB, and its concessional lending arm, the 
African Development Fund, each define their objectives of contributing to 
development.786 In addition, since all MDBs raise money on global financial markets 
and therefore depend on a good credit rating, all are bound to respect standards of 
effectiveness and “sound banking in their operations”.787 Perhaps most particular and 
characteristic, all MDBs have a political prohibition clause in their mandate, which 
expressly protects the sovereignty of the countries they engage with.788  
The AfDB and the ADB further resemble the World Bank in that they make 
extensive use of internal rules to govern their operations on a daily basis. The ADB 
has an Operations Manual that systematically collects all of its binding operational 
policies and procedures. 789  The AfDB has a series of policies, guidelines, and 
procedures, though they are overall less comprehensive and also less structured. This 
makes it somewhat more difficult to distinguish between rules belonging to the legal 
or rather the policy framework.790 
                                                                                                                                                              
Development Banks. The Asian, African and Inter-American Development Banks (Praeger Publishers, 
1972), chapter 2 on the ADB and chapter 3 on the AfDB.  
786 Supra chapter III.2. The African Development Fund is the concessional lending arm of the AfDB, 
which thus has the same dual structure as the World Bank (consisting of the IBRD and the IDA). In 
contrast, the Asian Development Bank provides loans to middle-income countries and concessional 
loans to developing countries at the same time, but also uses “Special Funds” for the latter, which are 
held separate from its ordinary capital. ADB Agreement, Art. 19 and on the separation, Art 10. In detail, 
see also E. PHILIP ENGLISH & HARRIS M. MULE, The African Development Bank (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1996), 119.  
787 AfDB Agreement, Art. 17 (1) lit. j; ADB Agreement, Art. 14 (xiv). 
788 Supra note 279. 
789 ADB’s Operations Manual is accessible online, http://www.adb.org/documents/operations-manual 
(accessed December 2014). It contains operational policies that are similar to the World Bank’s OPs 
but called Bank Policies (BPs), and Operational Procedures (OPs), which spell out procedural 
requirements like the World Bank’s BPs. 
790 AfDB has no Operations Manual, though all policy documents, next to legal documents, are 
available online at http://www.afdb.org/en/documents/policy-documents/ (accessed December 2014). 
Policy documents include sectoral policies and policies on cross-cutting issues, financing policies, and 
guidelines and procedures. Which of these are considered binding on the organization’s staff is not 
clear form their designation. AfDB’s Independent Review Mechanism (the equivalent of the World 
Bank’s Inspection Panel), however, is mandated to review staff compliance with its “operational 
policies and procedures”. See the Board Resolution instituting the Independent Review Mechanism, 
Resolution B/BD/2010/10 – F/BD/2010/04 (June 16, 2010), para. 11 (i). 
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It is at the level of these internal, secondary rules that the MDBs have been found 
to often emulate each other.791 MDBs engage in the same types of activities and face 
similar challenges that were not necessarily foreseen when the organizations were 
first created. Accordingly, insofar as they feel the need to adopt policies and 
procedures to guide staff in areas of common concern, these are likely to show some 
resemblance. Does the same apply to their engagement with fragile states? To what 
extent have the AfDB and the ADB emulated the World Bank’s rules and practices 
when engaging with fragile states? 
The AfDB, the ADB, and the World Bank use a common approach to classify 
fragile states, namely a harmonized average of their respective CPIAs.792 They have 
also agreed to work on a more harmonized approach towards involvement in fragile 
states, and discussed the lessons learned of working in these contexts.793 When it 
comes to adapting their legal and policy frameworks for engaging with fragile states, 
the rules and practices of the AfDB, the ADB, and the World Bank show notable 
similarities, but also differences. In the following section, I will briefly examine these 
similarities and differences with regards to the organizations’ dealings with 
(in)effective government (a), and differential provisions concerning the planning and 
implementation of operations in fragile states (b).  
 
a) Dealings with (In)Effective Government  
 
 
Both the African and the Asian Development Bank have become increasingly 
engaged in fragile and conflict-affected states over the last two decades – the AfDB in 
Somalia and in newly independent South Sudan,794 for instance, and the ADB in East 
                                                        
791 BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, 'Partnerships, Emulation, and Coordination: Toward the Emergence of a 
Droit Commun in the Field of Development Finance'; and on the harmonization trend among the 
development banks, also SUZUKI, 'Regional Development Banks', paras. 73-77. 
792 Supra note 365. The CPIAs of all three organizations usually generate only slightly different scores, 
though some differences nevertheless exist. For instance, the IDA put more emphasis on governance 
than either of the two Regional Development Banks. 
793 Supra note 402.  
794 The AfDB became formally involved in Somalia as early as 2010, working with its Transitional 
Federal Government (supra note 663). In South Sudan, the AfDB has a history of engagement that 
commenced with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, i.e. six years 
before South Sudan became independent and a member state. Then a territory of Sudan, the AfDB 
provided assistance through a “one country-two systems” framework, which limited AfDB 
involvement to policy dialogue, technical assistance, analytical and knowledge work. When South 
Sudan became independent but was not yet a member state, the AfDB signed a Cooperation Agreement 
with the government as a legal basis for engagement. See AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'South Sudan 
Interim Country Strategy Paper 2012-2014' (October 2012), pp. 1 and 13. In contrast, the World Bank 
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Timor and post-conflict Afghanistan. 795  Next to political instability, institutional 
weaknesses, and particular socio-economic vulnerabilities, one type of challenge that 
the AfDB and ADB sometimes encountered in such settings has to do with identifying 
an effective government counterpart to engage with, as required by their legal and 
policy frameworks. Both organizations have adopted rules and developed aid 
instruments that in principle allow them to engage without the request or cooperation 
of a formal government, and issued guidance on dealings with de facto governments. 
The African Development Bank’s Executive Board first approved Policy 
Guidelines for post-conflict assistance in 2001, shortly after the World Bank adopted 
its OP 2.30 on Development Cooperation and Conflict, which is cited therein.796 
Unlike OP 2.30, however, the Policy Guidelines did not regulate how the AfDB was 
to engage in countries with no government in power, or in non-member states 
territories. With regards to the latter situation, which may become relevant when a 
new state emerges from conflict, the AfDB faces no restriction under its mandate 
anyway. The AfDB Agreement explicitly allows the Board of Governors to authorize 
agreements “with the authorities of African countries which have not yet attained 
independent status or […] not yet acquired membership”.797 But can the AfDB also 
engage in the absence of a government, or without its formal request? 
Following the adoption of AfDB’s first Fragile States Strategy in 2008, the Policy 
Guidelines for post-conflict assistance were superseded by the Operations Guidelines 
of the newly established Fragile States Facility.798 The FSF is a special financing 
vehicle that mainly aims at making additional resources available to fragile states, 
outside of their performance-based allocation. Since it was established as a legally 
                                                                                                                                                              
engaged with the non-member state South Sudan on the basis of OP 2.30, and an exceptional approval 
of the Executive Directors. On the World Bank’s approach, see supra chapter IV.3 a). 
795 The ADB has dealt with the government of Timor-Leste to support the development process since 
1999, three years before Timor-Leste gained independence and became a member of the organization. 
Like the World Bank, ADB resumed its partnership with the Government of Afghanistan after a hiatus 
from 1980 to 2001. As of 31 December 2013, the ADB’s cumulative lending amounted to more than 
USD 950 million. See the country informational available online, www.adb.org/countries/main 
(accessed December 2014).  
796 AfDB, Post-Conflict Assistance Policy Guidelines (2001). Unlike the World Bank’s OP 2.30, the 
Guidelines were not a short, focused statement, but laid out in a paper that summarized AfDB’s 
experience in post-conflict interventions and formulated some guiding principles and recommendations.  
797 AfDB Agreement, Art. 29 (2) c). Though the AfDB can generally use its resources only to support 
its member states just like the World Bank (see AfDB Agreement, Art. 1 and 14 (1)), the statute itself 
thus formulates an exception from this general rule. The AfDB relied on this exception to become 
engaged in South Sudan prior to becoming a member state, and therefore signed a Cooperation 
Agreement with the government (supra note 794).  
798 Supra note 369.  
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autonomous trust, however, it is also subject to somewhat different rules than AfDB’s 
normal operations. 799  These rules are contained in the mandatory Operations 
Guidelines, which were approved by its Executive Board and establish the objectives, 
eligibility criteria, and implementation arrangements of the Facility. 
According to the Operations Guidelines, one central principle of the FSF is to 
“enable the Bank to remain engaged in all fragile states”.800 To be eligible for the bulk 
of supplemental resources from the FSF, countries need to have “formed a functional 
(transitional) governmental authority broadly acceptable to stakeholders and the 
international community”.801 Rather than enabling the AfDB to engage in countries 
with no government in power, the Guidelines hence establish additional requirements 
as to the effectiveness and legitimacy of governments that seek financing from the 
FSF.  
The FSF has two additional financing windows with separate eligibility criteria, 
however, one for countries in arrears, and one targeted precisely at supporting 
“operations in fragile states that cannot be addressed through traditional projects and 
instruments”.802 Though it involves only very limited grant resources that are mostly 
used for technical assistance and knowledge activities, such targeted support is not 
restricted to countries that have a reasonably effective and legitimate government, but 
can be used in all countries in conflict or prolonged crisis. Moreover, the Operations 
Guidelines do not explicitly require a formal government request for such targeted 
support activities. In contrast to AfDB’s general practice of operating with and 
through national governments, resources from this window can even be channeled 
directly to non-state actors in fragile states, if approved by the Board of Executive 
Directors.803  
                                                        
799 See the FSF Operations Guidelines, Annex 1: Legal Note on the Fragile States Facility and the 
Operations Guidelines (hereinafter FSF Legal Note). I return to the legal specificities of the FSF in 
infra section 1 b) of this chapter. 
800 FSF Operations Guidelines, para. 2.1.2 (ii). 
801 FSF Operations Guidelines, para. 3.1.3 (eligibility criteria for the Supplemental Support Window). 
AfDB staff should therefore candidly assess “the composition of the transitional government, whether 
it has support from the international community and the timetable for holding parliamentary and 
presidential elections”. Moreover, post-conflict countries should have signed an “internationally 
recognized Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) or a post-crisis or reconciliation agreement.”  
802 FSF Operations Guidelines, para. 3.3.1. 
803 FSF Operations Guidelines, para. 3.3.5 (ii). Though the smallest in financial terms, the targeted 
support window is also the only window for which the AfDB has issued specific guidelines, the 
Guidelines on Administration of the Technical Assistance and Capacity Building Program of Pillar III 
Operations. 
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With the Facility’s targeted support window, the African Development Bank has 
thus created an (albeit small) avenue through which it can principally extent 
assistance to countries without explicit approval of a government – and without a 
request from the international community, for that matter. It is questionable, however, 
whether the AfDB could thus support non-state actors in one of its member countries 
if the government objected. Certainly, the FSF was deliberately established with 
separate resources and functions outside of the framework for AfDB’s normal 
operations. In this sense, the AfDB has a similar approach as the World Bank, which 
uses trust fund arrangement to circumvent some of the legal restrictions concerning 
the use of its normal resources. 804  However, independent of whether its normal 
resources are involved or not, the AfDB’s statute still governs how the organization 
can relate to its member countries, and so does the political prohibition clause 
therein.805 While it might seem unlikely that in practice, the AfDB would illicitly 
support non-state actors in a member’s territory if the government expressly opposed, 
the AfDB’s Fragile States Strategy at least contemplates such a use for the FSF. The 
2008 Strategy, an essential piece of its policy framework regarding fragile states, 
recommends non-sovereign support as a means for engaging in situations where no 
consensus can be reached with the government on development priorities, where there 
is no legitimate government, or where effective government has broken down.806 
The AfDB’s Emergency Relief Assistance, which is a further instrument for 
providing exceptional support to conflict-affected or fragile states, in turn requires 
government consent. According to the mandatory Policy Guidelines and Procedures 
for Emergency Relief Assistance, requests for emergency grants are processed upon 
request of the government or “upon receipt of a general appeal from United Nations 
(UN) Agencies to the international community”. 807  Though the formulation is 
reminiscent of one in the World Bank’s OP 2.30, the AfDB still needs “to obtain 
                                                        
804 On the World Bank’s use of trust fund arrangements in fragile states, see supra chapter IV.3 a) and 
c). The FSF thus resembles the World Bank’s SPF, whose resources can also be used to finance 
activities that are implemented through non-state actors directly, or by the Bank itself (supra note 766). 
805 The FSF Legal Note expressly states that the FSF will be governed by “general principles of trusts 
administered by international financial institutions” (para. 2.2). 
806 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND, 'Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States', para. 2.3 and 
Figure I. See also the FSF Operations Guidelines, para. 3.3.5 on service delivery through non-
sovereigns. The AfDB has channeled resources through non-sovereigns such as NGOs, private sector 
organizations, or UN agencies particularly to support service delivery in fragile states. 
807 AfDB, Revised Policy Guidelines and Procedures for Emergency Relief Assistance, para. 3.1. 
Emergency relief is financed through a small Special Relief Fund, which is mostly an instrument of 
solidarity as it only provides grants of USD 1 million. Implementing agencies can again be either the 
government, or a UN specialized agency or NGOs.  
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Government’s acknowledgement” before acting on a UN appeal, which is a concrete 
and coordinated request for humanitarian assistance. The international community’s 
call for action as expressed in the UN appeal thus cannot substitute for the 
government’s own approval. 
In practice, the African Development Bank has used both targeted support from 
the FSF and Emergency Relief grants to provide assistance to Somalia following the 
breakdown of government.808 As noted before, the AfDB dealt with Somalia’s TFG as 
the country’s legitimate (though hardly effective) government since 2010, whereas the 
World Bank dealt only with Somalia’s Federal Government established in 2012 – and 
before, on the basis of requests from the international community. 809  The AfDB 
accordingly concluded legal agreements for the provision of targeted support from the 
FSF and emergency relief with the TFG, while in light of its virtually inexistent 
capacities, actual implementation was done by third parties.  
The Asian Development Bank in turn has no internal rule concerning 
development cooperation and conflict, nor has it established a special facility to 
support fragile or conflict-affected states. However, ADB has adopted a mandatory 
Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy that is applicable also in conflict-affected 
or post-conflict countries. In notable departure from its normal practice of engaging 
only upon request of a formal government, Emergency Assistance Loans can be 
requested by “an internationally legitimate governing authority”, e.g. the UN in East 
Timor, or the transitional government in Afghanistan.810 Using short-term and small-
scale emergency loans that are not subject to normal loan terms, conditions, and 
policies, ADB has thus some flexibility to provide assistance to countries in the 
absence of a clearly identifiable, official government counterpart.811 While there are 
obvious parallels to a similar provision in the World Bank’s OP 2.30, in the ADB’s 
formulation, an extraordinary approval from the Executive Board is not foreseen. This 
                                                        
808 No normal lending could be extent to Somalia also because it is under the AfDB’s sanctions policy 
for not servicing its loans since 1990. 
809 See supra chapter IV.3 c). However, the AfDB apparently intensified its engagement in Somalia 
only following the joint request from Somalia’s transitional government, authorities from Puntland and 
Somaliland, and the regional organization IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority for Development). See 
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Somalia Country Brief 2013-2015'. 
810 ADB Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy, OM Section D7/BP (June 15, 2004), para. 26 (i) 
and the according Operational Procedures (OM Section D7/OP), para. 7 (ii), both superseding ADB’s 
previous emergency policies of 1987 and 1989. 
811 See ADB Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy, paras. 20-25 on the scope and conditions of 
Emergency Assistance Loans (EALs). Notably, though a portion of ADB’s resources can also be 
provided in the form of grants, EALs are still loans for which the government or the “legitimate 
governing authority” would need to assume financial liability. 
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is notable in that the ADB’s Executive Directors are competent to interpret the statute. 
Their explicit approval to operations not requested by the national government itself 
could have been counted as an implied interpretation of the ADB Agreement, which 
otherwise forbids any interference with the political affairs of member states.812 
Finally, both the African and the Asian Development Bank have also issued 
specific guidance on how to deal with de facto governments. Here, the regional 
development banks more closely emulate the World Bank. The guidelines prepared 
by the AfDB and ADB in large parts use the same wording as OP 7.30 on “Dealings 
with De Facto Governments”, which is why I focus on the remaining differences. 
Differences consist, first, in the type of legal instrument the MDBs have used to adopt 
the guidelines. The African Development Bank has not adopted an operational policy, 
but a Presidential Directive concerning engagement with de facto governments, an 
instrument that is not used by the World Bank. In contrast to operational policies, 
Presidential Directives are issued directly by the President pursuant to Art. 37 (2) of 
the AfDB Agreement, exercising the power to “conduct, under the direction of the 
Board of Directors, the current business of the Bank”. Presidential Directives are 
equally considered binding on the organization’s staff, though they are not adopted by 
the Board of Directors and hence the rule-making process does not directly involve 
any organ representing the organization’s member-states.  
The decision-making criteria and process that AfDB’s staff are requested to 
follow when approving new operations after an unconstitutional change of 
government largely correspond to those of the World Bank. 813  Unlike OP 7.30, 
however, the AfDB’s Directive also establishes general principles to govern its 
engagement with de facto governments, which reflect precisely the conflicting 
concerns it involves. Staff should avoid a “major deterioration in the Bank Group’s 
investments and projects”, as well as – “to the extent possible” – a “major 
deterioration of the economic situation of the population”.814 In addition, they should 
be informed by the views and decisions of the international community. How to 
                                                        
812 Supra note 279. 
813 AfDB Presidential Directive No.03/2010 concerning Continuity of Operations and Engagement 
with De facto Governments in Regional Member Countries, issued by the President on October 20, 
2010. Some smaller differences concern, for instance, the requirement for AfDB’s Management to 
inform the Board, which is not spelled out but practiced by the World Bank under OP 7.30. Moreover, 
the Directive states that new operations with a de facto government could also be implemented by the 
UN or another emergency assistance agency, which would again reduce the role that the de facto 
government would play during implementation (para. 13). 
814 AfDB De Facto Governments Directive No.03/2010, para. 9.  
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balance these different concerns – technical considerations and fiduciary interest, the 
humanitarian needs of the population, and conformity with the political decisions of 
the international (donor?) community – is largely left to the discretion of staff.  
The Asian Development again has issued guidelines on dealing with de facto 
Governments in the form of a Memo of its General Counsel.815 The organization has 
thus refrained from adopting a more formal and internally binding operational policy, 
declaredly because the frequency of coups in the region did not warrant so. The 
formulation of the guidelines itself still closely follows that of the rules adopted by 
the World Bank and African Development Bank.  
 
b) Differentiation in the Planning and Implementation of Operations 
 
 
The African Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank have in 
various official documents and statements affirmed that development cooperation 
with fragile states requires a differentiated approach. The AfDB’s 2008 Fragile States 
Strategy, for instance, demands that business processes and procedures should be 
adapted to better take into account the different circumstances of each country.816 
Similarly, the ADB’s Operational Plan and Staff Handbook for “working differently” 
in fragile states acknowledge that standard policies and approaches can be inadequate 
in these contexts, and hence require adaptation. 817  Yet to what extent have such 
commitments been translated into differentiated rules for planning and implementing 
development cooperation with fragile states? 
How the AfDB and the ADB plan, manage, and implement development projects 
and programs is generally governed by substantive and procedural rules in their legal 
and policy frameworks, which also define the roles and responsibilities that recipient 
governments assume in the process. Similar to the World Bank, these rules are laid 
down in the statutes and often concretized in operational policies and procedures. 
Whereas the World Bank has gradually introduced a number of exceptional rules that 
essentially aim at reducing or simplifying the requirements for operations in fragile 
states, both the AfDB and the ADB have chosen a somewhat different approach. 
                                                        
815 Memo of the General Counsel re De Facto Governments, dated 16 August 2000, with attached 
ADB Guidelines on Dealings with De Facto Governments.  
816 Supra note 366. 
817 Supra note 378. 
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 As noted before, the AfDB’s system of internal rules is prima facie less detailed 
and systematic than that of the World Bank. Not all of its activities are subject to an 
operational policy and corresponding procedures, and where they are, the respective 
rules are sometimes formulated in a less stringent manner. Concerning the protection 
of environmental and social standards in the projects it finances, for instance, the 
AfDB has adopted a more principles- and outcome-based approach than the World 
Bank, with its prescriptive and often heavily front-loaded safeguards polices.818 The 
African Development Bank is thus generally more agile – and with more flexibility to 
tailor its approach to the circumstances of each country, there is also less need to 
systematically adapt normal policies and procedures only to engage with fragile states. 
The AfDB has nonetheless found that while “consistent engagement” in all its 
member countries is fundamental to fulfilling its mandate, this is particularly 
challenging in post-conflict countries or otherwise fragile states.819 The organization 
has therefore created a special instrument to provide technical and financial assistance 
to fragile states, the Fragile States Facility. As seen before, the main purpose of the 
FSF is to make additional financing available to fragile states, easing the effects of the 
performance-based allocation system. Yet the Facility also aims to enhance the 
effectiveness of AfDB’s operations in fragile states. It was deliberately set up as an 
autonomous entity within the organization, so that it can operate with its own, more 
flexible rules and procedures than those applicable to AfDB’s normal resources and 
operations. A corresponding Legal Note states that due to its “operationally and 
financially autonomous nature”, AfDB’s operational policies “would not necessarily 
be strictly applicable” to the FSF, although they may “provide guidance”. 820  For 
example, anticipating that many fragile states are unlikely to qualify for budget 
support, which demands strong commitment, institutional capacity, and sound 
governance from recipient countries, the Operations Guidelines allow some of these 
prerequisites to be waived for countries that are supported under the FSF.821 This 
exception is quite important in practice, as staff have consequently been using the 
                                                        
818 At the time of writing, the World Bank was in the process of reforming its safeguards system to 
adopt a more principles-based approach like the AfDB, the ADB, and the IFC. See supra note 695. 
819 FSF Legal Note (supra note 799), para. 1.1. 
820 FSF Legal Note, para. 6.1, and para. 2.2, describing the FSF as an “operationally distinct and 
autonomous facility that functions outside of the framework of the Bank’s Group’s operations” (para. 
2.2). 
821 FSF Operations Guidelines, para. 6.1.2. A negative list of all prerequisites of AfDB’s regular 
Development Budget Support Instruments (DBSL) guidelines that cannot be waived is attached in 
Annex 7.  
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quick-disbursing instrument of budget support almost by default in fragile states. 
Besides, the FSF allows using more lenient procedures in order to accelerate 
disbursements and procurement activities for the benefit of fragile states.822 
In contrast to the World Bank, which has introduced exceptional provisions for 
fragile states throughout different operational policies, the AfDB has thus established 
a more coherent, almost self-contained, differentiated regime for resource allocation, 
planning, and implementation in fragile states. It has done so by setting up a special-
purpose entity within the organization, with a largely autonomous legal and policy 
framework.823 On the basis of the clearly defined eligibility criteria of the FSF, both 
the allocation of additional resources, and the application of differential treatment to 
fragile states are relatively transparent and predictable – and hence more likely to be 
“perceived as equitable”, as the AfDB’s Fragile States Strategy demands.824  
That having been said, the AfDB has subsequently revised the eligibility criteria 
for FSF support. Acknowledging that rigid criteria can constrain AfDB’s flexibility 
and responsiveness when faced with extremely heterogeneous fragile states, the 
organization has shifted to a more qualitative, country-by-country assessment of 
eligibility.825 This echoes a point I made above with regards to the World Bank’s 
CPIA-based classification of fragile states: Perhaps preferential in terms of 
predictability and coherence, a clear-cut definition of fragile states as a trigger for 
differential treatment inevitably confines the organization in responding flexibly to 
heterogeneous and evolving situations of fragility.826 
The Asian Development Bank, in turn, has followed neither the World Bank’s nor 
the African Development Bank’s approach to differentiation in planning and 
implementing operations in fragile states. Though it fully accords that fragile states 
pose specific challenges to development cooperation, so far, the ADB’ has apparently 
preferred to respond with a rather ad hoc, case-by-case approach – and if needed, 
                                                        
822 FSF Operations Guidelines, para. 5.2.1. 
823 On the legal personality of trust funds in general, see BANTEKAS, Trust Funds under International 
Law. Trustee Obligations of the United Nations and International Development Banks, 113-114, who 
finds that trust funds are seldom created as entities of their own rights, with a legal personality different 
of the overarching personality of the organization. This is only true with regards to the procedural 
aspects of the trust, however, whereas the law is unclear about the distinct liability of the trust or the 
legal regime governing its dissolution.” 
824 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND, 'Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States', para. 3.10.  
825 See the Report from the African Development Fund’s 13th Replenishment, ADF-13 Report on 
Supporting Africa’s Transformation, at para. 4.21. The importance of the CPIA-based classification of 
a country as fragile in the eligibility criteria has thus been further reduced, and merely acts as one 
possible reference point for staff. 
826 See supra chapter IV.2 b). 
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through waiving normal policy requirements, or using its Disaster and Emergency 
Assistance Policy.827 Under ADB’s Emergency Policy, which is also applicable in the 
context of conflict or post-conflict countries, standard ADB policies and procedures 
can “be liberally interpreted to ensure speedy and effective rehabilitation”.828 On the 
basis of this remarkably broad formulation, ADB’s staff apparently enjoys far-
reaching discretion in applying policies and procedures in the case of emergency – 
and what constitutes an emergency is again defined rather broadly.829  
The ADB’s approach thus contrasts with that of the AfDB with its special Fragile 
States Facility, and with that of the World Bank with its new OP 10.00 for project 
lending. Both define more precisely which of their relevant policies and procedures 
can be simplified, modified, or postponed, and in what situations. In practice, the 
ADB may no longer use uniform processes and procedures for fragile and non-fragile 
states alike – looking at its system of internal rules, however, this shift is so far barely 
reflected.830  
We will return to a more detailed comparison and evaluation of how – and why – 
AfDB and ADB have adapted their legal and policy frameworks to engage with 
fragile state. To make the comparison more meaningful, I first examine the approach 
of one further organization, the European Union. 
 
2. The European Union’s Development Cooperation with Fragile 
States 
 
The European Union has become one of the most important organizations 
providing ODA, and this is without counting the bilateral assistance provided by its 
member states. It is also the single largest provider of multilateral aid to fragile states, 
and in solely financial terms, outperforms even the World Bank.831 At the same time, 
                                                        
827 See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Achieving Development Effectiveness in Weakly Performing 
Countries. The Asian Development Bank’s Approach to Engaging with Weakly Performing Countries', 
para. 48, whereby relaxations to business process requirements require would require an approval of 
Management or the Board of Directors. 
828 ADB’s Bank Procedures for Disaster and Emergency Assistance (OM Section D7/ BP), paras. 16, 
18, 19. 
829 ADB’s Bank Procedures for Disaster and Emergency Assistance, paras. 4 and 5 on the definition of 
“disaster” and “emergency”. 
830 ADB’s Staff Handbook therefore explicitly states that it does not propose any changes at the level of 
operational policies and procedures (supra note 379). The recommendations in the Handbook rather 
concern the provision of policy advice, capacity-building and implementation assistance through ADB 
staff around the design of projects in fragile states, as well as recommendations concerning the 
implementation of projects in weak-capacity, high-risk environments. 
831 Supra note 346. 
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the EU is fundamentally different from other international organizations providing 
multilateral aid – from MDBs like the World Bank, the AfDB, the ADB, and also 
from the UN.832 Comparing the European Union’s development cooperation with that 
of the World Bank must therefore appear like comparing apples to oranges.  
To begin with, the European Union is not a development organization in the sense 
of a technical organization that is solely or primarily mandated to promote 
development. It is a political organization, and has a broad mandate that covers 
several policy fields. This characteristic also makes the EU a unique actor in fragile 
states, where it has a range of instruments at its disposal to address the diverse 
challenges associated with fragile states, most notably, development cooperation, 
humanitarian assistance, and its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).833 
Further, unlike other international development organizations, the EU is composed 
almost exclusively of countries that are themselves donors, not recipients of aid.834  
Since many donors are former colonial powers with a particular interest in supporting 
their old colonies, EU development cooperation traditionally has a strong regional 
focus on providing aid to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States 
(ACP).835 We will see that differentiation between countries or groups of countries is 
a fundamental principle of EU development cooperation, and also reflected in the 
dualist structure of its legal framework. Finally, not only is EU development 
                                                        
832 This is true even without considering the fact that the EU is a supranational organization. Though an 
important difference between the EU and the other international organizations considered here, it 
comes to bear less on the EU’s development cooperation, which is a policy field where the EU 
institutions and its member states exercise their competences in parallel. See TFEU, Art. 4 IV. 
833  For an overview of instruments, see EU DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES, 
European Parliament, 'EU Development Cooperation in Fragile States: Challenges and Opportunities' 
(April 2013), Figure 4. While often seen as an important comparative advantage of the EU in fragile 
states, the range of instruments that can be used in parallel also makes coordination between them a 
particular challenge. On the relation between the EU’s development policy and CFSP, see, for instance, 
FRANK HOFFMEISTER, 'Das Verhältnis zwischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und Gemeinsamer 
Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik am Beispiel des EG-Stabilitätsinstruments', in Sandra Bartelt (ed) 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im Recht der Europäischen Union (Nomos, 2008). 
834 Accordingly, EU law that regulate how the organization interacts with its member states do not 
concern how the organization deals with recipient governments, which prima facie constitute third 
parties. See also infra section 2 a) of this chapter. 
835 The group of ACP states is composed of 79 states (48 African, 16 Caribbean, and 15 Pacific states). 
In 2013, the European Union committed EUR 4.397 billion to ACP countries alone through the 
European Development Fund (EDF), whereas all other countries, including ACP countries, received 
commitments of EUR 9.327 billion through the EU’s General Budget (ODA only). See EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, '2014 Annual Report on the European Union’s Development and External Assistance 
Policies and Their Implementation in 2013' (2014), pp. 19-20. The differences between EU 
development cooperation with ACP and non-ACP states have been somewhat reduced with the reforms 
of the Lisbon Treaty, which led, for instance, to the abolishment of the division of competences for 
planning and implementation of cooperation with ACP and non-ACP states. On the organizational 
structure of EU development cooperation After the Lisbon Treaty, see infra note 836.  
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cooperation generally subject to intense legal regulation, but the rules that guide the 
allocation, planning, and implementation of EU development assistance are usually of 
a more formal, legal nature than those of other international organizations. 
I will further contemplate these and other differences throughout the following 
analysis of the EU’s development cooperation with fragile states. As much as they 
inhibit a systematic and straightforward comparison of the EU’s approach with that of 
the MDBs, they also make such a comparison particularly worthwhile. For the EU 
may face somewhat different challenges when seeking to engage with fragile states, 
and has different possibilities of adapting its legal framework in response. Direction 
and outcome of its response, however, show notable similarities. 
In the following section, I briefly introduce the EU’s legal framework and 
development mandate, indicating how some of the legal constraints the EU faces in 
fragile states, and the means it has for addressing them, differ from those of the 
MDBs (a). Next, I look in more detail at three distinctive aspects of the EU’s legal 
framework – the political mandate, its openness towards non-state actors, and the 
commitment to differentiation – and examine how they shape the EU’s approach to 
fragile states. The political mandate underlies how the EU deals with ineffective or 
illegitimate government counterparts (b). The EU’s flexibility to engage with actors 
outside the central government concerns how it may bypass governments, or engage 
in the absence of government (c). Finally, the principle of differentiation informs how 
in the allocation, planning, and implementation of aid, aid instruments and procedures 
can be adapted to different country circumstances and needs (d).  
 
a) Legal Framework and Mandate – Explicitly Political, Conveniently 
Adaptable 
 
For development cooperation with ACP and non-ACP countries, EU primary law, 
the Lisbon treaty, provides a common constitutional basis that regulates fundamental 
principles, objectives, and competences. 836  Beyond, the legal framework for EU 
                                                        
836 TFEU Art. 4 (4), establishing the (parallel) competence of the EU in the field of development 
cooperation; also Articles 208-211. The Lisbon Treaty has remodeled the organizational structure of 
EU development cooperation. Competences are now divided between “Development and Cooperation 
– EuropeAid” (a merger between the previous General Directorate for Development within the EU 
Commission, and the EU’s implementing agency) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), 
which is a functionally autonomous body whose staff consists of one-third each of former employees 
of the Commission, of the Council and national diplomats. EuropeAid is now mainly responsible for 
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development cooperation is different for ACP and non-ACP countries. Cooperation 
with ACP countries is largely based on an international legal treaty, the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement,837 and the rules governing disbursements under the European 
Development Fund (EDF), a separate EU budget. 838  Cooperation with all other 
developing countries rests not on a mutually agreed treaty, but on EU secondary law, 
namely the Regulation of the central “Development Cooperation Instrument”, as well 
as four other Regulations with a more refined geographic or thematic focus.839 The 
different nature of the legal basis for cooperation with ACP and with non-ACP states 
– one multilateral, one unilateral – is important to bear in mind, as it partly explains 
why ACP states can assume a more autonomous role in development cooperation 
with the EU. Besides, non-binding documents like the 2005 European Consensus on 
Development and the Commission’s 2011 Agenda for Change provide further 
orientation on the objectives and principles of EU development policy and its 
delivery.840 
These different sources constitute the legal framework and mandate of EU 
development cooperation. Like that of other international development organizations, 
the EU’s legal framework is in principle state-centric, and includes basic ideas of 
development, effectiveness, and sovereignty and ownership.841 There are important 
                                                                                                                                                              
concrete implementation, while most of the EU’s strategic planning is done by the EEAS. On the 
organizational structure and legal framework of EU development cooperation in detail, see DANN, The 
Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, 
pp. 170-180; and SANDRA BARTELT, 'The Legislative Architecture of EU External Assistance and 
Development Cooperation', in Sandra Bartelt (ed) Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im Recht der 
Europäischen Union (Nomos, 2008). 
837 Cotonou Agreement (supra note 281). For an overview, see MARTIN HOLLAND, The European 
Union and the Third World (Palgrave, 2002), pp. 196-219. 
838 The legal regime of the 10th EDF covering the period from 2008-2013 consists of Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 617/2007 (May 14, 2007) on the implementation of the 10th European 
Development Fund under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (OJ L 152/1 of June 13, 2007), and an 
Internal Agreement between the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on the 
financing of Community aid (OJ L 247/32 of September 9, 2006). At the time of writing, the legal 
regime of the 11th EDF covering the period from 2014-2020 was not yet finalized. 
839 EU Regulation No. 233/2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for 
the period of 2014-2020, 11 March 2014 (hereinafter DCI Regulation), superseding EC Regulation 
1905/2006 of December 8, 2006, which covers the objectives and principles of cooperation, as well as 
processes and procedures, which are largely similar to the implementation rules of the EDF for ACP 
countries. Of the four other regulations, of particular interest in the context of the present study are 
Regulation (EU) No 235/2016 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 on 
establishing a financing instrument for democracy and human rights worldwide (OJ L 77/85); and the 
IfS Regulation (supra note 392). 
840 European Consensus on Development (supra note 385) and the Agenda for Change (supra note 
390). In general, however, soft law seems to play a less important role in the legal framework for EU 
development cooperation, since it has such a plurality of formal legal acts at its disposal.  
841 On the state-centric legal framework of the EU, see supra chapter II.2 a), and on the basic ideas of 
development, effectiveness, and sovereignty, chapter III.2. 
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nuances, however, which also concern the EU’s engagement with fragile states. First, 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) commits the EU to the 
somewhat more narrow objective of poverty reduction.842 Yet the objective of poverty 
reduction is open to interpretation, namely in light of commitments and objectives 
that the EU and its member states have “approved in the context of the United Nations 
and other competent international organizations.”843 Since the EU has endorsed the 
OECD’s Fragile States Principles and the New Deal, it is committed to foster state- 
and peace-building through development cooperation by means of reference in its 
primary law. More explicit provisions are contained in the Cotonou Agreement and 
EU secondary law. Accordingly, EU cooperation with ACP states must support the 
objectives of peace-building and conflict prevention, including through 
“strengthening the democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of governance”. 844 
Cooperation with non-ACP states mainstreams institution-building throughout all 
development programs, and aims at building “legitimate, effective, and accountable 
public institutions” in fragile and conflict-affected states in particular.845 The EU is 
thus more expressly mandated to further state- and peace-building through 
development cooperation than the MDBs. 
In stark contrast to the MDBs, EU development cooperation is also committed to 
fostering political principles (or: liberal-democratic values), like democracy, rule of 
law, and human rights.846 The political mandate does not only concern what issues the 
EU can or must address in development cooperation with ACP and non-ACP 
countries. In light of the EU’s political mandate, the protection of sovereignty and 
ownership also receives a different pronunciation in the legal framework of EU 
development cooperation. At least formally, sovereignty, equality of partners, and 
ownership are fundamental principles of the EU’s cooperation with ACP countries; 
                                                        
842 Also Cotonou Agreement, Art. 1 and DCI Regulation, Art. 2 (1). 
843 TFEU Art. 208 (2).  
844 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 11 (2). See also Art. 1 (Objectives), and Art. 11 (1), which was amended 
in 2010 to explicitly acknowledge the interdependency between development and poverty reduction on 
the one hand, and peace and security on the other hand. 
845 DCI Regulation, Art. 3 (3) and Annex I on the Areas of Cooperation under Geographic Programmes. 
On the EU’s human rights conditionality, see BARTELS, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU's 
International Agreements, and on the use of democratic conditionality, MARCO GIORELLO, 'The 
Clauses of Democratic Conditionality in the European Union’s External Relations', in Carol Cosgrove-
Sacks (ed) Europe, Diplomacy and Development (Palgrave, 2001). 
846 TFEU Art. 208 (1), referring to TEU Title V, Art. 21 (1), the principles of EU External Action. Also 
Cotonou Agreement, Art. 9 (1) and DCI Regulation Art. 3 (1). On the EU’s political mandate, see also 
DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and 
Germany, 178-179. Notably, the EBRD is a Multilateral Development Bank that was founded in 1990 
and also includes political aspects in its mandate. See supra note 295. 
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somewhat less prominently, the principle of ownership is also included in the DCI 
Regulation. 847  The recipient countries’ realm of domestic affairs is, however, 
significantly reduced, inasmuch as the EU makes the promotion of democracy, the 
rule of law, and human rights explicit subjects of its cooperation. 
Further, the EU recognizes national governments as the main counterparts in 
development cooperation, which becomes explicit in the Cotonou Agreement.848 The 
EU engages mostly with national governments, although unlike the MDBs, it does not 
require governments to assume legal responsibility for the reimbursement of loans.849 
In contrast to the mandates of the MDBs, however, the EU’s mandate for cooperation 
with ACP and non-ACP countries also formulates a principle of participation, that is 
of non-state actors.850 Under the Cotonou Agreement, EU cooperation with non-state 
actors in ACP states is usually subject to the approval of governments, which often 
fear that the inclusion of non-state actors in cooperation could weaken their own 
role..851 Yet, the basic idea that actors outside of the central government play an 
important, complementary role both in policy-formulation and implementation – and 
that ownership thus extends beyond the national government – is firmly anchored. 
What is more, the DCI Regulation establishes that the EU shall consider using 
thematic programs to finance non-state actors and local authorities, including “in 
cases where there is no agreement on the action with the partner country 
concerned”.852 At least in principle, the state-centric paradigm is thus extenuated in 
EU development cooperation, with its legal framework leaving more room for 
cooperation with local authorities and non-state actors than those of the MDBs. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, this is true in particular for development cooperation with 
                                                        
847 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 2, where “ownership” was for the first time included in a binding 
international legal treaty. See also Art. 4 “The ACP States shall determine the development principles, 
strategies and models of their economies and societies in all sovereignty.”); and DCI regulation, Art. 3 
(8) lit. a).  
848 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 2 and Art. 58 (2) lit (a). 
849 The MDBs also need governments as legal counterparts for the conclusion of financing agreements 
that serve to secure the reimbursement of loans. See already supra note 272. 
850 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 2; DCI Regulation, Art. 3 (8) lit. c); and the European Consensus on 
Development, recognizing participation of civil society as a common principle (para. 4 (3)). The 
commitment to broad participation in development cooperation was reinforced with the adoption of 
Council Conclusions on “The Roots of Democracy and Sustainable Development: Europe's 
Engagement with Civil Society in External Relations” (14535/12), 15 October 2012, Luxembourg.  
851 E.g. Cotonou Agreement, Art. 58 (2), according to which local authorities, private enterprises, 
“decentralised cooperation and other non-State actors from the ACP States” are eligible for EU 
financing only subject to the consent of the ACP state. The EU typically funds civil society 
organizations only when their activities are identified in the country’s national development strategy. 
852 DCI Regulation, Art. 6 (2) lit. a); and infra section 2 c) of this chapter. 
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non-ACP states, which is governed by unilaterally-set EU secondary law, and not an 
agreement negotiated with recipient governments.  
Further, unlike those of the MDBs, the EU’s legal and policy framework refers to 
“differentiation” as a fundamental principle of cooperation. 853  In general, 
differentiation means that a country’s level of development, needs, or performance are 
taken into account in the allocation, as well as the planning and implementation of EU 
aid. An innovation of the Cotonou Agreement, the principle of differentiation reflects 
a growing acknowledgement of the immense diversity of developing countries, and of 
the gap between developing and least developed countries within the ACP group. In 
contrast to the MDBs, however, the EU is also less restricted in differentiating 
between different recipient countries. As an organization consisting exclusively of 
donors, recipient countries are not included within its membership. Consequently, 
while the EU is required to treat all its member states equally, this principle of equal 
treatment does not extent to the developing countries it engages with.  
Against this background, the EU appears to face sometimes less, sometimes 
similar, and sometimes distinct challenges when engaging with fragile states on the 
basis of its legal framework. For instance, it has a broader mandate and a broader 
range of policies and instruments of assistance to pursue state- and peace-building 
activities in fragile states. While mandate limitations are thus not so much an issue for 
the EU, delimitation, coordination, and coherence between different policy fields and 
instruments of assistance are all the more.854 Since the present comparison is with 
international organizations that are only engaged in development cooperation, 
however, I will not address this aspect of the EU’s engagement with fragile states in 
detail. 
Of greater interest in the present context are the EU’s political mandate, its 
openness to participation of non-state actors and accordingly less state-centric 
approach, and its formal commitment to differentiation. The political mandate permits 
the EU to openly address issues of governance, the consequences of conflict, or 
human rights violations. What does the political mandate imply for how the EU sees 
                                                        
853 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 2. Also DCI Regulation, Art. 3 (2); and the European Consensus on 
Development, paras. 56-66.  
854 Particularly the delimitation between different policy fields and according competences can pose 
legal constraints for EU development cooperation with fragile states. See, for instance, PANOS 
KOUTRAKOS, 'The Nexus Between the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy and 
Development', in Anthony Arnull, et al. (eds), A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in 
Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford University Press, 2011).  
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and addresses questions of government effectiveness or legitimacy in fragile states? If 
the EU has more means of bypassing the national government in development 
cooperation, is it also more flexible to engage in the absence of government? 
Differentiation according to different contexts and/or needs is a general principle of 
EU development cooperation. How does this formal commitment reflect on the 
planning and implementation of EU development cooperation, specifically with 
fragile states?  
Before I turn to these questions, it must be noted that the nuances that distinguish 
the EU’s development mandate from those of the MDBs are partly expressions of 
more recent shifts in mainstream development thinking – and can thus be explained 
by the fact that its mandate does not date back to the 1940s or 1960s.855 The Lisbon 
Treaty entered into force in 2009, the Cotonou Agreement was signed in 2000, and 
the legal regime of the EDF has an even shorter live span, with the 10th EDF covering 
the period from 2006-2013, and the 11th EDF that from 2014-2020. The five 
Regulations that inform the EU’s cooperation with non-ACP states were adopted in 
2006, and updated in 2014. Not only are the legal bases for EU development 
cooperation with ACP and non-ACP states thus more recent, they are also regularly 
renewed and in general easier to adapt than, for instance, the statutes of the MDBs. A 
case in point is the above-cited provision of the TFEU – usually static, EU primary 
law – whereby the objectives of EU development cooperation may evolve with the 
EU’s commitments to new, internationally agreed objectives. In principle, the EU 
thus enjoys greater latitude when engaging with countries that have limited or no 
effective government, and has an array of formal legal instruments to implement or 
consolidate a differentiated approach to fragile states. To what extent it uses them will 
be discussed in the following sections.  
 
b) The Political Mandate and the EU’s Interactions with “Difficult Partners” 
 
Apart from their different financing instruments, the EU’s political mandate is 
probably what distinguishes it most from the World Bank, the AfDB, and the ADB. 
                                                        
855 For instance, the principles of participation and differentiation were all introduced with the 2000 
Cotonou Agreement. On the changing political relations between the EU and ACP states since the 
1990s and the according legal modifications introduced to their cooperation agreement, see KARIN 
ARTS, 'ACP-EU Relations in a New Era: The Cotonou Agreement', 40 Common Market Law Review, 
95 (2003), and BERND MARTENCZUK, 'From Lomé to Cotonou: The ACP-EC Partnershp Agreement in 
a Legal Perspective', 5 European Foreign Affairs Review, 461 (2000).  
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Contrary to these more technical development organizations, the EU sees 
development cooperation as an aspect of foreign policy, involving political decision-
making and diplomacy, rather than the technical expertise of development economists 
alone.856  
A strong, political dimension, however, was introduced into the EU-ACP 
cooperation only in 1995, and further elaborated in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement.857 
It is thus a direct expression of the new aid orthodoxy that democracy and good 
governance further sustainable development, and a reflection of the changing 
understanding of state sovereignty post-1989 – the same paradigm shifts that have 
informed the growing concern with fragile states in the development community, and 
that of the EU in particular.858 For the EU has always defined fragile states in terms of 
weak governance, rather than weak capacity alone. The 2007 Council Conclusions 
refer to fragility as “weak or failing structures and to situations where the social 
contract is broken due to the State’s incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic 
functions”.859 Seen in this light, the reinforcement of the political dimension of EU 
development cooperation already reflects how the EU sought to deal with fragile 
states. 
                                                        
856 Also DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the 
EU and Germany, pp. 339, 384, describing the EU’s law for planning and implementing development 
cooperation as being “diplomatically oriented”.  
857 Art. 96 thus succeeds Art. 366a, introduced into the Lomé IV Convention following the 1995 mid-
term review. The fact that political principles entered the Cotonou Agreement despite the ACP states’ 
reservations is an expression of power asymmetries in the negotiation process. During negotiations, the 
EU Commission offered clearer differentiation according to country circumstances and needs and “a 
simpler, more efficient and accessible convention” in return. See the Communication to the Council 
and the European Parliament: Guidelines for the Negotiation of New Cooperation agreements with the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Countries, COM (97) 537 final, 29 October. On the EU’s 
motivation to strengthen the legal basis for the enforcement of political principles in development 
cooperation, see BARTELS, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU's International Agreements, 12-17; 
or HOLLAND, The European Union and the Third World, 178-182. 
858 Supra chapter II.2 a). See also DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative 
Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, 178-179, arguing that the explicit commitment of 
EU development cooperation to the EU’s political values marks a decisive change after the Cold War, 
when it became increasingly accepted to limit recipients’ sovereignty by linking aid to political goals.  
859 Council Conclusions on a EU response to situations of fragility (supra note 387), para. 2. The 
Conclusions further outline the basic functions of the state in terms of “rule of law, protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, security and safety of its population, poverty reduction, 
service delivery, the transparent and equitable management of resources and access to power”. The 
preceding Commission Communication (supra note 387) expounds “fragility is most often triggered by 
governance shortcomings and failures, in form of lack of political legitimacy compounded by very 
limited institutional capacities” (para. 4.7). On the EU’s governance-oriented concept and response to 
state fragility, see also WILL HOUT, 'Between Development and Security: the European Union, 
Governance and Fragile States', 31 Third World Quarterly, 147 (2010), 145-147. 
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The mandatory commitment to fundamental principles like democracy, the rule of 
law, and human rights implies that the EU can, and to a certain extent must, address 
political issues in dealing with recipient countries. The key tools for this purpose are 
the Political Dialogue and as an escalation, the invocation of Art. 96 procedures under 
the Cotonou Agreement. Inasmuch as the EU understands state fragility in terms of 
weak governance, a broken social contract, or failures to provide basic services – all 
issues that concern principles of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights – these 
tools are also central components of the EU’s engagement with fragile states, or 
“difficult partners”.860 Moreover, the EU uses the Political Dialogue and Art. 96 to 
respond to disorderly transfers of power in recipient countries, e.g. after a coup d’état 
or conflict, and thus to situations where the legal status of a government may be in 
doubt. 
The Political Dialogue is a continuous, formal or informal process of political 
consultations between the EU and the ACP states,861  with the broad objective of 
fostering mutual understanding and facilitating agreement.862 Most importantly, the 
Dialogue provides a format for addressing developments concerning the political 
principles that underscore the EU-ACP partnership: democracy, rule of law, human 
rights and good governance.863 These are identified as “essential elements” (good 
governance as “fundamental element”) of the Agreement. The Political Dialogue is 
also explicitly concerned with peace-building, conflict prevention policies, and as 
later amended, “responses to situations of fragility”.864  
                                                        
860 “Difficult partners” are considered countries where cooperation has been suspended, where national 
authorities are not committed to poverty reduction and basic political principles, and countries where 
the dialogue on participation of non-state actors in development is very limited. Commission 
Communication on the Thematic Programme “Non-State actors and local authorities in development 
cooperation”, COM(2006) 19 (January 25, 2006). 
861 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 8 (6), according to which the format of the Dialogue is very flexible, and 
formal or informal according to what is appropriate and required. Besides the EU and ACP states, 
regional organizations and civil society representatives shall be “associated” with the Dialogue based 
on Art. 8 (7). This has rarely been the case in practice.  
862 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 8 (2) and (3). The objective of facilitating mutual understanding concerns 
all aspects of the Agreement and basically any other question of common interest. See also the 
guidelines for the Political Dialogue established in the Resolution on the ACP-EU political dialogue 
(Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement), OJ C 80/17 (1.4.2005). 
863 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 8 (4) and Art. 9 (4). Similar commitments are included in Art. 3 (1) of the 
DCI Regulation, and in separate partnership and cooperation agreements concluded with non ACP-
countries.  
864 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 8 (5). Further, Art. 11 under the same “Political Dimension” section of the 
Agreement contains broad commitments to pursue policies and activities supporting peace-building, 
conflict prevention, and conflict resolution.  
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The Political Dialogue thus constitutes the EU’s process of first choice to address 
questions of government effectiveness or legitimacy in fragile states. 865  Yet the 
Cotonou Agreement also foresees a response to situations where political 
disagreements emerge between the EU and an ACP state, up to a breakdown of 
official relations: Article 96. If a party considers that one of the said essential 
elements of the Agreement has been violated, it can unilaterally initiate formal 
consultations to identify measures that remedy the situation.866 On the EU side, the 
Commission proposes when to invoke Article 96, upon which the Council decides by 
consensus.867 If consultations fail, are refused, or in the case of particularly flagrant 
violations of essential elements, the EU can take “appropriate measures”. These are 
not further specified, except that they must be in accordance with international law, 
proportionate, and include suspension as a last resort.868  
Notably, Article 96 is generally successive to the regular and more informal 
Political Dialogue that the EU holds with every ACP state under Article 8; once 
triggered, Article 96 consultations are still geared to reaching mutual agreement 
through dialogue, rather than sanctions. 869  From the perspective of ACP states, 
however, already the initiation of formal consultations is usually considered a form of 
punishment: consultations have always been initiated by the EU, and let to some form 
of “appropriate measures”.870 
                                                        
865 See the Communication from the Commission to the Council (supra note 387), para. 4.7, stating 
that addressing fragility demands “promoting political will for reform through dialogue and incentives, 
rather than through conditionality and sanction”. 
866 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 96 (2) lit. a), which also establishes some procedural requirements for 
consultations. Good governance is not an essential element, but only a “fundamental element” of the 
Agreement, and violations in this regard – namely cases of corruption – are dealt with under Art. 97 of 
the Agreement, establishing a similar procedure that has rarely been used. Specific suspension clauses 
are also included in partnership and cooperation agreements with non-ACP countries. The new DCI 
Regulation of 2014 does no longer conclude a general suspension clause. 
867 There are Council Conclusions for each case under Article 96, so what countries are subject to 
special measures is publically available information. 
868 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 96 (2) lit. c). Where the EU finds that the measures possible within the 
legal framework of the Cotonou Agreement are insufficient, it can unilaterally impose sanctions within 
the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
869 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 8 (2) and Art. 96 1a and (2) lit. a). 
870 JAMES MACKIE & JULIA ZINKE, European Centre for Development Policy Management, Discussion 
Paper No. 64A, 'When Agreement Breaks Down, What Next? The Cotonou Agreement's Article 96 
Consultation Procedure' (2005), 5. Notably, following the mid-term review of the Cotonou Agreement 
in 2005, the EU and the ACP states agreed to “strive to promote equality in the level of representation”, 
and “committed to transparent interaction prior to, during, and after the formal consultations”. Perhaps 
more importantly, the ACP group as a whole can since assume a role in the consultations, so that 
individual ACP states are not alone in negotiating with the EU. See Annex VII of the Cotonou 
Agreement. 
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Both in deciding when to trigger Article 96 (i.e. when and by what standards 
human rights, the rule of law, or the principle of democracy have been violated), and 
in deciding on the use of sanctions if formal consultations fail, the EU holds 
considerable discretion – which it uses in practice.871 In some cases, the Commission 
deliberately abstains from invoking Article 96 in response to violations, for instance 
when it expects consultations or sanctions to have no impact on the violating state. In 
essence, Article 96 constitutes a flexible, diplomatic tool: it allows the EU to enforce 
its general, political conditionality in development cooperation, but only if it sees a 
chance of inducing positive change.872 Consistent decision-making, though perhaps 
expected, is thus not a priority for the EU. 
Not least the fact that in about half the cases, Art. 96 was invoked in response to a 
coup d’état, suggests a brief comparison with the World Bank’s Operational Policy 
7.30 on Dealing with De Facto Governments. Unlike OP 7.30, Art. 96 procedures can 
be used for addressing questions of ineffective or illegitimate government, 
independent of whether they directly affect the economic feasibility and success of 
concrete development projects or programs. The EU can and does openly address the 
essentially political nature of such questions, through an openly political process. 
Since its financial assistance usually does not come in the form of loans, potential 
fiduciary risks of engaging with de facto governments are less important. For the 
World Bank with its non-political mandate, the purpose of OP 7.30 lays precisely in 
insulating an operational decision concerning the identification of government 
counterparts that are able to assume financial liability for the repayment of loans, 
from the political influence of its member states – which the Policy does more or less 
successfully.873  
Article 96 and the Bank’s OP 7.30 have in common that they leave a certain 
latitude to decision-makers, that is the EU Commission and Council and the World 
                                                        
871 Article 96 procedures were used mostly in response to alleged violations of democratic principles 
(often coup d’états) and human rights, for instance, in Zimbabwe and Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia, 
Guinea and Togo, and outside of Africa, Haiti and the Fiji Islands. See Evaluation Services of the EU, 
Evaluation of Co-ordination and Coherence in the Application of Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement, 2007; and with an overview and discussion of cases between 1996 and 2004, see ANDREW 
BRADLEY, European Centre for Development Policy Management, Discussion Paper No. 64D, 'An 
ACP Perspective and Overview of Article 96 Cases' (August 2005).  
872 The case of Zimbabwe, for instance, is often cited as a negative example. In Zimbabwe, the EU 
invoked Art. 96 in 2002, but its measures have remained without impact and only negatively affected 
EU-Africa relations prior to the 2002 elections. On the factors that are seen to contribute to successful 
consultations, see MACKIE & ZINKE, 'When Agreement Breaks Down, What Next? The Cotonou 
Agreement's Article 96 Consultation Procedure', 8. 
873 For a detailed analysis and evaluation of OP 7.30 see supra chapter IV.3 b) and c). 
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Bank’s staff respectively. Neither foresees a procedure that allows for an open 
discussion of different considerations and objectives in deciding on how to engage 
with a de facto government. In both cases, the organization is not obliged to furnish 
reasons for its decision, which thus remain largely non-transparent. 874  Arguably, 
inasmuch as the EU’s Article 96 and the World Bank’s OP 7.30 serve different 
purposes, the organizations use their discretion differently. The EU uses the available 
discretion to allow political considerations to decide how it will respond to an 
unconstitutional change of government, or deteriorating standards of governance 
more generally. OP 7.30, in contrast, aims to ensure that staff decisions on such 
delicate political matters are guided by mostly technical considerations. The 
discretion build into OP 7.30 thus rather reflects the Bank’s preference for flexible 
and decentralized decision-making on operational matters.  
Finally, both organizations could use their discretion to carefully consider the 
circumstances of each case and thus avoid an automatic suspension of aid, e.g. after a 
military coup or in situations of deteriorating governance more generally. After all, 
both organizations have committed to the OECD’s Fragile States Principle to “stay 
engaged” even in difficult situations, where disengagement may be neither adequate 
in light of the humanitarian needs of the population, nor conductive to longer-term 
objectives of development cooperation.875 For instance, if the EU seeks to gradually 
raise standards of good governance also in fragile states, it cannot automatically 
disengage wherever its standard of good governance is not yet or no longer met.876 At 
the same time, the EU and the World Bank could use the accorded discretion for 
political considerations – with the possible result being that the relative economic or 
political importance of a country may ultimately decide whether the EU’s political 
conditionality are enforced, or Bank operations discontinued. 877  The lack of 
                                                        
874 Further latitude consists in the fact that World Bank staff can practically invoke OP 7.30 without 
making a final decision on the continuation of operations for indefinite times. Somewhat similarly, the 
EU is not required to establish the duration of “appropriate measures” ahead, to provide an exit plan, or 
to resume consultations before measures are prolonged. 
875 Fragile States Principles, para. 9 (supra note 144). 
876 See Commission Communication on “Governance in Developing Countries”, COM(2003) 615 final, 
20 October 2003, p. 20; and Commission Communication on “Governance in the Consensus on 
Development”, COM(2006) 421 final, 30 August 2006, p. 9. On the EU’s approach to governance in 
fragile states, see also KUON, Good Governance im Europäischen Entwicklungsrecht , 236-246, who 
finds that while the EU’s normative standard of good governance is essentially maintained, instruments 
and means of implementation must be modified in the context of fragile states. 
877 Arguably, this is often the case at the World Bank (supra chapter IV.3 c)), and also at the EU. See 
HOLLAND, The European Union and the Third World, 133. 
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transparency and often consistency in the decision-making of both organizations does 
not serve to dispel this suspicion.   
 
c) Engagement in the Absence of (Good) Government and with Non-State 
Actors 
 
How does the EU deal with situations where there is no government in power, 
temporarily or for prolonged periods of time? To address this question, we first need 
to look to the EU’s involvement in Somalia, where the organizations found ways to 
overcome constraints of its legal framework that it subsequently formalized and 
mainstreamed. As an ACP state, Somalia had been receiving EU aid under the Lomé 
Conventions I-III, but with the breakdown of government, was no longer able to ratify 
the Lomé IV Convention in 1989, the predecessor of the Cotonou Agreement.878 
While the EU assumed an important role in providing and coordinating humanitarian 
aid to Somalia from 1991, given the absence of a legal basis and government 
counterpart, it could not provide development funds. Therefore, the EU and the 
government representatives from all ACP states adopted conclusions that authorized 
the exceptional release of unspent funds reserved for Somalia under the preceding 
Lomé Conventions.879 In the absence of a national government, the role of National 
Authorizing Officer, usually a senior government official appointed by and 
representing the ACP state in all EU-financed operations, was to be replaced by the 
EU’s Commissioner for External Relations, for as long as the circumstances 
justified.880 
When Somalia had still no government to sign the Cotonou Agreement in 2000, 
the EU and the ACP countries this time agreed on a formal provision whereby 
countries that were parties to the previous Conventions but unable to sign and ratify 
“in the absence of normally established government institutions” may receive aid 
                                                        
878 For a detailed reconstruction and analysis of the EU’s engagement in Somalia, including its lead 
role in representing the international community and establishing a Somalia Aid Coordination Body 
(SACB), see EMMA VISMAN, European Center for Development Policy Management, ECDPM 
Working Paper Number 66, 'Cooperation with Politically Fragile Countries: Lessons from EU Support 
to Somalia ' (1997). 
879  Conclusions adopted on December 4, 1992; and ibid.. 
880 On the role of the National Authorising Officer, see Cotonou Agreement, Art. 35. Further, during 
the 1995 mid-term amendment of Lomé IV, a provision was added to enable Somalia to accede the 
Convention as soon as it had formed a government – and in that case, to postpone the application of 
certain rights and obligations under the Convention in the interest of Somalia. See Agreement 
Amending the Fourth ACP-EC Convention of Lomé, November 1995, Art. 364a. 
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subject to the approval of the ACP-EU Council of Ministers.881 Further,  “provisions 
will be made for those countries which, due to exceptional circumstances, cannot 
access normal programmable resources.” 882  Initially, the Council of Ministers 
therefore adopted Conclusions that permitted an EU official to be entrusted with the 
competence usually accorded to the National Authorizing Officer – and to act on 
behalf of the Somali people.883 This practice was codified in a 2005 amendment to the 
Agreement, and is no applicable in all situations where an ACP state has insufficient 
capacity due to a crisis caused by “war, other conflict, or “exceptional circumstances 
with a comparable effect” – that is, situations that fall short of a complete breakdown 
of government like in Somalia. 884  Normal implementation arrangements shall be 
resumed as soon as the responsible national authorities are again able to manage 
development resources.  
Like the World Bank, the EU has thus not only sought an ad hoc response to 
dealing with the absence of government, but has partly formalized and mainstreamed 
its response by amending the Cotonou Agreement.885 The approach of the World 
Bank and the EU is also similar, in that broadly speaking, both organizations respond 
to the ineffectiveness of national governments by allowing for the temporary 
substitution of government approval and/or implementation. Beyond this common 
denominator, however, not only are there obvious differences concerning the 
applicability, content, and consequences of the relevant provisions. It is also 
important to note that the Banks response is codified in internal rules, OP 2.30 and OP 
10.00, which are elaborated by the Bank’s Management and approved by the 
Executive Board. In contrast, the provisions in the Cotonou Agreement were included 
in a multilateral treaty following negotiations between the EU and the ACP States, 
and a formal amendment procedure. The EU’s rules were thus not unilaterally set, but 
                                                        
881 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 93 (6).  
882 Cotonou Agreement, Annex IV (Implementation and Management Procedures), Art. 3 (3). Notably, 
this arrangement was not only used in the absence of a central government in Somalia, however, but 
also in Sudan, where the EU was unwilling to engage with the government for political reasons; 
SOPHIE GOMES, et al., European Center for Development Policy Management ECDPM Discussion 
Paper No. 31, 'The EU’s Response to Conflict Affected Countries Operational Guidance for the 
Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement' (2001). 
883 ACP-EC Council of Ministers Decision No 3/2001 on the allocation of resources to Somalia from 
the 8th and 9th European Development Fund, OJ L 56, 27.2.2002, p. 23. Strategic planning and 
detailed programming of development projects in Somalia was within the responsibility of the 
European Commission’s Somalia Operations Unit and the Directorate-General Development. 
884 Cotonou Agreement, Annex IV, Art. 3 (5).  
885 The World Bank has adopted OP 2.30 to enable engagement in the absence of a government, at the 
request of the international community, and OP 10.00 to permit the use of alternative implementation 
arrangements in weak-capacity environments. See supra chapter IV.3 a) and 4 a). 
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at least formally, are based on the consent of those states to which substituting 
arrangements could eventually apply.  
Besides the exceptional arrangements included in the Cotonou Agreement, it is 
important to note that the EU is generally more flexible when it comes to engaging in 
a country despite the absence of government – or the absence of ‘good’ government. 
First, the EU can always use humanitarian assistance, an alternative channel for 
rendering assistance to populations in need without going through the government.886 
Under the Cotonou Agreement, humanitarian assistance can be provided at the 
request of the affected ACP state, or alternatively, of the Commission, an 
international organization, or even an international or local NGO. 887  Though 
humanitarian assistance is usually also provided with the consent of the affected state, 
a formal request from the government in power is hence not required. Not least for 
this reason, the EU understands humanitarian assistance also as an instrument of last 
resort in fragile states: to continue rendering assistance in situations that are deemed 
inadequate for the more state-centric and cooperative modes of development 
assistance. 
Yet the EU’s legal framework for development cooperation, too, leaves room for 
providing assistance to local authorities and non-state actors directly. These are 
further avenues of providing development assistance where institutions of the central 
government are not functioning, and explicitly recognized as such by the EU in its 
approach to fragile states. The EU sees cooperation with non-state actors as 
alternatives to ensure continued engagement in a country “for reasons of solidarity 
with populations, of long term aid effectiveness and of global security” – which 
captures very well the humanitarian, operational, and political motivations that 
regularly shape the international community’s concern with fragile states.888  
Financing of non-state actors under the Cotonou Agreement is still subject to the 
agreement of the ACP state, and there is no explicit exception for situations where 
                                                        
886 On the differences between development and humanitarian aid concerning the role of the state, see 
VON ENGELHARDT, 'Reflections on the Role of the State in the Legal Regimes of International Aid'; or 
PAUL HARVEY, Overseas Development Institute, HPG Report 29, 'Towards Good Humanitarian 
Government. The Role of the Affected State in Disaster Response' (September 2009), 21-24. 
887 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 72 (6) 
888 Communication from the Commission to the Council, Towards an EU Response to Situations of 
Fragility (supra note 387), at 4.2. 
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there is no government to render approval.889 More flexibility exists under the DCI 
Regulation concerning Thematic Programmes, though they receive only a relatively 
small share of the EU’s budget.890 The EU uses Thematic Programmes, specifically 
the one for non-state actors and local authorities, to finance activities precisely where 
there is no agreement with the government – or for that matter, no government to 
agree with.891 In addition, the EU’s Instrument on Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) is specifically designed for rendering direct support to civil society 
organizations, parliaments, and even individuals. 892  Established by means of a 
separate Regulation, the thematic instrument shall be used precisely in difficult 
situations where there is no agreement with the government on the promotion of 
democratic values and human rights, or no official cooperation with the government. 
It is another preferred instruments of the EU for engaging with fragile states.  
Finally, even if the EU has thus a legal basis and specific financial instruments for 
supporting local authorities and non-state actors instead of engaging with the 
government directly, EU development cooperation remains very much focused on 
central government actors.893 This is owed to the fact, first, that in order to engage 
with actors outside of the government – be it as participants in planning and 
implementation processes, or as direct recipients of grants – external actors have to 
have a sound knowledge of local circumstances and dynamics, and decide whom to 
support or not to support without fuelling conflict or societal tensions. In Somalia, for 
instance, the EU sought to extend its cooperation with national and local non-state 
actors, but faced difficulties in identifying counterparts with the necessary capability 
                                                        
889 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 58 (2). Arguably, the above-cited provision in Annex IV of the Cotonou 
Agreement, Art. 3 (4) could be referred to in order to circumvent the requirement of approval in such 
situations. 
890 Though laid out in the DCI Regulation, Thematic Programmes are cross-cutting and can also be 
used in cooperation with ACP countries. They are subsidiary to the EU’s Geographic Programmes.  
See SANDRA BARTELT, 'The Institutional Interplay Regarding the New Architecture for the EC's 
External Assistance', 14 European Law Journal, 655 (2008), 672. 
891 DCI Regulation, Art. 6 (2) lit. a) and Annex II B. See also the Commission Communication on the 
Thematic Programme “Non-State actors and local authorities in development cooperation” (supra note 
860), elaborating the particular suitability of the Programme in “difficult partnerships”, post-conflict or 
fragile states. 
892 See EU Regulation No. 235/2014 on establishing a financing instrument for democracy and human 
rights worldwide (supra note 839) and EU Regulation No. 236/2014 laying down common rules and 
procedures for the implementation of  the Union’s instruments for financing external action (March 22, 
2014), Art. 11 on eligibility. The EIDHR is managed by the European Commission and its delegations 
in the field. 
893 See, for instance, HOUT, 'Between Development and Security: the European Union, Governance and 
Fragile States', 154-55, criticizing the EU’s focus on government actors and formal institutions in the 
context of development cooperation with fragile states. 
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and some degree of broader representativeness or legitimacy.894 Second, even where 
counterparts are identified, the EU’s procedures for engaging with non-state actors are 
still particularly complex, posing further obstacles. And third, the gap between the 
EU’s formal commitment and operational practice is owed to an established 
institutional culture of dealing with formal government institutions – a culture very 
similar to that of the MDBs.895  
 
d) Differentiation and Special Treatment in Aid Allocation, Planning and 
Implementation 
 
The EU has a comprehensive set of non-binding policy documents 
acknowledging that fragile states constitute particularly challenging environments for 
development cooperation.896 These documents form part of the policy framework that 
provides the analytical and conceptual grounds for the EU’s engagement with fragile 
states, but do not take the form of binding EU secondary law. Moreover, they 
primarily formulate specific strategies and objectives – strengthening democratic 
governance, institutional capacities, and state-society relations – instead of proposing 
different processes for development cooperation with fragile states.897  
If the EU thus appears more concerned with doing different things, than doing 
things differently in fragile states, this is for two reasons. First, the EU’s legal regime 
for project lending and budget assistance is generally less prescriptive and demanding 
on recipients’ institutions than those of the MDBs, where internal rules that regulate 
the provision of ODA have posed obstacles to engaging in weak-capacity, high-risk 
environments.898 Concerning project lending, the EU’s legal framework establishes 
                                                        
894 On the challenges of engaging particularly with local non-state actors in Somalia, see VISMAN, 
'Cooperation with Politically Fragile Countries: Lessons from EU Support to Somalia '. Despite these 
challenges, the case of Somalia still illustrates the EU’s capacity to support the provision of basic 
services through non-state actors, as well as to reach out to actors outside of the government and 
promote partnerships between government and civil society at the local level.  
895 See the external evaluation commissioned by the EU Commission, Evaluation of EC Aid Delivery 
Through Civil Society Organizations” (December 2008), identifying major gaps between the EU’s 
commitments towards civil society participation and actual implementation practices. Also FERNANDA 
FARIA & ANDREW SHERRIFF, European Centre for Development Policy Management, 'EU Policies to 
Address Fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa. European Report on Development Background Paper' (2009), 
8. 
896 See supra chapter II.3 b). 
897 Some of the recommendations of the 2007 Council Conclusions (supra note 387), however, also 
concern processes and instruments of cooperation with fragile states, which shall be made “more 
flexible and capable to provide quick responses” (paras. 12-13).  
898 For instance, the World Bank’s regime for project lending is particularly front-loading in terms of 
requirements that concern the institutions and policies of potential recipient countries, requirements 
 234 
less demanding ex ante requirements for the approval of projects. 899  Concerning 
budget assistance, the EU also maintains relative discretion in deciding when and on 
what grounds to provide direct support to a country’s budget, and there is no 
minimum threshold of preconditions that potential recipients must meet.900 Certainly, 
we have seen that the EU makes considerable use of conditionalities that come to bear 
during implementation – including political conditionalities, which demand that 
recipient government’s respect democratic principles, the rule of law, and human 
rights. 901  Yet, we have also seen that the EU does not automatically sanction 
violations, i.e. enforce its political conditionalities legalistically.902 
Second, the EU is less concerned with doing things differently in fragile states, 
because differentiation already constitutes a fundamental principle of EU 
development cooperation. In principle, the legal framework thus appears more attuned 
to different levels of capacity, or for that matter, variations in empirical statehood. 
How does the EU’s formal commitment to differentiation inform the allocation, 
planning and implementation of aid in fragile states? 
The principle of differentiation resounds in a number of provisions throughout the 
legal framework for development cooperation with ACP as well as non-ACP 
countries. Both at the level of resource allocation and in project planning and 
implementation, the EU must ensure that its approaches and aid instruments are 
tailored to a country’s specific circumstances or needs. 903  Next to this general 
commitment, the principle of differentiation applies in particular to Least-Developed 
                                                                                                                                                              
that have proven unrealistic and inadequate for engaging with fragile states. In detail, see supra chapter 
IV.4 a). 
899 This is true both for the Cotonou Agreement and the Regulations that govern EU assistance to non-
ACP states. For a comprehensive analysis of the EU’s legal regimes for project lending and budget 
assistance, including a comparison with those of the World Bank, see DANN, The Law of Development 
Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, pp. 383-397. Though 
not in the form of a binding legal instrument, the EU Commission has begun to develop a set of 
guidelines for staff, which concern the use of its different aid instruments. See, for instance, the 
Commission’s Guidelines No 2 on Support to Sector Programmes (July 2007), or No 3 on Making 
Technical Cooperation More Effective (March 2009). 
900 See the EU Commission’s Budget Support Guidelines, Executive Guide (September 2012), wherein 
eligibility criteria for budget assistance broadly refer to the “relevance” and “credibility” of a proposed 
government strategy. 
901 On the EU’s “constitutional conditionalities” in detail, see DANN, The Law of Development 
Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, pp. 391-394. 
902 See supra section 2 b) of this chapter, where I elaborate how the EU makes use of the discretion 
accorded under Art. 96 of the Cotonou Agreement. 
903 On the meaning and scope of differentiation in EU development cooperation, see also ECDPM, 
European Centre for Development Policy Management, Discussion Paper No.134, 'Differentiation in 
ACP-EU Cooperation. Implications of the EU’s Agenda for Change for the 11th EDF and Beyond ' 
(October 2012). 
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Countries and other vulnerable groups, where it provides the basis for special and 
differential treatment. For instance, the allocation of EU resources for cooperation 
with ACP and non-ACP countries takes place on the basis of performance as well as 
different needs, and particular attention shall be paid to the difficulties of conflict-
affected states.904 Similarly, the Cotonou Agreement and DCI Regulation call for 
differentiation in the design of strategies, projects, and programs in general, and 
require special treatment specifically for LDCs, as well as special consideration of the 
needs of post-conflict countries.905  
Apart from differentiation according to local context, a number of provisions in 
the EU’s legal framework also permit flexibility in adapting to changing 
circumstances over time. Again, flexibility concerns the allocation of resources to 
unforeseen needs, the review of projects and programs in line with changing 
circumstances or needs, as well as adjustments in the implementation phase.906 Since 
the adoption of the new DCI Regulation in 2014, such measures concerning the 
extraordinary allocation of resources and flexibility in programming are available for 
all countries “in crisis, post-crisis, or situations of fragility”.907  
The Cotonou Agreement and the DCI Regulation thus contain a number of 
provisions that differentiate in favor of weak-capacity states, and which may 
(sometimes explicitly) benefit fragile and conflict-affected states. The EU does not 
only associate fragile states with weak capacity, however, but also with situations of 
actual or imminent crisis. Therefore, the EU has created specific instruments to more 
effectively prevent or respond to crisis in developing countries, most notably, the 
Instrument for Stability and Peace (IfSP, previously Instrument for Stability, IfS).908  
                                                        
904 Cotonou Agreement, Annex IV, Art. 3 (1) and DCI Regulation, Art. 3 (2). 
905 A similar pattern can be found, for instance, in the principles for development finance cooperation 
under the Cotonou Agreement. Art. 56 (1) lit. b) contains, first, a general commitment to flexibility and 
adaptability for all ACP states, Art. 56 (2) requires, second, special treatment specifically for LDCs, 
and third, acknowledges and differentiates with regards to the specific needs of post-conflict countries. 
In addition, see the general provisions on special treatment of LDCs in Art. 84 (1) and (2), with a list of 
LDCs contained in Annex VI of the Agreement).  
906 For instance, Art. 12 (2) of the DCI Regulation, or the Common Implementing Regulation (EU) No 
236/2014 of 11 March 2014, laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the 
Union's instruments for financing external action, concerning the adoption of special measures by the 
Commission in the event of “unforeseen and duly justified needs” (Art. 2 (1)). 
907 E.g. DCI Regulation, Art. 3 (2), whereby “countries most in need”, including in particular countries 
in fragile situations, “shall be given priority in the resource allocation process”; and Art. 12, 
establishing special provisions for programming in countries or regions in crisis, post-crisis, or 
situations of fragility.  
908 Regulation No. 230/2014 establishing an Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (March 11, 
2014), OJ L77/1, hereinafter IfSP Regulation. Other instruments established in this context are the 
African Peace Facility, whereby development funds of the EDF are used to support African-led 
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Established in 2006 and renewed in 2014, the IfSP caters to the EU’s concern 
with the security risks associated with fragile states, and many of the activities that it 
can finance lay clearly at the interface between foreign, security, and development 
policy. 909  With its cross-cutting objectives and flexible design, the IfSP seeks to 
overcome constraints of the EU’s conventional instruments, which are less suitable 
for a rapid, flexible, and sustained engagement in countries experiencing crisis. IN 
fact, the IfSP mainly serves to channel rapid aid to (re)establish the conditions 
deemed necessary for the implementation of the EU’s normal development 
cooperation in crisis-affected countries. 910  Notably, this includes situations where 
cooperation has been suspended under Article 96, following a violation of the 
“essential elements” – democracy, rule of law, or human rights. To address its broad 
objectives, the IfSP offers considerable flexibility regarding what type of measures 
can be supported, and the recipients of aid, which can be national governments as 
well as community-level institutions, international organizations, and non-state 
actors.911 Besides, the IfSP is subject to a simplified decision-making process and 
lighter programming requirements to enable a more rapid use.912  
Finally, a number of more recent reforms outlined in the Commission’s 2011 
Agenda for Change, and (pending the adoption of a legal basis for the 11th EDF) in 
the Commission’s programming instructions for 2014-2020 explicitly target fragile 
states.913 Before, the terms “fragile states” and “situations of fragility” appeared in EU 
secondary law and the amended Cotonou Agreement of 2010, but never played a role 
in guiding the planning and implementation of EU development cooperation.914 The 
                                                                                                                                                              
peacekeeping operations on the African continent, and also other, predominantly capacity-building 
initiatives in the pre- and post-conflict phases.  
909 Accordingly, the use of the IfSP has raised questions as to the delineation and coherence of the EU’s 
development policy and the CFSP. See supra note 833. 
910 IfSP Regulation, Art. 1 (4) lit. a) and b) and Art. 3 (1) specify the objectives and types of support in 
response to situations of crisis, emerging crisis, or to prevent crisis. It is thus complementary to the 
EU’s other financial instruments, and applicable where other instruments cannot be used within the 
necessary timeframe. In addition, the IfSP can also be used in countries with stable conditions, in order 
to foster the capacity of the EU and its partners in conflict prevention, peace-building (Art. 4), and to 
provide assistance in addressing “global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats” (Art. 5). 
911 IfSP Regulation, Art. 1 (2) and Art. 6, 7, 8.  
912 IfSP Regulation, Art. 7.  
913 Agenda for Change (supra note 390); and the Instructions for the Programming of the 11th European 
Development Fund (EDF) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) – 2014-2020 (Brussels, 
May 15, 2013), prepared by the EEAS and EuropeAid. Both documents highlight that EU support in 
the future will focus on those countries most in need, including fragile states, and therefore increase the 
flexibility and context-specific differentiation of aid levels, instruments, and modalities. 
914 The fragile states terminology appears in the DCI Regulation and since its last amendment in 2010, 
also in the Cotonou Agreement (Art. 11 as part of the Political Dimension). Previously, ACP states 
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EU’s budget support instrument that was revised in this context, for example, 
introduces a specific category of budget support for fragile states, which is targeted at 
state-building, or more precisely, at supporting “transition processes towards 
development and democratic governance”.915 So-called “State Building Contracts” do 
not require an assessment of the government’s track record in terms of human rights, 
democracy, and rule of law, which implies that political standards that are required to 
access direct budget support are practically lowered for fragile states. Instead, 
potential risks that the EU identifies shall be balanced against the risk of inaction, e.g. 
concerning the provision of vital basic services – a shift in thinking that we now from 
the World Bank.916 However, this is not to say that a country’s commitment to human 
rights or democracy no longer matter in the EU’s choice of aid instrument. For 
example, the Commission’s Agenda for Change recommends that if countries “loosen” 
their commitment to such standards, the EU should gear up its cooperation with non-
state actors and local authorities.917  
In sum, the EU’s legal framework for development cooperation establishes 
differentiation – the commitment to take into account the different starting point of 
each country – as a general principle, which neither that of the World Bank, the AfDB, 
or ADB do. As an abstract principle, what differentiation entails needs to be 
concretized through more specific rules concerning the allocation, planning, and 
implementation of aid. Similar to the MDBs, the EU has accordingly introduced a 
number of provisions that differentiate based on a country’s capacity or needs. 
Differentiated treatment is mostly accorded to LDCs and other vulnerable groups, 
though increasingly also to countries affected by conflict, crises, or “situations of 
fragility”. What material and procedural standards can be modified, however, under 
what conditions, and how, is not always clear. Arguably, this corresponds to the 
finding that the legal and policy framework that regulates planning and 
implementation of EU operations is generally more flexible and accommodating to 
                                                                                                                                                              
have rejected the use of the terminology. Unlike the World Bank, the AfDB, and the ADB, however, 
the EU does not have a formal definition or classification of fragile states. On the EU’s understanding 
of state fragility outlined in the 2007 Council Conclusions, see supra note 859. 
915  See the Communication (October 2011) and corresponding Council Conclusions (May 2012) on 
“The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries”, which is reflected in the 
Commission’s Budget Support Guidelines (supra note 900), p. 10. State Building Contracts are used, 
for example, in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
916 On the World Bank’s approach to risk-management particularly in fragile states, see supra chapter 
IV.4 d). 
917 Agenda for Change (supra note 390), p. 5. 
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political considerations than those of the MDBs. Whether and how a government’s 
structure or performance affect how the EU differentiates between different recipient 
countries thus appears to remain a political decision – perhaps not surprisingly for a 
political organization. 
 
3. Comparison and Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a short, comparative analysis of how, and to what effect the 
AfDB, the ADB, and the EU have adapted their legal and policy frameworks to 
engage in development cooperation with fragile states. My objective was twofold: 
first, to present a more comprehensive picture of adjustments and regulatory trends 
concerning fragile states in the law of development cooperation. Second, to use the 
emerging nuances to learn more about the factors that may influence whether and how 
an organization decides to adapt its legal and policy framework, and hence formalize 
a differentiated approach.  
The African and the Asian Development Bank have prima facie much in common 
with the World Bank. Not only do they operate with the same classification and 
accordingly understanding of fragile states. Inasmuch as they have similar objectives 
and engage in the same types of activities, they also face similar constraints when 
seeking engagement with fragile states, where governments have often limited 
effectiveness. There is hence reason to suspect that the AfDB and the ADB have also 
emulated the World Bank’s response.  
This is indeed the case with regards to the MDBs’ dealings with de facto 
governments. After all, how to engage with an entity that came to power by 
unconstitutional means is an area of common concern to development banks, which 
need clarity particularly regarding a government’s capacity and will to fulfill its 
financial obligations. The question arises so frequently that all organizations have felt 
the need to provide guidance to staff, though with varying degrees of bindingness. In 
contrast, how to engage in the absence of a government in power is a question that has 
obviously come up much less often. Neither the AfDB, nor the ADB have therefore 
formulated a general policy principle concerning their involvement in the absence of a 
government in power, as the World Bank did in OP 2.30. Nonetheless, though 
normally bound to operate with and through governments, both organizations have 
created avenues through which they can provide limited support to the population of a 
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country without necessarily involving the government – the AfDB with its Fragile 
States Facility, and the ADB through emergency assistance. Especially where the 
organizations’ regular resources are not involved, both are thus more flexible and also 
prepared to work around the government – though if not from a government, the ADB 
insists on the approval of an “internationally legitimate governing authority”.918  
Like the World Bank, the AfDB and the ADB have also a practice of reducing or 
postponing requirements to enable a more flexible and speedy response in countries 
with low capacity and urgent needs. How they do so, however, differs. With its 
Fragile States Facility, the AfDB has created a quasi self-contained, differentiated 
regime that governs the use of resources for operations in fragile states. In contrast, 
the ADB has largely refrained from introducing specific exceptions for fragile or 
conflict-affected states in its legal and policy framework, and instead preferred to 
respond ad hoc, if necessary by waiving requirements. In sum, the “gravitational force” 
and model role of the World Bank, the oldest and largest of the MDBs, is apparently 
not so potent when it comes to developing and formalizing an approach to engaging 
with fragile states.919 
The EU is an organization essentially different from the MDBs, and also operates 
with a different mandate and aid instruments when providing ODA to fragile states. 
Besides the fact that is not a development bank that provides loans, the most notable 
distinction is that the EU has a political mandate, and development cooperation 
constitutes one of several instruments of the EU’s external relations – in other words, 
a diplomatic tool. Two additional distinctions in its legal framework proved to be 
relevant in the context of EU engagement in fragile states: the principle of 
participation (and hence the commitment to a notion of ownership that extends 
beyond the executive), and the principle of differentiation.  
Still, the EU assumes “the presence of a functioning government as a legitimate 
interlocutor and partner” in development cooperation no less than the MDBs, and has 
faced challenges in the context of fragile states. 920  A number of exceptional 
provisions were therefore included in the Cotonou Agreement, to allow allocating 
resources and conducting operations in countries with no government in power. 
                                                        
918 Supra note 810. 
919 BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, 'Partnerships, Emulation, and Coordination: Toward the Emergence of a 
Droit Commun in the Field of Development Finance', 175. 
920 FARIA & SHERRIFF, 'EU Policies to Address Fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa. European Report on 
Development Background Paper', 11. 
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Notably, these provisions were not introduced through the adoption of an internal rule 
like those of the World Bank in OP 2.30, but through negotiation and subsequent 
amendment of the Cotonou Agreement – and hence with the consent of those 
potentially affected.  
In turn, the EU’s approach to situations that concern not the absence of a 
government, but rather the identification of a legitimate government counterpart in 
post-conflict countries or following a coup d’état, is markedly different from that of 
the MDBs. These are situations that quite simply do not pose a challenge to the EU, 
since what makes them so tricky for the MDBs – their undeniably political nature – 
makes them palatable for a political organization. Instead of adopting guidelines to 
instruct staff in steering the difficult course between admissible and inadmissible 
political considerations, the EU can call a spade a spade – and leave it to political 
decision-making how to choose and interact with different government counterparts. 
What is more, if it does not want to interact with a government for political reasons, 
the EU has still the mandate and instruments to deliver aid to non-state actors or local 
authorities directly, and is hence less attuned to dealing only with (effective) 
governments than the MDBs.  
When it comes to modifying substantive or procedural requirements falling on 
recipient states to account for capacity constraints, the EU’s approach proved to be at 
once more comprehensive and less specific. Differentiation constitutes a fundamental 
principle for development cooperation, with constant reminders throughout its legal 
framework to take into consideration the special circumstances and needs of each 
country, including those in “situations of fragility”. Beyond this broad commitment, 
however, precisely what standards can be lowered or postponed, for whom and under 
what conditions, is not always clear. With regards to fragile states, the EU’s emphasis 
has rather been on simplifying procedures to be able to respond more rapidly to 
situations of crises. 
On the basis of this more nuanced picture of the regulatory activity of different 
organizations, what do we learn about the factors that influence whether and how 
organizations adapt their legal and policy framework to engage with fragile states? 
Obviously, to what extent international development organizations modify rules to 
engage with fragile states depends first of all on the extent to which rules are deemed 
too constraining or inadequate to begin with. It is thus not surprising that we found 
the greatest differences between the EU and the MDBs. The EU has a political 
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mandate, whereas the MDBs have a political prohibition clause in their statutes, 
which probably poses the most constraints in dealing with fragile states, for better or 
for worse. Besides, standards of effectiveness, which are partly responsible for the 
high ex ante requirements on ODA recipients in the internal rules of the MDBs, are 
somewhat less paramount in the EU’s legal framework, and hence do not stand in the 
way of assisting countries with weak capacity.  
Yet the analysis of the AfDB and the ADB has also brought to light notable 
differences in their respective approach, although their legal frameworks and 
mandates are largely similar to that of the World Bank. We have seen differences 
emerge mostly regarding the extent to which the three MDBs have decided to adopt 
or modify rules of the legal framework – or instead preferred a less regulated, less 
formalized response. After all, it is not mandate questions alone that account for an 
organization’s approach to fragile states, and what role rule-making assumes therein. 
Other factors are at least as important, even if they are more difficult to grasp, at least 
in a legal study: an organization’s institutional culture, for instance, its particular 
conception of state fragility, or the interests of influential member states.  
In this light, the fact that the ADB has largely abstained from making substantial 
modifications to its legal framework can be attributed to the fact that there are fewer 
fragile states in the region.921 It is also owed, however, to an institutional culture that 
is particularly responsive to the sensitivities of treating “fragile states” differently. 
This becomes clear considering that the ADB has continuously reiterated that the 
classification of a country as fragile does not in any way impair its membership status 
within the organization, but constitutes an acknowledgement of the country’s special 
needs.922  
The AfDB, in turn, covers the region that includes by far the most fragile states. 
Still, it has not been as active as the World Bank in adopting or modifying internal 
rules. One reason is that the AfDB quite simply has a general preference for flexibility 
                                                        
921 Sub-national conflicts are, however, widespread in the region, and considered to lead to regionally 
confined situations of fragility See the influential study of the Asia Foundation, THOMAS PARKS, et al., 
The Asia Foundation, ' The Contested Corners of Asia - Subnational Conflict and International 
Development Assistance' (2013). 
922 E.g. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Working Differently in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations - 
The ADB Experience: A Staff Handbook', para. 22. On the ADB’s institutional culture, see also J. 
Jokinen, Balancing between East and West. The Asian Development Bank’s Policy on Good 
Governance, in: MORTEN BOAS & DESMOND MCNEILL (eds), Global Institutions and Development. 
Framing the World? (Routledge, 2004), pp. 137-150. The authors show how the ADB’s approach to 
good governance was influenced by its specific political and institutional environment, and the 
importance given to its apolitical mandate in particular.  
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and experimental, case-by-case approaches over strict regulation, as suggested by the 
fact that it has still no Operational Manual like the other MDBs. Arguably, the role of 
lawyers within the institution is not the same as the role that lawyers have come to 
assume in the World Bank.  
Further, a fundamental difference between the EU and the MDBs consists not just 
in their legal mandates, but also in the fact that the former is not a bank that needs to 
worry about its creditor rating or the financial liabilities of its clients. Its institutional 
culture is hence less risk-averse, which is also reflected in how the EU engages with 
fragile states.923 Besides, the EU also seems to have a somewhat different conception 
of state fragility than the MDBs. At least in policy documents, the EU has emphasized 
poor governance and weak state legitimacy as key characteristics of state fragility 
form early on.924 In contrast, the World Bank’s conception of state fragility at least in 
the beginning focused on weak state capacity, and its approach accordingly on 
differentiated requirements and implementation assistance.  
Further, it should not be underestimated what role an organization’s membership 
structure can play in shaping its approach to fragile states. Differentiating more 
between individual recipient states, for instance, is unlikely to meet with objections in 
an organization consisting only of donors like the EU. In contrast, development 
organizations with a more mixed membership structure like the World Bank will 
always have to respond to the concern that differentiation in favor of one country 
automatically entails disadvantages for others.  
Finally, the comparison between the World Bank and the often similar-minded 
AfDB and ADB, which have gone less far in their reform efforts concerning fragile 
states, draws attention to a last, important factor. The World Bank’s most powerful 
shareholders have shown a strong interest in seeing the organization engage more 
with conflict-affected and fragile states, and therefore overcome constraints posed by 
its legal framework and mandate. 925  That the World Bank has overcome such 
constraints has much to do with the dominant position of these shareholders in the 
                                                        
923 The culture of risk-aversion is so dominant at the World Bank and other MDBs that it hardly 
matters that fragile states most often receive funding from the IDA, which does not invest on global 
financial markets itself, or from other sources such as trust funds. 
924 At the same time, the EU maintains a strong focus on security aspects in development cooperation 
with fragile states. See WILL HOUT, 'EU Statebuilding Through Good Governance', in David Chandler 
& Timothy Sisk (eds), Routledge Handbook on International Statebuilding (Routledge, 2013). 
925 For instance, the USA, the most important shareholder of the World Bank, pushed for the 
organization to engage in the West Bank & Gaza and in Bosnia. See supra chapter IV.3 a).  
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Executive Board, the organ that has the power to interpret the Articles of Agreement, 
and to approve new internal rules and operations.926 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
926 In contrast, the AfDB has “a large and dispersed ownership with no single member or group playing 
a pivotal role”, which can also be said for the ADB. ENGLISH & MULE, The African Development Bank, 
pp. 1, 39-48. This is not to say that politics do not matter within the AfDB – for instance, Mingst 
argues that the AfDB is as much a political institution as the World Bank. KAREN A. MINGST, Politics 
and the African Development Bank (University Press of Kentucky, 1990), pp. 151-186. 
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VI. Dealing with Fragile States, Adapting to State Fragility – 
Of Emerging Patterns and the Potentials and Perils of 
Regulation 
 
When engaging in development cooperation with fragile states, international 
organizations come across a problem that to some extent concerns the functioning and 
effectiveness of the international legal order as a whole. International organizations 
operate on the basis of rules that presume the existence of an effective government, in 
a de jure, and in a de facto sense. In fragile states, a formal government may, however, 
be nonexistent, or lack the capacity to fulfill its most basic rights and obligations. In 
previous chapters, we have seen how various development organizations have 
therefore adapted their premises, and the rules on which they operate. We have looked 
at the rules that govern how the World Bank, the AfDB, the ADB, and the EU 
negotiate, plan, and implement development projects – and considered how, and to 
what effect they have been modified to support the increasing engagement with a 
large variety of fragile states.  
Having demonstrated that though fragile states are a phenomenon beyond law, the 
evolving response of international development organizations is not, we are left with 
two questions. First, what are the broader patterns that emerge from the rule-making 
activities of various international development organizations? Certainly, there are 
important variations concerning the extent and specifics of how different 
organizations change their legal and policy frameworks to deal with fragile states. 
Regarding both the processes of adaptation and the specific results, we have, however, 
also seen notable similarities, which can serve as a basis for identifying patterns. 
These emerging patterns – though not very systematic and only partly formalized – 
illustrate how different development organizations have sought to respond to the 
refutation of the ‘effective government’ premise, which traditionally underscores their 
legal and policy frameworks.  
The second question that remains to be addressed is of interest to legal scholars 
and development practitioners alike. What are the potentials and perils of using rules 
to instruct and formalize a differentiated approach to dealing with fragile states? 
There appears to be demand within international development organizations for more 
appropriate rules, which have the potential to provide guidance, and also the basis for 
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a more transparent and consistent manner of aiding fragile states.927 Yet, the notion of 
fragile states is analytically imprecise and comes with a dubious political agenda.928 
Moreover, international legal scholars must look with caution at any endeavor to 
regulate and formalize a differentiated approach to dealing with fragile states, and 
eventually, to cement a de facto second-class status of statehood. At the same time, 
legal scholars are well placed to scrutinize the processes whereby international 
development organizations make or modify rules, and set – often unilaterally – the 
terms and conditions upon which fragile states receive ODA.  
In addressing the two questions, this final chapter synthesizes and discusses the 
key findings of the preceding analysis of the World Bank, the AfDB, the ADB, and 
the EU. I begin by tracing patterns in the way international development organizations 
are dealing with fragile states, and accommodating state fragility, illustrating how 
‘state-building’ emerges as a new development paradigm – and what is more, a 
regulatory theme (VI.1). On this basis, I identify the potentials and perils of endeavors 
to regulate a differentiated approach to fragile states, be it through adopting or 
modifying rules that govern the transfer of ODA (VI.2). To conclude, I draw on legal 
approaches to governance activities of international organizations to propose some 
design considerations and procedural requirements that could enhance the potential of 
a legal response (VI.3). 
 
1. Emerging Patterns – State-building as a Development Paradigm 
and Regulatory Theme 
 
International organizations have increasingly found that dealing with fragile states, 
basic premises of the traditional, state-centric development paradigm are put into 
question. In response, development organizations have reinforced efforts at 
establishing, reforming, or strengthening state institutions – in other words, on 
creating or fostering those conditions in recipient states found necessary for aid to be 
effective. With ‘effective government’ turning from a precondition into an objective 
or outcome of development cooperation, state-building, in the sense of strengthening 
                                                        
927 See, for instance, the report prepared by World Bank staff: The World Bank, Operationalizing the 
WDR 2011 (supra note 359), Annex B: Matrix for Action, demanding the revision of OPs/BPs; or 
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Working Differently in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations - The 
ADB Experience: A Staff Handbook', 1; and in detail, supra chapter II.3. 
928 On the analytical shortcomings of the notion of fragile states, see supra chapter I.1, and on the 
questionable political agenda behind it, also I.2 b). 
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effective government, is gaining importance as a paradigm for development 
cooperation.  
State-building was proclaimed a central objective in the OECD’s Fragile States 
Principles and in the New Deal, to which all major international development 
organizations operating in fragile states adhere. 929  The objective of establishing, 
reforming, or strengthening state institutions also reverberates throughout the 
organizations’ strategies and policies for fragile and conflict-affected states. It is an 
objective that is prima facie in line with the mandate of international development 
organizations. After all, functioning state institutions and state-society relations are 
increasingly understood as preconditions for sustainable and equitable economic 
development. 930  Considering that state-building is an ill-defined, but holistic 
undertaking and regularly involves cross-sectoral approaches, however, not all 
activities that contribute to state-building are also compatible with the mandate of 
development organizations. Drawing the line between quintessential development 
objectives and broader political objectives of state-building in fragile states has 
perhaps become increasingly difficult in abstract, but not altogether meaningless in 
practice. After all, not just the legal boundaries, but also the comparative advantage of 
development organizations in highly politicized, domestic processes of state-building 
remains contentious, and a clear indication of what the state-building agenda includes 
or excludes is often missing.931 
While state-building is firstly a paradigm that describes the high-level objectives 
and priorities of development cooperation specifically with fragile states, in a way, it 
can also be seen as a regulatory theme. For acknowledging that an effective 
government counterpart cannot always be taken for granted has led international 
development organizations not just to refocus their activities on the objective of 
                                                        
929 Fragile States Principles (supra note 144), Principle 3, and the New Deal (supra note 338). There is 
an extensive literature on the concept and practice of state-building. For a selection, see the references 
provided in supra note 125.  
930 This shift is reflected in various trends in mainstream development thinking, which I outline in 
supra chapter II.1 a).  
931 The complex challenges that international development organizations face when seeking to engage 
in ‘state-building’ have been aptly described by the Independent Evaluation Group when assessing the 
World Bank’s LICUS initiative in 2006 (supra note 777). The questions raised by the IEG remain 
equally relevant (and unanswered) today. See also TODD MOSS, et al., 'An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A 
Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa' Center for Global 
Development Working Paper 74 (January 2006), highlighting the potentially negative effects of aid 
dependence on state institutions; or ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, 
Prosperity, and Poverty, criticizing the “ignorance hypothesis” with which development agencies 
approach local actors, assuming they do not know what good institutions should look like; and on for a 
critical assessment of the state-building in general, see the references in supra note 128.  
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strengthening state institutions. To some extent, it has also led international 
organizations to revisit rules that were designed for more stable, high-capacity 
countries – and that, broadly speaking, assume the existence of an effective 
government.  
As a regulatory theme, state-building describes the underlying motive of how 
development organizations modify their legal and policy frameworks to engage with 
fragile states. Behind the move to differentiated approaches for fragile states lays 
essentially an endeavor to adapt rules to the present capacity constraints of state 
institutions, while making sure that their capacity is strengthened in the long term. 
The objective of strengthening the capacity of states to fulfill certain functions – as 
well as the acknowledgement that achieving this objective may require trade-offs in 
the short term – form the core of the state-building concept and agenda.932 Already the 
term state-building suggests that certain premises first need to be established for the 
state to be able to take on the full range of rights and responsibilities – in this case, in 
the development process.  
Understanding state-building as a regulatory theme provides a framework for 
analyzing the patterns that emerge in the way international development organizations 
adapt their legal and policy frameworks. A first pattern consists in the move towards 
greater differentiation in the rules that govern the transfer of ODA to countries with 
different capacities. We have seen that the rules that normally govern the approval 
and implementation of development projects and programs can, if strictly enforced, 
significantly delay, disrupt, or prevent engagement with countries that presently lack 
the capacity to comply. 933  Alternatively, they are ignored and hence remain 
ineffective. Therefore, many organizations have sought to better tailor the substantive 
and procedural requirements they attach, mostly unilaterally, to the approval and 
implementation of development assistance to the different capacity of recipient 
countries. 
Differentiation can be achieved through various techniques. Certainly, the easiest 
way is to differentiate at the level of conditionalities that are negotiated individually 
with each country in connection with development projects or programs, and which 
                                                        
932 ZAUM, The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International State-Building, 4-5.  
933 In supra chapter IV.4, for instance, I elaborate in detail how the internal rules that regulate the 
World Bank’s lending operations pose ex ante and ex post requirements on recipient countries. The 
requirements are generally aimed at ensuring that the projects and programs financed with ODA 
achieve development objectives, conform to certain fiduciary, environmental and social standards, and 
meet standards of economy and efficiency. 
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are not established as abstract, general rules in the law of development organizations. 
In fact, most organizations have committed to better tailor conditionality to the 
capacity of different countries.934 Another technique that does not require adapting 
existing rules is the establishment of specific financial instruments or trust funds, 
which are subject to different rules concerning project approval and implementation, 
and thus facilitate engagement in fragile states.935 Further, we have seen that the ADB 
relaxes substantive and procedural requirements for fragile states by waiving general 
policy requirements or making extensive use of its emergency policy.936 
Yet international development organizations have also introduced differentiated 
obligations at the level of those abstract, general rules of their legal and policy 
frameworks that prima facie apply equally to all countries. For example, the EU has 
made differentiation a general principle in the Cotonou Agreement and DCI 
Regulation. 937  The World Bank has reduced or postponed certain fiduciary, 
environmental and social standards for countries facing capacity constraints through 
revising the legal framework for project lending, OP 10.00.938 Moreover, the World 
Bank, the AfDB, and the EU have adopted exceptional provisions and mechanisms 
that enable the use of budget assistance in countries with institutions and policies that 
do not meet the usual, pre-approval requirements in terms of good governance.939 
                                                        
934 See, for instance, the World Bank’s Good Practice THE WORLD BANK, 'Good Practice Note for 
Development Policy Lending. Development Policy Operations and Program Conditionality in Fragile 
States'; or THE WORLD BANK & AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Providing Budget Aid in Situations of 
Fragility: A World Bank - African Development Bank Common Approach Paper', at 10, stating that 
“There is broad consensus among the three institutions that core conditionality in fragile states should 
be limited in number“ (the three institutions being the World Bank, the AfDB, and the EU), and 
„should be results-oriented, focused on the most critical elements and realistic.“ To what extent 
international development organizations have actually been using more or less stringent obligations in 
their contractual agreements with fragile states, however, is a different question that goes beyond the 
scope of the present study. It would require analyzing and comparing a large number of different kinds 
of financing agreements and project-level contracts concluded with fragile and non-fragile countries. 
935 See supra chapter V.1 b) on the AfDB’s Fragile States Facility; supra chapter II.3 b) on the World 
Bank’s State- and Peacebuilding Fund; and supra chapter IV.3 a) and c) on the World Bank’s use of 
country-specific or thematic trust funds, e.g. in the West Bank and Gaza, Kosovo, and Somalia. 
936 Supra chapter V.1 b). Most international development organizations have emergency policies that 
once triggered, permit reducing or postponing certain (mostly procedural) requirements to respond 
swiftly to onset disaster or emergencies. The World Bank also used to apply its emergency policy in 
fragile states beyond situations of immediate emergency, but has since formalized and mainstreamed 
the according exemptions for all operations in countries facing capacity constraints in OP 10.00.  
937 See supra chapter V.2 d), where I also show how this general principle is further concretized in a 
number of provisions that provide a basis for differential treatment. 
938 Supra chapter IV.4 a).  
939 See supra chapter IV.4 b) on the World Bank’s exceptional provision of budget assistance to fragile 
states; chapter V.1 b) on the option of waiving requirements for budget support under the AfDB’s FSF, 
and chapter V.2 d) on the EU’s use of budget assistance without assessing a government’s track record 
in terms of democracy, rule of law, and human rights, in order support state-building in fragile states. 
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Notably, where ex ante requirements have been reduced to acknowledge that the 
capacities necessary for compliance first need to be established, or that standards need 
to be achieved progressively, development organizations usually put more emphasis 
on supervision and other ex post controls that come to bear during the implementation 
stages.940  
Next to differentiating at the level of substantive and procedural requirements for 
the approval of development projects or programs, international organizations also 
differentiate at the level of implementation, for instance, by providing targeted 
capacity-building and implementation support. Again, the World Bank’s revised OP 
10.00 requires the use of alternative implementation arrangements in weak-capacity 
countries to be accompanied by capacity-building measures. 941  Strengthening the 
institutional capability of recipient countries has always been a centerpiece of 
development cooperation, and the idea of “capacity development” has experienced a 
resurgence of interest over the last decades – not only, but also in fragile states.942 In 
this context, however, capacity-building is targeted precisely at strengthening the 
state’s capacities in areas where they are insufficient to achieve the usual ex ante 
requirements for aid.943 In this sense, certain ex ante requirements of development 
organizations are no longer criteria for exclusion, but become benchmarks for 
identifying areas where capacity-building is required during implementation.944  
As indicated before, how international development organizations tailor rules to 
the weak capacity of fragile states or differentiate at the level of implementation is 
                                                        
940 This is the case, for instance, for budget assistance to fragile states provided by the World Bank, the 
AfDB, and the EU. See THE WORLD BANK, 'Good Practice Note for Development Policy Lending. 
Development Policy Operations and Program Conditionality in Fragile States', paras. 47-50; and THE 
WORLD BANK & AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Providing Budget Aid in Situations of Fragility: A 
World Bank - African Development Bank Common Approach Paper', 11. 
941 Supra chapter IV.4 a). 
942 For a broad overview, see OECD, 'The Challenge of Capacity Development. Working Towards 
Good Practice' (2006). Notably, what capacity-building means or entails – for instance, whose capacity, 
what capacities are build – is often ill-defined. See, for instance, BRIAN LEVY & SAHR KPUNDEH (eds), 
Building State Capacity in Africa. New Approaches, Emerging Lessons (World Bank Institute, 2004); 
or OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT, The World Bank, 'Capacity Building in Africa: An OED 
Evaluation of World Bank Support.' (April 2005) 
943 For instance, World Bank operations in fragile states often include a capacity-building component, 
mostly with a focus on public expenditure management, procurement, civil service, or revenue 
collection reforms. See INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP, 'World Bank Assistance to Low-Income 
Fragile- and Conflict Affected States', table 4.1 (p. 37). 
944 Though not specifically with regards to fragile states, this approach underscores the World Bank’s 
Program-for-Results Financing instrument introduced in 2012. Government programs are assessed 
against (a condensed version of) the World Bank’s safeguards, but where shortcomings are identified, 
they do not automatically lead to the exclusion from financing. Rather, they are addressed during the 
implementation stages, with the Bank providing support through capacity-building. In detail, see supra 
chapter IV.4 c). 
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reminiscent of a familiar concept in international law: differential treatment.945 Most 
commonly known in international environmental and international trade law, the 
concept of differential treatment refers to the use of differentiated standards to 
accommodate empirical differences between states in the design or implementation of 
rules.946 Differential treatment rests on the acknowledgment that strict legal equality 
can actually cause inequality, given that states have very different levels of capacities, 
including factual capacities, to exercise rights and obligations. At the same time, 
differential treatment – be it through lowering standards, focusing on progressive 
realization, or providing implementation support – can also contribute to increasing 
the effectiveness of rules where implementation is currently weak.947 Arguably, both 
are also motives for international development organizations in adapting their legal 
and policy frameworks vis-à-vis fragile states.  
These examples of differentiation are, however, still too rudimentary and sporadic 
to amount to a coherent regime of differential treatment of fragile states. They also 
illustrate that differential treatment in the law of development cooperation does not 
necessarily target and hence apply exclusively to “fragile states”, as a distinct group 
of countries with common characteristics or needs. Quite in contrast, definitions or 
classifications specifically of fragile states or situations assume a relatively minor role 
as a trigger for differentiation, as I pointed out repeatedly throughout this thesis. More 
often, differentiated ex ante requirements or implementation targets post-conflict 
countries (e.g. the World Bank), countries affected by emergencies (ADB), or still 
more generally, by crisis (EU).948 
                                                        
945 Supra chapter IV.4 a). 
946 For a comprehensive treatment of the concept and forms of differential treatment in international 
law, see PHILIPPE CULLET, 'Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of 
Inter-state Relations', 10 European Journal of International Law, 549 (1999); and CULLET, Differential 
Treatment in International Environmental Law. In his monograph, Cullet defines differential treatment 
as “intrinsically linked to the search for substantive equality” (p. 19), as situations where the principle 
of reciprocity of obligations gives way to differentiated commitments, for the purpose of fostering 
substantively more equal results than what is achieved through the principle of formal equality, in 
situations where actors are not equal” (p. 1). On differential treatment in general, see also 
CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, 'Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law', 98 
American Journal of International Law, 276 (2004); on forms of differential treatment in 
environmental law, see also LAVANYA RAJAMANI, Differential Treatment in International 
Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2006); and in international trade law, JESSEN, WTO-
Recht und "Entwicklungsländer". 
947 CULLET, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law, 16. 
948 Moreover, the EU has made differentiation a general principle, which prima facie does not gear 
towards a particular group of countries or situations at all. However, more concrete, differential 
provisions in the EU’s legal framework for development cooperation often target LDCs, to which the 
majority of fragile states belong. See supra note 598.  
 251 
On the one hand, the fact that none of the organizations I analyzed attaches 
particular importance to the classification of fragile states as a trigger for differential 
treatment reflects that the notion is generally considered too broad and reductionist to 
be of operational value.949 Most organizations prefer an approach that is tailored to 
specific situations or circumstances, and hence more fine-tuned, not to mention 
politically correct. On the other hand, the limited role of the fragile states 
classification indicates that many of the changes that development organizations have 
made to their legal and policy frameworks are perhaps inspired by, or addressed to 
challenges associated primarily with fragile states – but they are also very much 
linked to broader trends in the law of development cooperation, which are not limited 
to fragile states.  
One such broader trend that also constitutes a pattern in how development 
organizations adapt their legal and policy frameworks for fragile states is the move 
towards greater flexibility in regulating the transfer of ODA. Flexibility is 
increasingly valued as essential in steering processes of development cooperation in 
immensely different countries and circumstances. Importantly, it is not the antithesis 
of regulation. Flexibility rather refers to the possibility of adapting rules not only in 
line with a country’s capacity, but also, for instance, changing circumstances over 
time. In that sense, flexibility is an objective that can be achieved through the specific 
design of regulation. Further, though flexibility can still result in differentiation, it is 
prima facie not aimed at differentiation. To the contrary, flexibility (for all) may 
eventually replace differentiation (for a few) in the law of development 
cooperation.950  What I observe, however, is that international organizations deem 
rules that provide for flexibility in the sense of adaptability to be particularly suitable 
for regulating development cooperation in the context of political volatility and 
quickly evolving needs, and thus in fragile states.  
The techniques for inducing flexibility into substantive and procedural rules vary, 
and to what extent they involve modifying the existing legal and policy framework 
naturally depends on how much flexibility it leaves in the first place. For example, we 
have seen that the EU’s legal framework is less rigid when it comes to pre-approval 
                                                        
949 On this point, see also supra chapter IV.2 b). 
950 With regard to differential treatment in the field of environmental law where it is most common, 
Rajamani already makes out a trend whereby more flexible rules for all countries are increasingly 
preferred over differentiated obligations for specific groups of countries. LAVANYA RAJAMANI, 'The 
Changing Fortunes of Differential Treatment in the Evolution of International Environmental Law', 88 
International Affairs, 605 (2012).  
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requirements. Still, the organization has introduced various provisions that facilitate 
the adjustment of ongoing projects and programs in response to “crisis, post-crisis, or 
situations of fragility”, and the allocation of resources to unforeseen needs. 951 
Flexibility is also a guiding principle in regulating the World Bank’s new exceptional 
allocation regime for countries facing “turnaround-situations”. 952  Eligibility and 
actual amounts of additional financing can thus be adapted in line with changing 
circumstances and needs. The AfDB, too, has reformed the eligibility criteria of the 
Fragile States Facility to allow for more flexibility in addressing extremely 
heterogeneous and evolving situations of fragility.953 
At the World Bank, the move towards greater flexibility in the regulation of 
development cooperation also surfaces in the growing debate about the advantages of 
principles-based over strictly rules-based approaches. 954  This debate shows that 
flexibility goes beyond specific provisions that establish in what regard, and to what 
extent normal processes and procedures can be deviated from. Flexibility can also be 
built into the form of regulation, e.g. detailed and precise rules versus broad principles 
that leave room for discretion. For instance, while the Bank’s project lending is 
traditionally quite strictly regulated and contains a number of requirements for 
recipients to meet, the Program-for-Results financing instrument created in 2012 
deliberately focuses on a less prescriptive and more condensed version of social and 
environmental standards.955 The AfDB and ADB have already reformed the entire 
system of safeguard policies, moving to a principles-based approach that can more 
easily be adapted to the different constraints and capacity-building needs of each 
country.956 Further, the ADB’s Emergency Policy broadly establishes that standard 
policies and procedures should “be liberally interpreted to ensure speedy and effective 
rehabilitation”. 957  In this case, flexibility stems from a guideline concerning the 
(liberal) interpretation of rules, rather than from the formulation of the rules. 
                                                        
951 Supra chapter V.2 d).  
952 On the World Bank’s regime for allocating additional resources to countries facing “turn-around” 
situations, see supra chapter IV.2 b). 
953 Supra chapter V.1 b). 
954 See LEROY, 'The Bank's Engagement in the Criminal Justice Sector and the Role of Lawyers in the 
"Solutions Bank": An Essay'; and supra chapter IV.1 b). 
955 Supra chapter IV.4 c). 
956 In detail, see DANN & VON BERNSTORFF, 'Reforming the World Bank’s Safeguards. A Comparative 
Legal Analysis', pp. 17-24 on the use of a “principled and outcome-based approach”, together with a 
greater use of country systems and capacity support. 
957 Supra note 828. See also ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Operational Plan for Enhancing ADB's 
Effectiveness in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations', para. 18, on the importance of flexibility in 
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These patterns of differentiation and flexibility concern mostly the adaptation 
strategies of international development organizations (e.g. lowering, postponing, or 
waiving certain requirements) for fragile states that have insufficient capacity to fulfill 
them. But states with very weak or no effective government may equally lack the 
capacity to assume rights and responsibilities in the development process. We have 
seen that international development organization usually require national 
governments to have the capacity to express consent, to sign international agreements, 
and further to assume a decisive role in planning and implementing development 
projects and programs. 958 Rules that protect the sovereignty, and more specifically, 
ownership of recipient countries are contained in the legal and policy frameworks of 
all development organizations.959 Formally, they apply to all countries equally. Are 
there patterns in how development organizations have sought to engage with countries 
deemed incapable of exercising sovereign rights or assuming ownership? 
At the general policy-level, the OECD Fragile States Principles, the New Deal, 
and the fragile states strategies of various organizations reiterate that national 
ownership is essential for supporting development in fragile states.960 If anything, it 
appears even more important that governments not only buy in, but take the lead in 
decision-making where development cooperation concerns intrinsically political 
processes of state formation. From a more operational perspective, too, working 
through state institutions is considered crucial if the objective is to enhance the state’s 
capacity to provide basic services, and eventually its legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population.961  
There appears to be a certain shift in thinking about ownership in fragile states, 
however, a shift that is to some extent reflected in the legal and policy frameworks of 
                                                                                                                                                              
project processing and implementation in fragile states. 
958 See supra chapter II.2 a) on the state-centric paradigm of development cooperation and its premises. 
959 See supra chapter III.2, elaborating how the principle of sovereignty is reflected in the law of 
international development organizations. 
960 See the Fragile States Principles (supra note 144) and the New Deal (supra note 338), promoting 
“country-led and country-owned” development. Also: AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Addressing 
Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa: The African Development Bank Group Strategy 2014–
2019', para. 3.6; or ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Achieving Development Effectiveness in Weakly 
Performing Countries. The Asian Development Bank’s Approach to Engaging with Weakly Performing 
Countries', para. 61. 
961 The relationship between a state’s performance in providing basic services to the population and its 
legitimacy is, however, not necessarily linear. See CLAIRE MCLOUGHLIN, 'When Does Service Delivery 
Improve the Legitimacy of a Fragile or Conflict-Affected State?', Forthcoming in Governance (2014). 
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development organizations.962 It might be too much to speak of a pattern, but there are 
several examples where we have seen development organizations temporarily 
substitute or bypass national governments that lack the minimum capacity required to 
exercise certain rights, or assume full ownership of the development process.  
For instance, international development organizations have sought to deliver aid 
directly to, or through non-state actors instead of the government in fragile states, and 
have been prepared to circumvent applicable restrictions if needed.963 The AfDB, can 
through the Fragile States Facility channel resources directly to non-state actors 
without any government involvement required, an option that is not available for 
regular resources and aid instruments.964 AfDB’s Fragile States Strategy recommends 
support to non-sovereigns for situations where effective government has broken down, 
but also where there is no legitimate or consenting government counterpart.965 The 
World Bank has modified OP 10.00 to allow projects to be implemented through 
international organizations, national entities other than the government, or the Bank 
where the government’s capacity is insufficient. 966  Notably, such alternative 
arrangements must be limited in time, and accompanied with capacity-building 
measures so as to allow the transfer of responsibilities to the government as soon as 
possible. Permitting to bypass the state in the short-term, while safeguarding national 
ownership in the long-term, OP 10.00 thus exemplifies how the objective of state-
building becomes a regulatory theme.967 The EU, in turn, is generally committed to 
                                                        
962 On the modified understanding of ownership in fragile states, see, for instance, ASIAN 
DEVELOPMENT BANK, 'Achieving Development Effectiveness in Weakly Performing Countries. The 
Asian Development Bank’s Approach to Engaging with Weakly Performing Countries ', paras. 31, 34, 
and 41, expressing the idea that fragile states may lack the necessary capacity to assume full ownership, 
and that achieving government ownership in the longer term may require working more closely with 
sub-sovereign entities, NGOs, or the private sector in the short term. Also EUROPEAN COMMISSION & 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, 'European Report on Development. Overcoming Fragility in Africa. 
Forging a New European Approach', 4. 
963 Notably, though sought as a substitution strategy in the context of fragile states, enhancing the 
participation of actors outside of the government in processes of development cooperation is generally 
not a new trend, nor one confined to contexts where governments are exceptionally weak or 
nonexistent. See, for instance, DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis 
of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, 107-108, describing how demands for broader participation 
of the affected and other non-state parties in the development process already emerged in the 1970s. 
964 Supra chapter V.1 a). 
965 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND, 'Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States', 2.  
966 Supra chapter IV.4 a). Besides, the World Bank’s SPF can be used to channel special resources 
directly to non-state actors, and in principle without involving the government. However, activities 
financed through the SPF with no government involvement are usually of a small scale only, and often 
pertain to analytical work. See supra note 766. 
967 In general, the World Bank remains attuned to dealing with states through their governments, and 
understands the political prohibition clause to circumscribe the limits of dealing with non-state actors. 
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(broad) participation in its legal framework, and has a number of aid instruments to 
provide direct support to non state-actors. 968  Whereas such support generally 
complements the EU’s engagement with national governments, the organization has 
also established a financial instrument precisely to render assistance to non-state 
actors and local authorities where there is no effective government – or no 
government it agrees with.969  
Arguably, development cooperation thus come closer to the modi operandi of 
humanitarian assistance, which is mostly implemented through international 
organizations and NGOs, often in by-passing state institutions and delivering aid to 
the population directly.970 At least in the long run, such implementation strategies 
may undermine the overall objective of state-building, by strengthening non-state 
actors at the expense of the central government. 
Development organizations have not only looked for alternative ways to channel 
resources and implement projects in fragile states. Perhaps more interesting from an 
international law perspective, they have also sought alternative ways to authorize their 
engagement. The World Bank’s Operational Policy 2.30 is certainly the most striking, 
though not necessarily representative example. The internal rule formulates how the 
Bank can engage in the absence of a government capable of expressing consent, 
namely, by relying on a request of the international community.971 We have found 
similar provisions in the Emergency Policies of the ADB and the AfDB, however, 
whereby emergency assistance can be provided upon request of an internationally 
legitimate authority (ADB), or a UN appeal (AfDB).972  The Cotonou Agreement 
between the EU and ACP states, in turn, allows the transfer of aid to countries with no 
                                                                                                                                                              
The Bank’s cautious approach is outlined in the Guidance Note on Multi-Stakeholder Engagement 
(supra note 275). 
968 See supra chapter V.2 a) on the principle of participation in the EU’s legal framework for 
development cooperation; and supra chapter V.2 c) on the EU’s Thematic Programme on “Non-State 
actors and local authorities in development cooperation” and other instruments for providing support to 
non-state actors, e.g. humanitarian assistance. 
969 For the EU with its political mandate, it is thus not always a government’s capacity, but also its 
perceived legitimacy or political will to cooperate that determine to what extent the EU will turn to 
non-state actors instead. See, for instance, the Commission’s Agenda for Change (supra note 390), 
establishing that non-sovereign support should be scaled up where national governments do not adhere 
to the EU’s political standards. 
970 I unfold this argument in VON ENGELHARDT, 'Reflections on the Role of the State in the Legal 
Regimes of International Aid'. 
971 In detail, see supra chapter IV.3 a). In the absence of a formal government in power, the World 
Bank has also entered into legal agreements with entities other than the government, e.g. UNTAET in 
East Timor and UNMIK in Kosovo. 
972 Supra chapter V.1 a). 
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effective government, and hence no government official able to act as National 
Authorizing Officer and approve and manage resources allocated.973 Arguably, the 
respective provisions reflect the spirit of the emerging legal concept of the 
responsibility to protect, or for that matter, the responsibility to rebuild.974 To provide 
assistance to a population in need where the government is unable to do so, 
organizations like the World Bank and the EU are prepared to dispense with the 
requirement of state consent.975 
The protection of sovereignty and ownership may have always been more of an 
ideal than a practiced reality in the interaction of donor organizations with recipient 
states. 976  The described arrangements, however, are established in the legal 
frameworks of development organizations – in more or less formalized, internal rules, 
and in the case of the Cotonou Agreement, an international legal treaty. This is not to 
say that there is a complementarity regime in the law of development cooperation, 
whereby certain roles and responsibilities of recipient states would automatically 
move to international organizations or other implementing agencies if the state lacked 
sufficient capacity. 977  Under exceptional circumstances, however, international 
development organization can use the described provisions to de facto limit the 
                                                        
973 Supra chapter V.2 c). Notably, this arrangement is explicitly restricted in time “for as long as the 
circumstances justified”, a qualification that again serves to safeguard the long-term objective of state-
building. 
974 On the concept of responsibility to protect, see supra note 202; and on its application as a normative 
framework to justify the provision of humanitarian assistance without government consent, see 
REBECCA BARBER, 'The Responsibility to Protect the Survivors of Natural Disaster: Cyclone Nargis, a 
Case Study', 14 Journal of Conflict & Security Law, 3 (2009). The responsibility to rebuild forms part 
of the concept, and refers specifically to the responsibility of international actors to assist in post-
conflict reconstruction following an intervention. On the international community’s responsibility to 
rebuild institutional structures and social cohesion in fragile states, see LADWIG & RUDOLF, 
'International Legal and Moral Standards of Good Governance in Fragile States'.  
975 Notably, this sort of justification suffers similar shortcomings as the concept of responsibility to 
protect – for instance, who decides, and on the basis of what criteria, whether a government has a 
particular level of capacity or willingness. See also infra section 2 of this chapter.  
976 See, for instance, DAVID WILLIAMS, 'Aid and Sovereignty: Quasi-states and the International 
Financial Institutions', 26 Review of International Studies, 557 (2000); or LINDSAY WHITFIELD & 
ALASTAIR FRASER, 'Introduction: Aid an Sovereignty', in Lindsay Whitfield (ed) The Politics of Aid. 
African Strategies for Dealing with Donors (Oxford University Press, 2009); and in the context of 
conflict-affected and fragile states, e.g. BOON, '"Open for Business": International Financial Institutions, 
Post-Conflict Economic Reform, and the Rule of Law'; or CINDY DAASE, 'Liberia’s Governance and 
Economic Management Assistance Programme – A New Model of Shared Sovereignty?', 71 Zeitschrift 
für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 493 (2011). 
977 Some international legal regimes operate on the basis of a principle of complementarity, whereby 
certain responsibilities of the state can pass on to the international level if the state is “unable or 
unwilling” to fulfill them. See supra chapter I.3 b). The described provisions in the law of development 
organizations, however, remain the exception and incomprehensive.  
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sovereignty or ownership of recipients based on the perceived degree of government 
capacity.  
In sum, the law of development cooperation has not necessarily become less 
state-centric. Quite the contrary, the emergence of state-building as a development 
paradigm and regulatory theme entails that the project of statehood, and with it the 
formal commitment to sovereignty and national ownership, remain central. Yet the 
growing engagement of international development organizations with fragile states 
has highlighted a peculiar paradox – development cooperation is premised on the 
existence of ‘effective government’, and simultaneously concerned with strengthening 
government effectiveness. 978  Development organizations have therefore sought to 
adapt the premises and the rules on which they operate.  
A more complex and delicate question in dealing with fragile states remains how 
to deal with governments that are unable or unwilling to authorize, lead, and “own” 
processes of development policy-making and implementation. The emerging response 
of development organizations has regularly involved substituting, at least temporarily, 
for roles and responsibilities traditionally accorded to recipient governments. 
Arguably, ownership thus turns into an objective of development cooperation, which 
to achieve requires certain adjustments in the short term. 
Finally, although we have seen certain patterns emerge, it is important to note that 
the regulatory approach of international development organizations to fragile states is 
overall not very systematic, and only partly formalized. Some challenges that 
development organizations (in remarkable unanimity) associate with engaging in 
fragile states have been addressed much more systematically through legal and policy 
reforms than others. For instance, all organizations have simplified procedural 
requirements to facilitate more rapid engagement. In contrast, the majority of 
questions that concern how development organizations engage in the absence of 
effective government counterparts have not been subject to comprehensive regulation. 
Moreover, the same issue has sometimes been addressed by one organization through 
the formal adoption or modification of rules, and by another through the use of less 
formal rule-making processes, or on an ad hoc basis.979  
                                                        
978 On this paradox, see supra chapter II.2 a). 
979 For instance, all MDBs have prepared guidelines for dealing with de facto governments, but each 
has therefore chosen a different form. See supra chapter V.2 a). 
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The resulting impression of a regulatory piecemeal approach and halfway 
formalization is partly owed to the fact that the processes analyzed are still very much 
ongoing. It can also be intentional. Either way, it raises the question as to the value of 
(more) regulation in guiding a differentiated approach to dealing with fragile states.  
 
2. Potentials and Perils of Regulating Development Cooperation with 
Fragile States 
 
To engage differently with fragile states, international development organizations 
have increasingly modified rules that govern how development cooperation is 
normally planned, managed, and implemented. Evaluating the developmental effects 
of such adaptations – e.g. their potential to make development cooperation with 
fragile states more effective or sustainable – exceeds the scope and means of this 
thesis.980 Nor can I provide a clear answer to the fundamental question whether fragile 
states indeed constitute a challenge of a different kind, one that warrants a specifically 
tailored response. 981  On the one hand, the comparatively poor track record of 
development cooperation in weak-capacity and politically unstable environments in 
the past speaks for the need to reconsider unrealistic premises, and to develop more 
adequate approaches and aid instruments. On the other hand, the concern with fragile 
states rests on a vastly ambiguous concept, which fails to capture the immense 
diversity of causes, symptoms, and consequences of instability and underdevelopment 
in these countries.  
International legal scholars are, however, well-placed to explore the potentials 
and perils of regulating a differentiated approach towards fragile states – a question 
that is also of great relevance for development practitioners. By regulating, I mean 
that international development organization specifically adopt new rules or modify 
existing rules of their legal frameworks to guide their engagement with fragile 
                                                        
980 First of all, it would require an assessment of whether and how development organizations apply 
and implement the relevant rules in practice. For this we would need empirical information that not 
even the organizations themselves necessarily have – and if so, information may still be considered 
confidential. On the continuing debate about the desirability and feasibility of development operations 
focusing on state-building in fragile states, see the references in supra note 931. 
981 More than one decade after fragile states started becoming a key concern for the international 
development community, this question remains relevant and controversial. See, for instance, 
WOOLCOCK, 'Engaging with Fragile and Conflict-affected States. An Alternative Approach to Theory, 
Measurement and Practice'; CHANDY, 'Ten Years of Fragile States. What Have We Learned?'; or 
BERTOLI & TICCI, 'A Fragile Guideline to Development Assistance'; and with a more positive 
perspective on the results of differentiated approaches in fragile states, HELLMAN, Surprising Results 
from Fragile States. 
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states. 982  A look at the internal reform and rule-making activities of various 
organizations is enough to show that there is demand for guidance in dealing with 
fragile states, including more formalized guidance. Yet the analysis of the World 
Bank, AfDB, ADB, and EU, has also revealed a number of potentials and perils 
involved where international organizations adopt or modify rules that govern the 
transfer of ODA to fragile states. 
In exploring the value of regulating a differentiated approach to fragile states, we 
need to distinguish two aspects. The two aspects are closely linked, but entail 
different sorts of arguments. On the one hand, a number of arguments speak for or 
against adapting existing rules to the context of fragile states. International 
development organizations already operate on the basis of rules, which are contained 
in their statues and secondary rules. Broadly speaking, do these existing rules require 
adaptation vis-à-vis fragile states? On the other hand, even after accepting the premise 
that fragile states require a differentiated approach, a number of arguments can be 
made for and against development organizations adopting regulation to specify how 
they deal with fragile states. While the first aspect thus concerns the tension between 
adaptation and stability as an inherent characteristic and value of law given its 
counterfactual nature, the second aspect essentially concerns the pros and cons of 
using rules to control and govern conduct. The decision to adapt existing rules usually 
implies that the organization favors a more formalized response in dealing with 
fragile states. Yet particularly for organizations with a legal framework that prima 
facie poses fewer barriers to engaging with fragile states, the question remains 
whether or not to adopt specific rules to guide and constrain operations in fragile 
states.  
a) Potentials  
 
On this basis, the lawyer and optimist starts with the potentials of adapting 
existing rules to state fragility, and using regulation to consolidate a differentiated 
approach. There is much to be said about law’s counterfactual nature, and that of the 
                                                        
982 On the law of development cooperation and the legal nature of the rules that govern the conduct of 
international development organizations in particular, see supra chapter III.1. Accordingly, I focus here 
on rules that are contained either in the statute and thus international legal norms, or in secondary rules, 
including internal rules that are relatively formalized and considered binding on the organizations’ staff 
(as opposed to non-binding rules that belong to their policy framework). In the case of the EU, rules 
that govern the conduct of development cooperation are contained not only in EU primary and 
secondary law, but also in an international legal treaty, the Cotonou Agreement.  
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principle of sovereign equality in particular.983 To some extent, however, law needs to 
take into account differing and changing circumstances, 984  Development 
organizations that operate on the basis of rules that presume all recipient governments 
have the same, basic capacity to fulfill an array of requirements may find that these 
requirements pose an excessive burden on the already weak capacities and limited 
resources of fragile states, or simply cannot be met. 985  Adapting particularly 
demanding requirements to account for the different implementation capacity of 
fragile states is thus a matter of equity and fairness, central ideas of the concept of 
differential treatment.986 According to David Bradlow, development organizations are 
even required by the legal principle of non-discrimination to apply the same rules “in 
a way that is responsive to similarities and differences in the situation of each member 
state”, and “those who are differently situated should receive different treatment that 
reflects the differences in their situation”.987 
At the same time, adapting rules to empirical differences between recipient 
countries can increase the effectiveness of rules, i.e. their ability to achieve regulatory 
objectives. For example, where countries simply lack the capacity to meet fiduciary, 
environmental, or social standards that are regularly preconditions for aid, they may 
not receive ODA – but the respective standards are also not implemented, and hence 
remain ineffective. Accordingly, better tailoring particularly those rules that create 
obligations for recipient countries to the different capacity of state institutions can 
ultimately enhance compliance, in particular if complemented with targeted technical 
assistance and capacity-building to strengthen implementation.988 To some extent, this 
model is already reflected in the World Bank’s new Program-for-Results Financing 
                                                        
983 On the crucial role of the formal protection of sovereign equality, particularly in an environment 
like development cooperation that is characterized by material inequality and structural power 
discrepancies, see already supra p. 13 and chapter I.3 b). 
984 For a general discussion of the challenge of ensuring international law’s flexibility in light of 
evolving societal preferences or realities, see, for instance, FEICHTNER, The Law and Politics of the 
WTO Waiver. Stability and Flexibility in Public International Law, Part I, Chapter 2; and on the 
stability versus change debate in the law of treaties, BINDER, 'Stability and Change in Times of 
Fragmentation: The Limits of Pacta Sunt Servanda Revisited'. 
985 On this point, see also the references in supra note 208. 
986 On the concept of differential treatment, see supra section 1 of this chapter, and the references in 
supra note 946. 
987 BRADLOW, 'The Reform of Governance of the IFIs: A Critical Assessment', at 47. The use of 
differential treatment for LDCs, and increasingly for conflict-affected countries, in the EU’s legal 
framework for development cooperation provides an example. See supra chapter V.2 d). 
988 In this context, see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, The New Sovereignty. 
Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press, 1998) on the 
“managerial” (as opposed to “enforcement”) model of treaty compliance. 
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instrument, and the AfDB’s and the ADB’s reformed system of environmental and 
social safeguards.989 
A further argument concerns the need for law to take into account changing 
circumstances over time. Particularly the statutes of the MDBs often date back to the 
early years of development cooperation post-World War II, and contain rules that are 
not suitable for guiding the activities of development organizations in a global 
political environment that has substantially evolved since then. Certainly, it is highly 
doubtful whether state fragility itself is a new phenomenon, and thus a product of 
changing circumstances.990 Some of the circumstances that are commonly associated 
with fragile states may well constitute (and always constituted) the normal state of 
affairs in many countries. What has clearly changed, however, is how international 
development organizations conceive and address underdevelopment and inequality in 
countries with weak institutions, poor governance, and political instability. With the 
evolving understanding of what ‘development’ entails, organizations have taken on an 
expanding range of activities related to building or strengthening state capacities in 
areas well beyond economic affairs. 991  If the legal frameworks of international 
development organizations do not sufficiently reflect this evolving role, their ability 
to guide and constrain relevant activities is accordingly diminished.  
For example, the World Bank has prepared an internal rule and the General 
Counsel a legal opinion to clarify the boundaries of the Bank’s mandate in the context 
of post-conflict and humanitarian assistance.992 The organization has thus sought to 
provide a framework for the Bank’s expanding role, which neither the AfDB, nor the 
ADB has done.993 The example of the World Bank also illustrates that adapting rules 
of the legal framework to changing circumstances does not necessarily require a 
formal amendment of the statute, a process that is often cumbersome.994  A more 
common tool is interpretation, and of particular importance in the practice of 
                                                        
989 See supra chapter IV.4 c) on the World Bank’ s PfoR financing instrument, and on the integrated 
safeguards systems of the AfDB and ADB, supra note 956. 
990 See supra chapter I.2, where I argue that the growing concern with fragile states in the international 
community is equally the product of changing circumstances, and changing perceptions. 
991 On the evolving understanding of development and the consequences for the mandate and activities 
of development organizations, see already supra chapter III.2. 
992 See supra chapter IV.1 b), and for a detailed analysis of the relevant internal rule, OP 2.30, chapter 
IV.3 a). 
993 Available guidance is scattered throughout several, mostly non-binding rules. For an overview, see 
supra chapter II.3 b). 
994 Supra note 535. 
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development organizations, the adoption of internal rules.995 What form of adaptation 
is the most appropriate depends on each case, though in some cases, formal 
amendments can still be preferable over an often excessive use of interpretation, 
particularly informal, implied interpretations.996 In principle, however, an argument 
can be made that adapting rules is preferable over an excessive use of exceptions 
where differing or changing circumstances lead to structural problems for which 
existing rules are systematically inadequate.997  
This brings us to the second aspect and set of arguments, which concern the 
advantages of international organizations using regulation, rather than more ad hoc 
approaches, to instruct development cooperation with fragile states. Rules – if they 
are appropriate and relevant – quite simply provide guidance. They provide guidance 
through establishing limits, but also in the more positive sense of steering conduct, e.g. 
specifying how and by whom a certain issue or situation is supposed to be addressed. 
International organizations have an interest themselves in the internal rationalization 
of decision-making processes.998 Oftentimes, they adopt rules to regulate processes 
and procedures to be followed, and define the roles and responsibilities of different 
actors. Particularly where such guidance is stipulated in rules that are at least partly 
formalized and considered binding, it comes with the promise of enhancing clarity, 
transparency, consistency, and accountability in decision-making concerning fragile 
states.999  
First, regulation provides ex ante clarity. Considering that international 
development organizations are often huge bureaucracies with more or less 
decentralized structures, clarity and legal certainty can be essential to reducing 
                                                        
995 I elaborate the role of internal rules in adapting the legal frameworks of development organizations 
in supra chapter III.1, and with specific regard to the World Bank, in chapter IV.1 b). In contrast to the 
MDBs, the legal framework governing the EU’s development cooperation is mostly set out in more 
recent, legal sources and not just the founding treaties. It is thus easier to adapt to changing 
circumstances than those of the MDBs. See supra chapter V.2.a). 
996 See supra chapter IV.3 c), where I argue that World Bank engagement at the request of the 
international community would have required an amendment of the Articles of Agreement, rather than 
an internal rule in combination with an implied interpretation of the Executive Directors.  
997 FEICHTNER, The Law and Politics of the WTO Waiver. Stability and Flexibility in Public 
International Law, 325. 
998 See VON BERNSTORFF, 'Procedures of Decision-Making and the Role of Law in International 
Organizations', 797. 
999 In this section, I focus on rules that form part of the legal framework of international development 
organizations, in contrast to the non-binding rules that form part of their policy frameworks (on this 
distinction, see the Introduction). As noted before, however, non-binding rules can also be effective at 
steering behavior, and enhance the clarity, transparency, and consistency of decision-making processes. 
See supra chapter III.1. 
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transaction costs.1000 For example, a rule that establishes clearly in what situation and 
to what extent environmental and social standards can be postponed for fragile states 
reduces transaction costs that result from uncertainty, e.g. in terms of staff time that is 
lost going through a difficult debate about the appropriate response. Lower 
transaction costs also enable a speedier and more efficient response, which is 
particularly crucial in addressing time-sensitive needs in conflict-affected and fragile 
states. 
Second, regulation enhances transparency by laying open the decision-making 
criteria, processes, and responsibilities to those involved and those affected by 
decision-making, or the interested public at large. With the publication of guidelines 
that regulate dealings with de facto governments, for instance, the World Bank, AfDB, 
and ADB, have disclosed who, on the basis of what criteria, decides whether 
cooperation continues with a government that came to power by unconstitutional 
means.1001 Besides, published rules that provide transparency regarding an expected 
behavior constitute a condition for basically any form of review or broader public 
scrutiny. 
Particularly were rules are linked to enforcement and review mechanisms, they 
also lead to more consistent decision-making – a third, inherent promise of regulation. 
More consistent decision-making procedures and outcomes result in greater 
predictability, which again reduces transaction costs. Further, consistent decision-
making is a matter of fairness, reduces the risk of discrimination, and increases 
legitimacy. For example, if the AfDB provides additional resources to certain 
countries outside of its performance-based system of resource allocation, the 
stipulation of clear eligibility criteria leads to more consistent decisions, which are 
more likely to be perceived as equitable by all member countries.1002 In contrast, 
                                                        
1000 See, for instance, LEROY, 'The Bank's Engagement in the Criminal Justice Sector and the Role of 
Lawyers in the "Solutions Bank": An Essay'; SIA SPILIOPOULOU AKERMARK, 'Soft Law and 
International Financial Institutions – Issues of Hard and Soft Law from a Lawyer’s Perspective', in 
Ulrika Mörth (ed) Soft Law in Governance and Regulation. An Interdisciplinary Analysis (Edward 
Elgar, 2004), pp. 68-70; from the perspective of organization theories, GÖHRAN AHRNE & NILS 
BRUNSSON, 'Soft Regulation from an Organizational Perspective'in ibid.; or ROBERT WADE, 'Greening 
the Bank: The Struggle over the Environment, 1970-1995', in Devesh Kapur, et al. (eds), The World 
Bank. Its First Half Century. Volume 2: Perspectives (Brookings Institution, 1997), 729, stating “the 
larger the organization, the greater the need for rules.” 
1001 See supra chapter IV.3 b) (World Bank) and chapter V.1 a) (AfDB and ADB). However, I show 
later in this section why the de facto government guidelines constitute a rather imperfect example of 
transparency. 
1002 On the AfDB’s Fragile States Facility, see supra chapter V.1 b). 
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inconsistent decision-making, whether real or apparent, eventually weakens the 
legitimacy of an organization.1003 
Fourth, rules that are linked to mechanisms of review are not only more likely to 
result in more consistent decision-making, but also greater accountability of decision-
makers. The MDBs, for instance, have established quasi-judicial review mechanisms 
that can investigate staff compliance with binding, internal rules. 1004  Such 
mechanisms are of particular relevance given that the avenues to hold international 
development organizations to account for their actions are in general very limited.1005 
In addition to these attributes, a further potential of regulation lays in the process 
whereby rules are made. In principle, rule-making can be understood as a deliberative 
process, whereby international development organizations need to reflect, to consider 
and balance different view and arguments, and ultimately to take an informed 
decision. In that sense, the adoption of rules to regulate different aspects of engaging 
with fragile states can prima facie enhance the rationality as well as legitimacy of 
subsequent decision-making. Obviously, this is more likely to be the case where the 
process of formulating and adopting regulation follows a transparent and formalized 
process, in which at least the affected, if not all interested stakeholders can participate. 
The World Bank’s internal rule-making process, for example, has become gradually 
more public and participatory, even if the relevant administrative procedures are yet 
codified.1006  
 
                                                        
1003 See, for instance, HUNTER, 'International Law and Public Participation in Policy-making at the 
International Financial Institutions', 211-212, on procedural fairness as a source of legitimacy. 
1004 See supra chapter IV.1 a) on the World Bank’s Inspection Panel and other mechanisms to review 
compliance with OPs/BPs; and on the potential of (internal) rule-making in opening up avenues for 
judicial or quasi-judicial review and enhancing accountability, BRADLOW & NAUDÉ FOURIE, 'The 
Operational Policies of the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation. Creating Law-
Making and Law-Governed Institutions?'; or HUNTER, 'International Law and Public Participation in 
Policy-making at the International Financial Institutions', 236. 
1005 On the still rudimentary and often insufficient mechanisms of accountability in the law of 
development cooperation, see DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis 
of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, chapter 9 (pp. 452-460 on the World Bank and pp. 460-471 
on the EU); and infra section 3 of this chapter. 
1006 In detail, see HUNTER, 'International Law and Public Participation in Policy-making at the 
International Financial Institutions'. For example, Operational Policy 9.00 adopted in 2012 to regulate 
the Bank’s PfoR Financing is the result of extensive internal deliberations, as well as broad 
consultations with governments, parliamentarians, international partners and civil-society organizations. 
See THE WORLD BANK, 'A New Instrument to Advance Development Effectiveness: Program-for-
Results Financing ', paras. 2-4. Needless to say that resulting from multilateral treaty negotiations 
between the EU and the ACP states or formal amendments, the rules of the Cotonou Agreement are per 
se more legitimate, in the sense of being directly based on state consent. 
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b) Perils  
 
A number of fundamental concerns, however, need to be considered before 
adapting existing rules to reflect empirical circumstances. Such concerns are 
particularly serious when considering the stakes of the debate: the sovereign equality 
of all states, which development organizations are bound to respect.1007 Moreover, the 
emerging practice of different development organizations provides a number of 
reasons that speak against the use of regulation, as opposed to more ad hoc 
approaches in dealing with fragile states.  
To start, a more cautious perspective leads to the question whether the adaptation 
of existing rules always serves to accommodate differing circumstances or needs of 
fragile states. One obvious alternative are wider political motivations. The capacity of 
state institutions is generally not easy to measure.1008 Many fragile states may appear 
weak with regards to some state functions, but rather strong with regards to others. 
Even acknowledging that the capacity of state institutions in fragile states is typically 
weak, it is not necessarily weaker than that of other LDCs, nor are the needs of fragile 
states necessarily different. Against this background, what is presented as differential 
treatment to account for the disadvantaged position of fragile states may as well 
unduly disadvantage other recipient states.1009 When development organizations lower 
or postpone established environmental, social, or other standards for fragile states, for 
instance, it might also be to facilitate engagement in countries that are of particular 
interest to the organization or its donors. This suspicion arises where the respective 
rules leave it essentially to the discretion of political organs of the organization to 
decide what countries are subject to differentiated treatment.1010 Besides, the apparent 
preoccupation with the weak capacity of fragile states has rarely led development 
organizations to adopt specific measures that ensure weaker countries enjoy a 
meaningful level of procedural participation in structures of decision-making. 
                                                        
1007 See supra note 25; and on the protection of sovereignty in the legal frameworks of international 
development organizations in particular, supra chapter III.2. 
1008 See supra chapter II.1 on different attempts to measure state fragility, and chapter IV.2 b) on the 
shortcomings of the World Bank’s CPIA-based measurement and classification of fragile states. For 
instance, development organizations tend to assess the capacity of formal institutions at the level of the 
central state, and thus ignore that informal institutions and non-state actors may be very effective at 
providing basic services. 
1009 See also supra chapter IV.4 d), where I discuss the use of differential treatment by the World Bank 
against the background of a principle of equal treatment of all member states. 
1010 For example, the World Bank’s regulatory framework for budget assistance allows certain social, 
environmental, and fiduciary considerations to simply be sidelined if there is not “sufficient time or 
country capacity” to address them. See supra chapter IV.4 b). 
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A cautious perspective is also needed when considering the adaptation of existing 
rules, particularly the statutes of international development organizations, to changing 
circumstances over time. Evidently, if rules are always adapted in line with the 
expanding activities of an organization in practice, they become oblivious. The 
stability and continuity of established rules in light of changing circumstances, 
however, should not be easily discarded. The global political environment in which 
international development organizations operate has certainly changed considerably 
since the end of the Cold War, and again since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001. Yet there is also a certain tendency to define everything as new development 
challenge, and hence justify an expanding array of activities in response.1011 At least 
to some extent, the growing concern of development organizations with fragile states 
– and consequently with a range of activities from justice and security sector reforms 
to strengthening state-society relations – reflects this pattern. While there is not 
always a bright-line test to answer what activities still correspond to an organization’s 
original objectives and purposes, the mandates of international development 
organizations are still the most potent means in setting limits to the phenomenon of 
mission creep.1012 The political prohibition clause of the World Bank and other MDBs, 
for instance, might appear anachronistic. Yet, it still constitutes the most important 
protection of member states’ sovereignty, while it helps to focus the organizations’ 
limited resources on core competences.1013 
Next to these broader concerns and arguments pertaining to the adaptation of 
existing rules vis-à-vis fragile states, we can question the specific value of regulation 
to guide development cooperation with fragile states, as opposed to more ad hoc 
approaches. The central argument against regulation in general is that it reduces 
flexibility. Whether rules establish limits or otherwise guide conduct, regulation 
prima facie reduces the room for decisions to be tailored to the specific circumstances 
of each case. We have seen that fragile states are characterized by extremely 
heterogeneous conditions, however, which are hardly amenable to one-size-fits-all 
                                                        
1011 Koskenniemi refers to this tendency as the “politics of re-definition”. See KOSKENNIEMI, 'The 
Politics of International Law - 20 Years Later', 10; and supra chapter I.1. 
1012 On mission creep, see supra note 472. 
1013 With a detailed discussion of the pros and cons of maintaining the political prohibition clause, 
CISSÉ, 'Should the Political Prohibition in Charters of International Financial Institutions be Revisited? 
The Case of the World Bank'. 
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approaches.1014 Moreover, the value of regulation is reduced considering that fragile 
states are commonly associated with volatile circumstances and quickly evolving 
needs.1015  It is thus extremely difficult for rule-makers to design rules and regulations 
that are adequate not only for a large variety of countries and situations, but also to 
anticipate all kinds of future scenarios and challenges. 
Further, to what extent regulation in fact enhances the clarity, transparency, 
consistency, and accountability of international organizations’ decision-making varies 
greatly. Rules that are formulated in broad terms or leave considerable discretion to 
decision-makers – though perhaps desirable in terms of flexibility – provide little ex 
ante clarity. For instance, the internal rules that the World Bank and the AfDB have 
adopted to regulate dealings with de facto governments require staff to assess whether 
a government exercises “effective control”, a test that is difficult for staff to apply in 
practice. 1016  The EU has made “differentiation” a fundamental principle of 
cooperation with ACP and non-ACP countries, but to what extent concrete rules can 
be tailored to the different circumstances of recipient countries is often not clear.1017 
Transparency, in turn, certainly increases where the rules that inform decision-
making criteria, process, and competences are published. Yet we have seen that the 
actual process whereby rules are applied and decisions made all too often remains 
obscure.1018 Again, the example of the World Bank’s de facto governments policy is 
instructive. Though the decision-making criteria are stated n the policy, staff 
assessments and weighting of different criteria take place behind closed doors, the 
transcripts not being publically available. This lack of transparency and accordingly 
public scrutiny can also be seen to hamper processes of institutional learning, as 
                                                        
1014 On the extreme heterogeneity of fragile states that appears to inhibit any form of uniform definition, 
let alone policy response, see supra chapter I.2 b), and the discussion pertaining to the World Bank in 
supra chapter IV.2 b). 
1015 E.g. MARC, et al., Societal Dynamics and Fragility.  Engaging Societies in Responsing to Fragile 
Situations, 147-148, arguing that fragile and conflict-affected countries require “more flexible 
approaches, judgment calls, no rigid, risk-averse planning and sequencing, since institutional change is 
no linear process”; or WOOLCOCK, 'Engaging with Fragile and Conflict-affected States. An Alternative 
Approach to Theory, Measurement and Practice'. 
1016 See supra chapter IV.3 b) and c) for an analysis of the World Bank’s OP 7.30 on “Dealings with 
De facto Governments”. 
1017 Supra chapter V.2 d). 
1018 See the evaluation of the World Bank’s internal rules concerning fragile states in supra chapter 
IV.3 c) and 4. d). Also BRADLOW & NAUDÉ FOURIE, 'The Operational Policies of the World Bank and 
the International Finance Corporation. Creating Law-Making and Law-Governed Institutions?', 27; and 
criticizing the information disclosure policy of the World Bank and the ADB from a human rights 
perspective, SANAE FUJITA, The World Bank, Asian Development Bank and Human Rights. Developing 
Standards of Transparency, Participation and Accountability (Edward Elgar, 2013), 85ff.  
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Nesbitt points out, reducing “the guidance that precedents can provide when new and 
difficult situations arise.”1019  
Knowledge about precedents could also help to make decision-making processes 
more consistent – for consistency, too, does not necessarily follow from the existence 
of rules per se, but from their application in practice. On the one hand, the potential of 
rules to enhance the consistency of decision-making outcomes depends on their 
ability to trigger compliance, which is generally more likely if they are linked to 
enforcement and accountability mechanisms. With regards to the World Bank and 
other MDBs, as well as the EU, this is only partly the case, as available mechanisms 
are usually not geared towards allowing recipient states to call for a compliance 
review, or challenge specific operational decisions.1020  
On the other hand, rules lead to more consistent decisions when they provide 
clear guidance, and to more consistent decision-making processes in the sense of 
procedural regularity if they formulate procedural requirements. Rules that are 
vaguely formulated, without providing decision-making criteria or regulating the 
decision-making process can thus still result in arbitrary decision-making. For 
example, the provision in Operational Policy 2.30 that permits the World Bank to 
engage outside the territories of member states if deemed “for the benefit of members” 
is so subjective that it does little to prevent decision-making to be perceived as 
arbitrary. 1021  Notably, we have seen that organizations do not always aspire to 
consistency. The Art. 96 procedures of the Cotonou Agreement leave it deliberately 
open for the EU Commission to decide when to trigger sanctions against a country, 
and it is no secret that the decision is guided by political considerations.1022 
Finally, processes of rule-making might entail deliberations and potentially 
enhance the rationality of subsequent decision-making, but to what extent they do 
                                                        
1019 NESBITT, 'The World Bank and De Facto Governments. A Call for Transparency in the Bank's 
Operational Policy', 646. 
1020 See DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the 
EU and Germany, 459, arguing that the World Bank is prominently accountable to its richer member 
states through various mechanisms, but member states that depend on the Bank’s loans and grants are 
in a weak position to challenge its decisions and hold the organization accountable. The EU presents an 
entirely different case, in that it is generally subject to much more formal forms of judicial review. The 
means for recipients of EU aid to hold the organization accountable are, however, minor compared to 
those of EU member states. In detail, see ibid., at 462 and 471. 
1021 The same can be said for another provision in OP 2.30, which states that the World Bank can 
engage at the “requests from the international community, as properly represented” in countries with 
no government in power. For a detailed analysis of OP 2.30, see supra Chapter IV.3 a) and c). 
1022 Supra chapter V.2 b) on Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, which regulates the use of sanctions 
in response to alleged violations of human rights, democratic principles, or the rule of law. Notably, the 
decisions of the EU Commission are nonetheless public.  
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once again varies greatly. As illustrated before, a large part of the rule-making 
processes of international (development) organizations are in fact internal, allowing 
for little or no participation of those potentially affected, not even member states.1023 
Internal rules in particular often emerge from relatively informal processes, and are 
subject to few legal constraints. Through such internal rule-making, often in 
combination with informal or implied interpretations, regulation can perhaps be 
adopted (or adapted) more easily, but it does not necessarily add to the broader 
legitimacy of subsequent decision-making.  
The World Bank’s Operational Policy 2.30 is a striking example. Apparently 
based on an interpretation that is not, however, publically available, the World Bank 
has therein adopted a provision establishing that in the absence of a government in 
power, a request from the international community could replace an official 
government request. 1024  Besides the question whether the provision would have 
required a formal amendment of the Articles of Agreement, the rule-making process 
clearly lacked transparency and participation.1025 In turn, looking at the rule-making 
processes of the EU, we see two extremes. Whereas rules that govern development 
cooperation with ACP countries result from formal multilateral treaty negotiations, 
cooperation with all other countries is governed by a set of EU Regulations – which 
were certainly adopted in a formalized process, but still without the participation of 
recipient countries.1026  
Ultimately, understanding the perils of formalizing a differentiated approach to 
fragile states requires a look at the rule-making actors. At the outset, international 
organizations already suffer from weak democratic legitimacy and accountability.1027 
                                                        
1023 See supra chapter III.1, and concerning the World Bank’s internal rule-making and use of implied 
interpretations, chapter IV.1 a).  
1024 Supra chapter IV.3 a) and c). 
1025 The World Bank’s process of internal rule-making has perhaps become more open and 
participatory in recent years (see supra note 526). However, the administrative practice of holding 
broad consultations when preparing an OP/BP has not yet been codified, and accordingly, not always 
applied. 
1026 See supra chapter V.2 a) on the EU’s dual legal framework for development cooperation and the 
different legal nature of its rules. In the law of EU development cooperation, there is thus a 
characteristic interaction between formal multilateralism and more unilateral modes of rule-making. 
1027 On the accountability of international organizations, a topic that is widely researched and subject of 
an ongoing discourse, see, for instance, AUGUST REINISCH, 'Securing the Accountability of 
International Organizations', 7 Global Governance, 131 (2001); ROBERT O. KEOHANE, 'Global 
Governance and Democratic Accountability', in David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds), 
Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance (Polity Press, 2003); the Report INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ASSOCIATION, 'Final Report on the Accountability of International Organizations' (2004); and the 
according analysis by IGE F. DEKKER, 'Making Sense of Accountability in International Institutional 
Law. An Analysis of the Final Report of the ILA Committee on Accountability of International 
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Yet, international development organizations are in a position to wield considerable 
power vis-à-vis recipient states that are structurally dependent on aid. 1028  
Development organizations also wield power in making or adapting rules that set the 
terms upon which fragile states receive ODA – activities that constitute a “significant 
form of governance”.1029 Not least to make this exercise of public power less arbitrary, 
I conclude with some recommendations concerning the rule- and decision-making 
processes of international development organizations. 
 
3. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
In this chapter, I synthesized and discussed the key findings of how, and to what 
effect, the World Bank, the AfDB, the ADB, and the EU have adapted their legal and 
policy frameworks vis-à-vis fragile states. All organizations have introduced more 
differentiation and greater flexibility in the rules that govern the transfer of ODA, 
responding to the capacity constraints and volatile circumstances they associate with 
fragile states. To deal with situations where there is no government capable to 
authorize and implement development projects or programs, all organizations have 
developed substitutional arrangements that to some extent qualify the requirements of 
state consent and protections of ownership, at last in the short term. Accordingly, I 
argued that the central objective of state-building in fragile states also informs the 
adaptation of development organizations’ legal and policy frameworks – namely, 
adjusting rules to reflect the limited capacity of state institutions in the short term, 
while remaining committed to strengthening state capacity in the long term. 
Acknowledging that the identified patterns are not very systematic and only partly 
formalized, I examined the value of international development organizations using 
(more) regulation to guide their dealings with fragile states. I considered arguments 
                                                                                                                                                              
Organizations from a Conceptual Legal Perspective', 36 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 
83 (2007); as well as the references to GAL (supra note 442), IPA (supra note 444), and other 
approaches (supra note 441) concerned with the governance activities of international organizations in 
supra chapter III.1 
1028 On the legitimacy problem of development cooperation in general and with regards to rule-making 
processes in particular, see DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of 
the World Bank, the EU and Germany, pp. 510-513; and with proposals to enhance the accountability 
of international development organizations, see, for instance, MAC DARROW & AMPARO TOMAS, 
'Power, Capture, and Conflict. A Call for Human Rights Accountability in Development Cooperation', 
27 Human Rights Quarterly, 471 (2005); KAREN HUDES & SABINE SCHLEMMER-SCHULTE, 
'Accountability in Bretton Woods', 15 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, 501 (2008-
2009); and BRADLOW & HUNTER (eds), International Financial Institutions and International Law. 
1029 Supra note 44. 
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for and against adapting existing rules to differing or changing circumstances – and 
more generally, for and against using formal rules to guide the conduct of 
international organizations.  
Ultimately, the practice of the World Bank, the AfDB, the ADB, and the EU 
provides ample evidence of both, the potentials and the perils of using regulation to 
instruct and formalize a differentiated approach to fragile states. Whether we want 
more or less regulation is thus difficult to say in general. The answer depends on the 
content and design of the relevant rules, and as illustrated, on the process whereby 
rules are made. 
Legal scholars have an inherent bias towards law, which I cannot defy. Based on 
the preceding analysis, there are a number of instances where regulation in fact 
appears desirable in terms of more clarity, transparency, and consistency. Rules can 
guide decision-makers in how to adapt overly unrealistic and stringent ex ante 
requirements when engaging in countries with weak capacities, without 
compromising environmental, social, or fiduciary standards altogether. Rules can 
assist staff in balancing short-term substitution with long-term capacity-building 
support, responding to time-sensitive needs without violating the principle of 
sovereignty or abandoning the idea of national ownership. Rules could also require 
international development organizations to engage more systematically with local 
stakeholders particularly in countries with no effective government, an area that is 
currently subject to little regulation, if any.1030 Such rules do not need to hinge on a 
clear definition or classification of “fragile states”, an ambiguous notion of little 
analytical or operational value. Moreover, rules that inform the conduct of 
development organizations do not have to be overly prescriptive concerning the 
outcome of decision-making – and can still be useful in creating an analytical and 
procedural framework for informed decision-making, and in determining who decides, 
and can be held accountable.  
If there is prima facie reason to believe in the potential of regulation to make 
development cooperation with fragile states more transparent, consistent, and 
ultimately principled, however, it is not without conditions. Not least with regards to 
                                                        
1030 On this point, see also SAUL, 'From Haiti to Somalia: The Assistance Model and the Paradox of 
State Reconstruction in International Law', criticizing the sole reliance of external actors on state 
consent to legitimize interventions in states with barely effective governments. Saul finds that “there is 
an inherent need for flexibility in relation to who is given a voice”, and “[a]t present, this flexibility 
appears largely unregulated by international law.” (147).  
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the ambiguity and sometimes questionable agenda behind the notion of fragile states, 
it is of utmost importance that regulation used to instruct and formalize a 
differentiated approach is not a mere façade for political, or rather politicized 
decision-making. This requires, first of all, that rules be formulated in a way that 
provides a minimum level of clarity and predictability both to decision-makers within 
development organizations, and to countries affected by their decisions. Certainly, 
broadly formulated rules or principles are sometimes preferable over narrow rules, 
because they leave decision-makers the necessary discretion to address individual 
cases. However, discretionary powers can still be counterbalanced with procedural 
requirements that aim to ensure the transparency and rationality of decision-making – 
and similar requirements can be formulated with regards to the process whereby rules 
are made or modified in the first place..1031  
In making concrete proposals to enhance the rule- and decision-making processes 
of international development organizations, we can draw on emerging legal 
approaches to governance activities of international organizations. 1032  From the 
perspective of the GAL approach, how development organizations make or modify 
rules to engage with fragile states constitutes a form of regulatory administration.1033 
As such, it should adhere to administrative law principles that are familiar from 
domestic legal orders, 1034  but also increasingly expressed in the legal and policy 
frameworks of international organizations – e.g. standards of transparency, reason-
                                                        
1031 After all, processes of rule-making essentially constitute processes of decision-making. See VON 
BERNSTORFF, 'Procedures of Decision-Making and the Role of Law in International Organizations', pp. 
792, 795, distinguishing between rule-making decisions and operational decisions of international 
organizations, with the latter being those “taken in order to implement rules adopted in plenary or in 
the framework of explicitly or implicitly delegated tasks and mandates.”  
1032 For an overview of legal approaches that have grappled with global governance phenomena, 
including activities of international organizations that reach beyond traditional sources of public 
international law, see supra chapter III.1. I focus here on the GAL approach, since it has a particularly 
problem-oriented approach, while focusing mostly on enhancing procedures of decision-making. Other 
proposals are more concerned with the international rule of law and internal constitutionalization of 
international organizations at large. See, for instance, SIMON CHESTERMAN, 'An International Rule of 
Law?', 56 American Journal of Comparative Law, 331 (2008); ARMIN VON BOGDANDY, 'The European 
Lesson for International Democracy: The Significance of Articles 9-12 EU Treaty for International 
Organizations', 23 European Journal of International Law, 315 (2012); and on proposals to make 
international organizations strictly adhere to human rights standards, VON BERNSTORFF, 'Procedures of 
Decision-Making and the Role of Law in International Organizations'. 
1033 Supra note 442.  
1034 KINGSBURY, et al., 'The Emergence of Global Administrative Law', 37-51; ESTY, 'Good 
Governance at the Supranational Scale. Globalizing Administrative Law'; or BRADLOW, 'The Reform 
of Governance of the IFIs: A Critical Assessment', 49-50, summarizing similar requirements 
concerning the rule- and decision-making of international financial institutions under a “principle of 
good administrative practice”. 
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giving, procedural participation, and review. 1035  Similarly, the report of the 
International Law Association (ILA) on the accountability of international 
organizations suggests that decision-making should respect principles like 
“procedural regularity”, or “objectivity and impartiality”.1036  
What would this mean, for example, for the World Bank’s regulatory activity 
concerning fragile states? Many of the analyzed Operational Policies were formulated 
in relatively broad terms, with few objective decision-making criteria or procedural 
requirements. To reduce the risk of Bank staff abusing the accorded discretionary 
powers, staff could be required to provide written justifications for their decisions, 
which need to be published and available to the public. To some extent, this has 
actually been put in place, e.g. where staff prepare an eligibility note outlining the 
reasons for extending additional financing to countries in “turn-around” situations.1037 
There is little reason for not applying this approach more broadly. Moreover, the 
World Bank’s Access to Information Policy adopted in 2010 recognizes the 
fundamental importance of transparency and accountability in decision-making. 
Nevertheless, the Bank is still not required to disclose certain “deliberative 
information”, an exception that the organization has too often used to keep decision-
making that concerns the application of OPs/BPs secret.1038 
In some contexts, for example when Bank staff decide about continuing 
operations with a de facto government, affected governments could be granted the 
possibility to have their views considered prior to the decision being taken, or to 
challenge a decision once taken. So far, particularly recipient countries have very few 
avenues to request a review of the application of internal rules, let alone to demand 
accountability for wrongful decisions. 1039  A legal basis for demanding more 
                                                        
1035 KINGSBURY, 'Global Administrative Law in the Institutional Practice of Global Regulatory 
Governance', at 9; or VON BERNSTORFF, 'Procedures of Decision-Making and the Role of Law in 
International Organizations', 797-798, showing how international organizations already relay on 
procedural requirements imported from a domestic rule of law tradition. With regards to the World 
Bank as well as the EU, see also DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative 
Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, chapter 4; and concerning principles of participation 
in particular, HUNTER, 'International Law and Public Participation in Policy-making at the International 
Financial Institutions'. 
1036 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, 'Final Report on the Accountability of International 
Organizations', 14.  
1037 See supra note 591. 
1038 World Bank Access to Information Policy (supra note 520), paras. 6 and 16.  
1039 See supra note 1020, also noting that recipient countries are unlikely to use the available avenues if 
they rely on World Bank financing. With its focus on the infringement of beneficiary rights, a quasi-
judicial review of staff compliance with OPs/BPs through the Inspection Panel is of limited importance 
concerning the effects of the Bank’s decision-making on specific member states. See supra note 522. 
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consistent decision-making could come from the political prohibition clause in the 
Articles of Agreement. The clause requires the Bank to be impartial in its 
considerations, and this should also concern the application of internal rules to 
different countries.1040 It is also important to note, however, that the analyzed rules 
concerning fragile states often grant the ultimate decision-making authority to the 
Executive Board, not the Bank’s staff. Accordingly, the problem is not necessarily 
that staff members take inconsistent decisions, but that the Executive Board makes 
decisions that appear to be influenced by the political and strategic interests of its 
major shareholders, which hold the majority of votes.1041 
Concerning the process of making OPs/BPs, the World Bank has increasingly 
published drafts of its internal rules and invited affected or interested parties to 
comment on them. In practice, the process has thus become more transparent and 
participatory already. To grant potentially affected member states, groups, or 
individuals a formal right to procedural participation, however, and guarantee 
minimum procedural benchmarks, the World Bank should codify this process.1042 In 
adapting existing rules of the legal framework, in turn, the organization should 
reconsider the appropriate use of implied interpretations, an informal practice of 
interpretation that is “certainly not a model of transparency”, as Hassane Cissé 
confirms.1043 
Considering such proposals to enhance the design of rules and processes of rule-
and decision-making within international development organizations, regulation 
seems to indeed have the potential of making dealings with fragile states more 
transparent, consistent, and not necessarily less flexible.1044 At the same time, the 
                                                        
1040 Supra note 558. The requirement to ensure the impartial application of internal rules could be 
translated into certain procedural requirements, e.g. of procedural regularity, due diligence, etc. 
1041 On the system of weighted voting, see supra chapter IV.1 a). 
1042 See also HUNTER, 'International Law and Public Participation in Policy-making at the International 
Financial Institutions', 235-237; and BRADLOW & NAUDÉ FOURIE, 'The Operational Policies of the 
World Bank and the International Finance Corporation. Creating Law-Making and Law-Governed 
Institutions?', 59. Notably, at the time of writing, the Bank was in a process of reforming its system of 
internal rules, which could also entail the codification of the rule-making process. Supra note 525. 
1043 CISSÉ, 'Should the Political Prohibition in Charters of International Financial Institutions be 
Revisited? The Case of the World Bank', 86, further pointing out that since through interpretation 
rather than formal amendment, “small shareholders stand to be deprived of ‘protection of their interests 
guaranteed by high majority required for formal amendment.’” 
1044 Obviously, more concrete proposals concerning the design of rules, procedural requirements for 
decision-making, or the rule-making process, can only be formulated with regards to specific 
organizations and the issues they face. As a matter of principle, it should be noted that administrative 
decision-making with effects that are in fact predominantly internal should be subject to different 
requirements – e.g. in terms of effectiveness and efficiency – than decision-making with clearly 
external effects, where standards like participation and review are more important. On the dualistic 
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measures I discussed could help reduce some of the identified perils. Namely, that 
regulation entrenches a form of discrimination on the basis of a government’s 
perceived effectiveness, or becomes a mere façade for political decision-making.  
Finally, avoiding that regulation becomes a mere façade also requires an 
acknowledgment of the limits of regulation. Not all of the questions that development 
organizations encounter when seeking to engage in fragile states can be resolved on 
the basis of clear rules. Where regulation is nonetheless sought, decision-makers need 
to be open about the often inherently political nature of the questions faced when 
dealing with fragile states – e.g. concerning the recognition of governments or the 
identification of non-state actors to engage with – rather than making that the political 
nature could be neutralized using regulation. This is true for even the most technical 
international development organizations, which are not value-neutral and do respond 
to political and other agendas defined by their member states.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
character of administrative law, see CHRISTIAN TIETJE, 'Comment on the Contributions by Jochen von 
Bernstorff and by Maja Smrkolj', in Armin von Bogdandy, et al. (eds), The Exercise of Public 
Authority by International Institutions (Springer, 2010), 817-818. 
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Conclusion 
 
Of the 1.5 billion people living in fragile countries, many may not feel like living 
in a state at all. International law, however, upholds the legal status of states even if 
the government is barely able to exercise effective authority, and provide basic 
services to its people. The reasons for maintaining this fictional façade are compelling. 
Yet it leads to a number of problems in the practice of international cooperation, 
where international organizations, for instance, expect governments to assume quite 
substantial roles and responsibilities. For the citizens of fragile states, the lack of a de 
jure and de facto ‘effective government’ can ultimately impede their ability to receive 
international financial and technical assistance.  
Since I started writing this thesis, some countries managed to transition out of 
fragility, while others have joined the list of fragile states.1045 Considered as relatively 
stable up to 2011, Libya threatens to disintegrate.1046 Similarly, Syria’s civil war has 
brought the country close to becoming “another Somalia” and destabilizes the entire 
region.1047 The world’s youngest state South Sudan has descended into civil war two 
years after independence – not least because development organizations have failed to 
adequately acknowledge and address deep-seated problems of political 
reconciliation.1048 And, despite vast amounts of ODA, Afghanistan’s future remains 
uncertain as Ashraf Ghani takes over the Presidency.1049  
                                                        
1045 Countries and territories that were on the World Bank’s list of fragile states (supra note 1) in 2012, 
but no longer in 2015, are: Angola, Republic of Congo, Georgia, Guinea, Nepal, Timor-Leste, and 
Western Sahara. Countries that were not on the 2012 list, but appear on the 2015 list, are: Libya, 
Madagascar, Mali, Syria and Tuvalu. 
1046 E.g. JON LEE ANDERSON, 'Can Libya be Saved?', in The New Yorker (August 7, 2013); or HISHAM 
MATAR, 'The killing of Abdelsalam al-Mismari, and the triumph of fear in Libya', in The Guardian 
(July 30, 2013) a Libyan author stating that “Under Gaddafi we were afraid of the state; now its 
weakness imperils all we have achieved”.  
1047 ANONYMOUS, Ex UN envoy predicts Syria will be 'failed state', BBC News (June 8, 2014), at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27754732 
1048 See MARK TRAN, 'South Sudan failed by misjudgment of international community, says UN chief', 
in The Guardian (January 22, 2014); and SARA PANTULIANO, Donor-Driven Technical Fixes Failed 
South Sudan: It’s Time to Get Political, December 9, 2014 (Think Africa Press), at 
http://thinkafricapress.com/south-sudan/donor-driven-technical-fixes-failed-time-put-politics-heart-
nation-building-project-kiir-machar-garang. Notably, South Sudan was a test case for new and 
differentiated approaches to development cooperation with fragile states: three months prior to 
descending into civil war, the country was in the process of developing a New Deal Compact. On the 
New Deal, see supra chapter II.3 a). 
1049 President Ghani is also co-author of the book “Fixing Failed States” (supra note 124). On the 
results of over a decade of international state-building efforts in Afghanistan, leaving the country with 
political instability, a fragile economy, and highly dependent on foreign aid, see, for instance, 
JONATHAN STEELE, 'The West's Legacy in Afghanistan: So Much for so Little', in The Guardian 
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Against this background, I do not naively suggest that the manifold challenges of 
aiding fragile states lend itself to an easy or perfect solution, nor that adapting the 
legal and policy frameworks of international organizations is all that it takes. I do, 
however, suggest that the legal response of international organizations can and should 
be analyzed in more detail – and that such an analysis can ultimately guide proposals 
to make their dealings with fragile states more transparent and less arbitrary. 
In this thesis, I have shown that fragile states are perhaps a factual phenomenon 
beyond law, but how international development organizations have addressed the 
challenges of engaging with fragile states is of legal significance. I have developed an 
approach for legal scholars to engage with the phenomenon of fragile states, which 
requires scrutinizing what position fragile states are accorded by other legal subjects, 
considering formal and informal legal instruments. Focusing on development 
cooperation, I have analyzed how, and to what effect various international 
organizations have adopted or modified rules of their legal and policy frameworks to 
engage with fragile states, identified emerging patterns, and discussed the potentials 
and perils of formalizing a differentiated approach to fragile states.  
In this conclusion, I summarize my key findings (1.), discuss their broader 
relevance, and identify questions for further research (2.). 
 
1. Summary of Key Findings 
 
Fragile states are a phenomenon characterized by the discrepancy between the 
formal legal status, and the weak factual capacity of state institutions. From an 
empirical-sociological perspective, it is neither new, nor surprising that different 
countries have more or less effective governments, or governance. Why a group of 
countries with weak institutional capacity and poor governance suddenly received so 
much attention from the international community is a multifaceted question – and the 
notion of fragile states must be understood both as an empirical phenomenon, as well 
as a construct of Western political and academic discourse. From a legal perspective, 
in turn, variations in a government’s effectiveness, whether real or apparent, retreat 
behind the legal status of the state and principle of sovereign equality. Fragile states 
are thus deliberately no legal concept, and – to paraphrase Koskenniemi – the 
                                                                                                                                                              
(January 15, 2014); or INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, Asia Report No 210, 'Aid and Conflict in 
Afghanistan' (August 4, 2011). 
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wonderfully artificial doctrine of juridical statehood also explains why international 
legal scholars have mostly neglected the discourse on state fragility.1050 
Acknowledging the analytical and normative shortcomings of the notion, as well 
as the difficulties of describing state fragility in terms of legal doctrine, legal scholars 
should nonetheless pay more attention to its consequences. International law rests on 
the formal premise that all states have ‘effective government’, and are in principle 
capable of exercising rights and obligations under international law. States that lack 
the actual capacity to perform even most basic functions accordingly pose a 
fundamental problem to the functioning and effectiveness of the international legal 
order. How this problem comes up and how it is addressed in the practice of 
international cooperation are thus questions of great relevance. 
A fruitful field for analysis is development cooperation, where the characteristic 
discrepancy between formal legal status, and weak factual capacity of state 
institutions has often complicated, delayed, and even prevented international 
organizations from engaging in countries with the most urgent needs. Development 
cooperation traditionally follows a state-centric paradigm, and international 
development organizations are in fact required by their legal and policy frameworks 
to deal with recipient states through the national government. National governments 
are expected to have the capacity to express consent, negotiate and ratify agreements, 
and to fulfill a number of requirements in the development process. The state-centric 
paradigm of development cooperation thus leads to a peculiar paradox. Development 
organizations operate on the premise that all states have effective governments, de 
jure and de facto, while they are naturally concerned with strengthening government 
effectiveness in developing countries.  
In response to the ensuing challenges of engaging with countries that have very 
weak or no government, development organizations have begun to revisit the basic 
premises and rules on which they operate. A preliminary overview of the policy-
making, standard-setting, and operational reform activities of a range of international 
development organizations suffices to show that they forge a common understanding 
and approach to fragile states. 
To grasp the legal significance and consequences of such activities, it is important 
to understand that how international development organizations transfer ODA to 
                                                        
1050 Supra note 11. 
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recipient states is generally governed by rules and procedures. The relevant rules are 
mostly contained in the legal and policy frameworks of international organizations – 
statutes, and more or less formalized, secondary rules – which guide how 
organizations negotiate, plan, and implement development projects in collaboration 
with the governments of recipient countries. Particularly internal, secondary rules are 
potent instruments in steering the conduct of development organizations, and 
regularly assume external effects for recipient countries through formulating the terms 
and conditions, including procedural rights, for the transfer of ODA. All organizations 
engaged in development cooperation are normally bound by the objective of fostering 
development, mostly procedural standards of effectiveness, and importantly, the 
protection of recipient sovereignty and ownership.  
How, and to what effect, have development organizations adapted their legal and 
policy frameworks to engage with fragile states? The analysis of the World Bank, my 
central case study, shows that over the last two decades, the organization has used 
interpretation and internal-rule making to become engaged in the contexts of 
humanitarian emergencies, conflict-affected, and fragile states. The Bank has adopted 
internal rules stating that in the absence of a government to express consent, the 
organization can engage upon requests of the international community instead; and in 
non-member countries or territories, it can engage if deemed beneficial for the 
membership as a whole. Both are situations that bring the World Bank exceedingly 
close to the limits of the political prohibition clause, but which are allegedly 
“consistent with the Bank’s will to act as a good and responsible international 
citizen.”1051 In addition, acknowledging that the requirements set out in conventional 
policies and procedures for project lending and budget assistance can be overly 
demanding for fragile states, the organization has modified the relevant internal rules 
to permit differential treatment of governments that currently lack the capacity to 
comply.  
Overall, the World Bank has shown a preference for consolidating and 
formalizing a differentiated approach to fragile states, wherein the official 
classification of fragile states that the Bank conducts on the basis of the CPIA 
assumes only a minor role. Yet, I also find that the World Bank’s response to the 
challenges of engaging with fragile states remains far from systematic. It often relies 
                                                        
1051 Supra note 685. 
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on rules that are formulated in ambiguous terms and leave considerable discretion to 
decision-makers – staff, or the Executive Directors. Whether the Bank seeks to 
systematically adapt to the special circumstances and needs of fragile states, or rather 
to evade certain mandate constraints to engage in countries that are of particular 
concern to its major shareholders, is not always clear.  
A more nuanced picture of how international development organizations adapt 
rules to engage with fragile states comes from comparing the regulatory approach of 
the World Bank with that of the AfDB, ADB, and EU. With similar legal frameworks 
and mandates, the AfDB and the ADB prima facie face similar constraints as the 
World Bank when seeking to engage in countries with weak or no government. Like 
the World Bank, both regional development banks have therefore sought ways of 
providing assistance to countries without necessarily involving the government, and 
of making sure that standard policies and procedures do not impede flexible and 
speedy operations in countries with weak capacity. Important nuances nevertheless 
emerge when considering to what extent and how AfDB and ADB have modified 
rules of their legal framework, or preferred a more ad hoc response. With the 
establishment of the Fragile States Facility, for instance, the AfDB has created a quasi 
self-contained, differentiated regime that comprehensively governs the use of special 
resources for operations in fragile states. In contrast, the ADB has mostly refrained 
from formalizing specific exceptions for fragile or conflict-affected states in its legal 
framework, and rather waived existing requirements if necessary. 
The EU, in turn, faces somewhat different constraints when seeking to engage 
with fragile states. This is mostly owed to its broader, political mandate, and the fact 
that differentiation (based on country circumstances or needs) and participation (of 
non-state actors) already constitute fundamental principles of the legal framework for 
EU development cooperation. Perhaps surprisingly, I nonetheless find that how, and 
particularly to what effect the EU has adapted its legal and policy framework to 
engage in countries with no or very weak government shows notable parallels with 
the MDBs’ approach. This concerns the use of differential treatment, but also the 
introduction of provisions that permit bypassing national governments if deemed 
ineffective – or illegitimate, as measured by the EU’s political standards.   
The comparison of the World Bank with two similar and one very different 
organization provides a basis for reflecting on the factors that account for the 
similarities and differences in their respective approach to fragile states. Apart from 
 281 
the question what constraints the existing legal framework poses in the first place, 
other factors – particular conceptions of state fragility, institutional culture, 
membership structure, and the interests of influential member states – equally shape 
to what extent and how international organizations decide to adapt their legal and 
policy frameworks.  
Further, the comparison provides a basis for identifying broader patterns in how 
different development organizations have responded to the challenges of engaging 
with fragile states through legal and policy reforms. I find that state-building, i.e. 
establishing, reforming, or strengthening state institutions, gains in importance as a 
central paradigm and objective of development cooperation in fragile states. More 
importantly, state-building also constitutes a regulatory theme, since it captures the 
underlying motive of how development organizations modify their legal and policy 
frameworks to engage with fragile states. In essence, development organizations have 
adapted rules to acknowledge better the capacity constraints of state institutions in the 
short term – while making sure that their capacity is strengthened in the long term. 
Accordingly, all organizations I analyzed have introduced greater differentiation and 
flexibility in the rules that govern the transfer of ODA, and created substitutional 
arrangements that may limit the ownership of national governments. The lowering of 
requirements in the short term is usually combined with implementation assistance 
and capacity-building support to the government, however, and substitutional 
arrangements are limited in time.  
Assessing the potential and perils involved where international development 
organizations formalize a differentiated approach to fragile states through legal and 
policy reforms requires consideration of a number of arguments – arguments that 
speak for and against adapting existing rules, and more generally, for and against 
using rules to regulate the conduct of development organizations. For instance, 
adapting existing rules to take into account the limited capacity of fragile states is a 
matter of equity and fairness, and can enhance the likelihood that the objectives of 
regulation are actually achieved. Yet, it can also mean that fiduciary, environmental, 
and social standards are discarded to facilitate engagement not necessarily in 
countries with the most urgent needs, but in those of particular interest to the donor 
community. Further, the adoption of formal rules to guide an organization’s response 
to situations where no national government can be identified prima facie comes with 
the promise of making operational decision-making more transparent and consistent. 
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Regulation, however, generally reduces flexibility for decisions to be tailored to the 
specific circumstances of each case.   
The current approach of the World Bank, the AfDB, the ADB, and the EU 
provides evidence of both the potentials and perils of regulation – and the value of 
formalizing a differentiated approach naturally depends on the content and design of 
the relevant rules, as well as the rule-making process. A number of measures could 
reduce the likelihood that rules used to formalize a differentiated approach to fragile 
states become a mere façade for political, or rather politicized decision-making. In 
essence, rules must be formulated in a way that provides a minimum level of clarity, 
and discretionary powers should be counterbalanced with procedural requirements 
that ensure the transparency and rationality of decision-making, and allow for review 
and contestation.  
 
2. Broader Relevance and Outlook  
 
The discrepancy between juridical statehood and empirical statehood challenges 
the functioning and effectiveness of the international legal order in general, and poses 
concrete problems to all those that operate on its premises and within its confines. 
International law is built on the assumption that all states have a functioning, effective 
government that can exercise rights and obligations. In all areas of international 
cooperation involving states, the government is the sole entity that can formally 
represent and legally commit the country. And yet our knowledge of how the ensuing 
problems of dealing with states that have no or only very weak governments are 
addressed in the practice of international cooperation is still limited.1052 How do other 
legal subjects engage with governments that exercise no real authority? How are legal 
rules adapted to accommodate the severe limitation of government effectiveness?  
And what are the consequences? As a first step towards addressing such far-reaching 
questions, this thesis examines the practice of international organizations in the field 
of development cooperation. The focus on international development organizations 
makes for a particularly relevant and rewarding analysis, for a number of reasons that 
I outline in the introduction. In the following, I discuss the broader relevance of my 
                                                        
1052 As noted before, some legal scholars have analyzed the consequences of a complete breakdown of 
effective government under international law, but particularly studies concerned with limitations of 
government effectiveness that fall short of a complete breakdown are largely missing. See supra note 9. 
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approach and findings beyond the field of development cooperation, and identify 
questions for further research. 
First of all, the approach of this thesis is as relevant as the question what state 
fragility means for the ability of international organizations to fulfill their objectives 
and functions. Development cooperation is certainly not the only field where 
interactions between international organizations and states, or among states, are based 
on the premise that the states involved have ‘effective government’. Quite the 
contrary, it may appear paradoxical that even an area of international cooperation that 
is largely concerned with enhancing the capacity of state institutions in developing 
countries also hinges on the existence of states with capable institutions in the first 
place.1053 The problems that arise when the ‘effective government’ premise is not met 
become particularly obvious when considering the interaction of international 
organizations with their member states. Member states are not only required to have a 
government with the capacity to represent the country in the organization’s bodies 
and proceedings.1054 They need a government with the factual capacity to exercise the 
rights and obligations that come with membership in the organization, comply with 
legal obligations arising from treaties concluded with the organizations, and fulfill 
other regulatory requirements set by the organization, legally binding or not. This 
holds true even if what level and what types of capacity international organizations 
require from their member states or the states they engage with varies significantly 
from one organization to another.1055 
To what extent dealing with fragile states poses challenges for the mandated 
objectives and ordinary functions of international organizations – or vice versa1056 – 
                                                        
1053 On this paradox, see supra chapter II.2 a). 
1054 Particularly the question who gets to represent a member state in the organization’s bodies and 
proceedings has ben addressed by legal scholars with regards to situations where there is no 
government in power (e.g. GEIß, Failed States. Die normative Erfassung gescheiterter Staaten, pp. 
143-150), or in situations of doubt, e.g. after state succession or unconstitutional changes of 
government (e.g. KONRAD G. BÜHLER, State Succession and Membership in International 
Organizations: Legal Theories Versus Political Pragmatism (Kluwer Law International, 2001).  
1055 Probably the highest level of capacity is required from EU member states to observe and 
implement EU law – and even EU member states may suffer from “systematic deficiencies” 
concerning their ability to guarantee the rule of law. See IOANNIDIS & VON BOGDANDY, 'Systemic 
Deficiency in the Rule of Law: What it is, What has been done, What can be done', examining what the 
widespread and entrenched inability of some member states to guarantee the rule of law, e.g. due to 
endemic corruption, weak institutional capacities, or insufficient resources, means for the EU legal 
order. 
1056 The question could also be asked the other way around: to what extent does dealing with 
international organizations, and meeting the regulatory requirements set by international organizations, 
put a further strain on the scarce capacity and resources of fragile states. See KINGSBURY & DAVIS, 
'Obligation Overload: Adjusting the Obligations of Fragile or Failed States', considering the perverse 
 284 
has, however, barely been addressed systematically in legal scholarship.1057 Nor do 
we know much about how different organizations respond to such challenges, either 
ad hoc or by modifying their legal and policy frameworks. For instance, some 
organizations engaged in humanitarian assistance equally require a formal 
government request to become active (e.g. the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA), whereas others can also provide 
assistance to the population at the request of the UN Secretary General (namely, the 
World Food Programme, WFP).1058 How humanitarian organizations are thus more or 
less attuned to dealing with fragile states is a question of great significance, 
considering that they mostly operate in fragile or conflict-affected states.1059 In turn, 
other international organizations and policy fields are not primarily concerned with 
providing technical and financial assistance to the most needy countries, but have still 
developed legal approaches that could help dealing with the limited institutional and 
administrative capacity of certain countries to exercise rights and obligations. Cases 
                                                                                                                                                              
effects of overly demanding requirements that lead to fragile state governments being unable to give 
priority to things that are truly important for the country. Notably, the authors refer to the accumulated 
effects of (non-pecuniary) obligations imposed not just by one international organization, but by all 
kinds of ‘global governance institutions’. Further, they highlight that affirmative obligations as 
opposed to negative obligations that only require states to abstain from doing something are more 
likely to pose problems for fragile states, just as obligations that come with procedural requirements 
(e.g. reporting) are more burdensome than obligations of result. 
 On the increasing level of regulatory requirements that fall on each state in the international system, 
see also supra chapter I.4.  
1057 The question has perhaps been raised in abstract and concerning situations where no government 
exists, but it has rarely been addressed in detail, e.g. for individual organizations. A notable exception 
is Chiara Giorgetti, who analyzes how some international organizations have sought to respond to 
crisis situations involving governments unable to perform certain obligations – though again with a 
focus mostly on Somalia, i.e. the complete breakdown and absence of government. See GIORGETTI, A 
Principled Approach to State Failure. International Community Actions in Emergency Situations, in 
particular chapters 5, 6 and 7. The question what level of actual capacity is required from states to 
participate in the UN was discussed at the organizations in the 1960s and 1970s, when a number of 
small-island states (“mini-states”) with very limited human and economic resources were seeking 
membership. See MICHAEL GUNTER, 'The Problem of Ministate Membership in the United Nations 
System: Recent Attempts Towards a Solution', 12 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 464 (1973).  
1058 See GIORGETTI, A Principled Approach to State Failure. International Community Actions in 
Emergency Situations, pp. 157-158, referring to the Guiding Principle 3 and 4 of the UN General 
Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991, which established OCHA (UN Doc. 
A/RES/46/182); and Article XI of the General Regulations, the legal framework of the WFP. In 
addition, based on Article X (2), bilateral donors, UN agencies, and NGOs “may request WFP services 
for operations which are consistent with the purposes of WFP”. On the differences between 
humanitarian and development aid concerning the role of the state, see also supra note 886 
1059 As I note in supra chapter II.3 a), with fragile states constituting environments where humanitarian, 
development, and security actors operate alongside each other, the Fragile States Principles can be seen 
as a synthesis approach between humanitarian principles (e.g. do no harm), and principles of 
development cooperation (e.g. focus on building the state’s long-term capacity). For an interesting 
reflection on the challenges that state fragility poses, for instance, to the international refugee regime, 
see also ALEXANDER BETTS, 'State Fragility, Refugee Status and ‘Survival Migration’', 43 Forced 
Migration Review, 4 (May 2013). 
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in point are the WTO and the WTO agreements, wherein a number of provisions 
accord developing countries special and differential treatment.1060 
Even if it turns out that international organizations have nowhere sought such a 
comprehensive response to the challenges of engaging with fragile states as in the 
field of development cooperation, their response could serve as a model for other 
organizations.1061 Particularly organizations that also engage with fragile states on a 
regular basis, also need governments to have the legal capacity to conclude 
agreements and the factual capacity to fulfill a number of regulatory requirements – 
and importantly, also have an interest in engaging with states where these conditions 
are not met – may face similar challenges as development organizations, and consider 
a similar response. The regulatory approaches and techniques I identify provide a 
reference point: for instance, using differentiated and more flexible requirements, 
shifting from ex ante requirements to ex post controls, or offering implementation 
assistance combined with capacity-building. The practice of development 
organizations also provides negative examples, however, e.g. of rules that leave 
unfettered discretionary powers and make decision-making concerning fragile states 
appear arbitrary and politically selective. Ultimately, formalizing a differentiated 
approach to fragile states always comes with potentials and perils, which should be 
carefully considered and weighed.  
Speaking of the potentials and perils of formalizing a differentiated approach, my 
findings have also greater relevance in corroborating that the internal rule-making 
activities of international organizations still deserve more attention from legal 
scholarship.1062  For many international organizations, internal rules are of crucial 
                                                        
1060 At the WTO, special and differential treatment consists, for instance, in the granting of longer time 
periods for implementation, but also technical assistance to help developing countries build the 
infrastructure to undertake WTO work, handle disputes, and implement technical standards. Special 
attention is accorded to LDCs. On the concept of differential treatment and its use in the WTO and in 
many environmental treaty regimes, see supra note 946; and with further examples of treaty regimes 
that to some extent acknowledge states’ different implementation capacities (e.g. in the area of money-
laundering and anti-corruption), OETER, 'Regieren im 21. Jahrhundert: Staatlichkeit und internationales 
System', 80-81. 
1061 There are a number of reasons why the phenomenon of fragile states has gained so much traction in 
the field of development cooperation, and not all of them have to do with the underlying premises of its 
governing law, which I outline in supra chapter II.2. The high saliency of the topic, for instance, has to 
do with the fact that tackling state fragility is increasingly seen as a global public good (supra note 
257). Moreover, a broad coalition of interest – multilateral donors, bilateral donors, and recipient states 
– apparently supports a comprehensive, systematic, and increasingly formalized response. See, for 
instance, supra note 140, on the advantages for developing countries that may come from being 
labelled as ‘fragile state’. 
1062 See supra chapter III.1 in general, and IV.1 a) on the internal rules of the World Bank. 
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significance in guiding their conduct, and though often developed in relatively 
informal, unilateral processes, can assume significant external effects on the countries 
they engage with. One aspect that deserves particular attention is the relationship 
between more or less formalized, internal rules of international organizations, and 
international law’s traditional sources. 1063  Some internal rules have certainly no 
bearing on international treaty or customary law, even if they have significant internal 
and external effects. Examples are the Operational Policies that regulate the World 
Bank’s financing instruments.1064 Other internal rules, however, are used to codify 
interpretations of the founding treaties or emerging organizational practices, and thus 
affect existing treaty law – for example, the World Bank’s OP 2.30 and 7.30.1065 To 
what extent do the internal rules of international organizations also contribute to the 
further development of international law, in areas that are important, yet under-
developed?1066 Stating that the World Bank or other organizations have contributed to 
the transformation of the legal doctrine of statehood or principle of sovereignty 
appears a bit too far-fetched. Yet, their rule-making concerning fragile states certainly 
reflects the evolving understanding of sovereignty in the 21st century, which manifests 
itself in the internal legal order and practice of the organizations.1067 
The legitimacy concerns raised by these observations reverberate in a growing 
body of legal scholarship concerned with the governance activities of international 
organizations. 1068  In this context, the contribution of this thesis lies in directing 
attention to a particular constellation – international organizations and fragile states. It 
is a constellation worth analyzing further from the perspective of legal approaches 
                                                        
1063 I point attention to the diverging views concerning the relation between internal secondary rules 
and the traditional sources of international law established in Art. 38 ICJ-Statute in the introduction, 
and in supra note 54. 
1064 For a detailed analysis of OP 10.00, OP 8.60, and OP 9.00, see supra chapter IV.4. 
1065 In this context, the World Bank’s practice of using internal rules as a basis for informal, implied 
interpretations appears particularly noteworthy, and problematic.  See supra chapter IV.1 a); and for a 
detailed analysis of OP 2.30 and OP 7.30, supra chapter IV.3.  
1066 BRADLOW & NAUDÉ FOURIE, 'The Operational Policies of the World Bank and the International 
Finance Corporation. Creating Law-Making and Law-Governed Institutions?', 7, arguing that 
institutions can “influence the normative development of international law” when they “are interpreting 
and applying international law in areas that are particularly under-developed with respect to specific 
cases or factual situations”. For further references, see supra note 439. 
1067 See also WEILER, 'Editorial. Differentiated Statehood? 'Pre-States'? Palestine@the UN', 5, 
reminding us that “in the actual praxis of international life, functionally things look interestingly 
different, reminiscent perhaps of the tension between the formal existence of a right and its exercise. 
Statehood, grant me, is not that simple a monolithic concept.” 
1068 See supra chapter III.1, on the contribution of the GAL and IPA approaches to grasping the 
potential effects of a variety of normative outputs of international organizations; and supra chapter 
VI.3 on proposals to address the ensuing legitimacy concerns. 
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that seek to conceptualize and importantly, to confine the governance activities of 
international organizations. This would entail asking more normative questions than 
this thesis does – an important exercise, given that the legal frameworks of many 
organizations provide relatively few, effective constraints on their rule-making 
activities.1069 
At the same time, considering the rules and processes through which international 
organizations engage with fragile states draws attention to a number of conceptual 
and theoretical questions that have yet to be addressed. For instance, how do we 
factor in that the determining effects of a formally non-binding rule on some states 
may be much more substantial than for others, depending on the extent to which states 
are able to resist the rule’s impetus? 1070  Further, how should international 
organizations legitimize their activities when dealing with states that have no 
government, or one with virtually no capacity to maintain public order and represent 
the population internationally?1071  Domestic public authority may appear weak in 
some states, but international organizations are still far from constituting effective and 
legitimate public authorities themselves. 
Finally, I hope that this thesis inspires further research into the empirical 
phenomenon of fragile states from the perspective of international law. We can 
acknowledge the conceptual ambiguity and normative bias of a notion like fragile 
states, and still ask for the role that states with no or only very weak governments are 
accorded by different actors, in different legal regimes. In fact, considering the 
politics invariably involved when it comes to describing and dealing with fragile 
states, this kind of informed but cautious analysis is highly relevant. The fundamental 
problem that state fragility poses to the international legal order will certainly not go 
away. Quite the contrary, it will become more acute with the increasing intensity of 
international cooperation and regulation, with states no longer assuming the sole, but 
                                                        
1069 See supra chapter III.1 and the references in supra note 433. 
1070 See, for instance, RIEGNER, 'Measuring the Good Governance State: A Legal Reconstruction of the 
World Bank’s “Country Policy and Institutional Assessment”', 10, proposing to amend the current 
threshold approach that the IPA approach uses to determine the legal significance of non-binding acts 
(supra note 444), namely to “take into account legally defined situations of structural asymmetries or 
dependencies in which a legally circumscribed category of subjects can be presumed to be particularly 
receptive to authoritative forms of governance”; or DANN, The Law of Development Cooperation. A 
Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, 510. 
1071 Some inspiration for this question can be sought in GOLDMANN, Internationale Öffentliche Gewalt. 
Handlungsformen internationaler Institutionen im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, 573; or LADWIG & 
RUDOLF, 'International Legal and Moral Standards of Good Governance in Fragile States', discussing 
the “metaproblems of legitimacy” in fragile states. 
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still the most important role as law-makers and primary agents of implementation. 
Statehood will continue to matter, as will state fragility. And for international 
organizations to navigate, and ultimately to help reduce the uncomfortable gap 
between legal status and weak government effectiveness, more practical legal 
guidance is needed. 
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